寻找产品市场契合度(product-market fit)的框架 | Todd Jackson(First Round Capital)
A framework for finding product-market fit | Todd Jackson (First Round Capital)
Framework Origins and Value
Todd Jackson: Finding product-market fit is the single most important thing that your startup does in the first three years, and it’s just underexplored and it’s just underexplained as a topic.
Who Should Use This Framework
Lenny Rachitsky: You’ve been working on a product-market fit framework.
Todd Jackson: We’ve published dozens of articles on the First Round Review, and we have found a very consistent set of patterns, demand satisfaction, and efficiency. But the interesting thing is that you don’t go for all three of them from the very beginning.
Expected Framework Outcomes
Lenny Rachitsky: There’s essentially four levels of product-market fit: nascent, developing, strong, extreme.
Todd Jackson: Roughly, 60% are never going to get past L2.
Companion Program Overview
Lenny Rachitsky: These four Ps is essentially what you should try to change if you’re stuck.
Todd Jackson: You’ve got the persona, the problem, the promise, and the product. Lattice kept the first one but changed the others. Vanta changed all four.
Incentive Alignment and Time Commitment
Lenny Rachitsky: Hearing level three tells me level two is basically your pivot from: I’m just grinding, selling, pitching.
Product-Market Fit Framework Overview
Todd Jackson: This is where it starts to get fun.
Lenny Rachitsky: Today my guest is Todd Jackson. Todd is a partner at the legendary VC firm, First Round Capital. I rarely have VCs on this podcast, but as Todd shares at the top of this episode, Todd is a very special VC. Prior to moving into venture, he was product lead for Gmail for four years. He was product manager of Facebook’s newsfeed, photos and groups, including leading a major redesign of the newsfeed. He’s also a director of product management at Twitter and VP of product and design at Dropbox.
He’s also a founder and sold his company to Twitter. This episode is a very different and special kind of episode. Todd and the team at First Round have spent the last year looking at all of their data and the journeys of the hundreds of startups that they’ve worked with over the years. And through that, have put together a very practical and very actionable framework to help founders find product-market fit. They’re turning this framework into a three-month program for founders, and in this conversation, Todd shares an exclusive peek into the program, in particular, the stages of product-market fit.
We talk about how to know which stage you’re in, what to do if you’re stuck in that stage, and also what you can change in order to get unstuck. If you’re a founder or building a new product within a company and feeling like you’re not making as much progress as you’d hope, you will find tremendous value in this conversation. With that, I bring you Todd Jackson after a short word from our sponsors. And if you enjoy this podcast, don’t forget to subscribe and follow it in your favorite podcasting app or YouTube. It’s the best way to avoid missing feature episodes and it helps the podcast tremendously.
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Nascent Stage Benchmarks and Warning Signs
Todd Jackson: Lenny, I’m excited to be here. Thank you for having me.
Lenny Rachitsky: So first of all, just to mention you’re a VC, which is very rare for this podcast. But you’re a very special VC, you have a deep background in product, and I thought it might be helpful just to give a little bit of context on your product background, your product bona fides so people will get a real sense of just how legit you are as a product thinker.
Case Study: Lattice’s Pivot
Todd Jackson: Yeah, you got it. So I am a VC. I’m a partner at First Round Capital now, and I’ve been at First Round for four years. But I was not a VC before First Round. So I started a company in 2013 called Cover, and that was actually funded by First Round 11 years ago. That’s how I got to know First Round. And before that, I had worked on Gmail as the product lead in the early days, early 2000s and at Facebook.
And then I started Cover, and we ended up selling Cover to Twitter in 2014. And I worked on a bunch of different products at Twitter. And then I was the VP of product and design at Dropbox. That was 2015 to 2018. So I have always loved product, and that’s actually the reason now that I love being a seed stage VC because I love investing at the early stage founders who are pre-product-market fit and then helping them get there. And I just love doing that over and over again.
Lenny Rachitsky: I feel like we could have a whole other podcast episode on why you decided to move into venture versus staying in product.
Plaid’s Pivot and the Four Ps
Todd Jackson: We can do it.
Nascent Stage Traits and Stalling Signs
Lenny Rachitsky: But we’re going to stay focused. So the reason we’re here is that for over a year, you’ve been working on a product-market fit framework, essentially, a framework to help founders and product teams find product-market fit, which we should talk about this. But this is the most important thing you’ve got to get right as a founder in a product team is finding product-market fit. I got a peek at this framework. I love it. I love the way you’ve structured it, the way you’re thinking about it.
So what we’re going to do today is walk through this framework in depth. First, I just want to spend a few minutes on setting a little context just so people understand who this is for and how to think about this. So maybe a first question is just why do you believe people need a framework for finding product-market fit? And just also, if you want to touch on why is product-market fit so important? Why is that something people should even be thinking about?
Todd Jackson: The thing about product-market fit is that I find it’s mysterious to a lot of people, and people tend to think about it purely as an art rather than a science. And all the advice that you find out there on the internet is very general when it comes to product-market fit. You’ll know it when you see it, you’ll know it when you have it. It’s not specific. And there’s so many other startup topics where there is good content on the internet like hiring your first salesperson, running board meetings, stuff that is specific and tactical. But there isn’t that much content around product-market fit that is that specific.
And so I think that’s actually why Rahul from Superhuman is well-known for his approach to finding product-market fit. That was published on the First Round Review in 2018, and it was immediately popular and interesting to people. And I think the reason is because it was specific and because it was tactical and it brought a little bit of the science to something that people thought was just an art. And I think it’s why your content is really popular too, Lenny.
You and I worked on this product validation article together a little while back, and the seven part series that you did on B2B SaaS companies and the PMF benchmarking data that you had, I think it was how long it took to get to a product and a customer and to product-market fit, that was super well-read. And there just isn’t that much good specific content about this. But like you said, product-market fit is the single most important thing that your startup does in the first three years and it’s just underexplored, it’s underexplained as a topic.
So we felt this was a very important thing to do, something worth focusing on. And I’ve personally talked to hundreds of founders about this topic. We’ve published dozens of articles on the First Round Review. We call this our Paths to Product-Market Fit Series where we interview founders about the early days. And I’m just always interested in what are the patterns. If you talk to enough successful founders, and in this case, it can be enterprise founders, and you ask them, “What did you do in the first six to nine months of running your company, of starting your company? What patterns emerged from that?” And we have found a very consistent set of patterns, and that’s what we decided to base our framework around.
Stage Two: Developing Product-Market Fit
Lenny Rachitsky: Amazing. And I think you’re at such an interesting Venn diagram of exposure to develop something like this. One, you have a deep product background, you started a company, you see tons of startups going through the journey, many succeeding, many not. So I get why one, you wanted to do this and why I think this is going to be so valuable to a lot of people. You talked briefly about why product-market fit is so important, and maybe it might be helpful just to share a little bit more just why is this something people should be so obsessed with and why did you spend so much time developing this?
Case Study: Looker and Ironclad
Todd Jackson: I think as a founder, there are so many things you have to do. You have to pick a market, you have to find a co-founder, you have to hire a team, you have to raise funding, you have to build a product, you have to sell a product. And so sometimes it gets lost that actually, the only thing that matters in the first couple years is finding product-market fit and actually, what we define as extreme product-market fit, and I’ll go into that. Because if you find extreme product-market fit, the momentum just carries you, and the market pulls you along. And it’s easy to know what to build because you’re building the thing that your customers want and it’s motivating as a team. It’s easy to hire people, everything becomes easier if you find product-market fit, it is the thing that propels the company.
And so we are a seed stage venture firm. We tend to work with very early founders who are pre-product-market fit. And the hard truth about it is that most of them don’t get past the first couple levels of it. The majority of startups do not get past, what we call, level one product-market fit or level two product-market fit. And I’ll go through and define all that stuff. They get stuck at one of those first couple levels. And if they can unlock the right product and the right way to explain it to a customer and make a customer deeply satisfied, and there’s enough customers out there like that, it just pulls the whole thing along.
Positioning and Category Creation
Lenny Rachitsky: Who is this framework for specifically? And for people that are listening, how do they know if this is for them or not?
Todd Jackson: This is for early B2B founders, and specifically founders who are doing something that is more sales-led than bottom-up. I think bottom-up is its own world. It’s closer to consumer product development in my mind. And I have done consumer products. Consumer product, I think there is a little bit more alchemy involved. It’s about having great taste and finding the right thing at the right time and it’s like catching lightning in a bottle.
I think the good thing about enterprise, and specifically sales-led B2B, is that there is more science to it. And so it is for sales-led B2B founders who are in, let’s call it, the first six to nine months of starting their company and want to set the foundation for product-market fit right from the beginning.
Warning Signs of Stalling at Stage Two
Lenny Rachitsky: Awesome. Okay. So B2B founders, sales-led in the first six to nine months of their journey. Awesome.
Todd Jackson: That’s right. Yes.
Necessity and Difficulty of Pivoting
Lenny Rachitsky: You talked about the science of this. I imagine you don’t want to overpromise this is going to help you find product-market fit, step one, two, three profit. How do you think about just what the benefits of this are and how people should think about the chance that they will find product-market fit at the end of this journey following this framework?
Todd Jackson: We can’t guarantee success here. I just want to contextualize that finding extreme product-market fit is very, very hard. And what we are trying to do is increase your odds, increase the odds, reduce the role of luck, give you a framework and way of thinking about the things that you need to do. And I think that that can increase the odds. Like I said earlier, the majority of startups are getting stuck at these first couple levels. I think if you know what the path looks like and you know what the levers are at your disposal and you know what you need to aim for, I think we can get more of these companies to level three and level four product-market fit, which is where you really want to be and where you have a very valuable company.
Sales Cycles and Demand Channels
Lenny Rachitsky: Perfect. Okay, final question. You launched a whole program for founders to go through and learn all of this in depth, many week kind of program. We’re going to be covering a lot of it here for folks that want to go a lot deeper and actually go through this program. Talk about how they find this and how this program works.
Strong Product-Market Fit Stage
Todd Jackson: So we launched a new program, and we call it Product-Market Fit Method. It is designed, like I said, to help early B2B founders increase the odds of finding product-market fit. It’s totally free, it’s a very intensive program. You can see all the details at pmf.firstround.com, and the application deadline is May 7th. The program starts on May 29th. And we actually ran a beta version, a test version of this late last year with 11 founders, I think probably some you know, Lenny, from Stripe and Plaid and Airbnb and Twitter. And the feedback, it was great. It made me feel very good.
One of the founders was like, “I feel like these 14 weeks saved me two years of time in what would’ve been wandering through the desert.” And so there’s eight sessions in the full program, and the first one is the one we’re going to do today. So the first session is on what we call the levels of product-market fit. The second one is on customer discovery, and we actually refer to it as dollar-driven discovery. We get very specific about not just the normal way of doing customer conversations and customer discovery, but how do you find that a customer is willing to pay money for this thing and a lot of money?
We talk about market validation, product positioning. We do a section on design partners because I think a lot of founders have questions about that. How do I find the right design partners? What’s the right way to structure an agreement with them? How do I convert them to paying customers? All that stuff. We talk about product iteration and pivots, and I refer to this stage as the grind, the grind of product iteration. And then we spend a ton of time on founder-led sales.
And the reason that we do that is we really like working with very technical founders, builders, people that are either engineering background, product design, data science, people who are builders. So that’s the program in a nutshell. And like I said, any founder working on a new B2B SaaS company, welcome to apply. And then bonus points if you are technical, like I said, if you have a clear product idea or a hypothesis, but that you’re less than six to 12 months into building the company.
Lenny Rachitsky: I love how incentives are so aligned here. You help companies find product-market fit. If First Round does great, everyone does great. It makes so much sense to build something like this. One thing I can’t help but mention or ask about is you said it’s an intensive program. How do you find founders have time to do something like this and also be building their company? I know this helps them build, but how do you just think about they have so much to do, they have time to do a program like this?
Stage Three Challenges and Breakthroughs
Todd Jackson: The way that we think about it is that the program roughly takes about 10 hours a week for each founder, and it’s 10 hours of work that you were going to be doing anyway. It is literally you’re talking to customers, you’re improving your positioning, you’re doing critical thinking about your market and what you should be building. And so the way I think about it, and the way I’ve heard from the 11 founders that went through it is it just added structure to what I was doing anyway and it actually made me more efficient.
Stage Four Traits and Challenges
Lenny Rachitsky: Last question, you mentioned that it’s free. How does that work? How does that work for everyone?
Todd Jackson: So it’s 100% free and literally, it costs you 0, we own 0% of your company. And it’s pretty different than I think a lot of other programs out there. And this is just something we do. Over the years, we’ve run First Round Angel Track, which I know you were in, Lenny. We’ve run the First Round Review for 10 years. We make these things free and our belief is that you have to create value in the ecosystem.
You have to put stuff out in the world that is useful, and if you can create that value, create enough value with the audience, then you’ll be able to capture that value at some point. And so we think there’s a win-win here. We get an inside look at some of tomorrow’s great companies and they get an inside look at First Round.
Challenges of Continuously Finding Fit
Lenny Rachitsky: Got it. So companies don’t have to take money from you guys to be a part of this program.
Advancement Rates Across Stages
Todd Jackson: That’s right.
Lenny Rachitsky: Okay, let’s get into it. Let’s talk about this framework. Maybe just as a broad strokes overview, how does this framework work? How do companies find product-market fit?
Timeframes for Each Stage
Todd Jackson: So the framework starts with a very simple idea that is product-market fit is not a one-size-fits-all thing, and it doesn’t just happen overnight. And for B2B companies, specifically, it does tend to follow a repeatable pattern. And so we start with defining the ultimate goal. The ultimate goal is to get to extreme product-market fit. And we have a precise definition for this. Let me read it to you. So extreme product-market fit is a state of widespread demand for a product that satisfies a critical need and crucially can be delivered repeatably and efficiently to each customer.
And so there’s three key ideas in there: demand, satisfaction and efficiency. And I think efficiency is worth highlighting because that’s what most people would leave out of their definition. You talk about like, “Oh, it’s a product, people like it. That’s good, that’s product-market fit.” But if you look, there’s products out there. I was a big fan of WeWork, as a customer of WeWork. And I’m a fan of Casper and these other products. Those products managed to achieve customer satisfaction and demand, but they never got the efficiency right, and so the whole business just never worked at scale.
And my partner, Brett Berson, at First Round, he gives this example of the 100 bill comes out. And that’s the product. That would have insane demand. There would be a line at that vending machine. I think people would be extremely satisfied. They’d be like, “This is awesome.” The retention would be very good. I’m sure they would come back tomorrow. But the whole thing is it’s ridiculous. The whole metaphor is ridiculous because it’s just not viable to do something like that.
And yet you see a lot of startups kind of do this. They’re basically with their products, giving away 1 and it gets them pretty far. But that’s not real product-market fit. And so that’s one of the reasons that we think efficiency and how you think about the economic model of what you’re doing is very important. And then this other aspect that I like, which is we have this concept that we call the marginal customer, and the next incremental customer you’re going to get for your company, for your product. And if you have product-market fit, and as you are progressing along this journey, the marginal customer should be getting easier and easier and easier to get, easier to acquire them, easier to give them good service with a good product.
And that means your efficiency is increasing along the way and your product-market fit is strengthening. So you’ve got to have all three of those things: demand, satisfaction, efficiency. But the interesting thing is that you don’t go for all three of them at once from the very beginning. And so product-market fit, it happens in the sequence of levels, it happens over multiple years. And for the best enterprise companies, I would say they tend to reach extreme product-market fit in roughly four to six years. There’s some variance, but roughly four to six years. And so we label these four levels. We say level one product-market fit is nascent product-market fit. Level two is developing, level three is strong, and level four is extreme. And that’s where you want to get.
And along the way, you’re trading off these three dimensions: satisfaction, demand, and efficiency because they’re intertwined. You could spend a bunch of money on marketing, and that’s going to increase your demand, but you’re decreasing your efficiency if you do that. You can invest a bunch in efficiency and automating a whole bunch of stuff, but that actually might harm the customer experience and you’re reducing satisfaction. So that’s an interesting thing, I think, is you’re actually making trade-offs at each level and what you should optimize for at each level is different. And so we talk about all these signs, whether you’re getting stuck at a given level, how do you get unstuck and how do you progress along this path.
Advice When Facing Stagnation
Lenny Rachitsky: Amazing. And we’re going to go through each of these. And the idea, as a listener, what I’m thinking is you’re probably in one of these buckets. What we’re trying to do is help you out of that bucket and help you move further up the ladder to the next level. So just to summarize, I have my notes here. So there’s essentially four levels of product-market fit, basically, the strength of product-market fit that you have: nascent, developing, strong, extreme.
Todd Jackson: Yes.
The Four Ps and Stage Review
Lenny Rachitsky: Okay. And then you have three dimensions within each of these levels: satisfaction, demand, and efficiency. We’re going to talk about what all these mean and how you use these. Let’s talk about level one, nascent product-market fit. What does that look like? What do you do when you’re there if you’re stuck? And what are some examples of companies that felt nascent product-market fit?
Identifying Extreme Value and Wow Signals
Todd Jackson: Yeah. Okay, level one, nascent. So at this point, you’re probably like a pre-seed or seed stage company. You’ve got less than 10 people on your team. And at level one, your job is to find three to five customers that have a particular problem that is worth solving and to deliver them a satisfying solution. And you got to pick a problem that is both important and urgent to them.
And the solution that you deliver needs to satisfy some kind of promise that they care deeply about. So of the three dimensions that you just recapped, Lenny, it’s satisfaction first, demand second, efficiency last when you’re at level one. It’s actually okay to be inefficient at this stage if it helps you uncover something that delivers an insanely good customer satisfaction. And so I think that one of the best examples I can think of that is this company called Vanta.
Lenny Rachitsky: Love Vanta. Also, a happy sponsor and I’m an investor. What a great example.
Verifying Ability and Willingness to Pay
Todd Jackson: What a great example. So Vanta was founded in 2016 by Christina Cacioppo, and she had come from Dropbox and we got to work at Dropbox together, which was awesome. She was the PM of Dropbox Paper at that time. And so Vanta, it’s a company that does compliance automation, continuous monitoring. And most startups think of Vanta is how you get a SOC 2, but they didn’t do that at first.
And I remember in 2018, Christina and I went on a walk around the South Park neighborhood in San Francisco. And this was the first time I heard the idea of Vanta. And she had actually, in 2016, 2017, tried a few other ideas. She had this smart speaker that would record meetings and it would send meeting summaries over Slack.
Challenges and Tips for Asking Questions
Lenny Rachitsky: B2B Alexa is what she called it. I remember.
Todd Jackson: B2B Alexa. And she had this other idea, something about dropshipping, but she didn’t know anything about dropshipping. And she had just been in this mode of like, “We’re building stuff and then we’re seeing if anybody wants it.” And then she realized that wasn’t working and she changed what she was doing. And she started talking to potential customers, and she was very interested in the idea of security and why a lot of startups didn’t use any security products.
And she was talking to security engineers and CISOs and just CTOs and startups. And she would ask them, “What is the thing you hate most about your job as it relates to security?” And over and over and over they would say, “I hate filling out the security questionnaires. I hate doing the compliance audits. It’s so much grungy manual work. I’m in there filling out spreadsheets and taking screenshots of my AWS account. And the whole thing just doesn’t make sense.” And she had actually felt this herself when she was on Dropbox Paper and the experience of getting a SOC 2 was onerous.
And the reason that she needed to get it is because we wanted to start selling Dropbox Paper into enterprise. And so she said to me, “There’s this pain out there, I think I can solve it, and I think there might be a revenue unlock.” And I was like, “What do you mean by that?” And she was like, “Well, I’ve got these first few customers or design partner, pseudo customers. It’s Segment and Front and Figma.” And this is 2017, ‘18. So these companies were smaller at the time, not the big companies they are now. And she was like, “Yeah, they’re trying to sell into Fortune 500 companies. One of them is actually trying to land a Fortune 10 right now. And they said the thing that’s holding them back is they don’t have compliance certification, they don’t have a SOC 2.
“And I told them, ‘Hey, what if I do that for you?’ And they were like, ‘Oh, you can just do that?’” And she was like, “Yeah.” And she did it, and they landed the deal. And it’s one of the clearest examples to me of a product that satisfies a promise, but this product is going to unlock revenue for you. You are going to be able to land this enterprise deal. And so I think they just did a phenomenal job of that. And that’s what you’re looking for when you’re at level one, a problem that really matters to three to five customers.
Program Application Guide
Lenny Rachitsky: That specific example, I think she delivered a spreadsheet. There was no product, she just manually filled out a spreadsheet and gave it to them.
Todd Jackson: Completely manual. She was the one behind the email address posing as the AI, but doing it herself. And I think that’s revealing of it’s okay to be inefficient at level one, as long as you are delivering incredible satisfaction.
Lenny Rachitsky: Yeah, I was just going to say that. This is the ultimate example of efficiency is not important, which I love, is what you’re pointing out at this step. I know you’re going to share another example, but just to summarize what this stage feels like from earlier when you talked about, essentially, of less than 10 people, you’re trying to find three to five customers. I think that’s so important. You’re not trying to find tens or hundreds, you’re just like, “Three to five people.” And the customer element, I imagine, you’re implying they’re paying you money.
Todd Jackson: Yes, they’re paying you money and you’re delivering a product that solves a problem for them.
Lenny Rachitsky: And the product could be potentially a spreadsheet or super Wizard of Oz at this point even.
Todd Jackson: Yeah, that’s okay at this level.
Lenny Rachitsky: I know RAMP actually had barely a product when they started selling. Initially, they had someone just updating things behind the scenes on these dashboards. And then you talked about the problem needs to be important and urgent, which connects to people paying attention to a startup that they don’t trust or know anything about because the problem is that important and urgent. And you also mentioned it has to satisfy a promise you’re giving them, “We’ll solve SOC 2 for you,” and then you actually accomplish that.
Todd Jackson: That’s right.
Lenny Rachitsky: Is there anything else maybe as a benchmark that tells you you’re at this step of product-market fit?
Todd Jackson: Yeah. So like I said, you’re pre-seed less than 10 people. Probably, your demand source at this stage is mostly people you know. It’s friends and family, it’s your network, maybe it’s VCs. You haven’t probably done a lot of cold outreach at this point, and it’s hard to find customers. You’re trying to get three to five. It probably takes you 20 warm intros to get one, something along those lines. So maybe to get to three to five, it’s at least 50 conversations. That’s very normal at this stage because you’re just trying to find the right problem and find customers who have it. You’re probably in the $0 to 500K ARR, somewhere in that zone. I would say that you’re at level one.
And then there are metrics to track efficiency, things like burn multiple, gross margin, NRR all of these things. All of them are just not applicable at this stage. It’s too early and you shouldn’t be worrying about that stuff. And so you want to be feeling this sense of progress that there are customers who need what you are building and the thing you’re building works. And so conversely, the signs that we see a lot of founders get stuck, and this is a very common level to get stuck. And so if you’re hanging out here for six months, nine months, 12 months, and there’s yellow flags that are appearing, you’re starting to feel stuck.
And so the yellow flags are something like, let’s say, your product disappeared overnight, your customers wouldn’t be super disappointed. Let’s say you have a handful of happy customers. Let’s say you’ve got four or five customers, but the most important feature is actually different for each one of them. That starts to look a little bit more like a consulting business than a product business. Or it just feels incredibly hard to find the marginal customer, the next new customer. Or your usage is low. The product is in their hands, but the usage is low, it’s not growing that much. It lasts for six months.
And I think, there’s a really good example, Jack Altman, who’s the founder of Lattice, he founded Lattice in 2015. We’ve talked to him a bunch on the First Round Paths to Product-Market Fit and other things. So for those who don’t know, Lattice is a people management platform, but it didn’t start that way. And most people don’t know about this, Lattice actually started as an OKR tool back in 2015.
Lenny Rachitsky: Oh, didn’t know.
Todd Jackson: Yeah. And so Jack had just seen this at other companies. He’s like, “Okay, companies are doing OKRs, but they’re not very good at it and it causes a lot of arguments among the executive team and employees are noncompliant. They think the whole thing’s dumb. So I can fix that with software.” And so the original version of Lattice was for managing OKRs. And he was able to sell it. And so his buyer was the head of HR, and they said, “Okay, yeah, we’ll give this a shot.” And he had a couple companies using it, and they would use it for one quarter. And then the next quarter would come around, and they were like, “Didn’t go that well last time. I don’t know, the employees don’t seem to like it. I don’t know.”
And then the quarter after that, they were like, “No, we’re not buying this, we’re not using this.” And so Jack pulled off the pivot to people management. And the way that he did it was he actually kept the persona. And so this gets into the ideas of the four Ps, and I’ll talk about this a little bit more. This is our version of the four Ps. You’ve got the persona, the problem, the promise, and the product. And all four of these things have to line up. Your product has to deliver a promise that solves the problem of your persona. And so Jack actually kept the persona. He was like, “I’ve gotten to know these heads of HR really well over the last six to nine months. I text with them, I go out to coffee with them, I’m friends with them, I know them really well. This OKR thing just doesn’t seem to be a big deal for them, but they’ve got other problems that I could look at solving.”
And the interesting thing was that timing, it was mid-2010s, performance management had started to come back in favor. It was like this pendulum. There was a period of time where performance management was really important, and then all these companies were like, “We’re not doing this anymore.” And then the pendulum swung back, and around 2015, 2016 was that time. And so Jack literally showed them Figma mock-ups. There was no product, but he’s like, “What if I could solve performance management for you in a way that is much more modern and much more employee-friendly and manager-friendly and the whole thing’s just going to work better?”
And the response was off the charts. And people wanted this thing. And I believe he sold his first five or 10 customers with Figma mock-ups. Before, he hadn’t built anything really. And so that, I think, is an interesting example of he was stuck in the zone of people didn’t love what he was doing. He kept the persona, but he changed the problem that he was solving and the promise he was delivering through the product. And we do a whole section on pivots and when to pivot and how to pivot. And I think this is actually the best framework for this, is the four Ps. Lattice kept the first one but changed the others. Vanta changed all four.
There are other products like Plaid that actually kept elements of the product they were doing. So I don’t know if you know the story of Plaid, but Zach Perret was building… Plaid started out not as like a API for bank accounts. It started out as a consumer budgeting app. It was a consumer app. And it just was supposed to help you save money and budget and stuff. And it just wasn’t that popular. And the founders were frustrated, but they had built this part of the product that enabled the app to connect to your bank accounts, and had solved all the nitty-gritty issues with that. And then they found that their friends wanted to license it from them.
So Zach had a friend at Venmo who wanted to license this, and they got Robinhood at some point, they got Coinbase at some point. So that’s an example of they actually kept a lot of the code that they had written. They kept the product, but they completely changed the other three Ps. Instead of solving for consumers who have a problem with budgeting, we are going to solve for developers at fintech companies who have a problem connecting to bank accounts. And it was a total flip of the four Ps. But that’s why I really like this framework because I think it really helps founders think in a structured way about this.
Lenny Rachitsky: Todd, this is amazing. I’m so happy we’re doing this. I think this is going to help a lot of people. I want to move on to level two, but first let me try to summarize some of these key elements. So these four Ps is essentially what you should try to change if you’re stuck in this level or any level. And just to summarize, you can change who you’re targeting, the persona, you can change the problem you’re solving, you could change the way you’re pitching it, which is the promise is how you describe it, basically positioning. And then you could also just change your product. You mentioned Vanta changed all four, some companies change just one. Any advice for how to know which of these to change? What points you to change this versus change that? Is there anything that you’ve seen?
Todd Jackson: I think different founders approach this differently. And I’ve seen a lot of founders who are build first and then sell, and I’ve seen a lot of founders who are sell first and then build. And they can both work. I tend to gravitate towards the, “I want to sell it before I build it,” because I really want the signal from customers and I want that to be the guide and the oxygen that drives what I’m building. I find that very motivating. I also find it easier, honestly.
Rather than guessing like, “Oh, I’m going to write 50,000 lines of code and then see if somebody wants this thing,” I think it’s better to talk to a bunch of customers, know that, “Hey, if I had this thing, if I could build this thing, I know it would sell. I know these people want this thing.” So I tend to approach it from that point of view and therefore, I focus on the persona and the problem and the promise. What is the promise that is really going to click for that buyer, for that persona? And then the product’s job is to satisfy those first three Ps really.
Lenny Rachitsky: And obviously, those are much easier to change and play with versus rebuilding your product. So if nothing else, you should probably start there. I actually have a post with a bunch of awesome examples of changing the positioning, changing the persona, and so we’ll link to that in show notes if people want more examples. Finally, let me try to summarize the stage. So I think it’s important to note at this nascent stage, it’s not roaring product-market fit. It’s, as you described, very nascent. You’re getting customers, but it’s hard. You said it’s 20 introductions to one sale, but you’re getting them.
I know Retool has a great quote. David has this quote of, “Every customer he got early on, he felt it was the last customer he was ever going to get. No more people want this thing and it’s always a struggle.” So I think that’s very normal, is what you’re describing. The beginnings are rarely off and to the right. And it’s okay if this takes a while. You said that if you spent 12 months at this stage, you’re probably stuck in the stage, and signs that you’re stuck in this nascent stage versus this is actually normal. Signs you mentioned are if you ask people if this went away and they wouldn’t be disappointed, they’d be like, “Nah, all right. It’s cool.”
You have many customers, but they’re using different features of the product. So to you, the way you described it, essentially, you’re professional services for them. You’re not actually building a product. You consult a lot of people. And then they’re actually not using it often. They’re buying, they’re paying for it, like the last example, but they’re not necessarily using it and they’re going to churn pretty quickly.
Todd Jackson: That’s right.
Lenny Rachitsky: Anything else you wanted to touch on there before we get to level two?
Todd Jackson: The last thing that I’d add at level one is there’s this founder from a company called Persona, his name is Rick Song. He’s super awesome. Persona is a First Round company. They do identity verification. And Rick’s analogy, I just love it for level one, is you don’t want to get friend-zoned by your customers, where your customers like you, but they don’t love you and they don’t need you. And he was super paranoid about this in the early days of Persona. And his technique for doing this, which I really like, is super simple, was he was very close with his first five or 10 customers.
And he would go to them and sit them down one-on-one and say, “I need your help. It is very important to me that this company succeeds and does not fail. So I don’t want you to be nice to me. I want you to tell me is Persona a necessity for your company? If we went away, how painful would that be? If a competitor came along that charged half as much as us, would you switch to them?” And he’s really trying to get to the essence of: is Persona critical for you or am I in the friend zone? And I just think that’s a really great way of thinking about this.
Lenny Rachitsky: I love that story. It’s like in a relationship, it’s the talk.
Todd Jackson: It’s the talk.
Lenny Rachitsky: “Are we a thing?” I love that. That’s so good. The sooner you know the truth, the better. And it’s hard to hear bad news, but I love that, just advice of just sit them down one-on-one. Let me tell you about CommandBar. If you’re like me and most users I’ve built product for, you probably find those little in-product pop-ups really annoying, “Want to take a tour?” “Check out this new feature.” And these pop-ups are becoming less and less effective since most users don’t read what they say. They just want to close them as soon as possible.
But every product builder knows that users need help to learn the ins and outs of your product. We use so many products every day and we can’t possibly know the ins and outs of everyone. CommandBar is an AI-powered toolkit for product growth, marketing and customer teams to help users get the most out of your product without annoying them. They use AI to get closer to user intent. So they have search and chat products that let users describe what they’re trying to do in their own words, and then see personalized results like customer walkthroughs or actions.
And they do pop-ups too, but their nudges are based on in-product behaviors like confusion or intent classification, which makes them much less annoying and much more impactful. This works for web apps, mobile apps and websites, and they work with industry-leading companies like Gusto, Freshworks, HashiCorp and LaunchDarkly. Over 15 million end-users have interacted with CommandBar. To try out CommandBar, you can sign up at commandbar.com/lenny and you can unlock an extra 1,000 AI responses per month for any plan. That’s commandbar.com/lenny. Let’s talk about level two. So what does level two look like? And what should founders be focusing on when they’re in level two?
Todd Jackson: Yeah. So level two is developing product-market fit, and your job at level two is now you’ve got to go from five satisfied customers to 25 satisfied customers. And so now you’ve got to start thinking about demand in addition to satisfaction. Because it is very hard to just grind your way all the way to 25 customers with sheer willpower, but you can do that to five, maybe 10. And we see some founders who just have phenomenal willpower and grit and grind their way to five or 10 customers. To get to 25 and to get beyond 25, the product has to be doing a lot of the heavy lifting for you. And so that is the essence of this level.
So if you’re at this level, now you’re seed or Series A style company, maybe you’ve got up to 20 people at the company. And you’re starting to work on this demand source where you have the early signs of a scalable channel, and it’s not just warm intros from your VCs or from your friends. You’re maybe investing in cold outreach and getting that tuned and humming. You might be investing in content, you might be doing community events, but the whole idea is you’re trying to scale the demand source. It’s still not easy. A benchmark, we would say, is that your sales conversion without a warm intro is still probably 10%, something like that.
First call to close one is around 10%. If you get higher than that, that’s great, but that sort of benchmark for this level. You’re in anywhere from the 500K to five million ARR zone, that’s a hallmark of level two. And you’re actually starting to think about efficiency metrics and sales metrics. You might starting to be thinking about magic number, which is a new ARR that you take in in a period divided by the CAC you spend in that period, so something in the 0.5 to 0.75 range. You want to get higher eventually, but that’s pretty reasonable for this level.
You’re just starting to think about retention. You’ve been around for a year, so you’ve got renewals and you want those renewals renewing. Maybe something like 10%, 20% regretted churn is okay. You don’t want to be higher than that, and you want your NRR to be at least 100%. And then things like gross margin and burn multiple, they’re still not the focus. Those are the classic efficiency metrics. They’re not the focus right now.
But we would say you want your gross margin to be not worse than 50%, and you’d want your burn multiple to be not worse than five X. Your burn multiple, by the way, is just how much you burn in a current period versus how much new ARR comes in. So if you burn $5 million and you take in one, then you’ve got to burn multiple of five. And you don’t want to be worse than that at this stage.
Lenny Rachitsky: Amazing. There’s a lot of these benchmarks which I love. I imagine not everyone’s going to hit each of them exactly. These are just rough guidelines of like, “You’re probably in this stage if you’re in this level,” right?
Todd Jackson: Yeah, exactly. There’s some wide bars around these metrics. It’s just representative of, generally, the stage of five to 25 customers.
Lenny Rachitsky: I love it. And it’s so interesting that people think of product-market fit, as you said, as this binary, “I have it or I don’t.” And the way you’re talking about this is in this level to developing product-market fit, a company has 25 satisfied customers, they’re over five million in ARR, a lot of cases they have 20 employees.
Todd Jackson: Between 500K and five million. Yeah.
Lenny Rachitsky: 500K and five million. They have 20 employees. In theory, you would think this is a roaring success. They’re killing it, they have all these customers, they’re growing. But it’s still just level two of product-market fit. So I think this has a really interesting insight, and it reminds me of when I did a bunch of research on product-market fit.
So many founders are like, “I never felt that product-market fit. I didn’t have it. It was always, ‘I don’t know, maybe when we get to 100 million ARR, I’ll really feel like we got this.’” So I think this is a really good reminder that a lot of times you’re not actually going to feel so confident this will last, and you’re going to get to lasting durable product-market fit. So I think that’s a really great insight here.
Todd Jackson: Yeah. And the thing that’s really, I think, the hallmark of level two is you’ve got a product that a handful of people like. It’s satisfying a critical need for them. Now you’ve got to open the demand floodgates so that we can get to 25 customers and beyond. And different companies do this in very different ways. It’s much easier said than done. Looker is an example. So Looker is a First Round company founded in 2012 by Lloyd Tabb. They do business intelligence. And Looker is interesting because they spent actually a long time at level one, but then flew through level two. And the reason is because Lloyd, the founder, the first five customers of Looker, he was basically going in and doing consulting for them.
And the reason is because of the nature of the product. People don’t get Looker until they see their own data in it, and their data is modeled and they see the dashboards and they’re like, “Oh, my God. Wow, I didn’t realize these insights.” So Lloyd understood Looker is not a product you could sell with Figma mock-ups. And so what happened was Lloyd would go into these customers, spend 20, 30, 40 hours before they were even a customer, modeling their data, teaching them how to use it, showing more people within the organization the power of the data and the dashboards.
And later, they called this their forward deploy process. This is how they figured out sales. And so it actually took them a long time in level one to get this right, but then they were able to do this repeatably. And so they went from five to 25 fairly quickly, and a lot of amazing… 75% close rate because they were only selling customers who were already using it. There was zero churn. And Lloyd explains once he got to 20 customers, he’s like, “I know I’m onto something. And I think I figured out a model.”
And the model stayed the same until they ended up selling to Google. And so they did these other things too. They started focusing on demand channels. They got a couple SDRs who were prospecting. I think they did some partner marketing with AWS Redshift. They did these look-and-tell customer events in San Francisco where they got Looker customers together to talk about what they were doing in Looker and how they built the product. But really, the groundwork was set at level one and then they moved really quickly through level two.
Lenny Rachitsky: So again, the way to think about this phase, is this is when you’re starting to scale a way to drive demand. You’re not just grinding sales, cold outreach. There’s a way you’re starting to bring in customers that are more efficient. And in Looker’s case, they just started coming because I imagine there’s word of mouth and people started to talk about it.
Todd Jackson: Yeah. Let me do another example. A really different example is a company called Ironclad. Ironclad, it’s legal. It’s a legal tech company founded in 2015. Jason Jason Boehmig is the founder. AI-powered contract management software. So this was interesting because Jason, he started out calling this an AI legal assistant. And in 2024, people are like, “Oh, AI legal assistant. Yeah, that’s awesome.” But in 2014, people were like, “What?” And he found it really hard to sell. No one was looking for an AI legal assistant. And so he told us this story.
There was an email address on the Ironclad homepage, hello@ironclad.com. This is in 2015. And he doesn’t get very much email, but Jason is checking the email. And one day he gets this one line email, and he almost archives it because he doesn’t know who it’s from and it’s one line. But he sees that it’s from a person at a publicly-traded company, and so he’s like, “Oh, maybe there’s something here.” And the one line email is just, “Are you a CLM?” And he was like, “What is a CLM?” And he Googles for it. A CLM is a contract lifecycle management platform. And he’s reading up about CLMs, and he’s like, “Oh, we do that. Yeah.”
And so he replies to the email, “Yes, we are a CLM.” And the customer gets them on the phone. And the customer says, “Oh, I’m in the market for a CLM. I’m looking at 10 or 12 different vendors, but you guys look pretty cool because there’s some automation and some AI stuff going on. Can I check this out?” And Jason’s like, “Of course.” So he and his co-founder take the train from San Francisco down to San Jose. And on the train, Jason is telling his co-founder, Cai, “Hey, I need you to code this up right now to make it look like what this customer is expecting.”
And they get to the meeting, and they do the demo. And the customer has no idea that they just made this demo on the train, and they’re a very small company. And they win the contract against these 10 or 12 other established bases, because Ironclad, it’s more modern, it’s automated, it’s got this AI stuff. It’s just a better product, or the demo looks like it’s going to be a better product. And so Jason reflects on this and he’s like, “Yeah, the thing for us is we had been trying to create this new category of AI legal assistant, and it was just a slog.
“And instead, when we changed our positioning to play in an existing category of CLM, but a much better CLM, but customers are already looking for a CLM, they’re already looking to spend money on a CLM, and just expand the definition of what that category is, things just started to click.” And that’s how they got through that zone of 10, 20, 30 customers. And even if you look at the Ironclad website today, it says AI-Powered Contract Management Software. That really is the key idea still.
Lenny Rachitsky: Awesome. So this is an awesome example of positioning/promise is the lever they pull here. I love the point about category design. That’s one of the ongoing debates on this podcast, whether you should try to create a category.
Todd Jackson: I know, it’s a hot topic.
Lenny Rachitsky: Hot topic. Sounds like you’re in the boat of probably better not to create your own category.
Todd Jackson: I think it’s hard to create a category. It certainly works in some cases, but if you actually have a really interesting spin on an existing category, there’s already buyers spending money on that thing. They’re already looking for something to buy. So if you can do it, I do actually think that way is easier.
Lenny Rachitsky: Before we get to level three, what are signs that you’re maybe stuck at level two, and what should one do about that?
Todd Jackson: Yeah. So the whole idea of level two is this thing that the marginal customer is getting easier. And so you’ve got to be focusing on demand and the repeatability of demand while you maintain satisfaction. So the yellow flags are things that are the opposite of that. Your current customers are pretty happy, but you’re just having trouble opening the floodgates. As you’re getting to the top end of level two, you should start to hear some startups know who you are like, “Oh, you need a SOC 2, you’re a startup. Oh, Vanta.” “Oh, you need AI-powered contract management software. Oh, Ironclad.” You start to get known for a thing.
And so if you’re having trouble opening those floodgates, and you’re sitting there for, I don’t know, 12 months, 18 months, that’s a problem. Or you have things like your regretted churn is greater than 20%. That’s a satisfaction warning sign. And again, you have to maintain the satisfaction as you work on these other things. Every level just gets more things you have to do. Or you could be finding that the sales cycle’s taking too long, you’re losing deals late in the funnel, you’re losing the competitors. You’re just not feeling the urgency from customers or you’re struggling to hit the price point that you want.
And the way that customers will say this to you because customers are nice, right? They’ll say, “Oh, we don’t have the budget.” Or, “Oh, it’s just not the right time for us. We’d love to talk again next year.” That means no, when you’re hearing that from customers. You want customers who are like, “Oh, of course. Yeah, this is expensive, but I’m going to make this work because I need this.” And so if you’re seeing any of those signs, those are the signs that you maybe are stuck or plateauing at this level. And I really think it’s important to think about the four Ps and think about: how am I going to pivot my way out of this? Jack Altman, who I mentioned earlier from Lattice, he’s got a great quote on this.
It’s up in a video on the website. What did he say? He said, “Most founders do a 10% pivot, and what they need to be doing is a 200% pivot.” Jack didn’t say this, but I think part of my interpretation of this is it’s psychologically hard as a founder. You’ve gotten to this many customers, you’re starting to plateau, but you’re like, “I don’t want to throw this whole thing away.” But you have to be willing to let go and really focus on nailing the four Ps at this point.
Lenny Rachitsky: And in your experience, do you find, essentially, pivoting is the answer if you’re stuck?
Todd Jackson: I think sometimes it’s nice when it’s the Ironclad thing, right?
Lenny Rachitsky: Yeah.
Todd Jackson: It’s nicest when it’s the Looker thing of you don’t have to change anything. It just starts working and basically, the whole thing works the whole time. That’s not common. It’s nice when it’s the Ironclad thing when you just change one of them, or maybe two of them. Starting over with all four of these is hard at level two, but oftentimes, it’s what’s required. I was mentioning earlier, level two is the second most common level to get stuck.
A big chunk of companies are going to get stuck at level one, and the second biggest is at level two. So sometimes it’s hard. I think the trap is not doing enough to realize that you’re actually not progressing to product-market fit in the way that you need to and just starting to burn money and not make progress. And you’ve seen many startups struggle with this. I think it’s the hardest part of it.
Lenny Rachitsky: Yeah. Especially once they’re a million, two million, three million ARR and they’re like, “Look, we’re making all this money.” And they don’t necessarily realize that they’ve been stuck at this stage for so long. So just to summarize flags that something is wrong and that you should probably think about changing your persona, your problem, your promise or your product, is it’s been 12 to 18 months at this stage of product-market fit. You are churning about 20% of customers. And these are logo churn, I imagine, just like businesses stop using you.
Todd Jackson: Yep.
Lenny Rachitsky: Your sales cycles are really slow. Is there a sense of what slow means? Just a rough heuristic. What should it…
Todd Jackson: Well, some sales cycles are slow. If you’re selling to companies that are big, you’re selling to government, that type of thing. I don’t know. Rough rule of thumb is… There’s different ACVs also. If you’re the kind of product that is 20K, 30K annual contracts, that was Looker, right? But they were able to do the sales cycle very repeatedly because they closed so often. There are some contracts that are 100K, 200K, six figure contracts. Those can take a long time. Those can take three to six months. You can’t basically be in the worst of both worlds where you’ve got a slow sales cycle and a low ACV. That is the quadrant of death basically.
Lenny Rachitsky: Awesome. Okay. And then the other sign is just you’re not finding demand starting to come to you. You’re not finding a channel to drive demand. And is a big part of this inbound? You’re supposed to start seeing more inbound coming at you? Or is it more just sales becomes easier?
Todd Jackson: It’s both. So sales becomes easier, but I think if you are starting to get to level three, which is where we’re getting to next, you’ve probably got 10%, 20% of your inbound coming or completely organic inbound.
Lenny Rachitsky: Awesome. Okay. So again, if you’re stuck at this stage, and these are signs that are like, “Oh, man, this sounds familiar,” your advice is find one of these things to shift the person you’re going after, the problem you’re solving, the way you position it and/or your product if you have to.
Todd Jackson: Yeah. And probably just look for something that is a lot more of a burning pain. It’s usually that the problem is not significant enough, important enough to people, or the promise is not valuable enough. It’s usually one of those [inaudible 00:54:54] assuming you have a reasonable persona.
Lenny Rachitsky: Awesome. And the reason I am spending so much time here, as you said, most companies get stuck here, like B2B SaaS companies. So I think it’s really important to make sure people have something to go with. And in the course and in the post you put out, there’s more examples of companies going through this and what they did. Let’s talk about level three. What does level three look like? What should you be focusing on there?
Todd Jackson: Yeah. So level three is strong product-market fit. This is where I think it starts to get fun. This is where all the product-market fit adages come in, “The fish are jumping into the boat. The rock is rolling down the hill and I’m trying to chase it instead of pushing it up the hill.” And keep in mind, for most enterprise founders, we’re now three, four or five years into the company, so it’s not easy to get here. And to get to L3 here, you are looking for repeatability. The marginal customer has become much easier.
And so you mentioned, Lenny, this quote from David Hsu from Retool, which I love too, and I’ll read it again. He said, “We talked to someone who said that finding product-market fit was so visceral, you immediately felt it like a geyser.” And we honestly never felt that in the first couple years. At Retool, every customer we got, whether that was number four or number 14, felt like the last customer we were ever going to find. It felt like rolling the stone uphill, and if you stop pushing, it’s going to roll back on you and crush you.
And that’s how it felt until we had a few million in ARR. That’s when the boulder went down the other side and we had to chase it to keep up. And you mentioned earlier, founders were like, “I’m not sure I ever felt product-market fit.” This is when you start to feel it. And Jack Altman, again, from Lattice said, “The biggest shift was in the ease of getting leads.” I remember thinking, “I don’t even know where these leads are coming from, just more and more of them are showing up each month.”
But that is a great feeling. That is a great feeling. Filip Kaliszan from Verkada, he’s in some of the videos on our website too. His quote, I’ll read it, was, “After our first year of sales in 2018, those next two years were crazy. We were barely keeping up with production. We had to scale all the systems. A lot of things had to happen in the span of 12 to 18 months in order to deliver on everything that customers were hoping the solution was going to do for them. And that in itself was a very formative and tricky part of the journey.”
So the benchmarks when you are at level three are now you’re probably 30 to 100 people inside your company. You’re probably at Series B-ish territory in terms of venture, maybe late Series A, maybe early Series C, but probably around Series B. You’ve really cracked a demand channel. You’ve cracked marketing and sales. You’ve got at least one channel that is very scalable. And probably 10% or more of your inbound is coming from just referrals and word of mouth and you’re getting known, like we talked about.
ACV ranges are very high. Very wide, I should say. I’d say where you want to get to with level three is 100 customers. And so if you’re approaching 100 customers and maybe you have 75K average ACV, that would be strong. You’re in this wide zone of five million, all the way up to 25 million ARR. That is very level three. And you’re actually starting now to think about some of these efficiency metrics. Remember, we’ve been punting efficiency. We were saying it shouldn’t be worse than a certain number, but it’s not a focus. Now, it’s got to come into focus.
Because the way that we get to level four is we keep ripping on the satisfaction and the demand, and we tune this thing to get very efficient. So we’re talking about our gross margin needs to be above 60%, hopefully above 70%. Our burn multiple is now below three. Ideally, we’re close to one. Burn multiple in the one to three zone is where we want to be at level three. Regretted churn’s less than 10%, NRR is greater than 110%. These are good benchmarks for this level.
Lenny Rachitsky: Hearing level three again tells me level two is basically your pivot from: I’m just grinding customers, selling, pitching, constantly trying to find new people, to level three, where it’s coming at you and basically, it’s the way you always hear about it, as you described. It’s rolling downhill. Fish are jumping in the boat. I haven’t heard that one before, but I love this.
So essentially, you found a demand channel. You found a way to get people to come to you. A lot of them are just hearing about you from other people, you don’t even know where they’re coming from. 10% you said are coming from referrals and you’re getting to 100 customers. I actually have another quote from David Hsu at Retool, and he actually said even at 100 customers, he still felt like every customer he was getting was the last one.
Todd Jackson: Oh, wow.
Lenny Rachitsky: He’s like, “I can’t believe we got DoorDash. That’s incredible. Okay. I think there’s no more. That’s it.”
Todd Jackson: He is a critical person and critical of himself, but a very high expectations person, let’s say.
Lenny Rachitsky: Yeah. Actually, another quote from Ali Ghodsi from Databricks actually said even at 100 million, he wasn’t sure they had product-market fit.
Todd Jackson: I mean, come on.
Lenny Rachitsky: Because he’s like, “I don’t know.” I don’t know. He felt like, “This is it. Okay, we’re done. We’re going to cap out here.” And I get that.
Todd Jackson: I think if you told many, many pre-seed founders that they’d be able to get to 100 million and not know whether they had product-market fit, they’d probably take that.
Lenny Rachitsky: But I think that’s maybe an interesting insight. It’s often good to be really paranoid and not feel like, “Okay, we’re on our way. Let’s start pouring in money. Let’s do it.”
Todd Jackson: I think that’s what makes a lot of the best founders the best.
Lenny Rachitsky: Indeed. Okay, so level three, anything else that would be useful here? Maybe what are signs that you’re struggling at level three, you’re stuck?
Todd Jackson: Yeah. So level three problems. And again, it’s hard to get to level three, so awesome work for getting here. But the problems that might start to emerge are you’ve got a leaky bucket, your NRR is below 90%, or your regretted churn’s greater than 10%. Maybe growth is just slowing down. You grew three X each of the prior two years, but you’re struggling to do a two X this year. At level three, or five years into the company or so, there’s probably a lot of competition. If you’ve gotten here, you’ve got something that’s working, and people are starting to notice and there’s going to be competitors.
And they could be the big competitors, they could be the new startups, but you’re going to have to figure out how to navigate probably a tougher market than you entered five years ago. And so maybe you found your first scalable channel, but it’s getting saturated, you got to find a new channel. These are the level three problems. Or you’re growing, but like I said, with efficiency, you’re spending too much money to grow. So you feel like, “Okay, yeah, we can grow at three X year over year, two X year over year, but that’s going to push our burn multiple above three again.” And that’s a little bit of a pickle to be in when you have to trade off growth and spend like that.
Lenny Rachitsky: You make it sound like life’s great, level three people are coming at us. I think it’s important to note never is it easy, never is it like, “Okay, we’re good. Let’s just ride this wave. Life’s going to get so much easier from now on.” It’s never easy. As you said, there’s all these things, you’re always still juggling, you still aren’t sure it’s going to keep going.
Todd Jackson: No, I agree. It’s like you’re spinning plates, and the higher levels you get, there’s more plates. You have to keep spinning. And so at level three and getting to level four, we’ve got to maintain satisfaction and demand. We cannot let them regress in a market that’s getting harder, and we have to really start focusing on efficiency. And the companies that can maintain satisfaction and demand and continue to grow and become really efficient, now we’re at level four.
Lenny Rachitsky: Let’s talk about level four. What does that look like? What are some problems people run into there?
Todd Jackson: So first of all, congrats. If you get to level four, you have a valuable company. You are probably already a unicorn, and you’re starting to think about, “Can I become a decacorn?” And so you’ve reached the highest levels of satisfaction, demand, and efficiency. And so the benchmarks at level four are like, “Okay, now your team is probably bigger than 100 people, you’re Series C, Series D or beyond. You’ve got more than 100 customers and you’re starting to figure out, ‘How do I get to 200, 300, eventually 1,000 customers?’” You’re beyond 25 million in ARR, so 25 million and up, I think in ARR, it qualifies as level four. And your other metrics are looking really good too. Your sales conversion first call to close one is probably better than 15%, your magic number is greater than one, your tax payback is less than 12 months.
All these things are super awesome. And finally, now you’ve got your gross margin above 80%. Your burn multiple’s ideally less than one at this point, you’ve got less than 10% churn. You’ve got greater than 120% NRR. And so now the whole thing is like, “Well, how do I keep growing?” This thing’s gotten pretty big. And this is generally when we get to 100 million, especially and beyond, the stage that founders are thinking about, “How do I keep growing by expanding TAM, by expanding total addressable market?” And to expand TAM, I can usually take my product and bring it into new markets, or I start to think about multiple products as a way to expand TAM.
And so this is where you see all the truly great companies, the legendary companies are all able to do that. Vanta has begun to do this. They have the Vanta trust management platform, they’ve got security questionnaires, they’ve got vendor risk management. So they’re starting to do this. You think of Verkada, who I mentioned before. They started with cloud security cameras, now they do alarms, now they do smoke detectors, now they do badge readers. Stripe has classic Stripe, but they’ve got Stripe Radar, Stripe Atlas. Square has the Square Stand, Cash App, Square Checking, Square Loans. All the companies that are tens of billions of dollars of value have figured out a way to do this. And it’s like the never-ending journey that you said before, Lenny. Like, “Congrats, you got to level four.”
But there’s just this endless thirst for continued growth. And the interesting thing about that is that it requires finding product-market fit over and over again. Just because you got to level four on your main product doesn’t mean product-market fit is free on all these new products. And you’ve been inside Airbnb and I’ve been inside Dropbox and Twitter. Getting new products to be successful is hard and it requires this mindset of like, “Yeah, we’ve got a little bit of advantage because people know who we are, and we have a customer set that hopefully we can layer on new products to. But it’s not easy.” You have to get into this mindset of product-market fit is never easy, and if we want to continue to grow, we got to find it again and again and maintain that mindset.
Lenny Rachitsky: Casey Winters has this great point also that expectations of customers ever increase. And so you have product-market fit today, but there’s going to be better products coming out, they’re changing, the world changes. And so not only do you have to worry about competitors, there’s just expectations continue to rise. So it’s a never-ending battle. To give people a little bit of a broader sense here, what percentage of companies do you find make it through each of these stages in your experience, what are rough numbers you may have in your head?
Todd Jackson: The majority of companies, so greater than 50%, probably closer to 60 or 70%, are going to get stuck at L1 or L2. And so that leaves, roughly, let’s say, 30% make it to L3 or L4 just in our experience looking broadly. And that’s our entire goal. Because again, once you get to L3, you’ve got a real shot, you’ve got a real shot at building an awesome company. And so if we get that number, help founders get that number above 30%, imagine if that was 50/50 and half the companies that we were working with at seed were able to get to level three strong product-market fit. I think that would be epic. And I think our founders would… There’d be incredible benefits to the ecosystem from that.
Lenny Rachitsky: Okay. So essentially, 60% ish of companies don’t make it past L2. And I love the way you’re framing it of just, “If we can just get a few more companies further, that makes a massive dent both in the world and the lives of founders and people that want to use products.” Another question I wanted to talk about briefly is just again, the timelines of each of these levels. Just in your rough experience, how long do each of these levels roughly take so people can get a sense of like, “Oh, it’s taken a lot longer. Maybe there’s a problem”?
Todd Jackson: So again, this whole thing probably takes four to six years, and so let’s just pick five years as the number to get to level four. I think the way this works, ideally, is you probably take 12 to 18 months to do level one, because that is the most important level, honestly, in my mind because that’s where you’re really choosing the right persona and the right problem to focus on. And I think just that choice is one of the most important choices that founders make. And the interesting thing, my partner, Josh Kopelman, talks about this all the time, is that founders spend 99% of their time building because that’s what they’ve done.
And they spend 1% of their time picking, in picking the market, picking the problem, picking the customer. And in reality, it’s that pick that determines the constraints and the boundaries of where you’re going to be working for the next, hopefully, 10 years of your life. So there’s a real imbalance there. And I actually think that that pick is the most important thing. So I would actually like to spend, let’s say, somewhere 12 to 18 months in level one, just really figuring that out and figuring out my four Ps. And then, hopefully, I move very quickly. It takes me a while to get to my first five satisfied customers, but they love it.
And then I go quickly through L2, maybe that takes about a year. This is like the Looker path, the happy path. And then L3 is long just because we’re going all the way from five million in revenue up to 25, and that might take a year or two, probably two years even in a good case. And then getting from 25 to 100 million is hard, obviously very hard. And then that probably takes a couple years. And then you’re figuring out all of these things.
You’re growing your team and your company’s got a lot more moving parts and functions, and there’s a demand generation side of the house and sales and there’s engineering and the whole thing just gets more complicated with a lot more people. But I think that if you set the foundation really nicely at level one and level two that hopefully the whole thing… The boulder is rolling down the hill and it’s carrying you forward and you don’t just feel like you’re pushing this rock uphill for five years. That’s not a fun place to be.
Lenny Rachitsky: There’s a lot of founders in that place and I know a few, so this is really interesting. So you’re roughly saying that maybe spend a year, year and a half on level one, which is you’re just grinding, cold emailing, reaching out, selling customers, and maybe getting to five customers in the first year and a half. That’s at the extreme, but that’s a good outcome. And then maybe another year trying to get to… What was it? 20? 25 customers.
Todd Jackson: Going from five to 25 quickly. Yeah, if I see a company go from five customers to 25 in a year, that is almost always a sign that there’s some pretty strong product-market fit there.
Lenny Rachitsky: Awesome. So many companies don’t go through that, and they have the funding to keep iterating, exploring, trying to figure things out. I don’t know if you have the answer here, but just what’s your advice of if it’s been four years and demand is not starting to come to them, they don’t have 25 customers? Is it, “Wait until you run out of money, just give it a shot”? Or is it, “Let’s just give the money back and move on to something else”?
Todd Jackson: Well, that’s a personal decision for founders. I do think if you’ve been going at it for four to five years and you haven’t started to find anything that you’re really feeling pull from the market on, I don’t know, you’ve done it for four to five years, what are the chances that you’re going to magically find something? I think there are probably a handful of startups that do it that figure it out and get back on an amazing growth curve, but that’s the exception rather than the rule.
So if a founder wants to return the money to investors, if a founder wants to look for a soft landing, there’s no shame in that. Product-market fit is very, very hard. That’s why we’re doing this. It’s why we’re trying to increase the odds. And we’re also trying to make it clear what it looks like and what it doesn’t look like. And everybody knows when they do a startup that the odds are that you will not get there. So there’s no shame in that, and I would completely be supportive of any founder who wants to take that path.
Lenny Rachitsky: I love that advice. I think that was a really important point to make. Let’s quickly summarize the levels and then I want to also summarize the four Ps again, because I think that’s the thing you can actually do. And so I think I just want to reinforce, “Here’s the four things you should play with if things aren’t going in the direction.” So first of all, let’s summarize the levels, what it looks like and what you should be focusing on there.
Todd Jackson: Okay. So level one, nascent product-market fit. You’re just trying to get three to five customers and you’re focused on satisfaction first and foremost. Level two is developing. This is where you’re going from five to 25 customers, and you’re really starting to focus on demand. Level three is strong product-market fit. You’re going from 25 customers up to 100 or more, and you’ve got to start thinking about efficiency at that scale. And then level four is extreme, you’re more than 100 customers, your company’s awesome. You got to keep doing all three of those things well, and you have to start looking for ways to expand your total addressable market.
Lenny Rachitsky: Okay, perfect. And then let’s come back to the four Ps. I have the draft. I have your post up here, so I have the detailed version of each of these things. But could you just talk through these four things? What is it you should be thinking about changing if things aren’t working, the four Ps basically?
Todd Jackson: Yeah. So the four Ps again are: persona, problem, promise, and product. And the persona is interesting because in some ways, it’s synonymous with the market. A lot of people think of the market in this macroeconomic way where it’s like, “Oh, it’s this category of ERP software or whatever.” I think it’s much more tangible for a founder to think of the market as a collection of people. Jack Altman was thinking about his market as all of the HR leaders out there, and he was thinking about how many of them are there and what are the problems they have and how much money are they willing to spend on solving those problems.
It’s a collection of people who have money to pay for a product or pay for a service. And so that’s really the first piece, find the persona and really try to get into the mind of the persona. That’s another thing I was amazed about spending time with Zach from Plaid, and Lloyd from Looker, and Jack from Lattice. They had all of these people, they were text messaging with all of their customers and they’re meeting them on the weekends and stuff. They really, really knew their customer well. They were friends with their customers.
And so you’ve got to get so deep into the mind of the persona and: what are their challenges? What are their goals? How do you help them succeed at their job? That’s the stuff that earns you the right to get the rest of the Ps right. And so the problem, obviously, comes next. And I think about this, and I can actually get into, Lenny, a little bit if you want to get into some of the customer discovery stuff because that’s the second session.
Lenny Rachitsky: Perfect segue.
Todd Jackson: And I was talking a little bit about we think of it as dollar-driven customer discovery. And I think a lot of founders are familiar with customer discovery. I think they at least talk to customers, which is good. I don’t think most of them do it in the highest signal way because again, the customers, they’re people, they’re nice, they’re going to be polite. They’re also not good at predicting things that they will use or buy or want.
They’re very good at talking about their problems, but they’re not necessarily good at predicting their own behavior. So we think about it in terms of dollar-driven discovery, which is how do you test the dollar potential of a hypothesis? And this is a whole two-hour session, but I’ll try to do it briefly here just to give you a sense of it.
Lenny Rachitsky: No, let’s get into it. Let’s keep going. I’m just joking.
Todd Jackson: So you’ve got to identify extreme value. This is independent of what I’m building, Lenny. I want to hear about your problems and your challenges and what is most important to you. And so I need to do it in this non-leading way and I need to avoid the trap that we call happy years. Because I found a lot of founders, “I want to build this thing, I want you to like my thing.” And so I look for the things that you say that support what I’m doing. That’s the trap. And so I could just try it on you, Lenny. Yeah, I might say…
Lenny Rachitsky: Let’s do it.
Todd Jackson: Okay, Lenny, so you’re doing Lenny’s Newsletter and you’re building Lenny’s Podcasts. When you think about we’re sitting here in April, over the next three months, let’s say, what are your top three goals for Lenny’s Newsletter and Lenny’s Podcast?
Lenny Rachitsky: Oh, wow, interesting. I’m trying to find a more scalable way to do this newsletter long-term. It’s basically something I have to do for the rest of my life, in theory. I don’t know if there’s an exit path for this newsletter career, so I’m trying to find ways to scale this over time. That’s one. Two is just up-leveling the quality of each podcast episode in terms of visuals and audio and trailers and things like that. And then three is make the community more valuable to everyone that listens that’s in the newsletter community. Those are top of mind.
Todd Jackson: Okay, awesome. And so what’s hard about those three things? You said you want to scale the newsletter, you want to increase quality, you want to make the community awesome. What’s hard about those things? Or what’s standing in your way of doing those?
Lenny Rachitsky: I don’t have the answer yet, I guess is the answer. I don’t know exactly how to do this yet.
Todd Jackson: You don’t know how to do it. Okay. It’s probably a service in this case, not a product. What if I was able to give you a service that said, “Lenny, you’re going to be able to scale this podcast. We are going to help you find the 500 best guests in the world that are really excellent. We’re going to guarantee they show up. You’re going to have endless content on your podcast, in your newsletter”? What do you think about that? What do you think about that idea?
Lenny Rachitsky: I’d pay a lot of money for that.
Todd Jackson: Okay. So that’s an example of a wow statement. And you probably had in the back of your mind, “How are you going to do that? Is that actually going to work?”
Lenny Rachitsky: That’s right.
Todd Jackson: In my experience, that’s a good thing and an exciting thing. If I’m pitching a product idea to somebody and they are like, “Wow, does that really work? And if that thing works, I’d sign up for the wait list today.” That to me is like, “Okay, now I got to figure out how to build that thing, but I know if I am able to build it and deliver on that promise, they are going to want it.” Or you would maybe say signs like you would demonstrate a behavior that shows that you’re interested in. You’d be like, “Oh, Todd, can we meet again next week to talk about this?” Or like, “Hey Todd, I actually would love to show this to the people I work with. Can you send me the deck?”
Those are the signs that I’m looking for. If you had reacted like, “Yeah, that sounds kind of interesting,” that’s a no, right? That is a no. The word interesting is a polite way of saying no, right? And so I’m either looking for wow statements or I’m looking for demonstrated behavior that shows interest. I then would probably, if I want to keep going with this, and this is all in the identifying extreme value, I’d ask you, “Well, what stands out as valuable here to you?” And I want to hear you answer quickly. You mentioned it’s either going to make my products so much better, it’s going to drive success for my business, or it’s going to save me a bunch of money or something. Save me a bunch of risk.” But something where you would very quickly be able to identify why that’s valuable to you.
So that part one is extreme value. Then I got to figure out ability to pay and willingness to pay. And for you, this is easy because you’re not a 5,000 person company and you’re the boss. So this is probably pretty streamlined. There’s no procurement function at Lenny’s Newsletter. So let’s say I’m going after a bigger company. The questions I’d ask on confirming the ability to pay are: are you currently looking for a product like this? Or are you building something internally?
This is the Ironclad thing where Jason was like, “Oh, you’re looking for a CLM already.” Another way I think about it is if a customer has a problem, and I really think they have a problem, and they know they have the problem and they’re looking for a solution for the problem. Or they’ve even tried to build their own solution to it and failed, that’s the best customer. They want this thing badly. They’ve demonstrated that and they’ve actually failed at building it because they underestimated how hard it was. So are you currently looking for building a solution here?
Lenny Rachitsky: Essentially, there’s a budget. You’re looking for, “Is there money to go towards this problem”?
Todd Jackson: That’s the next question I was going to say is where would a budget for this come from? And the best answer is that there’s an existing budget. Either we already spend money in some way for a competing tool, or something that can be displaced by you, or we’re spending, we put five engineers together to help build this thing. There’s some source of budget that I can get. Then the question is, “Well, how does your team make decisions on third-party tools to bring on?” And you’re never going to get the cleanest answer here. In larger companies, you might get semi-clean answers, but it’s something like, “Okay, this manager can approve it directly up to a certain dollar amount. If not, it goes to this next level up of manager. And if we’re going to spend more than 50K on it, we actually have to compare three different alternatives.”
But whatever, there’s some known process. That’s what I’m looking for rather than just a bunch of ambiguity. So that’s ability to pay. And then I’m going into willingness to pay. I don’t want to try to quantify that. That’s where I go, “What’s your budget for solving this? What are you paying for this other tool? Let me show you mine. You think that you’d pay less for that or you’d pay more for that? Can you replace this other thing with the thing I have?” And then I love this question. I think you’ve had Madhavan Ramanujam on the show, right?
Lenny Rachitsky: Mm-hmm.
Todd Jackson: He has this question, he’s from Simon-Kucher. I love his thing of like, “Lenny, what is a fair price you would pay for this thing that I just described to you?” And then you say your thing. And then I go, “Okay. Well, what would be an expensive price?” And then I say, “Okay, what would be a prohibitively expensive price?” And you ask those three questions. And generally, when people tell you the fair price, it’s a little bit of like they’re trying to get a deal. And if the product’s good, the expensive price is the one that they would actually pay.
Where they’re saying it feels expensive, but you put it in front of them, and you say, “It costs this much,” and if it’s really good, they want it. And the prohibitively expensive one is the one that’s too expensive and they’d have to just, “I just can’t do that.” So I love these style of questions. I think they’re just a lot more specific than what I see most founders doing, which is just chatting with customers. You really want to try to put them to some questions where you know they’re going to answer honestly because you’re asking them questions. You’re not asking them to speculate and you’re asking them fairly concrete stuff.
Oh, and the thing I should say is it’s a two-hour session, like I mentioned. It’s one thing to explain this stuff, but it’s another thing to see it. And so we show tons of Zoom recordings from founders who have gone through the program, and we actually do this thing where all the founders who are going through the program, they recorded all their videos, their customer discovery videos, and then our team watches all of the videos and creates highlight reels.
And we sit around in a room and watch them together and we say like, “Oh, look at these questions that Lenny asked. And did you see how the customer responded? Wow, that’s an eyes-light-up moment.” Or, “Todd asked these questions, he’s leading the witness a little bit and the customer didn’t seem that interested.” So the thing that’s interesting is as a founder, you never see anybody else’s version of this. You only have your own experience. And so just seeing how other founders do this in a real live setting is super. People love it.
Lenny Rachitsky: And it’s always easy to hear these things. It’s much harder to be the person asking these questions to a potential customer you’re trying to sell. And it’s just asking, “How much would you pay for this?” So I love that you kind of force people through the actual practice of it. Todd, you’re going to get a lot of applicants for this program. This sounds amazing. I know you’re giving a peek at the stuff that we haven’t really talked about. On this point you just shared, which is essentially trying to get real skin in the game insight into how big of a problem this is, I love that you just basically shared a bunch of questions.
Someone could just rewind right now and just write down all these questions that you shared and use them when you’re talking to customers. Obviously, the classic problem is they tell you they’re going to buy it but they don’t. And all the stuff you shared is, “Here’s ways to get at: will they actually buy it before they have the actual product?” Is there anything else you want to say on that? Just tips for not being tricked and people just saying, “Oh, yeah, I love this thing”? I know you talked through a lot of this, but anything else?
Todd Jackson: Yeah, I think there’s a couple of things. One is you have to know what to show people when you’re actually showing them something. Lattice is the kind of product I mentioned that could be sold with Figma mock-ups. Looker couldn’t be sold that way. Looker, you actually had to do a demo with their real data. So it required a lot more work to do that. Vanta was neither like a demo or a mock-up, it was actually doing the work. And Pilot was like that. There’s a bunch of companies like that. So you have to figure out what is my product and how does it solve the problem? And therefore, what fidelity does my early product or early demo have to be at in order to land the sale?
And then I think you have to know when you’ve talked to enough people. It takes time to talk to people. And the rule of thumb is if you talk to enough people and you can predict 70 to 80% of what the next person is going to say to you, because you’ve just talked to so many people and you’ve heard the pattern so clearly, that’s when you’ve talked to enough people. But these are all things you got to learn. And that’s why doing it experientially in the way that we do the program we think was best.
Lenny Rachitsky: Is there anything that we haven’t covered that you wanted to touch on before we let you go?
Todd Jackson: No. If you’re listening, if you’re a B2B founder in those early days of starting your company, or you know anyone who fits that description, and you have an appreciation for just how hard it is to find product-market fit and you don’t want to go it alone, then please apply to this program or share the application. Like we promise, we will review every single application. And I’m just really looking forward to working with a group of 20 or so amazing founders, and helping them navigate these early days of product-market fit finding. It’s what I love to do.
Lenny Rachitsky: So just to make sure the right people apply, remind people who is a great fit. So it’s B2B founders, and you said they’ve been at it for six to nine months, something like that?
Todd Jackson: Yeah, something in that zone or earlier. You have an idea of what your product is. You have a hypothesis about what it is and who it’s for, but you probably haven’t started writing any code yet.
Lenny Rachitsky: And if they’ve been at it for four years and haven’t found success, this is not a fit.
Todd Jackson: I could try to help them one-on-one, but no, that’s not a fit for this program.
Lenny Rachitsky: And then how do they apply and when are their applications due?
Todd Jackson: Yeah. So you go to pmf.firstround.com. Applications are open. They’re going to go till May 7th, and then the program starts on May 29th. And if you want to reach out to me specifically, you can find me on Twitter. I’m @tjack, T-J-A-C-K. You can follow me, DM me. And yeah, I’m looking forward to working with some amazing founders that I know are listening right now.
Lenny Rachitsky: Amazing. I’m so happy we did this. I feel like this conversation is going to help a ton of founders, and they’re going to come back to it again and again. Todd, thank you so much for being here.
Todd Jackson: Lenny, it’s been a pleasure.
Lenny Rachitsky: It’s been my pleasure. Bye everyone. Thank you so much for listening. If you found this valuable, you can subscribe to the show on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, or your favorite podcast app. Also, please consider giving us a rating or leaving a review as that really helps other listeners find the podcast. You can find all past episodes or learn more about the show at lennyspodcast.com. See you in the next episode.
Glossary
| English | 中文 |
|---|---|
| ACV | 年合同金额(ACV) |
| ARR | 年度经常性收入(ARR) |
| Brett Berson | Brett Berson |
| burn multiple | 资金消耗倍数(burn multiple) |
| Casey Winters | Casey Winters |
| Christina Cacioppo | Christina Cacioppo |
| design partners | 设计合作伙伴(design partners) |
| developing | 发展 |
| dollar-driven discovery | 美元驱动的探索(dollar-driven discovery) |
| ecosystem | 生态系统(ecosystem) |
| extreme | 极强 |
| extreme product-market fit | 极强产品市场契合度(extreme product-market fit) |
| First Round | First Round |
| founder-led sales | 创始人主导的销售(founder-led sales) |
| gross margin | 毛利率(gross margin) |
| Ironclad | Ironclad |
| Jack Altman | Jack Altman |
| Jason Boehmig | Jason Boehmig |
| Josh Kopelman | Josh Kopelman |
| Lenny Rachitsky | Lenny Rachitsky |
| Lloyd Tabb | Lloyd Tabb |
| Looker | Looker |
| Madhavan Ramanujam | Madhavan Ramanujam |
| magic number | 神奇数字 |
| marginal customer | 边际客户(marginal customer) |
| nascent | 萌芽 |
| NRR | 净收入留存率(NRR) |
| persona | 目标用户 |
| Persona | Persona |
| problem | 问题 |
| product | 产品 |
| product-market fit | 产品市场契合度 |
| Product-Market Fit Method | 产品市场契合度(product-market fit)方法 |
| promise | 承诺 |
| Rahul | Rahul |
| regretted churn | 非意愿流失(regretted churn) |
| Rick Song | Rick Song |
| Series A | A 轮(Series A) |
| Series B | B 轮(Series B) |
| Series C | C 轮(Series C) |
| Series D | D 轮 |
| Simon-Kucher | Simon-Kucher |
| strong | 强 |
| strong product-market fit | 强产品市场契合度(strong product-market fit) |
| TAM | TAM(总可达市场) |
| tax payback | tax payback(回收期) |
| the grind | 苦工(the grind) |
| Todd Jackson | Todd Jackson |
| wow statement | 惊叹陈述(wow statement) |
| Zach Perret | Zach Perret |
Reformatted by reformat_english.py
产品市场契合度(PMF)常被视为创业过程中难以言喻的“玄学”,却又是企业前三年生死攸关的命题。本文基于First Round Capital合伙人Todd Jackson对数百家初创公司的深度复盘,将这一模糊概念拆解为极具操作性的科学框架。Todd凭借其在Gmail、Facebook等顶尖科技公司的深厚产品资历,指出PMF并非一蹴而就,而是存在萌芽、发展、强、极强四个递进层次,且约六成企业会受困于第二级。面对增长瓶颈,文章给出了破局的“四个P”法则——精准调整目标用户、问题、承诺与产品。这不仅是一套诊断工具,更是一份跨越“埋头苦干”阶段、通往高阶PMF的实战指南,值得每位在迷雾中摸索的创业者与产品人深思。
寻找产品市场契合度(product-market fit)的框架 | Todd Jackson(First Round Capital)
核心观点速览
Todd Jackson:寻找产品市场契合度(product-market fit)是创业公司前三年最重要的事情,作为一个话题,它却一直缺乏充分的探讨和解释。
Lenny Rachitsky:你一直在研究一个产品市场契合度框架。
Todd Jackson:我们在 First Round Review 上发表了几十篇文章,发现了一套非常一致的规律:需求满足度和效率。但有趣的是,你并不是从一开始就同时追求这三者。
Lenny Rachitsky:产品市场契合度基本上有四个层次:萌芽(nascent)、发展(developing)、强(strong)、极强(extreme)。
Todd Jackson:大约有 60% 的公司永远无法跨过第二级。
Lenny Rachitsky:如果你卡住了,这四个 P 基本上就是你应该尝试改变的东西。
Todd Jackson:它们是目标用户(persona)、问题(problem)、承诺(promise)和产品(product)。Lattice 保留了第一个,但改变了其余三个。Vanta 则四个全改了。
Lenny Rachitsky:听到第三级的描述,我感觉第二级基本上就是你摆脱“只是埋头苦干、销售、推销”状态的转折点。
Todd Jackson:这正是事情开始变得有趣的地方。
嘉宾介绍
Lenny Rachitsky:今天的嘉宾是 Todd Jackson。Todd 是传奇风投公司 First Round Capital 的合伙人。我很少在播客里请风投,但正如 Todd 在本期节目开头分享的那样,他是一位非常特别的风投。在进入风险投资领域之前,他担任了四年 Gmail 的产品负责人。他是 Facebook 动态消息、照片和群组的产品经理,包括主导了动态消息的一次重大改版。他还曾是 Twitter 的产品管理总监,以及 Dropbox 的产品和设计副总裁。他也是一位创始人,将自己的公司卖给了 Twitter。本期节目是非常特别且与众不同的一期。Todd 和 First Round 的团队在过去一年里查看了他们所有的数据,以及多年来合作的数百家初创公司的历程。由此,他们整理出了一个非常实用且可操作的框架,以帮助创始人找到产品市场契合度。他们正在将这个框架转化为一个为期三个月的创始人项目,在这次对话中,Todd 分享了对该项目的独家预览,特别是产品市场契合度的各个阶段。我们将讨论如何知道你处于哪个阶段,如果卡在那个阶段该怎么办,以及你可以改变什么来摆脱困境。如果你是一名创始人,或者在公司内部构建新产品,感觉进展不如预期,你将从这次对话中获得巨大的价值。接下来,有请 Todd Jackson。
Lenny Rachitsky:Todd,非常感谢你的到来,欢迎来到播客。
深入探讨前的背景
Todd Jackson:Lenny,我很高兴来到这里。谢谢你的邀请。
Lenny Rachitsky:首先提一下,你是一名风投,这在我的播客中非常罕见。但你是一位非常特别的风投,你有深厚的产品背景。我觉得稍微介绍一下你的产品背景和资历可能会有帮助,这样大家就能真正体会到你作为产品思考者有多么靠谱。
Todd Jackson:没错。我是一名风投,现在是 First Round Capital 的合伙人,在 First Round 待了四年。但在 First Round 之前,我并不是风投。2013 年我创立了一家公司叫 Cover,那实际上是在 11 年前由 First Round 投资的。我就是那样结识 First Round 的。在那之前,我在早期的 Gmail 担任产品负责人,那是 21 世纪初,后来我在 Facebook 工作。然后我创办了 Cover,最终我们在 2014 年把 Cover 卖给了 Twitter。我在 Twitter 参与了许多不同的产品。之后我是 Dropbox 的产品和设计副总裁,那是 2015 年到 2018 年。所以我一直热爱产品,这也是我现在热爱做种子轮风投的原因,因为我喜欢投资那些尚未达到产品市场契合度的早期创始人,然后帮助他们达成这一目标。我就是喜欢一遍又一遍地做这件事。
Lenny Rachitsky:我觉得关于你为什么决定进入风投而不是留在产品领域,我们完全可以再录一期完整的播客。
Todd Jackson:我们可以录。
Lenny Rachitsky:但我们要保持专注。我们今天在这里的原因是,过去一年多来你一直在研究一个产品市场契合度框架,本质上是一个帮助创始人和产品团队找到产品市场契合度的框架,我们应该谈谈这个。但作为创始人和产品团队,你必须做对的最重要的事情就是找到产品市场契合度。我提前看了一下这个框架,我很喜欢。我喜欢你的结构方式,喜欢你思考它的方式。
框架的起源与价值
那么我们今天要做的,就是深入探讨这个框架。首先,我想花几分钟设定一点背景,让大家了解这个框架适用于哪些人,以及该如何看待它。所以也许第一个问题是,你为什么认为人们需要一个寻找产品市场契合度的框架?另外,如果你愿意的话,也可以谈谈为什么产品市场契合度如此重要?为什么这是人们甚至应该去思考的事情?
**Todd Jackson:**关于产品市场契合度,我发现对很多人来说它很神秘,人们往往把它纯粹看作一门艺术而不是科学。而在互联网上能找到的关于产品市场契合度的建议都非常笼统。“你看到它的时候就会知道,你拥有它的时候就会知道”,它并不具体。还有很多其他创业话题在互联网上有很好的内容,比如雇佣第一个销售人员、召开董事会会议,这些都是具体且具战术性的内容。但是围绕产品市场契合度的具体内容并没有那么多。
所以我认为,这实际上就是 Superhuman 的 Rahul 因其寻找产品市场契合度的方法而闻名的原因。这篇文章于 2018 年发表在 First Round Review 上,立刻引起了人们的兴趣并广受欢迎。我认为原因在于它很具体,具有战术性,并且为这个人们原本认为纯粹是艺术的事物带来了一点科学成分。我认为这也是为什么你的内容也如此受欢迎,Lenny。不久前我们一起合作了一篇关于产品验证的文章,还有你做的关于 B2B SaaS 公司的七部分系列文章以及你提供的 PMF 基准数据——我认为是关于达到一个产品和获取客户以及达到产品市场契合度需要多长时间——那些文章被广泛阅读。关于这个话题确实没有那么多好的具体内容。但就像你说的,产品市场契合度是初创公司在前三年里要做的唯一最重要的事情,而它作为一个话题,只是探索得太少,解释得太少。
所以我们觉得这是一件非常重要的事情,值得专注于此。我个人就这个话题与数百位创始人进行过交谈。我们在 First Round Review 上发表了几十篇文章。我们称之为“通往产品市场契合度之路”系列,在其中我们采访创始人关于早期的经历。我总是对其中存在哪些模式很感兴趣。如果你和足够多的成功创始人交谈——在这种情况下,可以是企业级软件创始人——并问他们:“在运营公司、创办公司的最初六到九个月里,你做了什么?从中涌现出了什么模式?”我们发现了一套非常一致的模式,这就是我们决定以此为基础构建框架的原因。
**Lenny Rachitsky:**太棒了。我认为你接触到的经验处于一个非常有趣的维恩图交汇点,非常适合开发这样一个框架。第一,你有深厚的产品背景,你创办过公司,你看到大量的初创公司经历这段旅程,许多成功了,许多没有。所以我理解为什么你想做这件事,也理解为什么我认为这会对很多人非常有价值。你简要谈到了为什么产品市场契合度如此重要,也许再多分享一点会很有帮助,为什么这是人们应该如此执着的事情,以及为什么你要花这么多时间来开发它?
**Todd Jackson:**我认为作为创始人,有太多事情要做。你必须选择一个市场,寻找一位联合创始人,组建一个团队,筹集资金,构建一个产品,销售一个产品。所以有时候人们会忘记,实际上,在前几年里唯一重要的事情就是找到产品市场契合度——实际上,是我们定义的极强产品市场契合度(extreme product-market fit),我稍后会详细说明。因为如果你找到了极强产品市场契合度,势头自然会带着你,市场会拉着你走。而且很容易知道该构建什么,因为你正在构建客户想要的东西,这对团队也是一种激励。招人也变得容易,如果你找到了产品市场契合度,一切都会变得更容易,它是推动公司前进的动力。
我们是一家种子阶段的风投公司。我们倾向于与处于达成产品市场契合度之前的非常早期的创始人合作。关于这一点残酷的真相是,他们中的大多数人都没有跨过前几个层级。大多数初创公司都没有跨过我们称之为的一级产品市场契合度或二级产品市场契合度。我稍后会详细说明并定义所有这些内容。他们卡在了前几个层级中的一个。如果他们能够解锁正确的产品,找到向客户解释它的正确方式,让客户深感满意,并且外面有足够多这样的客户,这就会带动整个公司向前发展。
框架的适用人群
**Lenny Rachitsky:**这个框架具体是为谁准备的?对于正在听的听众来说,他们如何知道这是否适合自己?
**Todd Jackson:**这是为早期的 B2B 创始人准备的,特别是那些所做的业务更偏向销售驱动而非自下而上的创始人。我认为自下而上是一个独立的世界。在我看来,它更接近消费品开发。我也做过消费类产品。我认为消费类产品涉及更多的炼金术。它关乎拥有极佳的品味,在正确的时间找到正确的东西,就像把闪电装进瓶子里一样。我认为企业级业务的好处,特别是销售驱动的 B2B,在于它有更多的科学成分。所以它是为那些处于创办公司最初的六到九个月,并希望从一开始就为产品市场契合度打下基础的销售驱动型 B2B 创始人准备的。
**Lenny Rachitsky:**太棒了。好的。所以是 B2B 创始人,在创业历程的前六到九个月内,销售驱动。太棒了。
**Todd Jackson:**没错,是的。
框架的预期效果
**Lenny Rachitsky:**你谈到了这其中的科学性。我想你不想过度承诺,说这能帮你找到产品市场契合度,然后第一步、第二步、第三步就能获利。你如何看待这个框架带来的实际好处,以及人们应该如何评估在遵循这个框架走完这段历程后,找到产品市场契合度的概率?
**Todd Jackson:**我们无法在这里保证成功。我只想先说明一点,找到极强产品市场契合度是非常非常困难的。我们试图做的是提高你的胜算,提高概率,减少运气的成分,为你提供一个框架和一种思维方式来思考你需要做的事情。我认为这确实能提高概率。就像我早些时候说的,大多数初创公司都卡在了前几个层级。我认为,如果你知道这条路是什么样子,知道你可以利用哪些杠杆,并且知道你的目标是什么,我认为我们可以让更多公司达到三级和四级产品市场契合度,这才是你真正想要达到的位置,也是你拥有一家极具价值的公司的位置。
配套项目介绍
**Lenny Rachitsky:**完美。好的,最后一个问题。你为创始人推出了一整个项目,让他们能够深入学习所有这些内容,是一个为期数周的项目。对于想要更深入钻研并实际参与这个项目的人来说,我们今天在这里也会涵盖其中的很多内容。谈谈他们如何找到这个项目,以及这个项目是如何运作的。
**Todd Jackson:**我们推出了一项新项目,我们称之为产品市场契合度(product-market fit)方法。就像我说的,它的设计初衷是为了帮助早期的 B2B 创始人提高找到产品市场契合度的胜算。它是完全免费的,是一个非常密集的项目。你可以在 pmf.firstround.com 查看所有细节,申请截止日期是 5 月 7 日。项目于 5 月 29 日开始。我们实际上在去年年底运行了一个测试版,我想你可能认识里面的一些创始人,Lenny,他们来自 Stripe、Plaid、Airbnb 和 Twitter。反馈非常棒,这让我感觉非常好。
有一位创始人是这么说的:“我觉得这 14 周为我节省了两年的时间,不然我可能会在沙漠中漫游。”所以完整的项目有八个环节,今天我们要做的正是第一个环节。第一个环节是关于我们所说的产品市场契合度层级。第二个环节是关于客户探索,我们实际上称之为美元驱动的探索(dollar-driven discovery)。我们会非常具体地探讨,不仅是做客户访谈和客户探索的常规方式,而是如何发现客户愿意为这个东西付钱,并且付很多钱?
我们会讨论市场验证、产品定位。我们有一个关于设计合作伙伴(design partners)的环节,因为我认为很多创始人对此有疑问。我该如何找到合适的设计合作伙伴?与他们达成协议的正确方式是什么?我该如何将他们转化为付费客户?所有这些事情。我们讨论产品迭代和转型,我将这个阶段称为苦工(the grind),产品迭代的苦工。然后我们会花大量时间讨论创始人主导的销售(founder-led sales)。
我们这样做的原因是我们真的非常喜欢和非常技术的创始人、建设者、那些有工程背景、产品设计、数据科学背景的人、那些建设者合作。所以这基本上就是这个项目。就像我说的,任何在构建新的 B2B SaaS 公司的创始人,都欢迎申请。如果你是技术出身,就像我说的,如果你有一个清晰的产品想法或假设,但你创办公司不到 6 到 12 个月,那会加分。
激励一致与时间投入
**Lenny Rachitsky:**我很喜欢这里的激励是如此一致。你们帮助公司找到产品市场契合度。如果 First Round 做得好,大家都会好。构建这样的东西非常有意义。我忍不住想提到或问的一件事是,你说这是一个密集的项目。你是如何发现创始人有时间做这样的事情,同时还在构建他们的公司的?我知道这有助于他们构建,但你如何看待他们有这么多事情要做,却有时间参加这样的项目?
**Todd Jackson:**我们对此的看法是,这个项目每个创始人大概每周需要 10 个小时,而这 10 个小时是你本来就要做的工作。字面意思就是,你在和客户交谈,你在改进你的定位,你在对你的市场和你应该构建什么进行批判性思考。所以我对这个问题的看法,以及我从经历过的 11 位创始人那里听到的说法是,它只是为我本来在做的事情增加了结构,并且实际上让我变得更高效了。
**Lenny Rachitsky:**最后一个问题,你提到它是免费的。这是怎么运作的?这对所有人来说是怎么运作的?
**Todd Jackson:**所以它是 100% 免费的,字面上说,它花费你 0 美元。我们给你 0 美元,我们拥有你公司 0% 的股份。这和我想的市面上很多其他项目非常不同。而这只是我们做的一件事。多年来,我们运行了 First Round Angel Track,我知道你参加过,Lenny。我们运行 First Round Review 已经 10 年了。我们让这些东西免费,我们的信念是你必须在生态系统(ecosystem)中创造价值。
你必须向世界推出有用的东西,如果你能创造那种价值,为受众创造足够的价值,那么你最终将能够捕获那种价值。所以我们认为这是一个双赢。我们得以一窥未来的一些伟大公司,而他们也得以一窥 First Round。
**Lenny Rachitsky:**明白了。所以公司不需要接受你们的资金就能成为这个项目的一部分。
**Todd Jackson:**没错。
**Lenny Rachitsky:**好的,我们进入正题。让我们谈谈这个框架。也许作为一个粗略的概述,这个框架是如何运作的?公司如何找到产品市场契合度?
产品市场契合度框架概述
**Todd Jackson:**所以这个框架始于一个非常简单的想法,即产品市场契合度不是一刀切的事情,而且它不会在一夜之间发生。具体对于 B2B 公司来说,它确实倾向于遵循一个可重复的模式。所以我们从定义最终目标开始。最终目标是达到极强产品市场契合度(extreme product-market fit)。我们对此有一个精确的定义。让我读给你听。极强产品市场契合度是一种对产品的广泛需求状态,该产品满足了一个关键需求,关键是,能够可重复且高效地交付给每个客户。
所以这里有三个关键想法:需求、满意度和效率。我认为效率值得强调,因为这是大多数人会在他们的定义中遗漏的东西。你会听到类似,“哦,这是一个产品,人们喜欢它。那很好,那就是产品市场契合度。”但是如果你看看,市面上有那些产品。作为 WeWork 的客户,我曾是它的忠实粉丝。我也是 Casper 和其他这些产品的粉丝。那些产品设法实现了客户满意度和需求,但他们从来没有把效率做对,所以整个业务就是永远无法规模化。
我在 First Round 的合伙人 Brett Berson 给出了这个一百美元自动售货机的例子,我非常喜欢这个例子,想象一下我造了一台自动售货机,我把它放在旧金山的正中间。你走到这台自动售货机前,你放进去一美元,出来一张一百美元的钞票。这就是产品。那将有疯狂的需求。那台自动售货机前会排起长队。我想人们会非常满意。他们会说,“这太棒了。”留存率会非常好。我确信他们明天还会回来。但整个事情是它很荒谬。整个隐喻是荒谬的,因为做这样的事情根本不可行。
然而你会看到很多初创公司有点在这样做。他们基本上是在用他们的产品,花一美元给出两美元,这让他们走得很远。但这不是真正的产品市场契合度。所以这就是我们认为效率,以及你如何思考你正在做的事情的经济模型非常重要的原因之一。然后是我喜欢的另一方面,也就是我们有一个我们称之为边际客户(marginal customer)的概念,以及你将为你的公司、为你的产品获得的下一个增量客户。如果你有产品市场契合度,并且随着你在这个旅程中前进,边际客户应该变得越来越容易、越来越容易、越来越容易获得,更容易获取他们,更容易用好的产品为他们提供好的服务。
Todd Jackson:这意味着在这一过程中你的效率在不断提升,你的产品市场契合度也在不断增强。所以你必须同时具备这三样东西:需求、满意度和效率。但有趣的是,你并不是从一开始就同时追求这三者。因此,产品市场契合度是分阶段发生的,它会在多年内逐步实现。对于最优秀的企业级公司来说,我想他们大约需要四到六年时间才能达到极强产品市场契合度(extreme product-market fit)。虽然会有一些差异,但大致是四到六年。因此我们将这四个层级进行了标记。我们说第一级产品市场契合度是萌芽(nascent)产品市场契合度。第二级是发展(developing),第三级是强(strong),第四级是极强(extreme)。而这正是你想要达到的目标。
在这一过程中,你需要在满意度、需求和效率这三个维度之间进行权衡,因为它们是交织在一起的。你可以在营销上花一大笔钱,这会增加你的需求,但如果你这样做,你的效率就会降低。你可以在效率和自动化大量东西上投入很多,但这实际上可能会损害客户体验,从而降低满意度。所以我认为有趣的一点是,你实际上在每个层级都在做出权衡,而你在每个层级应该优化的东西是不同的。因此我们讨论了所有这些迹象,无论你是否在某个特定层级陷入了困境,如何摆脱困境,以及如何沿着这条路径前进。
萌芽(nascent)产品市场契合度
Lenny Rachitsky:太棒了。我们将逐一讨论这些。作为听众,我的想法是你可能正处于其中一个层级中。我们试图做的就是帮你走出那个层级,并帮助你沿着阶梯向上移动到下一个层级。所以简单总结一下,我这有笔记。基本上产品市场契合度有四个层级,也就是你所拥有的产品市场契合度的强度:萌芽(nascent)、发展(developing)、强(strong)、极强(extreme)。
Todd Jackson:是的。
Lenny Rachitsky:好的。然后在这些层级中的每一个里面,你都有三个维度:满意度、需求和效率。我们将讨论这些意味着什么以及你如何使用它们。让我们谈谈第一级,萌芽(nascent)产品市场契合度。它看起来是什么样的?如果你在那里陷入困境,你会怎么做?有哪些感觉到处于萌芽(nascent)产品市场契合度的公司例子?
Todd Jackson:好的。第一级,萌芽(nascent)。在这一点上,你可能就像一个种子前或种子阶段的公司。你的团队不到10人。在第一级,你的工作是找到三到五个有特定且值得解决的问题(problem)的客户,并为他们提供令人满意的解决方案。你必须挑选一个对他们来说既重要又紧迫的问题(problem)。你提供的解决方案需要满足某种他们深切关心的承诺(promise)。所以,Lenny,在你刚回顾的三个维度中,当你在第一级时,满意度排在第一位,需求第二位,效率排在最后。在这个阶段,如果效率低下能帮助你发现能带来极好客户满意度的东西,那么实际上是可以接受的。因此,我认为我能想到的最好的例子之一就是这家叫 Vanta 的公司。
Lenny Rachitsky:喜欢 Vanta。真是个绝佳的例子。
Todd Jackson:绝佳的例子。Vanta 是由 Christina Cacioppo 在2016年创立的,她来自 Dropbox,我们曾有幸一起在 Dropbox 工作,那非常棒。当时她是 Dropbox Paper 的产品经理。而 Vanta,是一家做合规自动化、持续监控的公司。大多数初创公司认为 Vanta 就是你如何获得 SOC 2 的途径,但他们一开始并没有这么做。我记得在2018年,Christina 和我在旧金山的 South Park 社区散步,那是我第一次听到 Vanta 的想法。而实际上在2016年、2017年,她尝试了其他几个想法,她有一个可以录制会议的智能音箱,它会通过 Slack 发送会议摘要。
Lenny Rachitsky:她称之为 B2B Alexa,我记得。
Todd Jackson:B2B Alexa,此外她还有另一个关于一件代发的想法,但她对一件代发一无所知。她当时一直处于这种模式:“我们构建东西,然后看看是否有人想要。”然后她意识到这行不通,于是她改变了她正在做的事情。她开始与潜在客户交谈,她对安全的想法以及为什么许多初创公司不使用任何安全产品非常感兴趣。她与安全工程师、首席信息安全官以及初创公司的首席技术官交谈,她会问他们:“就安全而言,你最讨厌你工作中的什么?”一次又一次,他们会说:“我讨厌填写安全问卷。我讨厌做合规审计。这是太多繁琐的手工工作了。我在那里填写电子表格,并截取我 AWS 账户的截图。而这一切根本说不通。”当她在做 Dropbox Paper 时,她自己实际上也感受到了这一点,获得 SOC 2 的体验非常繁重。
发现解锁收入的痛点
她之所以需要获得它,是因为我们想开始将 Dropbox Paper 销售给企业,所以她对我说:“外面有这种痛点,我认为我可以解决它,并且我认为这可能解锁收入。”我就像:“你这是什么意思?”她就像:“嗯,我有这第一批客户或者说是设计合作伙伴(design partners)、伪客户。是 Segment、Front 和 Figma。”这是在2017、18年,所以这些公司当时规模较小,还不是现在的大公司。她就像:“是的,他们正试图卖给财富500强公司,其中一家实际上现在正试图拿下财富10强的客户。而他们说阻碍他们的事情是他们没有合规认证,他们没有 SOC 2。”
“我告诉他们,‘嘿,如果我替你们做呢?’他们就像,‘哦,你可以直接做这个吗?’”她就像,“是的。”她做了,他们拿下了这笔交易。对我来说,这是满足承诺(promise)的产品(product)最清晰的例子之一,而且这个产品(product)将为你解锁收入。你将能够拿下这个企业交易。因此我认为他们在这方面做得非常出色。这就是你在第一级时要寻找的东西,一个对三到五个客户真正重要的问题(problem)。
Lenny Rachitsky:在那个具体的例子中,我想她交付的是一份电子表格。没有产品(product),她只是手动填写了一份电子表格并交给了他们。
Todd Jackson:完全手动。她是在那个邮箱地址背后假装成 AI 的人,但都是她自己做的。我认为这揭示了在第一级效率低下是可以的,只要你提供令人难以置信的满意度。
Lenny Rachitsky:是的,我正要说这个。这是效率不重要的终极例子,我很喜欢这一点,这也是你在这一步所指出的。我知道你还会分享另一个例子,但为了总结这一阶段的感受,正如你之前谈到的,基本上不到10个人,你试图寻找三到五个客户。我认为这太重要了。你不是试图寻找几十个或几百个,你只是想“三到五个人”。而在客户这个元素上,我想你的意思是他们在付钱给你。
Todd Jackson:是的,他们在付钱给你,而你在交付一个为他们解决问题的产品(product)。
Lenny Rachitsky:而此时产品(product)可能只是一份电子表格,甚至是一个非常像绿野仙踪式的幕后手动操作的东西。
Todd Jackson: 是的,在这个阶段这是可以接受的。
Lenny Rachitsky: 我知道 RAMP 在开始销售时几乎没有什么产品(product)。最初,他们只是安排人在幕后手动更新这些仪表盘上的内容。然后你谈到问题需要重要且紧急,这与人們会去关注一个他们不信任或一无所知的初创公司联系在一起,因为这个问题太重要也太紧急了。你还提到它必须满足你给他们的承诺,“我们将为你解决 SOC 2 问题”,然后你确实做到了。
Todd Jackson: 没错。
Lenny Rachitsky: 还有没有其他可以作为基准的东西,能告诉你正处于产品市场契合度的这一步?
萌芽阶段的基准与预警信号
Todd Jackson: 有的。就像我说的,你处于 pre-seed 阶段,不到10个人。在这个阶段,你的需求来源可能主要是你认识的人。是朋友和家人,是你的朋友圈,也许是投资人。你在这个时候可能还没有做过太多陌生拜访,而且很难找到客户。你试图找到三到五个。可能需要20个熟人引荐才能得到一个,大概就是这个比例。所以也许为了达到三到五个,至少需要进行50次对话。在这个阶段这非常正常,因为你只是在试图找到正确的问题,并找到有这个问题的客户。你的年度经常性收入可能在0到50万美元之间,大概在这个区间。我会说你处于第一阶段。
然后有一些用来追踪效率的指标,比如资金消耗倍数、毛利率、净收入留存率,所有这些东西。它们在这个阶段统统不适用。现在还为时过早,你不应该担心这些东西。因此,你想要感受到的是一种进展感,即有客户需要你正在构建的东西,而你构建的东西是有效的。反过来说,我们会看到很多创始人卡住的迹象,而这是一个非常容易卡住的阶段。所以如果你在这里停留了六个月、九个月、十二个月,并且出现了黄旗警告,你就开始感到卡壳了。
这些黄旗警告比如说,假设你的产品(product)一夜之间消失了,你的客户不会感到超级失望。假设你有一小群满意的客户。假设你有四五个客户,但对每个人来说最重要的功能实际上是不同的。这开始看起来更像是一家咨询公司,而不是一家产品公司。或者感觉寻找边际客户(marginal customer),即下一个新客户,变得无比困难。又或者你的使用率很低。产品(product)在他们手上,但使用率很低,没有太大的增长。这种情况持续了六个月。
Lattice 的转型案例
Todd Jackson: 我认为有一个非常好的例子,Jack Altman,他是 Lattice 的创始人,他在2015年创立了 Lattice。我们在 First Round 的《实现产品市场契合度的路径》和其他节目中多次与他交谈过。所以对于不知道的人来说,Lattice 是一个人员管理平台,但它最初并不是这样的。大多数人都不知道这一点,Lattice 实际上在2015年最初是一个 OKR 工具。
Lenny Rachitsky: 噢,不知道。
Todd Jackson: 是的。Jack 只是在其他公司看到了这种情况。他想,“好吧,公司都在做 OKR,但他们做得不是很好,这在高管团队之间引起了很多争论,而且员工也不配合。他们认为这整套东西很蠢。所以我可以用软件来解决这个问题。”因此 Lattice 的最初版本是用来管理 OKR 的。并且他能够把它卖出去。他的买方是人力资源主管,他们会说,“好的,是的,我们会试一下。”他有几家公司在使用它,他们会使用一个季度。然后下一个季度到来时,他们会说,“上次效果不太好。我不知道,员工们似乎不太喜欢它。我不知道。”
然后在接下来的那个季度,他们会说,“不,我们不会买这个,我们也不会用这个。”因此 Jack 成功转型到了人员管理领域。他做到这一点的方式实际上是他保留了目标用户。这就涉及到了四个 P 的概念,我会多谈一点。这是我们的四个 P 版本。你有目标用户、问题、承诺和产品(product)。这四个东西必须保持一致。你的产品必须交付一个承诺,从而解决你目标用户的问题。因此 Jack 实际上保留了目标用户。他想,“在过去六到九个月里,我已经非常了解这些人力资源主管了。我和他们发短信,我和他们出去喝咖啡,我们是朋友,我非常了解他们。这个 OKR 的事情对他们来说似乎并不是什么大问题,但他们还有其他我可以尝试解决的问题。”
有趣的是时机,那是在2010年代中期,绩效管理开始重新受到青睐。它就像一个钟摆。有一段时间绩效管理非常重要,然后所有这些公司都说,“我们不再做这个了。”然后钟摆又摆了回来,大约在2015年、2016年正是那个时候。因此 Jack 简直就是直接给他们看 Figma 模型。还没有产品(product),但他会说,“如果我能用一种更现代、对员工和经理更友好、整个流程运行得更好的方式为你解决绩效管理问题呢?”
反响非常惊人。人们想要这个东西。我相信他用 Figma 模型卖出了他的前五到十个客户。在此之前,他实际上并没有真正构建出任何东西。因此,我认为这是一个有趣的例子,他卡在了人们不喜欢他做的事情的区间里。他保留了目标用户,但他改变了他要解决的问题,以及他通过产品交付的承诺。我们对转型以及何时转型、如何转型有一个完整的章节。我认为这实际上是这方面最好的框架,也就是四个 P。Lattice 保留了第一个,但改变了其他的。Vanta 则改变了全部四个。
Plaid 的转型与四 P 框架
Todd Jackson: 还有其他像 Plaid 这样的产品,实际上保留了他们正在做的产品的元素。所以我不知道你是否知道 Plaid 的故事,Zach Perret 当时在构建……Plaid 最初并不是作为银行账户的 API 起步的。它最初是一个消费者预算应用。它是一个消费者应用。它只是用来帮助你省钱和做预算之类的事情。但它并不是很受欢迎。创始人们感到很沮丧,但他们构建了产品的这一部分,使应用程序能够连接到你的银行账户,并解决了与之相关的所有琐碎问题。然后他们发现他们的朋友想从他们那里获得授权。
所以 Zach 在 Venmo 有一个朋友想要授权这个,他们后来获得了 Robinhood,又在某个时候获得了 Coinbase。所以这是一个例子,他们实际上保留了大量他们编写的代码。他们保留了产品,但完全改变了其他三个 P。不再是解决有预算问题的消费者的问题,而是要解决金融科技公司中在连接银行账户方面遇到问题的开发人员的问题。这是四个 P 的彻底翻转。这就是我非常喜欢这个框架的原因,因为我认为它确实能帮助创始人以结构化的方式思考这个问题。
Lenny Rachitsky: Todd,这太棒了。我很高兴我们能聊这些,我认为这会帮到很多人。我想进入第二层级,但首先让我试着总结一下这些关键要素。所以这四个P基本上就是如果你卡在这个层级或任何层级时应该尝试改变的东西。简单总结一下,你可以改变你的目标对象,即目标用户,你可以改变你正在解决的问题,你可以改变你推销它的方式,也就是承诺,基本上也就是定位。然后你也可以直接改变你的产品。你提到Vanta改变了全部四个P,有些公司只改变了一个。关于如何知道该改变哪一个,你有什么建议吗?是什么促使你改变这个而不是那个?你有什么观察到的情况吗?
Todd Jackson: 我认为不同的创始人处理这个问题的方式不同。我见过很多先构建后销售的创始人,也见过很多先销售后构建的创始人。这两种方式都可以行得通。我倾向于“我想在构建它之前先把它卖出去”,因为我真的想要来自客户的信号,我想让这个信号成为指导和我正在构建的东西的氧气。我觉得这非常令人振奋。老实说,我也觉得这样更容易。与其像“哦,我要写五万行代码,然后看看有没有人想要这东西”这样去猜测,我认为最好去和一群客户交谈,确信“嘿,如果我有了这东西,如果我能构建出这东西,我知道它会卖得出去。我知道这些人想要这东西”。所以我倾向于从那个角度来处理,因此,我专注于目标用户、问题和承诺。对于那个买家,对于那个目标用户,什么样的承诺才能真正打动他们?然后产品的工作就是真正满足前三个P。
萌芽阶段的特征与卡顿迹象
Lenny Rachitsky: 显然,相比于重新构建你的产品,改变和尝试这些要容易得多。所以如果没有别的办法,你可能应该从那里开始。我实际上有一篇文章,里面有很多改变定位、改变目标用户的绝佳例子,如果大家想要更多例子,我们会在节目笔记中附上链接。最后,让我试着总结一下这个阶段。我认为需要指出的是,在这个萌芽阶段,并不是爆发式的产品市场契合度。正如你所描述的,它非常萌芽。你正在获得客户,但这很艰难。你说过这是20次介绍才能换来一次销售,但你确实在获得它们。
我知道Retool有一句很棒的名言。David说过,“他早期获得的每一个客户,他都感觉那是他能得到的最后一个客户。再也没有人想要这东西了,而且总是一场挣扎。”所以我认为你所描述的非常正常。开端很少是直接向右上方起飞的。如果这花费了一段时间也没关系。你说过如果你在这个阶段花了12个月,你可能就卡在这个阶段了,以及你卡在这个萌芽阶段与这实际上属于正常情况的迹象。你提到的迹象包括,如果你问人们如果这东西消失了他们是否会感到失望,他们会说,“算了吧,好吧。挺酷的。”你有很多客户,但他们使用的是产品的不同功能。所以对你来说,正如你所描述的那样,本质上,你就像是他们的专业服务机构。你实际上并没有在构建一个产品。你咨询了很多人。然后他们实际上并不经常使用它。他们购买了,他们为之付钱了,就像最后一个例子一样,但他们不一定会使用它,而且他们会很快流失。
Todd Jackson: 没错。
Lenny Rachitsky: 在我们进入第二层级之前,你还有什么想补充的吗?
Todd Jackson: 我想在第一层级补充的最后一件事是,有一家叫Persona的公司,其创始人名叫Rick Song。他非常棒。Persona是First Round投资的公司。他们做身份验证。Rick的比喻,我非常喜欢它对第一层级的适用性,就是你不想被你的客户“发好人卡”,也就是你的客户喜欢你,但他们不爱你,也不需要你。在Persona的早期,他对这件事超级偏执。而他这样做的方法,我真的很喜欢,超级简单,就是他和他的前五到十个客户非常亲近。
他会去找他们,和他们一对一坐下来,说:“我需要你的帮助。这家公司成功而不失败对我来说非常重要。所以我不想你对我客气。我想让你告诉我,Persona对你们公司来说是必需品吗?如果我们消失了,那会有多痛苦?如果出现了一个收费只有我们一半的竞争对手,你会转向他们吗?”他真的是在试图触及本质:Persona对你们来说是关键的吗,还是我被发好人卡了?我只是认为这是一种非常好的思考方式。
Lenny Rachitsky: 我喜欢这个故事。就像在一段关系中,那是摊牌。
Todd Jackson: 是摊牌。
Lenny Rachitsky: “我们算什么关系吗?”我喜欢这个。太好了。越早知道真相越好。听到坏消息很难受,但我喜欢这个建议,就是和他们一对一坐下来。
第二层级:发展产品市场契合度
Lenny Rachitsky: 让我们谈谈第二层级。那么第二层级是什么样的?创始人在第二层级时应该专注于什么?
Todd Jackson: 是的。所以第二层级是发展产品市场契合度,你在第二层级的任务现在是必须从五个满意的客户发展到二十五个满意的客户。所以现在你除了满意度之外,还必须开始考虑需求。因为仅凭纯粹的意志力一路苦干到25个客户是非常困难的,但你可以靠意志力做到五个,也许十个。我们看到一些创始人拥有惊人的意志力和毅力,硬生生苦干到了五到十个客户。为了达到25个并超越25个,产品必须为你承担大部分繁重的工作。这就是这个层级的本质。
Todd Jackson: 因此,如果你处于这个层级,你现在是一家种子轮或 A 轮阶段的公司,公司可能已经有大约 20 人。你开始着手建立这个需求来源,其中已经有了可扩展渠道的早期迹象,而不再仅仅是来自你的风险投资人或朋友的熟人引荐。你可能正在投资于陌生开发,并让其调整到顺畅运转的状态。你可能正在投资于内容,也可能在举办社区活动,但核心思想是你正在尝试扩大需求来源。这仍然不容易。我们会说,一个基准是,在没有熟人引荐的情况下,你的销售转化率可能仍然只有 10% 左右。从首次通话到成交的转化率在 10% 左右。如果能高于这个数字,那太好了,但这大致是这个层级的基准。
你的年度经常性收入(ARR)处于 50 万到 500 万美元的区间,这是第二层级的标志。你实际上开始考虑效率指标和销售指标。你可能开始考虑神奇数字(magic number),即你在某段时间内获得的新 ARR 除以你在该段时间内花费的获客成本(CAC),大概在 0.5 到 0.75 的范围内。你最终希望这个数字更高,但在这个层级,这已经相当合理了。你刚刚开始考虑留存率。你已经成立了一年左右,所以有了续约,你希望这些客户能够续约。大概 10% 到 20% 的流失率(regretted churn)是可以接受的。你不希望高于这个数字,并且你希望你的净收入留存率(NRR)至少达到 100%。
至于毛利率和资金消耗倍数(burn multiple)之类的东西,它们仍然不是重点。但我们会说,你希望你的毛利率不低于 50%,你希望你的资金消耗倍数不超过五倍。顺便说一下,你的资金消耗倍数就是你在当前阶段的资金消耗量与带来多少新 ARR 的比值。所以如果你消耗了 500 万美元并带来一份,那么你的资金消耗倍数就是五。在这个阶段,你不希望比这更差。
Lenny Rachitsky: 太棒了。有很多这样的基准指标,我很喜欢。我想不是每个人都能精确达到每一项。这些只是粗略的指导原则,比如,“如果你处于这个层级,你可能就处于这个阶段”,对吧?
Todd Jackson: 是的,完全正确。这些指标周围有很宽泛的区间。它们只是大致代表了拥有五到二十五个客户这个阶段。
Lenny Rachitsky: 我很喜欢。非常有趣的是,正如你所说,人们把产品市场契合度看作是一种二元的,“要么我有,要么我没有”。而你的谈论方式是,在这个发展产品市场契合度的层级,一家公司有 25 个满意的客户,他们的 ARR 超过 500 万,在很多情况下他们有 20 名员工。
Todd Jackson: 在 50 万到 500 万之间。是的。
Lenny Rachitsky: 50 万到 500 万。他们有 20 名员工。理论上,你会认为这是一个巨大的成功。他们表现出色,拥有所有这些客户,他们正在增长。但这仍然只是产品市场契合度的第二层级。所以我认为这里有一个非常有趣的洞察,它让我想起了当我做了一堆关于产品市场契合度的研究时的情况。许多创始人会说,“我从来没有感觉到产品市场契合度。我没有。情况总是,‘我不知道,也许当我们的 ARR 达到 1 亿时,我才会真正觉得我们做到了。’”所以我认为这是一个非常好的提醒,很多时候你实际上不会感到如此自信,认为这会持续下去,并且你会达到持久稳健的产品市场契合度。所以我认为这是一个非常好的洞察。
案例分析:Looker 与 Ironclad
Todd Jackson: 是的。我认为,第二层级真正的标志是你有一个少数人喜欢的产品。它满足了他们的一个关键需求。现在你必须打开需求的闸门,这样我们才能达到 25 个客户并超越这个数字。不同的公司以非常不同的方式做到这一点。说起来容易做起来难。Looker 就是一个例子。所以 Looker 是一家 First Round 公司,由 Lloyd Tabb 于 2012 年创立。他们做商业智能。Looker 很有趣,因为他们在第一层级实际上花了很长时间,但随后快速飞越了第二层级。原因是,作为创始人的 Lloyd,对于 Looker 的前五个客户,他基本上是进去为他们做咨询。
原因在于产品的本质。人们直到在其中看到他们自己的数据,并且他们的数据被建模,他们看到仪表板,他们才会理解 Looker,然后他们会说,“哦,我的天。哇,我没有意识到这些洞察。”所以 Lloyd 明白 Looker 不是一个你可以用 Figma 模型来销售的产品。因此发生的情况是,Lloyd 会进入这些客户那里,在他们甚至成为客户之前,花 20、30、40 个小时,为他们建模数据,教他们如何使用它,向组织内更多的人展示数据和仪表板的力量。后来,他们称之为他们的前置部署(forward deploy)流程。这就是他们摸索出销售方法的方式。
所以实际上他们在第一层级花了很长时间才把这件事做对,但随后他们能够可重复地做到这一点。因此他们相当快地从五个客户发展到 25 个,并且有很多惊人的…… 75% 的成交率,因为他们只卖给已经在使用它的客户。流失率为零。Lloyd 解释说,一旦他达到了 20 个客户,他就像,“我知道我找到了方向。我想我找到了一个模式。”这个模式保持不变,直到他们最终卖给了谷歌。所以他们也做了其他这些事情。他们开始专注于需求渠道。他们招募了几名负责寻找潜在客户的 SDR。我想他们与 AWS Redshift 做了一些合作伙伴营销。他们在旧金山举办了这些展示与讲述客户活动,把 Looker 客户聚集在一起,谈论他们在 Looker 中在做什么以及他们是如何构建产品的。但实际上,基础工作是在第一层级奠定的,然后他们非常快速地通过了第二层级。
Lenny Rachitsky: 再说一次,思考这个阶段的方式是,这是你开始扩大一种驱动需求的方法的时候。你不再只是苦干销售、进行陌生开发。有一种你开始用来引入客户的方法变得更有效率。在 Looker 的例子中,客户只是开始自己找上门来,因为我想有口碑传播,人们开始谈论它。
Todd Jackson: 是的。让我再举一个例子。一个非常不同的例子是一家叫 Ironclad 的公司。Ironclad 是法律领域的。这是一家成立于 2015 年的法律科技公司。Jason Boehmig 是创始人。他们做的是 AI 驱动的合同管理软件。这很有趣,因为 Jason 一开始称它为 AI 法律助手。在 2024 年,人们会说,“哦,AI 法律助手。是的,那太棒了。”但在 2014 年,人们的反应是,“什么?”他发现这真的很难卖。没有人在寻找一个 AI 法律助手。所以他把这个故事告诉了我们。
在 Ironclad 的主页上有一个电子邮件地址,hello@ironclad.com。这是在 2015 年。他收到的邮件不多,但 Jason 会查看这个邮箱。有一天他收到了这封只有一行字的邮件,他差点把它归档,因为他不知道是谁发的,而且只有一行字。但他看到这是来自一家上市公司的人,所以他想,“哦,也许这里有点东西。”这封一行字的邮件只是说,“你们是 CLM 吗?”他当时的反应是,“什么是 CLM?”然后他去谷歌上搜索了它。CLM 是一个合同生命周期管理平台(CLM)。他阅读了关于 CLM 的资料,然后他想,“哦,我们做的就是那个。是的。”
于是他回复了邮件:“是的,我们就是一个 CLM。”这位客户给他们打了电话。客户说:“哦,我正在市场上找 CLM。我正在看 10 到 12 家不同的供应商,但你们看起来挺酷的,因为有自动化和一些 AI 的东西。我能试用一下吗?”Jason 就说:“当然可以。”所以他和他的联合创始人坐火车从旧金山去圣何塞。在火车上,Jason 告诉他的联合创始人 Cai:“嘿,我现在需要你把代码写出来,让它看起来像这个客户期望的那样。”
他们到了会议现场,做了演示。客户完全不知道他们刚刚在火车上才做好这个演示,也不知道他们是一家非常小的公司。他们打败了其他 10 到 12 家成熟的竞标方赢得了合同,因为 Ironclad 更现代、自动化,还有这些 AI 的东西。它就是一个更好的产品,或者说演示看起来会是一个更好的产品。于是 Jason 反思了这件事,他觉得:“是的,对我们来说,问题在于我们一直试图创建 AI 法律助手这个新品类,而这简直就是一场苦工。”
“相反,当我们把定位改成在一个已有的 CLM 品类中竞争,但做一个好得多的 CLM,而且客户已经在寻找 CLM,已经在打算为 CLM 花钱,我们只是扩展了那个品类的定义,事情就开始顺利起来了。”他们就是这样度过 10 个、20 个、30 个客户那个阶段的。即使你今天看 Ironclad 的网站,上面写的依然是 AI 驱动的合同管理软件。这确实仍然是核心理念。
定位与品类创建
Lenny Rachitsky: 太棒了。所以这是一个绝佳的例子,说明定位/承诺是他们在此拉动的杠杆。我很喜欢关于品类设计的观点。这是本播客持续辩论的话题之一,即你是否应该尝试创建一个品类。
Todd Jackson: 我知道,这是个热门话题。
Lenny Rachitsky: 热门话题。听起来你站在了最好不要创建自己品类的阵营里。
Todd Jackson: 我觉得创建品类很难。它在某些情况下确实有效,但如果你对现有品类确实有一个非常有趣的转变,那里已经有买家在为那个东西花钱了。他们已经在寻找要买的东西了。所以如果你能做到,我确实认为那样会更容易。
停滞在第二阶段的警示信号
Lenny Rachitsky: 在我们进入第三阶段之前,有哪些迹象表明你可能卡在了第二阶段,对此应该怎么做?
Todd Jackson: 是的。第二阶段的整个理念就是边际客户变得更容易了。所以你必须在保持满意度的同时,关注需求和需求的可重复性。因此,黄旗就是与上述相反的情况。你现有的客户相当满意,但你就是无法打开需求的闸门。当你接近第二阶段的顶端时,你应该开始听到一些初创公司知道你是谁,比如:“哦,你需要 SOC 2,你是一家初创公司。哦,Vanta。”“哦,你需要 AI 驱动的合同管理软件。哦,Ironclad。”你开始因为某件事而闻名。
所以如果你无法打开那些闸门,而且你在那里坐了,我不知道,12 个月,18 个月,那就是个问题。或者你的遗憾流失率大于 20%。那是一个满意度的警告信号。同样,你在做这些其他事情时必须保持满意度。每一个阶段都只是增加了你必须做的事情。或者你可能会发现销售周期太长,你在漏斗的后期丢掉交易,你输给了竞争对手。
而客户向你表达这些的方式,因为客户是友善的,对吧?他们会说:“哦,我们没有预算。”或者,“哦,现在对我们来说时机不对。我们很乐意明年再谈。”当你在客户那里听到这些时,意思就是拒绝。你想要的客户是那种:“哦,当然。是的,这很贵,但我会想办法解决,因为我需要这个。”所以如果你看到任何这些迹象,这些就是你可能在这个阶段停滞或触及天花板的信号。
我确实认为思考四个 P 并思考:我该如何转型走出这个困境,这一点很重要。我之前提到的 Lattice 的 Jack Altman,他在这方面有一句很好的名言。网站上的一期视频里有这句话。他说了什么?他说:“大多数创始人做的是 10% 的转型,而他们需要做的是 200% 的转型。”Jack 没有明说这一点,但我认为我对这句话的部分解读是,作为创始人在心理上很难。你已经获得了这么多客户,你开始触及天花板,但你会想:“我不想把这一切都扔掉。”但你必须愿意放手,并在此时真正专注于搞定四个 P。
转型的必要性与难度
Lenny Rachitsky: 根据你的经验,如果你卡住了,本质上转型就是答案吗?
Todd Jackson: 我觉得有时候像 Ironclad 那样会很好,对吧?
Lenny Rachitsky: 是的。
Todd Jackson: 像 Looker 那样你什么都不用改是最好的,它就是开始起作用了,基本上整个机制一直都是有效的。这并不常见。像 Ironclad 那样你只改变其中一个,或者其中两个,也是很好的。在第二阶段把四个全部推倒重来很难,但通常情况下,这是必须的。我之前提到过,第二阶段是第二个最容易卡住的阶段。
很大一部分公司会卡在第一阶段,第二大比例就是卡在第二阶段。所以有时候这很难。我认为陷阱在于没有做足够的努力去意识到你实际上并没有以你需要的方式向产品市场契合度推进,而只是开始烧钱且没有进展。你见过许多初创公司在这方面挣扎。我认为这是最难的部分。
销售周期与需求渠道
Lenny Rachitsky: 是的。特别是当他们的 ARR 达到一百万、两百万、三百万时,他们会说:“看,我们赚了这么多钱。”他们不一定意识到自己在这个阶段卡了这么久。所以总结一下,表明出了问题、你应该考虑改变你的目标用户、问题、承诺或产品的警示信号是:在这个产品市场契合度阶段已经待了 12 到 18 个月。你大约流失了 20% 的客户。我想这些是客户流失,就像企业停止使用你一样。
Todd Jackson: 没错。
Lenny Rachitsky: 你的销售周期非常慢。有没有关于慢的定义?只是一个粗略的经验法则。应该是什么样的……
Todd Jackson: 嗯,有些销售周期天生就慢。如果你卖的是大公司,你卖给政府,诸如此类的东西。我不知道。粗略的经验法则是……这也有不同的 ACV。如果你是那种年合同在两万、三万的产品,那就是 Looker,对吧?但他们能够非常可重复地完成销售周期,因为他们成单很频繁。有些合同是十万、二十万,六位数的合同。那些可能需要很长时间。那些可能需要三到六个月。你基本上不能处于两个世界中最糟糕的情况,即销售周期慢且 ACV 低。那基本上就是死亡象限。
Lenny Rachitsky: 太棒了。好的。另一个迹象就是你没有发现需求开始向你涌来。你没有找到一个驱动需求的渠道。这很大一部分是指主动找上门吗?你应该开始看到更多主动找上门的需求吗?还是说更多只是销售变得更容易了?
Todd Jackson: 两者皆有。所以销售变得更容易了,但我认为如果你开始达到第三级,也就是我们接下来要讲的部分,你可能会有 10%、20% 的主动找上门的需求,或者完全自然产生的主动需求。
Lenny Rachitsky: 太棒了。好的。所以再说一次,如果你卡在这个阶段,而这些迹象就像是,“哦,天哪,听起来很熟悉”,你的建议是找到其中一件事来改变:你追求的目标用户,你解决的问题,你的定位方式,或者在必要情况下改变你的产品。
Todd Jackson: 对。而且可能只是去寻找一种更强烈的痛点。通常是因为问题对人们来说不够显著、不够重要,或者承诺不够有价值。假设你有一个合理的目标用户,通常就是这其中的某一种原因。
Lenny Rachitsky: 太棒了。我在这里花这么多时间的原因,正如你所说,大多数公司都卡在这里,比如 B2B SaaS 公司。所以我认为确保人们有一些可以参考的东西真的很重要。在你发布的课程和文章中,有更多公司经历这一过程以及他们做了什么的例子。我们来谈谈第三级。第三级是什么样的?你应该把重点放在那里?
强产品市场契合度阶段
Todd Jackson: 对。所以第三级是强产品市场契合度(strong product-market fit)。我认为这是开始变得有趣的地方。这也是所有关于产品市场契合度的俗语出现的地方:“鱼儿自己跳进船里。石头正从山上滚下来,我是在追着它跑,而不是把它往山上推。”而且请记住,对于大多数企业级创始人来说,我们现在已经进入公司第三、第四或第五年了,所以能走到这里并不容易。而要达到这里的第三级,你寻找的是可重复性。边际客户(marginal customer)变得容易得多了。
你提到了 Retool 的 David Hsu 的一句名言,我也很喜欢,我再读一遍。他说:“我们和一个人聊过,他说找到产品市场契合度的感觉是如此真切,你就像感受到间歇泉一样立刻感觉到了。”而在前几年,老实说我们从来没有这种感觉。在 Retool,我们获得的每一个客户,无论是第四个还是第十四个,感觉就像是我们能找到的最后一个客户了。感觉就像是在把石头往山上推,如果你停止推,它就会滚回来压扁你。
直到我们的年度经常性收入(ARR)达到几百万时,感觉依然是这样。那是巨石滚到山的另一边的时候,我们必须追赶它才能跟上。你前面提到,创始人会说,“我不确定我是否曾感觉到产品市场契合度。”这就是你开始感觉到它的时候。Lattice 的 Jack Altman 再一次说道:“最大的转变在于获取线索的容易程度。”我记得我当时在想,“我甚至不知道这些线索从哪里来,只是每个月出现的越来越多。”
但那是一种很棒的感觉。那是一种很棒的感觉。Verkada 的 Filip Kaliszan,他也在我们网站上的一些视频里。他的原话,我来读一下,是:“在 2018 年第一年销售之后,接下来的两年简直疯了。我们勉强跟上生产。我们不得不扩展所有系统。在 12 到 18 个月的时间内,必须发生很多事情,才能兑现客户希望这个解决方案为他们做的一切。而这本身就是旅程中一个非常具有塑造力且棘手的部分。”
所以当你处于第三级时,基准现在是你的公司内部可能有 30 到 100 人。在风投方面,你可能处于 B 轮(Series B)左右的阶段,也许是 A 轮(Series A)后期,也许是 C 轮(Series C)早期,但大概在 B 轮左右。你真正破解了一个需求渠道。你破解了营销和销售。你至少拥有一个非常可扩展的渠道。而且可能 10% 或更多的主动找上门的需求仅仅来自推荐和口碑,你开始变得有名气,就像我们谈过的那样。
年合同金额(ACV)的范围非常高。我应该说是非常宽。我想说你在第三级想要达到的目标是 100 个客户。所以如果你接近 100 个客户,也许你的平均年合同金额是 75K,那就会是很强的。你处于 500 万一直到 2500 万年度经常性收入的广阔区间。这是非常典型的第三级。而且你现在实际上开始考虑一些效率指标了。记住,我们一直在搁置效率问题。我们说的是它不应该比某个数字更差,但它不是一个焦点。现在,它必须成为焦点。
因为我们达到第四级的方式是,我们继续在满意度和需求上发力,我们调整这个东西以变得非常高效。所以我们说的是我们的毛利率(gross margin)需要高于 60%,希望能高于 70%。我们的资金消耗倍数(burn multiple)现在低于 3。理想情况下,我们接近 1。资金消耗倍数在 1 到 3 的区间是我们希望在第三级达到的状态。非意愿流失(regretted churn)低于 10%,净收入留存率(NRR)大于 110%。这些都是这个级别的良好基准。
Lenny Rachitsky: 再次听到第三级,让我觉得第二级基本上是你从以下状态的转折:我只是苦工(the grind)般地做客户、销售、推销,不断地试图寻找新的人,到了第三级,需求向你涌来,基本上,这就像你描述的那样,是你一直听到的那种方式。石头在往山下滚。鱼儿跳进船里。我以前没听过这个说法,但我很喜欢。
所以本质上,你找到了一个需求渠道。你找到了一种让人们主动来找你的方法。他们中的很多人只是从别人那里听说了你,你甚至不知道他们是从哪里来的。你说过有 10% 来自推荐,而且你正在达到 100 个客户。我其实还有一句 Retool 的 David Hsu 的名言,他实际上说即使到了 100 个客户,他仍然觉得他得到的每个客户都是最后一个。
Todd Jackson: 哦,哇。
Lenny Rachitsky: 他就像,“我不敢相信我们拿下了 DoorDash。太不可思议了。好吧。我觉得没有更多的了。就这些了。”
Todd Jackson: 他是一个很挑剔的人,对自己也很挑剔,但可以说是一个期望值非常高的人。
Lenny Rachitsky: 是的。实际上,Databricks 的 Ali Ghodsi 的另一句话实际上说,即使在 1 亿的时候,他也不确定他们是否达到了产品市场契合度。
Todd Jackson: 我的意思是,拜托。
Lenny Rachitsky: 因为他就像,“我不知道。”我不知道。他感觉就像,“就这样了。好吧,我们完了。我们要到顶了。”我能理解。
Todd Jackson: 我想如果你告诉许多许多种子轮前的创始人,他们能够达到 1 亿却不知道自己是否有产品市场契合度,他们可能会愿意接受。
Lenny Rachitsky: 但我认为这可能是一个有趣的洞察。通常保持高度的偏执,而不觉得“好吧,我们在路上了。让我们开始砸钱吧。干吧”是件好事。
Todd Jackson: 我认为这正是让许多最优秀的创始人成为最优秀的原因。
Lenny Rachitsky: 确实。好的,那么第三级,还有什么有用的东西吗?也许在第三级挣扎、卡住的迹象是什么?
第三级的困境与突破
Todd Jackson: 对。所以第三级的问题。再说一次,达到第三级很难,所以能到这里工作做得很棒。但可能开始出现的问题是你的桶漏了,你的净收入留存率低于 90%,或者你的非意愿流失大于 10%。也许增长只是放缓了。你前两年每年增长了 3 倍,但今年你很难做到 2 倍。在第三级,或者说公司成立五年左右,可能会有很多竞争。如果你到了这里,你就有了一些行之有效的东西,人们开始注意到,竞争对手就会出现。
这些竞争对手可能是巨头,也可能是初创公司,但你必须摸索出如何驾驭一个可能比你五年前进入时更艰难的市场。也许你找到了第一个可扩展的渠道,但它正趋于饱和,你必须寻找新渠道。这些就是第三级的问题。或者你仍在增长,但正如我所说,在效率方面,你花了太多钱去换取增长。所以你会觉得,“好吧,是的,我们能够实现同比三倍、两倍的增长,但这会再次把我们的资金消耗倍数推高到三以上。”当你必须像那样在增长和支出之间做权衡时,处境就有点棘手了。
Lenny Rachitsky: 你听起来好像日子很好过,第三级的人们都在向我们涌来。我觉得很重要的一点是要指出,这从来都不容易,永远不可能像,“好吧,我们没问题了。我们就顺势而为吧。从现在开始生活会变得轻松得多。”这从来都不容易。正如你所说,有所有这些事情,你总是还在抛接杂耍,你仍然不确定它能否持续下去。
Todd Jackson: 不,我同意。这就像你在转盘子,而你达到的级别越高,盘子就越多。你必须一直转下去。因此在第三级以及迈向第四级时,我们必须维持满意度和需求。在越来越艰难的市场中,我们不能让它们倒退,并且我们真的必须开始关注效率。那些能够维持满意度和需求,并持续增长且变得真正高效的公司,现在我们就处于第四级了。
第四级的特征与挑战
Lenny Rachitsky: 我们来谈谈第四级。那是什么样的?人们在那个阶段会遇到什么问题?
Todd Jackson: 首先,恭喜。如果你达到了第四级,你拥有一家有价值的公司。你可能已经是独角兽了,并且开始思考,“我能成为十角兽吗?”因此你已经达到了满意度、需求和效率的最高水平。所以第四级的基准线是这样的,“好吧,现在你的团队可能已经超过了 100 人,你处于 C 轮、D 轮或更往后。你有超过 100 个客户,并且开始琢磨,‘我如何达到 200 个、300 个,最终 1000 个客户?’”你的年度经常性收入超过了 2500 万美元,所以我认为 2500 万美元及以上的年度经常性收入就符合第四级的资格。你的其他指标看起来也非常好。你从首次通话到成单的销售转化率可能高于 15%,你的神奇数字大于一,你的 tax payback(回收期)不到 12 个月。
所有这些都超级棒。最后,现在你的毛利率超过了 80%。此时你的资金消耗倍数理想情况下小于一,你的流失率不到 10%。你的净收入留存率大于 120%。所以现在整个问题变成了,“好吧,我如何保持增长?”这东西已经变得相当庞大了。通常当我们达到 1 亿美元,尤其是超过这个数字时,这个阶段创始人会思考,“我如何通过扩大 TAM,即扩大总可达市场来保持增长?”为了扩大 TAM,我通常可以拿我的产品进入新市场,或者我开始思考通过多个产品的方式来扩大 TAM。
因此在这里你会看到,所有真正伟大的公司、传奇的公司都能做到这一点。Vanta 已经开始这样做了。他们有 Vanta 信任管理平台,有安全问卷,有供应商风险管理。所以他们已经开始这样做了。想想我之前提到的 Verkada。他们从云安防摄像头起家,现在做警报器,现在做烟雾探测器,现在做门禁读卡器。Stripe 有经典的 Stripe,但他们还有 Stripe Radar、Stripe Atlas。Square 有 Square Stand、Cash App、Square Checking、Square Loans。所有价值数百亿美元的公司都想出了做到这一点的方法。这就像你之前说过的,Lenny,永无止境的旅程。就像,“恭喜,你到了第四级。”
持续寻找契合度的挑战
但只是存在着对持续增长的无尽渴望。而关于这一点有趣的是,它需要一次又一次地寻找产品市场契合度。仅仅因为你的主要产品达到了第四级,并不意味着所有这些新产品就能免费获得产品市场契合度。你在 Airbnb 待过,我在 Dropbox 和 Twitter 待过。让新产品取得成功很难,它需要这样一种心态,“是的,我们有一点优势,因为人们知道我们是谁,而且我们有一群客户,希望可以在他们身上叠加新产品。但这并不容易。”你必须进入这样一种心态:产品市场契合度从来都不容易,如果我们想继续增长,我们就必须一次又一次地找到它,并保持这种心态。
Lenny Rachitsky: Casey Winters 也有一个很棒的观点,即客户的期望在不断增加。所以你今天拥有产品市场契合度,但未来会有更好的产品出现,他们在改变,世界也在改变。因此,你不仅要担心竞争对手,仅仅是期望值就在不断上升。所以这是一场永无止境的战斗。为了让人们在这里有一个更宏观的认识,根据你的经验,你认为有多大比例的公司能够通过这些阶段中的每一个,你脑海中可能有的粗略数字是多少?
各阶段的通过率
Todd Jackson: 大多数公司,也就是超过 50%,可能接近 60% 或 70%,将会卡在第一级或第二级。因此从我们广泛的经验来看,大概只剩下 30% 能够达到第三级或第四级。而这正是我们的全部目标。因为再说一遍,一旦你到了第三级,你就有了真正的机会,你有真正机会建立一家很棒的公司。所以如果我们能提高这个数字,帮助创始人把这个数字提高到 30% 以上,想象一下如果那是 50 对 50,我们在种子轮合作的公司中有一半能够达到第三级强产品市场契合度。我认为那将会是史诗级的。我认为我们的创始人会……整个生态系统将从中获得难以置信的益处。
Lenny Rachitsky: 好的。所以基本上,大约 60% 的公司没有迈过第二级。我很喜欢你构建这个框架的方式,“如果我们能让更多的公司走得更远,那将在世界上,以及在创始人和想要使用产品的人们的生活中,产生巨大的影响。”我想简短谈论的另一个问题又是,这些级别中每一个的时间线。根据你的粗略经验,每个级别大约需要多长时间,以便人们能够感觉到,“哦,这花了太长时间了。也许有问题了”?
各级别所需的时间线
Todd Jackson: 再说一次,整个过程可能需要四到六年,所以我们就选五年作为达到第四级的数字。我认为理想情况下,这个过程是这样运作的:你可能需要 12 到 18 个月的时间来完成第一级,因为老实说,在我的脑海里那是最高级别,因为你正是在那里真正选择正确的目标用户和要专注的正确问题。而且我认为仅仅是那个选择,就是创始人做出的最重要的选择之一。而有趣的是,我的合伙人 Josh Kopelman 一直在谈论这一点,那就是创始人把 99% 的时间都花在了构建上,因为那是他们一直以来的工作。
而他们只花 1% 的时间去挑选,挑选市场、问题、客户。实际上,正是这个选择决定了你未来十年——希望能有这么久——将要工作的领域的限制与边界。因此这中间存在真正的不平衡。我实际上认为那个选择才是最重要的事情。所以我其实更愿意在第一级花上 12 到 18 个月左右,真正把这些弄清楚,把我的四个 P 弄清楚。然后,希望我就能非常快地推进。虽然我可能需要花一段时间才能获得前五个满意的客户,但他们非常热爱它。接着我快速通过第二级,大概需要一年左右。这就像是 Looker 的路径,一条顺利的路径。然后第三级比较漫长,因为我们要把收入从五百万一直做到两千五百万,这可能需要一到两年,即使情况良好可能也要两年。接着从两千五百万到一亿很难,显然非常难。那大概也需要几年时间,期间你还要弄清楚所有这些事情。
你在扩大团队,公司有了更多运作部件和职能部门,有需求生成部门、销售部门,还有工程部门,随着人员增多,整个事情就变得更加复杂。但我认为,如果你在第一级和第二级打下了非常好的基础,那么希望整个过程……巨石正在滚下山坡,带着你向前,而你不只是觉得自己在五年里一直推着这块石头上山。那不是一个好呆的地方。
Lenny Rachitsky: 有很多创始人正处于那种境地,我也认识几个,所以这真的很有趣。所以你大概是说,也许在第一级花一年到一年半的时间,也就是你只是在做苦工,发冷邮件,主动联系,向客户推销,也许在第一年半里获得五个客户。这已经到了极限,但这是一个好结果。然后也许再花一年时间试图达到……是多少来着?20 个?25 个客户。
Todd Jackson: 从五个快速增加到 25 个。是的,如果我看到一家公司在一年内从五个客户增长到 25 个客户,那几乎总是说明那里存在相当强的强产品市场契合度(strong product-market fit)。
面临停滞的建议
Lenny Rachitsky: 太棒了。很多公司并没有经历这个过程,而他们有资金可以继续迭代、探索,试图弄清楚问题。我不知道你是否在这里有答案,但只是想问一下你的建议,如果已经四年了,需求还没有开始向他们涌来,他们没有 25 个客户,该怎么办?是“等到钱花光,就试一把”?还是“干脆把钱退回去,转而去做其他事情”?
Todd Jackson: 嗯,这是创始人的个人决定。我确实认为,如果你已经坚持了四五年,却还没有开始找到任何让你真正感受到市场拉力的东西,我不知道,你已经做了四五年了,你神奇地找到某些东西的概率有多大?我想可能只有少数几家初创公司能做到这一点,弄清楚问题并回到惊人的增长曲线上,但那是例外而不是常态。所以,如果创始人想把钱退给投资者,如果创始人想寻找一个软着陆,这并没有什么可羞耻的。产品市场契合度非常、非常难。这就是我们做这些的原因。这也是我们试图增加成功几率的原因。我们也在努力弄清楚它看起来是什么样,以及不是什么样。每个人在创业时都知道,大概率是你无法达到那个目标。所以这并没有什么可羞耻的,我会完全支持任何想走这条路的创始人。
四个 P 与各级别回顾
Lenny Rachitsky: 我喜欢这个建议。我认为这是一个非常重要的观点。让我们快速总结一下这些级别,然后我也想再次总结一下四个 P,因为我认为这是你实际上可以做的事情。所以我想强调的是,“如果事情没有朝着正确的方向发展,这里有四件事情你可以去调整”。所以首先,让我们总结一下这些级别,它们看起来是什么样的,以及你在那里应该关注什么。
Todd Jackson: 好的。第一级是萌芽的产品市场契合度。你只是试图获得三到五个客户,你首先关注的是满意度。第二级是发展。这是你从五个客户增加到 25 个客户的地方,你真正开始关注需求。第三级是强产品市场契合度(strong product-market fit)。你从 25 个客户增加到 100 个或更多,你必须开始思考在那个规模下的效率。然后第四级是极强,你有超过 100 个客户,你的公司非常棒。你必须继续把这三件事都做好,并且你必须开始寻找扩大 TAM(总可达市场)的方法。
Lenny Rachitsky: 好的,完美。然后让我们回到四个 P。我有草稿。我把你的文章打开了,所以我这里有每样东西的详细版本。但你能不能直接讲讲这四件事?如果事情进展不顺利,你应该考虑改变什么,基本上就是这四个 P?
Todd Jackson: 是的。所以这四个 P 再次是:目标用户、问题、承诺和产品。目标用户很有趣,因为在某种程度上,它是市场的同义词。很多人以这种宏观经济的方式看待市场,比如,“哦,这是 ERP 软件的某个类别或者别的什么”。我认为对创始人来说,把市场看作是一群人的集合要具体得多。Jack Altman 把他的市场看作是外面所有的 HR 领导者,他在想他们有多少人,他们有什么问题,以及他们愿意花多少钱来解决这些问题。市场是一群有钱支付产品或服务费用的人的集合。所以这真的是第一块拼图,找到目标用户,并真正尝试进入目标用户的心智。这是让我感到惊讶的另一件事,当我和 Plaid 的 Zach、Looker 的 Lloyd 以及 Lattice 的 Jack 共度时光时。他们有所有这些人,他们和所有的客户发短信,周末也会和客户见面之类的。他们非常、非常了解他们的客户。他们和他们的客户是朋友。
所以你必须如此深入地进入目标用户的心智:他们的挑战是什么?他们的目标是什么?你如何帮助他们在工作中取得成功?正是这些东西赋予了你把剩下的 P 做对的权利。所以问题显然是接下来要考虑的。我在思考这个问题,Lenny,如果你想深入了解一些客户探索的内容,我实际上可以稍微展开讲讲,因为那是第二次会议的内容。
Lenny Rachitsky: 完美的过渡。
Todd Jackson: 我刚才稍微谈到了,我们认为这是一种美元驱动的探索(dollar-driven discovery)。我认为很多创始人都熟悉客户探索。我想他们至少会和客户交谈,这很好。我不认为他们大多数人是以最高信号的方式来做的,因为再次强调,客户,他们也是人,他们很好,他们会很礼貌。他们也不太擅长预测他们会使用、购买或想要的东西。他们非常擅长谈论他们的问题,但不一定擅长预测他们自己的行为。所以我们在美元驱动的探索方面考虑它,也就是你如何测试一个假设的美元潜力?这整整是一个两小时的会议,但我会在这里尽量简短地讲一下,只是让你对它有个感觉。
Lenny Rachitsky: 不,让我们深入探讨吧。继续吧。我开玩笑的。
识别极强价值与寻找惊叹信号
Todd Jackson: 所以你必须识别极强价值。这与我正在构建什么无关,Lenny。我想听听你的问题和挑战,以及对你来说最重要的是什么。因此我需要以这种非引导的方式进行,并且需要避免我们称之为“happy years”的陷阱。因为我发现很多创始人是,“我想构建这个东西,我想让你喜欢我的东西。”于是我就去寻找你说的那些支持我所做事情的话。那就是陷阱。所以我可以直接在你身上试一下,Lenny。是的,我可能会说……
Lenny Rachitsky: 来吧。
Todd Jackson: 好的,Lenny,所以你在做 Lenny’s Newsletter,并且在打造 Lenny’s Podcasts。当你想到我们现在坐在四月份,比如说在接下来的三个月里,你对 Lenny’s Newsletter 和 Lenny’s Podcast 的首要三个目标是什么?
Lenny Rachitsky: 哦,哇,有趣。我正试图寻找一种长期来看更具可扩展性的方式来做这个 Newsletter。理论上,这基本上是我余生都必须做的事情。我不知道这个 Newsletter 职业是否有退出路径,所以我正试图寻找随着时间推移扩展它的方法。这是其一。其二只是在视觉、音频和预告片等方面提升每期播客的质量。然后其三是让社区对收听的每个人以及 Newsletter 社区里的每个人更有价值。这些是我最关注的。
Todd Jackson: 好的,太棒了。那么这三件事难在哪里?你说你想扩展 Newsletter,你想提高质量,你想让社区变得出色。这些事情难在哪里?或者是什么阻碍了你做这些事?
Lenny Rachitsky: 我还没有答案,我想这就是答案。我还不知道具体该怎么做。
Todd Jackson: 你不知道怎么做。好的。在这种情况下,这可能是一项服务,而不是一个产品。如果我能给你提供一项服务,说:“Lenny,你将能够扩展这个播客。我们将帮你找到世界上真正优秀的 500 位最佳嘉宾。我们将保证他们会出席。你的播客和 Newsletter 里将会有源源不断的内容。”那会怎样?你觉得这个怎么样?你觉得这个想法如何?
Lenny Rachitsky: 我愿意为此付很多钱。
Todd Jackson: 好的。这就是一个惊叹陈述(wow statement)的例子。而你脑海里可能已经在想,“你要怎么做到?那真的能行吗?”
Lenny Rachitsky: 没错。
Todd Jackson: 根据我的经验,这是一件好事,也是一件令人兴奋的事。如果我向某人推销一个产品想法,而他们的反应是,“哇,那真的管用吗?如果那东西管用,我今天就会加入候补名单。”这对我来说就像是,“好的,现在我得弄清楚如何构建那个东西,但我知道如果我能够构建它并兑现那个承诺,他们就会想要它。”或者你可能会表现出一些迹象,比如展示出你感兴趣的行为。你会说,“哦,Todd,我们下周能再见面谈谈这个吗?”或者“嘿,Todd,我其实很想把这个展示给我一起工作的人看。你能把幻灯片发给我吗?”
这些就是我在寻找的信号。如果你当时的反应是,“是啊,那听起来有点有趣”,那就是拒绝,对吧?那就是拒绝。有趣这个词是一种礼貌的说“不”的方式,对吧?所以我要么在寻找惊叹陈述,要么在寻找展示出兴趣的实际行为。然后我可能会,如果我想继续下去的话,而这都还属于识别极强价值的范畴,我会问你,“那么,你觉得这里有什么突出的价值?”我希望听到你快速回答。你提到它要么会让我的产品变得好得多,要么会推动我业务的成功,要么会帮我省下一大笔钱之类的。帮我省下很多风险。但总是一些你能非常快速地识别出它为何对你有价值的东西。
确认支付能力与支付意愿
Todd Jackson: 所以第一部分是极强价值。然后我得弄清楚支付能力和支付意愿。对你来说,这很容易,因为你不是一个 5000 人的公司,而且你是老板。所以这可能非常精简。Lenny’s Newsletter 没有采购部门。所以说假设我要去搞定一家大公司。我在确认支付能力时会问的问题是:你目前是否正在寻找这样的产品?或者你们是否在内部构建类似的东西?这就是 Ironclad 的那个情况,Jason 当时就像,“哦,你已经在寻找 CLM 了。”我思考这个问题的另一种方式是,如果一个客户有一个问题,我真的认为他们有一个问题,而且他们知道自己有问题并且正在寻找解决方案。或者他们甚至尝试过构建自己的解决方案但失败了,那就是最好的客户。他们极度渴望这个东西。他们已经证明了这一点,而且他们实际上在构建它时失败了,因为他们低估了这有多难。所以你目前是否正在寻找构建这里的解决方案?
Lenny Rachitsky: 本质上,就是有预算。你在寻找的是,“是否有资金用于解决这个问题”?
Todd Jackson: 这是我接下来要问的问题,就是这笔预算从哪里来?最好的答案是已经存在一个预算。要么我们已经以某种方式在为竞争工具花钱,或者某些可以被你替代的东西花钱,要么我们正在花钱,我们安排了五个工程师来帮忙构建这个东西。存在某种我可以获取的预算来源。然后问题是,“好吧,你们的团队是如何决定引入第三方工具的?”在这里你永远得不到最干净的答案。在更大的公司里,你可能会得到半干净的答案,但大概是这样的,“好的,这个经理可以直接批准到一定的金额。如果不可以,就交由上一级经理。如果我们要在上面花费超过 5 万美元,我们实际上必须比较三个不同的备选方案。”
但不管怎样,总有一些已知的流程。这就是我要寻找的,而不是一大堆模糊性。所以这就是支付能力。然后我进入支付意愿。我不想试图去量化它。在那里我会问,“你解决这个问题的预算是多少?你为那个其他工具付了多少钱?让我给你看看我的。你觉得你会为那个付更少的钱还是付更多的钱?你能用我有的这个东西替换那个其他东西吗?”然后我非常喜欢这个问题。我想你请过 Madhavan Ramanujam 上节目,对吧?
Lenny Rachitsky: 嗯。
Todd Jackson: 他有这样一个问题,他来自 Simon-Kucher。我很喜欢他的这种做法,就像,“Lenny,对于我刚刚向你描述的这个东西,你会支付的一个公平价格是多少?”然后你说出你的价格。然后我会说,“好的。那么,什么样的价格算昂贵?”然后我说,“好的,什么样的价格算贵得令人望而却步?”你问这三个问题。通常,当人们告诉你公平价格时,他们有点像是在试图争取一笔划算的交易。而如果产品好的话,昂贵价格才是他们实际上会支付的价格。
Todd Jackson: 当人们说感觉昂贵时,你把它放在他们面前说,“它要这么多钱”,如果产品真的很好,他们就会想要。而贵得令人望而却步的价格就是太贵了,他们只能表示,“我实在做不到”。所以我非常喜欢这类问题。我认为它们比我看到的大多数创始人所做的仅仅是与客户聊天要具体得多。你真的想试着向他们提出一些你知道他们会诚实回答的问题,因为你在向他们提问。你不是在让他们猜测,你在问他们相当具体的东西。
哦,我还应该说的是,正如我提到的,这是一个两小时的课程。解释这些东西是一回事,亲眼看到是另一回事。所以我们展示了大量参加过该项目的创始人的 Zoom 录像,我们实际上会做这样一件事,所有参加该项目的创始人都录下了他们所有的客户探索视频,然后我们的团队会观看所有视频并制作高光集锦。然后我们坐在一个房间里一起观看,我们会说,“哦,看看 Lenny 问的这些问题。你看到客户怎么回应的吗?哇,那是一个眼睛发亮的时刻。”或者,“Todd 问了这些问题,他有点在诱导证人,而客户似乎没那么感兴趣。”所以有趣的是,作为创始人,你从来看不到别人是怎么做的。你只有自己的经验。因此,仅仅看到其他创始人如何在真实的现场环境中做这件事,感觉超级棒。人们很喜欢这个。
实际提问的难点与技巧
Lenny Rachitsky: 听到这些东西总是很容易的,但要成为那个向你想推销的潜在客户提问的人,却要困难得多。仅仅就是问一句,“你愿意为这个付多少钱?”所以我非常喜欢你们这种强迫人们进行实际练习的做法。Todd,你的这个项目会收到很多申请,听起来棒极了。我知道你透露了一些我们还没有真正谈论过的东西。关于你刚刚分享的这一点,本质上是为了获得关于这个问题到底有多大的一些真正有切身利益关系的洞察,我很喜欢你基本上直接分享了一堆问题。
现在有人可以直接倒带,把你分享的所有问题写下来,在跟客户交谈时使用。显然,经典的问题是他们会告诉你他们会买,但他们并没有。而你分享的所有东西都是,“这里有一些方法来解决:在他们有实际产品之前,他们到底会不会买?”关于这一点你还有什么想说的吗?就是关于不被欺骗、不被人们仅仅说一句“哦,是啊,我喜欢这个东西”就糊弄过去的技巧?我知道你已经讲了很多,但还有什么别的吗?
Todd Jackson: 是的,我想有几件事。第一件是,当你真的要向人们展示东西时,你必须知道该展示什么。我提到的 Lattice 是那种可以用 Figma 模型来卖的产品。Looker 就不能那样卖,对于 Looker,你实际上必须用他们的真实数据做演示,所以做那个需要更多的工作。Vanta 既不是演示也不是模型,它实际上是在干活,Pilot 也是那样的,有很多这样的公司。所以你必须弄清楚我的产品是什么,它如何解决问题?因此,我的早期产品或早期演示必须达到什么样的保真度才能达成交易?
然后我认为你必须知道什么时候你跟足够多的人聊过了。跟人交谈是需要时间的。经验法则是,如果你跟足够多的人聊过,并且你能预测下一个人会对你说什么的 70% 到 80%,因为你已经跟这么多人聊过,并且你非常清楚地听到了这种模式,那就是你跟足够多的人聊过的时候。但这些全都是你必须学习的东西。这就是为什么我们认为以我们在项目中的这种体验式方式来做是最好的。
项目申请指南
Lenny Rachitsky: 在我们让你走之前,还有什么我们没谈到而你想触及的吗?
Todd Jackson: 没有。如果你正在听,如果你是一家 B2B 创业公司在创业的早期,或者你认识任何符合这个描述的人,并且你很欣赏找到产品市场契合度有多难,而且你不想孤军奋战,那么请申请这个项目或分享这个申请。就像我们承诺的,我们会审查每一份申请。我只是非常期待与大约 20 位出色的创始人组成的团队合作,帮助他们导航寻找产品市场契合度的这些早期日子。这是我喜欢做的事。
Lenny Rachitsky: 那么为了确保合适的人申请,提醒大家谁是非常契合的。所以是 B2B 创始人,你说过他们已经做了六到九个月左右,类似这样?
Todd Jackson: 是的,大约在这个阶段或者更早。你对你的产品是什么有想法。你对它是什么以及它是为谁准备的有一个假设,但你可能还没有开始写任何代码。
Lenny Rachitsky: 如果他们已经做了四年并且还没有取得成功,这就不合适了。
Todd Jackson: 我可以尝试一对一地帮助他们,但是不,那不适合这个项目。
Lenny Rachitsky: 那他们怎么申请,截止日期是什么时候?
Todd Jackson: 好的。所以你去 pmf.firstround.com。申请已经开放了。它们会一直开到 5 月 7 日,然后项目在 5 月 29 日开始。如果你想特别联系我,你可以在 Twitter 上找到我。我是 @tjack,T-J-A-C-K。你可以关注我,给我发私信。是的,我非常期待与一些我知道现在正在收听的出色创始人合作。
Lenny Rachitsky: 太棒了。我很高兴我们做了这个。我觉得这次对话会帮助到大量的创始人,而且他们会一次又一次地回来看它。Todd,非常感谢你来到这里。
Todd Jackson: Lenny,这是我的荣幸。
Lenny Rachitsky: 这是我的荣幸。大家再见。非常感谢大家的收听。如果你觉得这很有价值,你可以在 Apple Podcasts、Spotify 或你最喜欢的播客应用上订阅这个节目。另外,请考虑给我们打分或留下评论,因为这真的能帮助其他听众找到这个播客。你可以在 lennyspodcast.com 找到所有的往期节目或了解更多关于这个节目的信息。下期见。
术语表
| 原文 | 中文 |
|---|---|
| ACV | 年合同金额(ACV) |
| ARR | 年度经常性收入(ARR) |
| Brett Berson | Brett Berson |
| burn multiple | 资金消耗倍数(burn multiple) |
| Casey Winters | Casey Winters |
| Christina Cacioppo | Christina Cacioppo |
| design partners | 设计合作伙伴(design partners) |
| developing | 发展 |
| dollar-driven discovery | 美元驱动的探索(dollar-driven discovery) |
| ecosystem | 生态系统(ecosystem) |
| extreme | 极强 |
| extreme product-market fit | 极强产品市场契合度(extreme product-market fit) |
| First Round | First Round |
| founder-led sales | 创始人主导的销售(founder-led sales) |
| gross margin | 毛利率(gross margin) |
| Ironclad | Ironclad |
| Jack Altman | Jack Altman |
| Jason Boehmig | Jason Boehmig |
| Josh Kopelman | Josh Kopelman |
| Lenny Rachitsky | Lenny Rachitsky |
| Lloyd Tabb | Lloyd Tabb |
| Looker | Looker |
| Madhavan Ramanujam | Madhavan Ramanujam |
| magic number | 神奇数字 |
| marginal customer | 边际客户(marginal customer) |
| nascent | 萌芽 |
| NRR | 净收入留存率(NRR) |
| persona | 目标用户 |
| Persona | Persona |
| problem | 问题 |
| product | 产品 |
| product-market fit | 产品市场契合度 |
| Product-Market Fit Method | 产品市场契合度(product-market fit)方法 |
| promise | 承诺 |
| Rahul | Rahul |
| regretted churn | 非意愿流失(regretted churn) |
| Rick Song | Rick Song |
| Series A | A 轮(Series A) |
| Series B | B 轮(Series B) |
| Series C | C 轮(Series C) |
| Series D | D 轮 |
| Simon-Kucher | Simon-Kucher |
| strong | 强 |
| strong product-market fit | 强产品市场契合度(strong product-market fit) |
| TAM | TAM(总可达市场) |
| tax payback | tax payback(回收期) |
| the grind | 苦工(the grind) |
| Todd Jackson | Todd Jackson |
| wow statement | 惊叹陈述(wow statement) |
| Zach Perret | Zach Perret |
此文档由 AI 分片翻译(translate_long_document)