优秀的创始人如何成为优秀的 CEO | Jonathan Lowenhar(Enjoy The Work 联合创始人)
How a great founder becomes a great CEO | Jonathan Lowenhar (co-founder of Enjoy The Work)
Introducing the Guest
Lenny Rachitsky: You basically spend all your time working with founders, and through that studying, you create frameworks and training and you use that in your work. I think that’s what many, many founders are looking for is how do I avoid pain?
Origin Story: Well-Run Companies Operate Alike
Jonathan Lowenhar: To be a founder is a state of being, it’s an attitude. To be a CEO is a craft. The more founders who can accept that those are two separate things and they’re both equally important to build an ascendant startup, the better all of us will be.
Founder Mode vs. Manager Mode
Lenny Rachitsky: I’m kind of tired of talking about founder mode, but it feels like what you’re describing is founder mode and manager mode.
Common Startup and CEO Failure Modes
Jonathan Lowenhar: Founder mode gets me angry. That article just got me hot. It really felt like an excuse. We were giving founders a permission to not learn the job. It’s not manager mode is bad, it’s the greatest CEOs know when to calibrate which one is needed.
Lenny Rachitsky: Something you talk about, there’s these two phases to a startup journey and most people focus on the first phase.
The Perfectionist CEO
Jonathan Lowenhar: Phase one is build something people want to buy. Phase two, the one we don’t talk about is now you have to build a company around that thing people want to buy. Building a company is always the same. I don’t care if it’s MedTech or fintech or hardware or consumer.
Lenny Rachitsky: You’ve come up with this methodology that you call the Magic Box paradigm that helps founders think about how to lead to a successful exit long-term.
The Angry CEO
Jonathan Lowenhar: This is a traditional sales process. You build a list of the companies that might want to acquire you, you ping them and you hope you get a deal. Magic Box argues that the best outcomes for early-stage startups don’t happen that way. You’re never for sale. In fact, you have seduced a buyer. They see the fantasy, they fall in love.
Lenny Rachitsky: Today, my guest is Jonathan Lowenhar. Jonathan runs a firm called Enjoy The Work, which I’ve heard amazing things about from so many people over the years. Their firm has a singular mission, to help founders become great CEOs. They do this through a blend of mentoring and advising services, which are rooted in their study of how the best startups operate. They take these lessons and fold them into frameworks and advice and training that they offer their CEOs, their insight, which you’ll hear in our conversation, is that most founders don’t come into the job knowing how to be a CEO, which includes learning how to do hiring, how to manage financials, figure out growth strategy, road mapping, planning, people management, and so many other skills that nobody teaches a founder.
In our conversation, Jonathan shares the most common CEO failure modes that he and his team have seen, the Magic Box paradigm for successfully selling your startup, a bunch of advice for finding and hiring the best talent, a framework for building a repeatable go-to-market motion, why and how you should learn to trust your intuition more as a founder and so much more. We could have gone on for so many more hours. Maybe he’ll be back to share more advice. If you’re a founder or hope to be a founder one day, this episode is for you. If you enjoy this podcast, don’t forget to subscribe and follow it in your favorite podcasting app or YouTube. It’s the best way to avoid missing feature episodes and it helps the podcast tremendously. With that, I bring you Jonathan Lowenhar. Jonathan, thank you so much for being here. Welcome to the podcast,
The Laissez-Faire CEO
Jonathan Lowenhar: Lenny, I am damn excited.
Lenny Rachitsky: So am I. The reason I’m excited to have you in this podcast is that you basically spend all your time working with founders, and through that studying, what causes them pain, what causes them to fail, what causes them to struggle, and then you take that and you create frameworks and training and you use that in your work with founders, and I think that’s what many, many founders are looking for is how do I avoid pain? How do I avoid these things that I’m going to probably run into? To build on that, briefly, can you just help people understand what it is you do, what it is your organization does with founders, how you work with founders?
Brake vs. Accelerator Types
Jonathan Lowenhar: Yeah, thank you. I’ll tell a bit of origin story that I think ends up answering that question.
Lenny Rachitsky: Let’s do it.
”Ready, Fire, Aim” CEO
Jonathan Lowenhar: I had run a bunch of different types of companies and they were really different ones. I ran a big division for a public company, then I was a private equity CEO, then I did back-to-back startups. The first one didn’t get very far, but we sold it, and the second one got really far. When I left the second one, I was like many founders, grossly unhealthy, 25 pounds overweight, wasn’t sleeping enough, all the things. I took a few months to get healthy and then reflect on those parts of my career. One of the things that I noticed at the time was all of those companies, when they got to a good place, when they started to run well, they were all run well in the same way. How could this be? How could public company, private equity, startups, early stage, growth stage, when they were run well, they were all run well the same way?
I started to obsess about this question, and what it led me to realize is that every well-run company has a rhythm. It’s unmistakable, you can’t miss it. You can’t not see it. You just spend a couple of days through a spy cam watching a business, you’ll see the pattern. How come some startups get there and some don’t? How does a founder learn the rhythm? How do they learn how to run a company well? I started to ask investors obsessively, and I asked them, Lenny, I asked them all three questions, same three over and over and over again.
First question was, well, describe to me your ideal founder. What’s a great founder? The answers universally were the same. Investors would use words that meant grit and tenacity and courage and insight, and I’d say, “Great. Question number two, describe to me a great startup CEO,” and they use none of those words. How can that possibly be true? Instead, they describe skills. This is a person who knows how to build stuff and sell stuff and recruit people and raise capital and organize humans and financially plan. Question number three, my final one, well, how does a founder learn those skills while doing the job? I got blank fucking stares, over and over again. It led me down this path that I’m now 10 years into with my colleagues of, well, how do we help founders learn those skills so that their venture investors don’t fire them, so that they can actually go build whatever company they want to build and stay in the job for as long as they want to stay in the job? That’s origin, that’s what got me going.
The Micromanager CEO
Lenny Rachitsky:
The new thing in Pendo, session replays, a very cool way to visualize user sessions. I’m not surprised at all that over 10,000 companies use it today. Visit Pendo.io/Lenny to create your free Pendo account today and start building better experiences across every corner of your product. PS, you want to take your product-led know-how a step further? Check out Pendo’s lineup of free certification courses led by talk product experts and designed to help you grow in advance in your career. Learn more and experience the power of the Pendo platform today at Pendo.io/Lenny. I’m excited to chat with Christina Gilbert, the founder of OneSchema, one of our longtime podcast sponsors. Hi, Christina.
Christina Gilbert: Yes, thank you for having me on, Lenny.
Lenny Rachitsky: What is the latest with OneSchema? I know you now work with some of my favorite companies, like Ramp, Vanta, Scale and Watershed. I heard that you just launched a new product to help product teams import CSVs from especially tricky systems like ERPs.
Christina Gilbert: Yes, so we just launched OneSchema FileFeeds, which allows you to build an integration with any system in 15 minutes as long as you can export a CSV to an SFTP folder. We see our customers all the time getting stuck with hacks and workarounds and the product teams that we work with don’t have to turn down prospects because their systems are too hard to integrate with. We allow our customers to offer thousands of integrations without involving their engineering team at all.
Lenny Rachitsky: I can tell you that if my team had to build integrations like this, how nice would it be to be able to take this off my roadmap and instead use something like OneSchema and not just to build it but also to maintain it forever?
Christina Gilbert: Absolutely, Lenny. We’ve heard so many horror stories of multi-day outages from even just a handful of bad records. We are laser-focused on integration reliability to help teams end all of those distractions that come up with integrations. We have a built-in validation layer that stops any bad data from entering your system, and OneSchema will notify your team immediately of any data that looks incorrect.
Lenny Rachitsky: I know that importing incorrect data can cause all kinds of pain for your customers and quickly lose their trust. Christina, thank you for joining us and if you want to learn more, head on over to OneSchema.co. That’s OneSchema.co. There’s obviously this new meme of founder mode. I’m kind of tired of talking about founder mode, but it feels like what you’re describing is founder mode and manager mode. You basically have to be good at both. This latter part is almost manager mode. Is that a way to think about it?
”Ready, Fire, Aim” Is Most Common
Jonathan Lowenhar: Yes. Founder mode gets me angry. That article just got me hot.
Lenny Rachitsky: Do share.
Four Backcasting Paths and Exits
Jonathan Lowenhar: It really felt like an excuse. We were giving founders a permission to not learn the job. If we think about an ascending startup, there’s this phase of I have to invent something. I now have to figure out how to get my customer in front of this invention and see if it works, and then I have to build a business model around that to see if there’s some repeatable way to attract, win, deploy my customer and thrill them with whatever the solution is. Okay, now I have to go build an enormous amount of demand and then I have to build up an operation that can handle all that demand. Oh, and by the way, at some point, figure out how to turn positive revenues into positive cash flows. The idea that the founder who’s writing code by themselves doesn’t have to advance their skills to learn how to do all those things, and that in fact what the article even implies is learning how to do those other things is a negative is bananas to me.
The things required to launch a company are not the same as grow a company as scale a company as exit a company, and the best startup CEOs learn them all along the way. There are lots of ways to learn them. I’m not suggesting there’s only one path, but founder mode was almost an excuse not to. I do think what’s unique about a founder that felt perhaps where that article was trying to go is that unlike the professional mercenary CEO that gets dropped in, the founder knows everything about what built this company and they can drop in at the most granular level and play anywhere. They can drop into a product feature, they can drop into a customer conversation or a partner conversation or with a long-time employee that’s still in IC and be impactful and then rise back up if they’ve gone the training and get back into a cockpit to run the company again. That’s to me the distinction. It’s not manager mode is bad, it’s the greatest CEOs know when to calibrate which one is needed.
Lenny Rachitsky: I love that. I’m glad we got there. I wasn’t planning to talk about founder mode, but I think this is really helpful for folks to hear that are founders and people working for founders too. Along these same lines, you have a really helpful and really funny also mental model for how to think about common failure modes of founders. You have these labels that I love, and this is actually the first thing I heard about Enjoy The Work is these labels that you guys use, and you also, a similar mental model for failure modes for a startup. Can you just share these modes that you’ve come up with?
The Magic Box Paradigm
Jonathan Lowenhar: We do take a bit of a comical approach to some of this. As I’ve shared with you previously, the name of our company is not an accident. If we can’t be playful, we can take the work seriously and not ourselves, so we do fuck around quite a bit. I think if I would separate failure modes for companies versus CEOs for a minute, the company ones are not quite as comedic, but they are ones we see all the time. One is you chose the wrong market. I don’t think we need to belabor that one. Lots of your prior guests have talked about the importance of getting that part right or nothing else really matters.
Second, back to what we were discussing a minute ago, build something people want to buy, got to go build the right thing. Cool. Third one, founder’s function. We like to joke that more companies die from suicide than homicide, and it’s grim, but also if the two or three people in charge of the business can’t get along, nothing else matters. It’s all going to break apart. Then fourth, execution, and execution now leads back to CEO. Okay, so now we have a bunch of playful ones here. We have the robot CEO, who believes emotion should not ever exist at a startup, at which point we train them on a very simple formula. Emotions are messy, humans have emotions, startups need humans, therefore startups are messy.
Lenny Rachitsky: I love how engineering-oriented that advice is, which makes sense for robots. Yeah.
Four Roles in the Magic Box
Jonathan Lowenhar: Also, a little bit more graceful of an answer there is also our CEOs want urgency and passion and excitement from their teams. They want them working enormously hard for below market comp more often than not with this promise of equity that might return value five or 10 or 12 years later. They want them to bring all of that emotion, but they’re supposed to figure out how to surgically cut off the emotions that are inconvenient. That’s the robot CEO who believes that we can just have several robots working for us and you just press a button and they do a thing. Second one is a pleaser CEO. This is the person who is far more concerned with being liked than running a business, so they can’t tell anyone hard news. They can’t break ties, they want a consensus on everything, and that’s not possible.
If you have a group of thoughtful people working for you, they’re going to fight, they’re going to debate and you want them to. Then at some point you have to call it and say, “No, we’re going left not right.” Or, “The two of you need to go get in a room and deal with something.” Or, “Hey, the way you just showed up is not the way I want you to show up.” The pleaser CEO won’t do any of that. They will simply hide and pray It goes away and it won’t go away. Next one is a perfectionist CEO. I’d like to say that these are the CEOs with the most beautiful product to be delivered minutes before they file for bankruptcy. This is the person who is far more concerned with being right and believing that there’s always a right answer than just moving forward.
It creates two problems in a business. One is you’re just slow and the other one is you’ll never take any bets because you will build a team that realizes the CEO is not allowed to be wrong, so you can’t disagree, you can’t use intuition, you can’t use gut. Everything has to be utterly factual and that is simply not possible. In early-stage startups, you have more questions than you do answers. Everything is circumstantial. It’s not like watching CSI entrepreneurship and you get to see a video to say, “Oh, look, the guy did it.” No, we have a bunch of little data points you have to come to a conclusion. The next one is the angry CEO.
I had a founder of mine a bunch of years ago and we were seeing a pattern across the leadership team and he and I get on the phone one morning and I said, “I have a theory for you. It might be a story, I might be wrong, but I want to share.” He said, ” Okay.” I said, “I think you wake up in the morning angry and you don’t know it, and then you get to the office and you beat the crap out of the first employee that crosses paths with you over something utterly unrelated because you’re angry. You realize that a few hours later and you apologize and your team hasn’t quit yet because they believe you’re a good human who doesn’t have good self-control.” Then I shared with him, “And you just had your first child. My guess is because I’m not a psychologist, I’m not a therapist, that you are modeling something that’s happened in your life. Is this something you want to change?”
His answer is yes, and I said, “Great. I have good news and bad news. The good news is because you said yes, we can do something about it, and the bad news is I don’t know what to fucking do. That’s not my job.” The point being, no one wants to work for the angry person. I don’t care what the equity potential is worth, no one wants to work for that person, and the moment they see greener pastures elsewhere, they’re leaving. The next one is the one that drives me particularly crazy, it’s the laissez-faire CEO, who insanely believes that I can just hire great people and utterly ignore them and let markets take care of themselves and they will do all the right things. I have never met anyone, Lenny, that didn’t benefit from good management and the laissez-faire CEO believes that management is not required, and so what they ultimately find is they have really, really good people doing utterly disconnected things and goals are not achieved.
Every CEO we can reductively reduce to one of two characters. They’re either comfortable with the brake or comfortable with the accelerator. The challenge with those who are comfortable with the brake, what I mean by that is they don’t want to spend any money, so they’re driving this beautiful sports car and they’re just leaning on the brake the whole time. Yes, they won’t run any money, and yes, they will also get lapped by everyone else and miss the opportunity. Where their opportunity is, is where can you take bets? Where can you actually downshift that car in such a way where you give yourself a chance in the market? Separate, those who ride the accelerator, we’ve all met this one. They’re going to run out of money really fast, and this connects to one of our other challenging CEO types, the ready, fire, aim.
Most CEOs are really bad at planning and that’s because there’s this little-known secret in the Bay area, most CEOs have never run a business before. Planning doesn’t have to be some heavy bureaucratic multi-month exercise that begins in August and ends in February, but a little bit of bottoms up planning to say, what are we trying to achieve? How do we quantify it? What resources are required? What humans are going to do what? How do we shorten feedback loops so we know in a week, in a month and two months, whether we’re on the right trajectory? The ready, fire, aim CEO says, “I don’t want to do any of that because they’re improvisational and they just want to take bets and they want to take shots,” and that’s what got the company started, and that’s also what will have the company go bankrupt. The micromanager one is the opposite of laissez-faire. They believe that no matter how many employees they have, they can do the job better.
The challenge with this one is it is massively disrespectful to those who work for you. We think that, and this is a bit insulting, that everyone that works for a founder can be fit into one or two chunks. They’re either an adult or a child. I have a three-year-old, my little girl is amazing. I’m utterly in love. If she doesn’t have a lot of structure and a lot of supervision, she’s going to run into things, man. Into things, off things, through things, but adults don’t need to be given utter instruction and watched all the time. In fact, it needs to be the opposite. We agree on what success is, what resources are, and you let them go and they’ll come back to you when they have questions. The micromanager CEO doesn’t see the difference between those two humans. They don’t trust anybody and that’s actually the thing under the thing under the thing, so they want to do everyone’s work and that will succeed right up into the point everyone quits.
Lenny Rachitsky: This is amazing. Okay, so let me recap these labels that you have just for folks. I have them written down here. There’s the robot CEO, perfectionist CEO, pleaser CEO, micromanager, laissez-faire, ready, fire, aim, riding the brake and then riding the gas, and as you said, the ever-popular angry CEO.
Phase Two: Validation
Jonathan Lowenhar: You got them all.
Lenny Rachitsky: As people hear this, I imagine people self-identify a few of these, like I have some of this, I have some of that, and it’s not like black or white. No one is like, “I’m a 100% robot CEO, and I need to fix that.” It’s like a pie chart kind of, I don’t know, what’s a visual of this? Everyone’s got a little bit of this, basically.
Phase Three: Quantification
Jonathan Lowenhar: That’s right. I enjoy giving this talk on stage and watching different founders in the audience cringe at different moments, but it doesn’t mean that they’re all one or the other. If they were all one of these and then didn’t want to even accept the possibility that there’s a little bit of a lot of these that they could work on, they’re probably not coachable and they’re not going to be in the talk anyway.
Lenny Rachitsky: It’s like I imagine each of these is very particular and it’s this journey you go on to work on yourself. Let me just ask, what’s the most common issue that you’ve found across these labels of type CEOs? What’s the most common one and what do you often recommend someone to work on specifically to help them through that?
Additional Key Points
Jonathan Lowenhar: I think ready, fire, aim is the most common that we’ve seen, and that has been an affliction that’s been growing in the last number of years. It wasn’t long ago that CEOs could paper over poor execution with easy access to capital. Suddenly, over the last number of years, we’re expecting founders to be better operators. Better operators means eventually being on a path when more cash comes into the business and out of the business. That doesn’t happen by accident. The ready, fire, aim CEO has probably suffered this pain where they took lots and lots of bets. Maybe they measured the outcome after the fact and they were wrong and they were wrong and they were wrong in ways that were expensive, and they’ve raised their hand to say, “I see it. I want to get better at this.” Basic, basic business design and business planning is not some corporate effort. It’s some thoughtful exercise that starts with what are we working backwards from?
Because in any given time, Lenny, companies are working backwards from one of four things, whether they like it or not. I am working backwards from an exit. I’m working backwards from a next fundraise. I’m working backwards from profitability or I’m working backwards from winding down. We don’t talk about the fourth one that much, but I got to choose one. I got to choose the top of the mountain. More often than not, they’re choosing a fundraise. Then we’ll ask that founder, you know your market, you know your investors, you know the next set of investors, we’ve done some intel. What has to be true to unlock the next fundraise? That’s a qualitative and quantitative answer, but we write it down. We need to get better at go to market. We need to land our first partner. We need to launch next iteration of the product and show this level of efficacy, engagement, what have you. Can we codify that? Yes. Can we talk through what actions would be required on what cadence to unlock that quantified set of results? Yes.
… that quantified set of results? Yes. Do we understand what resources would be required to do those things? Recognize we might have to squint through some of it, but again, the answer is yes. [inaudible 00:24:13] now aimed. If we have a culture that has some accountability, that has a communication architecture, so there’s some rituals about how we meet and how we share information and how we talk through problems, and how we work through bottlenecks, well, now we have a plan and now we have accountability. I now no longer have to just guess all the time. And this only works for the CEO who says, “My improvisational efforts got me here, but I don’t think they’ll get me there.”
There’s a guy I worked for a long time ago, and he had this phrase… He had like seven or eight phrases, he would use them over and over and over again. It was hard not to commit them all to memory, and one of them was, “If you keep doing what you’re doing, you keep getting what you’re getting.” And for the ready, fire, aim folks who realize the weakness of that at scale, the way to counteract that, is to start with good planning.
Lenny Rachitsky: It’s interesting that’s the most common type of CO, when with Founder Mode, it feels like it just accelerates that further. The whole meme of Founder Mode, which are what makes you upset. Makes sense. Great.
Okay, so I love that you talked about exiting as basically one of these four working backwards paths, because that’s where I wanted to go next. I want to talk about some of these specific frameworks and skills and methodologies that you teach, and one of them… I want to almost go to the end of selling your company. And the reason I’m excited to talk about this, is if you think about, and tell me if I’m wrong, but it feels like most startups that succeed end up selling their company. That’s the most likely success, right?
Seduction vs. Enterprise Sales
Jonathan Lowenhar: Yes, by far.
How to Start Building Relationships
Lenny Rachitsky: Great. Yeah, because the other option is IPO or just run this privately forever. Or fail, basically, and fold. So of the successful options, the most common is selling. At the same time, founders have never done this before, they don’t know what they’re doing. The other side, often, has done it many times, and so it’s a pretty treacherous and scary and high-stakes thing to do and to learn on the spot. And you’ve come up with this methodology that you call the Magic Box Paradigm that I love, that helps founders think about how to lead to a successful exit long term. Can you talk about what this is?
Relationship-Building Strategies (Continued)
Jonathan Lowenhar: I can, and I want to give credit where it’s due. There’s a book by this name, it’s called Magic Box Paradigm, written by an independent banker named Ezra Roizen. And the book’s fantastic, and Ezra is fantastic.
What we’ve done, is we’ve operationalized it so that we could teach founders over, and over, and over again. If the founder wants to hire a banker for this particular process, because we’re not bankers, we’re not BD, we don’t get paid that way, we’re teachers. But if wanted to hire a banker, go hire Ezra. But the methodology itself is a inversion for how venture and venture boards have thought about startups being ready for sale for a long, long time. It’s utterly counter to so much advice that founders have heard. There are two ways you can get acquired. This is purposely reductive. One is you put up a for-sale sign. This is a traditional sales process. You build a list of the companies that might want to acquire you. You figure out the categories of buyers, the companies there, the contact list within that. You ping them and say, “We’re open to a transaction,” or some euphemism the like. You contact them and say, “I’ll give you some information now. Sign an NDA. Give me an indication of interest by this date.” And you work through a process, and you pray you have more than one person at the end of the game, try and ratchet them up, sign a term sheet. They will then re-trade along the way, right up until the point you die and you hope you get a deal done.
Lenny Rachitsky: Sounds very familiar.
Goals for the First Conversation
Jonathan Lowenhar: And it’s one that often will just hit the nervous system of any founder that’s been through it a couple of times. Because man, is it a fraught exercise? What Magic Box argues, is that the best outcomes for early-stage startups don’t happen that way. You’re never for sale. In fact, you have seduced a buyer. You have brought someone in. And there are three stages to Magic Box work. There is learn the fantasy, there’s prove the fantasy, and there’s quantify the fantasy.
All right, so what the hell do I mean by a fantasy? You’re an early-stage startup, and you meet a company that is in your space, in your vertical, what have you, and they’re much more advanced than you. It’s a large business. Generally speaking, another oversimplification here, large companies are interested in small companies because they’re technology. And small companies are interested in large companies because they’re distribution. And there’s someone at the large company who becomes fascinated with you.
What’s the fascination? What they see in their head is, “Oh, interesting. If I buy your company, this thing happens.” The classic example of this is Instagram. This is the number one example of this. Lenny, do you remember how much revenue they had when they got acquired by now Meta?
Lenny Rachitsky: I think it was zero.
Working with Jonathan Lowenhar
Jonathan Lowenhar: I think it was zero.
Three Core Jobs of a CEO
Lenny Rachitsky: Okay.
The Hiring Methodology
Jonathan Lowenhar: Do you remember the acquisition price?
Values-Based Interviewing
Lenny Rachitsky: A billion dollars, which was absurd at that point.
Jonathan Lowenhar: There was no math Facebook could use, historically speaking, that would justify a billion dollars. It had to be a model on the future. This is Magic Box to a T. They had a fantasy that adding Instagram would expand ad revenue. They figured out some way to prove it. I’ll explain more on what I mean by proof. And then their quantification was based on the future. And that’s the difference between a Magic Box approach and traditional approaches. Traditional approaches are based on the past, Magic Box is on the future.
Let me tell a story. In one of our companies in construction tech, their technology was able to suck in video camera data from construction sites for project planning. No one was doing this yet. And the business was doing pretty well. We helped the founders launch the company. We got first product in market. We raised a couple of rounds of capital. The product mostly worked. But we weren’t sure it was venture scale as we were going along. And we had some large construction tech companies and real estate companies and development companies leaning into us. And one particular company then said, “Huh, we’re really good at construction planning, and we’ve collected all of this video data that we don’t use at all.” And the champion on the other side in the product org, he has a fantasy. “Oh, shit. We take your video analytics platform and plug it into what we do, and this is what happens to my business.”
Now, the person on the other side is a person. And the reason I’m being specific about that, is because you don’t sell to a company. Magic Box is about finding the person. You’re finding the champion on the other side, the person who has motivated for their own reasons, career, money, reputation, what have you. They see the fantasy. They fall in love. And this person says, “I am in love with this idea. If I can grab security data into my product organization. Now I have to prove the fantasy.”
What’s different about a champion in this kind of process, is they want to find a way to say yes. They’re not looking for a way to say no. And this brings us to the four characters you’re going to meet along the path of Magic Box. There might be a fifth. You’re going to meet your champion, you’re going to meet your advocates, you’re going to meet your blockers, and you’re going to meet your buyer. You might meet Corp Dev along the way.
Let me talk about each of those folks. The champion is the one who’s fallen in love. They’re the ones with the fantasy. They’re the ones who are arguing on your behalf. They’re the ones fighting for you when you’re not in the room. They are texting you, they’re telling you things about the business that they’re probably not supposed to tell you.
The buyer. All they care about is math. It might be a committee, it might be a group, the IC, the EC, the investment group, what have you. They’re the ones who actually can sign off on a deal. They care about business case.
Advocates… Lenny, do you play chess?
On Hiring Junior Talent
Lenny Rachitsky: I have played chess, yes.
Three Executive Archetypes: Architect, Optimizer, Expander
Jonathan Lowenhar: You have played chess. So advocates are pawns. They don’t matter at all until they matter enormously. These are folks that, like, you are the CEO doing a meeting with your potential buyer, and there are somehow 12 people on the Zoom call, but only two do the talking. The other 10 might be advocates. They’re rooting for you, but they will take no political risk. Their value is in giving you intel.
Blocker. This is the person who can’t say yes, but they can say no. This is OPSEC, this is Procurement, this is Legal. You’re going to meet all these characters during the Magic Box dance. Your champion just wants you to get the deal done so in love. So what happens, is they’ve come up with a fantasy and you as a CEO need to lean into it. This isn’t enterprise selling. I’m not trying to sell you this thing that I have. I’m just trying to find ways to say yes.
So when, in my story, the person says, “Could we provide you all of our video data that we’ve collected forever and you now could enhance our ability to predict whether large- scale construction projects are on time”? I don’t want the CEO saying anything other than, “We can do that.”
Now, phase two, I need to prove it. Okay, because I have a champion who wants to say yes, proof can be really easy. And the reason the proof is so important, is not to convince the champion they’re in love with the fantasy. They’re already convinced. It’s because in almost all cases, big company is buying little company and your champion doesn’t have unilateral authority. They’re going to socialize the deal. They have to get buy-in from who? The aforementioned buyer. They have to be able to survive the aforementioned blockers.
So eventually, when they pitch this to whatever committee is in charge, that committee is going to say, “What proof do we have that it works?” And we just want to be able to provide the champion with enough evidence that it works. So in this case, we said to the champion, ” Well, give us video data, and we will provide you the evidence that you need.” Because we’re dealing with a champion who’s not a cynic, because champions aren’t, we could tell them, “And provide us the data in this way, in this fashion, and here’s what we’ll send you after. Are we in agreement?” We know we’re already going to win the proof, and it’s critically important in these dances.
Number three, quantify. At this point, we’re not up for sale, but we’re spending a lot of calories on somebody, and they know it. So we have our CEOs say the following phrase to them: “My board is asking questions. They’re wondering why we’re spending so many calories on this when it’s not really core and we’re not selling you our product. I’m convinced of how exciting this could be, together, but I think we need to do some math. So I can explain to my board why this might matter. So let’s imagine all this works, because it’s going to work, and it’s a year from now or five years from now. What changes about your business?” And the champion will tell you, “Retention does this, or deal size goes like this, or market share goes like this.” And you’ll say to them, “Fantastic. Look, I’m going to build some shitty verse version of the model. You tell me what I got right and what I got wrong, but I have a board meeting in 16 days, and I need to be able to walk them through the justify why I am spending so many calories on this exercise.”
You build the model, you hand it to them. If they in any way respond to your model, you’ve won. Because you have now divorced history from future, and you are now playing in future, you are playing the Instagram game in this case. The ending of the story for the company that I was describing, it was a business sub 2 million in revenue. Our prospects of raising series B felt low. We were not yet profitable, and that was an exit that was generational wealth for the co-founders and their families. The CEO went on and spent two-plus years with the now public company that did this acquisition. The technology did get integrated, but it took a long time and they had to do a lot of changes to it, certainly beyond what was envisioned during the diligence process. But all parties are happy. And if we hadn’t done it this way and we had just been up for sale, we’d get a dollar for that company.
A couple of other side points that are really important here. For any of you founders out there that are thinking about working backwards from an exit, there are two things that I really want to stress. One is the fantasy is beyond just, “What is the business change you can have?” The fantasy is, “Your books are in order.” Your fantasy is all of your investors will sign off on the deal and you will have unanimous consent, that the key members of your team are going to stick around, that you’re a joy to work with. Please God, founder, do not puncture the fantasy at any time.
So whatever is starting to shape in your buyer’s mind, get to know it. Live that everybody wins from that game. Second, Corp Dev, they will probably show up in the stands. Corp Dev make deals. They’re not deal sponsors, they’re not a champion, they’re not a buyer. They are an expert negotiator. Their job is to facilitate deals and get deals done. The most important things to understand is that they can be a leverage point to have a deal move with some process and some pace and some urgency. Because either deals have momentum or they die, and Corp Dev can help there.
Second, they are way better at negotiating than you. So anytime dealing with a superior negotiator, the only thing you can do to try and even the scales, is move the negotiation async. So founders, repeat after me, I’m talking to you directly now. You’ll say to Corp Dev, “You know I’m not alone in this decision. I love what you just said and I’m excited about this opportunity. Once I see it in writing, I can socialize it with advisors, lawyers, co-founders, whoever.” But don’t negotiate live. You will lose.
Lenny Rachitsky: Let me just say that was extremely delightful to listen to. I’ve never heard like a M&A strategy be this fun. And it makes me want to sell a company. It’s like, “Okay, let’s do this. I’m hyped.” I think you got it all. I have a few questions.
Interestingly, the middle part is… It feels a lot like enterprise sales, which a lot of founders are used to. Understand the stakeholders move things forward. Here’s your champion, here’s your blockers, here’s the buyer. Is there anything there you want to say, what’s maybe most different from enterprise sales, which I think a lot of founders are maybe used to? Or is it pretty similar?
Three Conditions for Sustainable Success
Jonathan Lowenhar: Yeah, I think three things. One is there are a lot of moments in enterprise sales where we’re trying to push for a compelling event. That doesn’t work in seduction. The playful metaphor that we’ll often use, is you’ve been dating for a while, this person could be the person, but they’re not quite convinced yet that it should be a life together, and you’re sitting at dinner. And in enterprise sales, you’re eager to get it done. You’re eager to move the relationship forward and move in and get engaged, what have you. And so you might be inclined to say, “Hey, either we move this relationship the next step, or there are a whole bunch of people eyeing me, and I’m going to go date someone else.”
That conversation never goes well, and in Magic Box founders are eager to do the same thing, thinking that competition will improve their deal size, when in fact I think more often than not, that is a negative signal until the very end of the dance. So instead in enterprise selling where I’m pushing, in Magic Box, I’m always trying to entice, I’m never, ever trying to push. So instead I might say things like, “Hey, I’m going to raise my next round in Q1, because I’ve been intending to do this business independently. Now all I really want to do, is win. I just want my product in as many customers’ hands as possible. Whether I do that on my own as I was planning, in partnership with someone, or under someone else’s roof, honestly I don’t care. But I have a company to run and I’m going to go raise my next round in Q1. And if I do that, probably too expensive for this deal to make sense anymore, and my board will want me to move on anyway.” I’m enticing. I’m never trying to push.
Lenny Rachitsky:
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Okay, so I’m thinking about as a founder hearing this, and I feel like what they’re probably wondering is that first step of finding that person, starting to build this fantasy. Any advice you could share for a founder that’s like, “We probably need to sell this company”? What can they do to start creating these relationships, find this person, create this fantasy in their minds?
Hiring Is Never the Goal
Jonathan Lowenhar: Ezra does this really well in the book. Again, it has to be not solicitous. So one of our companies, we had maybe 20 months of capital left, and the two co-founders and our team were convinced, “This isn’t a venture business. We thought it might be a venture business. It’s not a venture business. It takes too long to do a deal that’s not that interesting with each of our enterprise customers.” It was disappointing, but at least we were honest about it. “Okay, so who are we going to sell to? Let’s go play this game.”
So we started with categories, categories of buyers. It could be, for this particular example that was in my head, ERP companies could be a buyer, large banks could be a buyer, the big software companies like Microsoft could be a buyer. There were a few different categories. And we said, “Great. Who are the companies within those categories that make sense?” They’re acquisitive, they have the balance sheet for it. There’s a Corp Dev department, so we know that they actually know what they’re talking about here. Ideally, there’s an existing relationship with core team or advisors or board members. Make a list.
Now, how do we meet them in a way without selling them? So one of the examples in the book, which I love, is small startup wants to meet the luminaries in a space, and they have their PR agency set up a panel where they contact the CEOs of the potential buyers and say, “We’re putting together a panel of the world’s foremost experts in X. We’re going to put four people on the panel, and it’s going to be you and famous person number two and famous person number three, and this fourth person,” that is a luminary to us. And it’s our startup CEO. And suddenly you’re at the table as a peer. It’s a completely different conversation.
The second one, and this is going to sound a little silly, but I am not exaggerating, it works. If you are a CEO founder and you have that title on LinkedIn, it’s amazing the responses you’ll get. So we made this list and we just started to send connection requests to the CEOs or CPOs or CFOs on our target list, and said something as simple as this, “You’re doing something really cool. So are we. You game just for a 30-minute chat? Because I don’t know where it’ll go, but I think it’ll be fun.” Keep it that informal. It’s peer to peer. I’m not selling you anything.
If you can draw a line to some post that they had or some speech that they gave, even better. But we found without fail, there would be math that would show up, one out of four, one out of five, or one out of six, “Yeah, that sounds fun.” There’s a lot of those CEOs never talk to startups, and that’s fascinating to them, especially when presented with the energy of, “I just want to have a fun, intellectual discussion.”
What you’re looking for in that first conversation, and this is what we ask our CEOs to do, is to ask questions like, “What do you care most about in the next year? What’s the mandate? What about for your department? What are the things that keep you up at night? What’s the break? What’s the thing that could actually kill everything, if you had a pre-mortem for the next year?” Those kind of open-ended questions, because what we want our CEO listening for, is the fantasy to see if there’s some intersection between what they care about and what we might be able to squint and say we do.
The Four-Module Go-To-Market Framework
Lenny Rachitsky: It’s interesting, because it sounds a lot like there’s a jobs-to-be-done framework here, or just like, “What is the job they need done?” What is the pain you’re going to solve, and then create a fantasy around how amazing it’ll be for them if you can solve that problem.
Jonathan Lowenhar: And ideally they’ll say it and you just reflect it back in active listening.
The Brain Writing Method
Lenny Rachitsky: Chris Voss negotiation style. Okay, so you’re the kind of guest, Jonathan, where the whole podcast could be about each one of these topics, and so I know there’s so much more to talk about here. I want to move to a different topic, but to leave folks with, one is if they want to explore this methodology more, there’s a book you mentioned, called Magic Box Paradigm by Ezra Roizen, right?
If companies are in this process, starting to think about it, does it make sense for them to come to you and like, “Hey, help me through this process”? I know you said, “Go to an investment banker.” Or does it make sense to like, “Hey, let’s bring on Jonathan,” or someone from your team to help them?
It makes sense to like, Hey, let’s bring on Jonathan or someone from your team to help them.
Jonathan Lowenhar: We meet two types of founders. Founder one says, fix this part of my business, totally transactional. I want to raise the next round, or I’m hiring people badly or my founders aren’t getting along, or I want to sell my company. Well, I need to be honest, that’s not interesting to us. That’s not our work. Go find someone who is, and I don’t mean this disparagingly, but like a screwdriver, like fixes one thing, go fix one thing. Then we meet second type of founder and that founder says, most likely to themselves, ‘cause it’s the only safe audience. There’s some gap between the CEO I am and the one my company needs me to be. There are a set of skills that I’m great at and there are these things where I know if I’m really honest with myself, if I listen to the quiet voice, I’m soft at these things or I’m not good enough at these things or I have some imposter syndrome about these things and if I don’t get better at them, danger. That’s the one we work with. And it’s when they care that much about both the hard skill development and maybe the soft skill development in their path to become a great CEO.
How to sell the company. It’s one of the skills. We teach this to all of our founders as well as hiring and management and planning. I don’t care what the thing is. For every one of our founders, we audit them and say, here’s what you’re great at, here’s what you’re shitty at, and here’s what you’ve never done before, and which of these do you want to work on next given where the company is in its cycle.
Go-To-Market Framework Recap
Lenny Rachitsky: Great segue to where I wanted to go with this, which is hiring. So I hear all the time that a founder’s core job is fundraising and hiring an amazing team. Basically that’s their main goal. Just like hire amazing people. The people you hire make your company, create the culture. You got to get that right. But similar to trying to sell your company, most founders have never really hired lots of people, they’ve never hired for all these different skill sets they’re trying to hire for and I know that you guys spend a lot of time helping founders hire and find amazing people. Can you just share some of the advice you share with founders for how to find and hire amazing people?
Costliest Mistake: Choosing Wrong Customers
Jonathan Lowenhar: Yeah, so we actually think the CEO has three jobs. We agree with the two that you said, but we think there’s a third. One is, make sure everyone knows where we’re going. The second one, pick the right people for the team. Third one, give those people the tools they need to win. And you can abstract from those what they all mean, but-
Planning from Reality
Lenny Rachitsky: I love that.
Jonathan Lowenhar: … most founders are really bad at hiring. They fall prey to all sorts of pretty common human biases. The lazy ones, back to laissez-faire, think it’s just gambling like, oh cool, they worked at Meta and Salesforce already, so hire them, just gambling. There was work done by and then codified in a beautiful book. I’m going to make sure I get the names right, Geoffrey Smart and Randy Street. They had a consulting firm that dates back to the mid-nineties. Then they wrote a book in 2007 or 2008 called Who: The A Method for Hiring. We have operationalized that book and then expanded on it ‘cause there are some parts of it that we found a little dated, but it’s really still as applicable today as it ever was.
And I think there are three core mistakes that founders make all the time, that can be really easily rectified. The first one is, you should hire people who have already done the thing you need to have done next. And I know that sounds simple, but founders don’t think of hiring that way. They start with a job description. We’ve been taught that for a long time. Start with the job description. It’s a fucking mistake. Start with, it’s 12 months later, you hired the person, they started today, 12 months have gone by, you’re clinking champagne because of how great it’s been. What’s changed about the business? What does success look like 12 months later? Document it. And then when you interview people, look for people that have already done that stuff.
Second, the notion of does the person in front of you have a history of creating raving fans? They talk in the book about this idea of you being pulled or pushed in your career. If you were an outstanding performer in Job A, it is a high likelihood that in job B, someone associated with you in job A is going to pull you into the next thing and then pull you into the next thing and pull you into the next thing and you’ll never do a job search ‘cause you were great. And if you see a history of that, ding, ding, ding, ding, ding, really attractive candidate. Third, core values matter a lot. Culture is not an accident. Culture at scale is the codification of what matters to a business and the ritualization of living those values. It starts with whoever the founders are and then it will emanate across as long as the founders are super consistent. But that also means you need a methodology for evaluating the next human in front of you on whether they actually represent your values. We think of these interview stages in a way similar to the book, we use slightly different language, but we think that there is a culture interview, there is a functional interview, and there is a technical interview, but they’re designed to get at these notions of have they actually done this kind of work before? Have they been pulled or pushed in their career and are they your kind of human?
Trust Your Instincts
Lenny Rachitsky: Funny on that last detail actually, [inaudible 00:54:03] at Airbnb, there was actually a core values interview team that was formed around studying what the founders Brian, and Joe, and Nate valued specifically and then they codified them to core values at the business and then there’s this team that was a very select handpicked team that at every interview loop interviewed the person for their values.
Trust Instincts, Not Fear
Jonathan Lowenhar: That is a beautiful example of how interviewing for values is independent of title. ‘Cause you’ll find people in the company at every stage of a company that are the best ambassadors, the best embodiments of those values. Please use them for interviewing and in addition, they love it ‘cause they’re protecting their castle. They love where they work, they want to keep it that way.
Lenny Rachitsky: So true that team is a real special team and it was really honored to be on that team. So let me summarize what you just shared, which I love. There’s so much value here, it just keeps going and going. So when you’re hiring, your advice is: look for people, one, that have done it before; two, that have been pulled from job to job by someone else that loves their work and wants them to be with them at this new company. And then three, their values match the values of the founder and the business essentially, right?
Founder Is a State, CEO Is a Craft
Jonathan Lowenhar: Yes. And for the recruiters out there, a really simple way to get rid of a lot of the crap that ends up showing up at the top of the funnel is just to ask the simple question even in the cover letter, of your last ex-bosses, how many would get on the phone and say, you’re amazing? If there’s any equivocation in the answer, great, move on.
Quick Fire Questions
Lenny Rachitsky: So a couple of follow-up questions here. One is, this point of hiring people that have done it, obviously this implies don’t hire junior up-and-comers as much. Thoughts on just when it makes sense to hire someone more junior that’s really ambitious, real smart, you think they can learn the job, thoughts there?
Story of a Casino Dynasty
Jonathan Lowenhar: So one of our companies is hiring a team of reasonably junior account execs. We’re looking for folks that have been out of school for two years. Now, that means they are highly unlikely to have had three years of quota achievements and a similar… you get the point. Okay, so how do you hire someone who’s already done it? We know what success looks like 12 months later. For that role, they’ve learned how to hunt, they’ve been able to create pipeline of X and close Y in business, et cetera. What we are looking for then in their history, if they have any sales chops of any kind. They could be selling Girl Scout cookies, or tickets to some event, or they work for a non-profit for while. I don’t care, but I want some evidence that they’ve sold. I want some evidence that they’re comfortable getting on the phone or showing up at meetings or showing up at events. So, that they’ve done it before should be reviewed or thought of creatively.
Turning 40,000
Lenny Rachitsky: Got it.
Jonathan Lowenhar: Now for more senior roles, I want an explicit. We think of, for example, for executives, Lenny, we think there are three types of executives that startups end up hiring over time. We call them the architect, the optimizer, and the scaler. The architect, let’s use sales as an example. This is someone who has to build a playbook. So they’re going to uncomfortably stay close to the founder, watch and listen, and listen to recordings and pick their brain to pull the magic from the founder of like, oh, here’s the dance that she or he goes through to actually close a deal and they write first playbook. And the goal of the codification of that is so you can bring on a first account exec and the next account exec because account execs back to our language earlier in this adult children dynamic are children. You need to give them structure for them to win. That’s the architect. The optimizer, this is someone who’s now going from a few account execs to maybe 10, 15 and we now have targets we have to hit. The business is now reaching a different level of professionalism and expectation and you have to optimize that earlier playbook to try and find more efficiency and performance out of it.
The scaler is saying, okay, now how do I find leverage? How do I have 10X more account execs or how to get other people to sell for me? They’re all going to be called VP of sales or chief revenue officer. They’re completely different archetypes, and that same person exists in engineering and in product, et cetera. In those cases, I only would want to bring on an architect if they’d been an architect before. If they’d only been an optimizer, they’re going to fail because they’ve never written playbook from scratch.
Lenny Rachitsky: It touches on a conversation I had recently. It was a live podcast recording with Shreyas Doshi at my summit where he talks about a lot of people are really frustrated at work because they’re in the wrong one of those buckets, essentially. Like you enjoy certain type of work and your job is not doing that type of work, whether it’s in your case scaling or optimizing. And so, it just reminds that if you’re frustrated at work, you’re in the wrong job in terms of the type of output they’re trying to expect from you.
Jonathan Lowenhar: The story in my head is that talking to me and my colleagues sometimes can feel a little like death by frameworks. We have one for everything and in this example, I think if you’re going to be sustainably successful in any kind of job, I don’t care what it is, three things have to be true. You have to be good at it, you have to like it, and the market has to give a shit about it. And if one of those is off, you’re not staying in that job long.
Lenny Rachitsky: Yeah. And this touches on the name of your firm, Enjoy The Work, got to enjoy the work to make it sustainable. Okay, one other thing. So one other follow up question real quick on the hiring and then I want to talk about one other bucket of work. And again, I think each of these could be like an hour, two hour long podcast conversation. I love that there’s this recurring theme of working backwards to inform what you do today. So earlier you talked about working backwards from what the outcome you want next for your business, whether it’s fundraising or exit or winding down. And for hiring, you have the similar advice, work backwards from what you want this person to achieve in the first year, whether it’s drive this sort of growth in the product or drive sales. I guess anything else there of just the power of working backwards versus the typical approach for hiring, you talked about job descriptions.
Jonathan Lowenhar: Hiring is never the goal and it’s often the first thing that we’ll hear from a founder, “I have to hire this person.” One, that is so dangerous for confirmation bias. The hiring manager is always the one most burdened by that particular bias, but it’s also hiring is never the goal. We will pull them back to over and over and over again, which of the three milestones matter, right? Fundraise, exit, profitability. What has to change about the business, for example, to get to that fundraise? How do we quantify that change? Some sort of goal setting framework. OKRs, EOs, I don’t care. All goal setting frameworks have the same bones. There’s some description of it, there’s some quantification of it, there’s some work that has to be done. There’s some accountability rituals with clear owners and clear agreements.
So once I actually have the quantification of here’s what work needs to be done, I now know what resources I need to be able to pull that work forward and therefore now I know what kind of humans I need, whether I’m hiring or renting. And that should drive the conversation, not the, “Oh God, I need another PM.” It’s no, here’s the set of features that we’ve said matter most this year. Here’s the gap in the resources we have and the resources we need, that’s why we’re hiring this role. And here’s what success would look like 12 months from now or six months from now. So they’re tying back to what would change about the business.
And this is this recurring theme of our work with our founders. They’re so in it Lenny that they rarely have time to sit above what they’re working on. This notion of working in the business versus on the business. And so much of our work is to separate them from the day-to-day, which is enormously important, not in any way denigrating it, and I need to know where I’m headed and why, and how I’m going to measure progress along the way. And so, so much of what we’re doing with them is to say, I want to hear from you what you think success looks like. I’m going to push back and pressure test a bunch of things. Can we define that in a way? Can we agree on who needs to do the work along the way, and how we’re going to keep checking on it to keep feedback loop short? Now we can go back into business and then we’ll check again in a week or in a month.
Lenny Rachitsky: I love that. That’s actually a great segue to the final bucket I want to spend some time on which is growth and go to market. Another area that many founders have never worked on before. A lot of founders are like, Hey, I have this awesome idea. I’m going to build this awesome product. I know how to do that. I know what market needs. But building a go-to-market motion to get it into people’s hands is a whole different skill. We spent a lot of time on this on the podcast, you have a really cool simple framework of just how to think about go-to-market. There’s all this like, oh, you need a go-to-market strategy. Talk about how you talk to founders about thinking about what it takes to put together a go-to-market plan and how to make it a repeatable motion versus just I’m just going to go to people and try to sell them.
Jonathan Lowenhar: Our founders, even the most capable of them find this topic pretty overwhelming because it branches into so many areas. So we do try and distill it to something that is in bite-sized chunks. We think of it in four pieces. The first piece is ideal customer profile. Who do we really want to sell to? What are their qualifications? What are the discovery questions we would use to get to those qualifications? What are the kill criteria to know that this is [inaudible 01:04:10] fool’s goal, this really isn’t the human?
Second bucket, loosely called marketing. But within that marketing is also positioning. So what is our uncommon denominator from the enemies? So who are we competing against? Is it actual companies or is it status quo in some sort? What are they great at? What are we great at? What are we great at that they’re not? Then how do we represent that in the world? That’s branding and artifacts and identity work, et cetera.
Next is demand gen, which we’ll simplify to say, how do we go find the humans we want? I’ve long loved the book Traction that Gabriel Weinberg… I’m going to forget unfortunately the co-author’s name right now, Jason Mares? Sorry. Where they talk about the 19 channels that all companies have availability to, they’re the same ones. Now the book has got a couple of years on it, so there are a couple of new channels that have popped out since, but what we then try and expand the aperture for our founders is rather than just think about meeting your next customer through however you did at your last company, availability bias, instead, which of these might make most sense next? A simple two by two matrix can work here like some experimentation, some brain writing. Love brain writing, not brainstorming. I know you’ve talked about that on prior pods. And then high impact, low effort. Can we think of the three or four experiments we want to run by channel? Let’s go play.
And then fourth, sales. And this is the codification of a playbook. How are we having the conversation? How are we doing discovery? How are we handling objections? How are we doing demo? How are we moving to close? If we can get through those four, then we can start to talk about deployment and customer success and upselling and account management, et cetera, et cetera. Those are good problems to have. Oh my god, my install base is so large, I need to manage it. Great, great fricking problem. But we try and break this complexity of going from individually selling to building a machine into just these four buckets. Who am I selling to? What do we want to say about ourselves? How do we reach them? How do we close them?
Lenny Rachitsky: Amazing. I was going to summarize that. You did an excellent job there. Before we follow up on this, you mentioned this term brain writing. What does that mean?
Jonathan Lowenhar: Oh, first time I heard of this was Adam Grant. I don’t know if he’s the originator of the idea. Brainstorming, you talked about this a bit in your Annie Duke podcast as well of how horribly coercive meetings can be.
Lenny Rachitsky: For brainstorming, especially.
Jonathan Lowenhar: For brainstorming especially. And so, what many of our founders don’t recognize because they just see like, Hey, I’m just sitting around a table with a group of folks I respect, so we can just debate things as peers. No, you can’t. You’re a founder. Your voice has a megaphone attached to it even if you can’t hear it. So you have to turn down the megaphone if you actually want to learn what your people have to say. So brain writing is I’m going to expose an idea and I want everyone to now write and weigh in on there… it could be in a survey, it could be in a shared doc, what have you, my preferences in through some sort of methodology, you are now sharing your opinions, comments, edits, dreams, in an async way that no one else can see until it’s all combined, maybe even ideally without authorship identified.
Then when the founders weigh in, you don’t know, they’re just a part of the mass. Let everyone read the thing. I even like the Amazon, take the first 10 minutes of a meeting, let’s just go read so we’re all fully present and then have a debate. What it allows for is the dampening of the founder effect in meetings.
Lenny Rachitsky: You’re just so full of golden nuggets. That’s just like a random tangent that I think could be really transformative for a lot of teams. So the advice here is just when you’re trying to ideate and brainstorm, don’t go in a big room and put post- its on a wall and talk throughout ideas and have a discussion. Instead, just everyone individually sits and thinks and shares their thoughts and the founder presents, here’s a problem, here’s a question we’re trying to tackle.
Jonathan Lowenhar: What it also allows for is an evening of the playing field between fast processors and slow processors, introverts and extroverts, because they’re all equally potentially talented in your room, but if you do live brainstorming, you have diminished all the folks that prefer to sit and chew on something first.
Lenny Rachitsky: That’s very much me. That’s exactly how I operate. I need to think and process. I’m not on the spot quick thinker person. So 100% fan of this approach. Let me come back to your go-to-market framework. I have the notes pulled up here. So basically if you’re a founder or even a product builder and you’re trying to think about how do I… people keep telling me I need a go to market plan, I need to grow this thing. How do I think about this? You’re basically saying there’s these four buckets to think about; who are you selling to? How are you going to motivate them and get them excited to buy your thing? How do you reach them? And then how do you close them?
Jonathan Lowenhar: Yes.
Lenny Rachitsky: Luckily I have podcasts and newsletter posts on every single one of these buckets, if folks want to pursue each one of these. I have templates for ICPs, marketing advice, all these things. So that’s good news. There’s a lot of content for people to read if they want to explore this stuff. Let me ask you, where do you often find the biggest bang for your buck when you come to a founder or if founder comes to you and they’re like, I need to figure out, go-to-market motions? Just start from the top and work your way down. Or is there, here’s where maybe you want to spend a lot of time.
Jonathan Lowenhar: Early stage founders, and this is certainly more true for the first timers Lenny than the veterans ‘cause they learn this problem. The first timers are like twenty-something year olds in a bar and they’re being social for the first time in their lives, and anyone that makes eye contact with them is enough for them to say, I want to go on a date with you. That’s it. There’s no discrimination of any kind, like, oh my god, they like me, I’m in. That’s the mistake that hounds first timers. The veterans and those we get our hands on. Instead, we say, let’s imagine you could build your perfect customer in a lab, like a Petri dish and you grew them, what do they look like? And if you have any kind of install base, I’ll ask the question. I just did this with the founder the other day. They are enterprise whale hunting business. They have four large customers.
Lenny Rachitsky: Wait, actually whale… okay, whale hunting in terms of large wealth person or actual whales?
Jonathan Lowenhar: The extreme of enterprise selling.
Lenny Rachitsky: Okay, okay, got it. I want to see a whale hunting startup. Okay, go on.
Jonathan Lowenhar: I said, so which of your four customers is your favorite? Which one, if I got them on the phone, they would rave about you. They would be salivating openly with a chance to evangelize what you’re doing for them. And they was like, oh, that’s clear. It’s this one of the four. Great. Tell me about them. And what you start to see and pull apart from that is the founder does have an ideal profile. They do have a dream. Now, there are all sorts of risks about is the world too small? Is it not a big enough market if they get too tight, and founders get so caught up in that and it’s a mistake because all we’re-
… so caught up in that, and it’s a mistake. Because all we’re looking for in the beginning is a white-hot center of opportunity, a small population that is an enormous fan that’s getting enormous impact. We can worry about adjacencies and expansion later. I like to remind them that Amazon just sold books. We can start with one thing and be great at it. So where the founders often get hung up on for us is that they’ve moved towards selling without contemplating ideal customer profile, without contemplating qualifications, without contemplating discovery questions that get to that. And most importantly, kill criteria, if this is true do not sign them, even if they want to go out on a date with you.
Lenny Rachitsky: I’m glad you said that because that’s exactly what I believe and I hear often on this podcast is how underappreciated picking your customers in early leads are. And if you think about this funnel you described, figure out who you’re selling to, how do you motivate them, find them and then sell them, all this trickles down from who are you going after. You will know how to motivate them if you know who you’re talking to versus the opposite. If you’re talking to everyone-
Jonathan Lowenhar: It’s the most expensive mistake of those four.
Lenny Rachitsky: Okay. Is there anything else on go-to-market or growth you think might be helpful just to touch on before we close up our conversation?
Jonathan Lowenhar: The one thing I’ll share, this goes back to the ready, fire, aim that we talked about earlier, is that there’s implicitly a funnel, mathematical funnel, to what we just described. And founders often make the mistake when planning for the year ahead of I need to be at this revenue to justify this multiple. And then all of the funnel math is a plug, and that’s death, as opposed to here’s what’s been true for the last three months, six months, nine months, 12 months. And then what assumptions can I reasonably make with ways I’m going to influence that funnel going forward, to go build up to where I think I’ll be a year from now? And it just lowers the bias that your planning process operates with.
But when a founder starts from a place of, “I have to get to 3 million or we’re dead,” you’re already dead. As opposed to what do I really believe I can do to get there, changing top of the funnel, changing conversion rates along the way, changing a deal size or deal length, et cetera based on my recent history, and then have a conversation about the gap between where I think the business reasonably can get with some ambition, and where I think I need to be financially, because that’s the more mature conversation and that’s the one the ready, fire, aim CEO doesn’t have. That’s the one most founders have only started to learn to have over the last few years when capital dried up.
Lenny Rachitsky: I love that. I love just how practical and real talk your advice always ends up being. Speaking of that, I emailed a founder that you work with and asked him, “What should I ask? What should I ask Jonathan when he comes on the podcast?”
Jonathan Lowenhar: Uh-oh.
Lenny Rachitsky: And he said something that was really… That’s great. It was really unexpected what he said. He said that the biggest lesson he learned from you is to, as a founder, to trust his intuition more throughout the journey of his startup. Can you just talk about that as something you’ve learned, something you’ve seen, that maybe founders under appreciate?
Jonathan Lowenhar: It’s impossible not to be a startup CEO and not face many existential moments. Is my company going to survive? Did I make a mistake? Will I ever be hired again? Should I sell the company now? Should I break up with a co-founder? Should I fire this critical employee? They happen to all of us. And fear is not a good decision maker. Our lizard brain is a really bad decision maker in those moments.
And so what we’ll often share with the founder who’s facing one of these scenarios, and I know the CEO you’re describing and he’s facing one of these scenarios, we’ll say to them, “Do you know that little voice when you get really still, the quiet one that says you should marry this person, you should take this job, you should start this company? Watch out for that human, they’re a bad one.” And most of the time, Lenny, when I frame it that way the person across me says, “Yeah, I know that voice.” And I’ll ask, “How do you hear it?” And they’re usually some version of, “I have to get really alone, really still, really quiet, walk on the beach, listen to music, work out, play with my pet.”
I said that voice is who you are. It’s not your brain. Your brain is a tool. It’s our hands, it’s our feet, just a tool. It’s a pattern recognition machine. But who you are, if you can watch your brain, you know what you’re thinking, like, oh, look what my brain’s doing. That means you’re not your brain. It’s something else. And that’s the little voice, and that little voice is going to be right. And where we get screwed up in life is when we stop listening to that voice, when the mania of our chaos of our lives get in the way of that voice.
And so whenever our founders face one of those moments, it’s not a framework, it’s not a playbook, or even a directed piece of advice from us to say, “You should just go left. I’ve seen this before. Go left.” Nope. I trust founder intuition. If the founder says this business is still going to work, or this co-founder is the wrong person, or yes, it’s time to sell, I’m in. We’re just here to support them. And we try and be the only person in their life that is fully on their team because we’re not on the preferred side of the CAFS table. We’re not fiduciary, we’re not board members, not a co-founder, none of those things. And so in those moments we’ll just say, “Can you get really quiet?”
And the founder you’re talking about, I have the story in my head, he was facing a breakup moment with his co-founder, and I asked him, because he’s good at getting quiet, “What did the voice say to you way back when?” And the voice said to him, “This is the wrong fit. This isn’t going to work. He believes in different things than I do, and that’s going to go badly.” But the lizard brain didn’t want to believe that, and so it took another year.
Lenny Rachitsky: Wow. I had tingles throughout that entire piece of advice. I love how it’s also very applicable to just life, not even just being a founder. It’s a good reminder to trust that voice more. It’s interesting that this also connects to founder-mode a little bit, and I’m curious how you think about that where a lot of the founder-mode advice is like trust your judgment, don’t hire people to delegate things away. Do you see a difference in the core idea of founder-mode and just like, but you should actually trust your intuition more?
Jonathan Lowenhar: Intuition comes from, in my point of view, a deep understanding of self, and the capacity to get quiet and be well resourced, meaning you’ve slept well and you’ve eaten well and you have enough love in your world. And I think what founder-mode can confuse is my intuition says I should just do this job for them and fire these three people. That’s not intuition, that’s reaction, that’s a fear response. And when the founder says, “I sat with this, I felt it out, I can see it. I need to terminate my whole go-to-market team and start over. This isn’t working, and I have data that supports it, but I know this isn’t working.” I’m like, “Let’s go with that. I’m in. Let’s do it.”
Lenny Rachitsky: And I think you described a lot of times people feel this, and it takes a year, two years, three years, many years to actually realize that. And your advice here is try to listen to that more and trust it more. Yeah. Wow. Okay. Well, Jonathan to pivot our energy, is there anything else want to leave listeners with, last piece of advice, anything that you think might be helpful before we get to a very exciting lightning round?
Jonathan Lowenhar: To be a founder is a state of being. It’s an attitude, it’s courage, it’s instinct, it’s a capacity to push through, despite all sorts of evidence suggesting you’re wasting your time. To be a CEO is a craft. The more founders who can accept that those are two separate things and they’re both equally important to build an ascendant startup, the better all of us will be. And so what I would encourage every founder out there that wants to go build something substantial, go work on your craft in addition to working on the business. Be honest with yourself about here’s the shit I’m bad at. I don’t know how to read a financial statement. My board meetings suck. Half my meetings that I have with my leadership team we all walk out of there saying what did we just accomplish right now? Or I get to the end of my workday and I’m like, I didn’t get anything done. Those are all examples of just not taking the craft seriously enough. I’ll leave with that.
Lenny Rachitsky: I love that. And I think I’ve made the mistake during our conversation of confusing founder and CEO and assuming they’re the same thing, and I really appreciate you just again pointing out to folks that that’s the big distinction you got to start making is there’s the founder and there’s the CEO. Often they’re same person, but different parts of your brain and different skill sets.
Jonathan Lowenhar: And I’m now fully off the very awkward soapbox I’ve been sitting on for a long time, so we can go to lightning round whenever you’re ready.
Lenny Rachitsky: With that, we’ve reached our very exciting lighting round. Jonathan, are you ready?
Jonathan Lowenhar: I’m ready. I’m ready.
Lenny Rachitsky: First question, what are two or three books that you have recommended most to other people?
Jonathan Lowenhar: My number one business book that I’ve recommended would be Five Dysfunctions of a Team, by Patrick Lencioni. I do think it always comes back to team. The right team can solve all the things. And that book is a beautiful distillation of the most common problematic archetypes that show up in a leadership group. So that’s the number one.
Lenny Rachitsky: Amazing. Anything else you’d recommend?
Jonathan Lowenhar: The second one, it goes more personal. It’s a book called Untethered Soul, by Michael Singer. It was, at least for me, the first introduction to this idea that I am not my brain and that my brain can be a tool that serves me well, and at times doesn’t. So that would be number two.
Lenny Rachitsky: I’ve started to read that book and then I never finished it, so this is a good reminder to give it another shot. Second question, do you have a favorite recent movie or TV show you’ve really enjoyed?
Jonathan Lowenhar: I just watched and really enjoyed, because by the way, I have a three-year-old at home, so the amount of content I now consume is reduced tremendously. Well, my wife and I just watched Will & Harper. This is the documentary between Will Ferrell and his very dear friend who just recently transitioned. They road trip across the country together, and it was freaking delightful. It was sweet and endearing and one of the better things I’ve watched in a while.
TV show, Slow Horses, I’m utterly addicted. I’m only midway through season two, but I’ve been voraciously sleeping less and watching more.
Lenny Rachitsky: I love both those. I just watched Will & Harper, and completely agree with your sentiment about it. I wasn’t planning to watch it. My mother-in-Law started watching. I’m like, wow, this is really fun. It’s also funny, meaningful funny.
Jonathan Lowenhar: There’s so many moments in it that are really sweet. As an aside, this was ‘20, I don’t know, April 2020, and a group of our very close friends said, “Hey, how are we going to keep in touch?” And so we started what we called Movie Club, and we routinely either pick a TV show or a movie. We all watch separately and every two weeks we get together on Zoom at night, we talk about what we just watched.
Lenny Rachitsky: I love that.
Jonathan Lowenhar: And some have been great, some have been terrible. But Will & Harper was our most recent.
Lenny Rachitsky: Oh, such a cool tradition. Okay, we’ll keep going. Do you have a favorite product you’ve recently discovered that you really love? Could be an app, could be something physical?
Jonathan Lowenhar: Two, and one is I’m going to talk my own book, but I still love it. The first one is Aura Frames. These are digital picture frames. They’re amazing. The UX for them is incredible, the quality of it, they’re pieces of artwork. So grandparents, in-laws, parents, we have multiple in our house, just love it.
Lenny Rachitsky: Just to clarify, it’s a frame that has picked digital photos and you can give it to your mom and show photos of your kid wherever they live. Is that right?
Jonathan Lowenhar: And the combination of the ease of the software and the quality of the imagery is better than anything I’ve tried, and I’ve tried a bunch of them. A-U-R-A Frames, and this is not an Enjoy The Work company. This is just one I’m a giant fan of.
The second one is an Enjoy The Work company called Augie Studio. A-U-G-I-E Studio. This is Canva for video. It can turn anyone with no engineering skills whatsoever, no code video creation, with full editing tools. So suddenly you can create branded high fidelity, high quality commercial video in minutes, with no effort. It’s amazing. It was built by two media tech co-founders that were building this thing pre-ChatGPT, and it’s just growing like this, and it’s super fun, and the guys are great. So A-U-G-I-E Studio.
Lenny Rachitsky: Sounds amazing. Augie Studio, I could use that. That sounds awesome. Two more questions. I feel like this one’s going to be a good one. Do you have a favorite life motto that you often come back to find useful and work on in life?
Jonathan Lowenhar: The first one, and the one that I probably most commonly refer to, is that there is only one life. The quick backstory, and I know it’s a lightning round, but I’m guilty of these stories. I went for a walk with a girlfriend of mine a bunch of years ago. And we did this once a month and we would always have a pretty typical ritual of giving each other life updates to begin the walk. And so I started the conversation with, “So there’s the family update and then there’s my work life and then there’s my social life.” She’s like, “No, no, no, no, no, stop. That’s all bullshit. It’s one life. Stop assuming that there are these pretend walls between them or among them.” I’ve lived that ever since.
So I try and show up. That phrase lets me show up the same way, no matter my setting. If you and I were having a beer or a meal, or if I’m sitting with one of my co-founders or clients, it doesn’t matter, I show up the same way everywhere. Part of the way I enjoy the work is by having a real friendship, a real intimacy with everyone at Enjoy The Work, and including our clients as well, I want that level of conversation. I don’t want the sterile stuff over here with my work environment versus my personal versus my family. It’s just one version of me.
Lenny Rachitsky: And the phrase is, it’s just one life.
Jonathan Lowenhar: Just one life.
Lenny Rachitsky: It’s just one life. Final question. So you ran a casino at one point, I believe, and it was like a Harrah’s Casino, is that right?
Jonathan Lowenhar: My first career was in the casino business.
Lenny Rachitsky: Okay.
Jonathan Lowenhar: But before I go on, what’s the question?
Lenny Rachitsky: The question is just is there a fun story, or experience, or lesson from that time in your life that might be fun to share? Maybe a mob involvement, or cheating, or something? I imagine that’s a unique life experience.
Jonathan Lowenhar: I’ll tell one of my favorite family stories then briefly. But yes, my family goes back in casino gambling in one form or another, several generations. My great-grandmother ran a illicit poker game. My grandfather ran numbers out of a gas station. My father’s been in the casino industry since Atlantic City in the 70s. My sister is a prominent gaming attorney, and I worked in the industry for a dozen years, so this is my family. And Lenny, I didn’t know any of this was weird until I was in my mid 20s.
I turned 21, and I’m old, yes, I’m going to just hide the year. I’m kidding. Anyway, I turned 21 and we take a family trip to Las Vegas because that was normal for us. My father was doing a lot of work out there, so he got us hotel rooms, etc. I’d never been there before, and I was newly 21 and so my parents said, “You have $300 to gamble with. We’re going to be here for five days.” This is a vacation. My grandparents are coming in. My uncle and aunt were coming in, and they’re encouraging me, “This is all up to you, but try not to lose it all on night number one,” which was good advice to give me. I was 21 and I was pretty much a schmuck at the time. But also, part of my experience being there was to interview for a summer internship. I was a college going to be junior.
So we go and I immediately go sit at some table and start playing some games. And I turn $300 into a few thousand dollars in the very first evening. And that was exciting and it was crazy and it was wild, et cetera. On the third night, which happens to everyone who goes to Vegas for too long, we’re all delirious because all of us are staying up all night and being silly and being stupid. And my parents ask me, by the way, this is pre-cell phones, they ask me, “Hey, can you stay awake? Your uncle and aunt are going to arrive late tonight. They’ll call the room. You can come down and just greet them and say hello?” Sure. So I get the phone call like 11: 30 at night. Go on downstairs, they’re here. I go downstairs in the casino floor. We’re staying at the Las Vegas Hilton. It’s since been renamed, but I go downstairs and I can’t find them anywhere. I think, okay, well I have cash in my pocket and I’m now awake so I might as well gamble.
Shortly thereafter, Lenny, I have an experience that happens one in 369,000 occurrences, and I win 40,000 that I turned $300 to, and I was just 21 years old, which has left me with one of my mantras that I’ve had for the rest of my life, which some people roll their eyes at, but that is gambling does pay.
Lenny Rachitsky: I love that you remember the exact amount. What games did you end up playing that helped you win so much money?
Jonathan Lowenhar: The primary game that I played was Caribbean Stud Poker, where there’s no skill of any kind. You get five cards, the dealer gets five cards, whoever wins wins, and if you have particularly unusual hands you get odds on the hand. And I got dealt 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 of spades in five cards.
Lenny Rachitsky: I thought you’d say slots or something. I love that you’re just sitting there playing poker and went from 40,000.
Jonathan Lowenhar: It’s not even real poker.
Lenny Rachitsky: That was a great story. I’m glad I went there. Jonathan, this was incredible. I think we’ve helped a lot of founders through this conversation. Two final questions. Where can folks find you guys? Who would be a good fit? What should people know about Enjoy the Work? And finally, how can listeners be useful to you?
Jonathan Lowenhar: Love that. So let me unpack those three. The first one is enjoythework.com, or just find me on LinkedIn. I’m not hard to find. Send us a note.
Who should ping us is very simple. If you’re a founder out there, or a CEO out there, and you know in your heart that there’s some gap between how you’re running the business and how the company’s going, and how it could be going, and how you could be running the business, if there’s some gap there, we’re here to help. Now our expertise, as we talked about in this call, is company building. So if you just have an idea on a napkin or you have a science experiment that you’re not sure, we’re useless, that’s not us. But if you have some breadcrumbs worth following, like the business is starting to work, you’re a series A into B and beyond, and you know that there’s better, you can see it, that’s where we help. Send us a note. Love to chat.
How can listeners be useful to us? So we are ferocious readers. All we try and do is study how do the best startups do X? From tiny things, like how do they run all hands meetings or off sites to the big meta topics of what is going to repeatable go-to-market even mean? Or what is financial planning in a way that’s useful? Or how do you set goals that won’t make you roll your eyes? We consistently learn from the ecosystem of podcasters and authors and journalists, like, go look at this material. So if your listeners have a favorite X on whatever topic in running a startup, send them my way. All we love to do is read and chew on that stuff.
Lenny Rachitsky: Awesome. And the best way to send that is either through Enjoy the Work or LinkedIn.
Jonathan Lowenhar: That’s right.
Lenny Rachitsky: Awesome. Jonathan, thank you so much for being here.
Jonathan Lowenhar: Lenny, this was so damn fun. Thanks for listening to my crazy casino stories.
Lenny Rachitsky: I want to hear more, but we got to go. Bye everyone.
Thank you so much for listening. If you found this valuable you can subscribe to the show on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, or your favorite podcast app. Also, please consider giving us a rating or leaving a review, as that really helps other listeners find the podcast. You can find all past episodes or learn more about the show at lennyspodcast. com. See you in the next episode.
Glossary
| English | 中文 |
|---|---|
| account exec | 客户经理(account exec) |
| active listening | 积极倾听 |
| Adam Grant | Adam Grant(人名,保留原文) |
| adjacency | 相邻领域 |
| advocate | advocate(支持者) |
| Annie Duke | Annie Duke(人名,保留原文) |
| architect | 架构师(architect) |
| Augie Studio | Augie Studio(品牌名,保留原文) |
| Aura Frames | Aura Frames(品牌名,保留原文) |
| availability bias | 可得性偏差(availability bias) |
| blocker | blocker(阻碍者) |
| bottoms up planning | 自下而上的规划 |
| brain writing | 书面脑暴法(brain writing) |
| brainstorming | 头脑风暴(brainstorming) |
| buyer | buyer(决策者) |
| Caribbean Stud Poker | 加勒比梭哈扑克(Caribbean Stud Poker) |
| champagne | 香槟(庆祝) |
| champion | champion(收购交易中的内部推动者,保留原文) |
| Chris Voss | Chris Voss(人名,保留原文) |
| compelling event | 紧迫事件 |
| confirmation bias | 确认偏误(confirmation bias) |
| construction tech | 建筑科技 |
| Corp Dev | Corp Dev(企业战略发展部门,Corporate Development) |
| CSI | CSI(犯罪现场调查,电视节目名,保留原文) |
| demand gen | 需求获客(demand gen) |
| discovery question | 探询问题(discovery question) |
| EC | EC(执行委员会,Executive Committee) |
| Enjoy The Work | Enjoy The Work(公司名,保留原文) |
| ERP | ERP(企业资源计划,Enterprise Resource Planning,保留原文) |
| Ezra Roizen | Ezra Roizen(人名,保留原文) |
| Five Dysfunctions of a Team | 《团队协作的五大障碍》 |
| founder mode | founder mode(创始人模式) |
| funnel | 漏斗(funnel) |
| Gabriel Weinberg | Gabriel Weinberg(人名,保留原文) |
| Geoffrey Smart | Geoffrey Smart(人名,保留原文) |
| go-to-market | go-to-market(市场进入) |
| Harrah’s | Harrah’s(赌场品牌名,保留原文) |
| IC | IC(投资委员会,Investment Committee) |
| ideal customer profile | 理想客户画像(ideal customer profile) |
| imposter syndrome | 冒名顶替综合征 |
| indication of interest | 意向书 |
| install base | 装机基数(install base) |
| jobs-to-be-done | 待办任务 |
| Jonathan Lowenhar | Jonathan Lowenhar(人名,保留原文) |
| kill criteria | 淘汰条件(kill criteria) |
| laissez-faire | 自由放任 |
| Legal | Legal(法务部门) |
| Lenny Rachitsky | Lenny Rachitsky(人名,保留原文) |
| lizard brain | 大脑杏仁核(lizard brain) |
| luminary | 行业领袖 |
| Magic Box paradigm | Magic Box paradigm(方法论名称,保留原文) |
| manager mode | manager mode(管理者模式) |
| Meta | Meta(公司名,保留原文) |
| Michael Singer | Michael Singer(人名,保留原文) |
| micromanager | 微操型(管理者) |
| Movie Club | 电影俱乐部 |
| NDA | NDA(保密协议,Non-Disclosure Agreement,保留原文) |
| OPSEC | OPSEC(运营安全部门,Operations Security) |
| optimizer | 优化师(optimizer) |
| Patrick Lencioni | Patrick Lencioni(人名,保留原文) |
| pipeline | 销售管线(pipeline) |
| playbook | 打法手册(playbook) |
| pre-mortem | 事前复盘 |
| Procurement | Procurement(采购部门) |
| qualification | 筛选标准(qualification) |
| quota | 业绩指标(quota) |
| Randy Street | Randy Street(人名,保留原文) |
| raving fans | 狂热粉丝 |
| re-trade | 重新谈判 |
| scaler | 扩张师(scaler) |
| series B | B 轮融资 |
| Shreyas Doshi | Shreyas Doshi(人名,保留原文) |
| Slow Horses | 《流人》 |
| solicitous | 推销式的 |
| term sheet | 条款清单 |
| The Untethered Soul | 《不羁的灵魂》 |
| uncommon denominator | 独特差异点(uncommon denominator) |
| upselling | 向上销售(upselling) |
| venture scale | 风险投资级别 |
| whale hunting | 猎鲸式销售 |
| white-hot center | 白热化核心 |
| Who: The A Method for Hiring | 《谁:A 级招聘法》 |
| Will & Harper | 《威尔与哈珀》 |
| Will Ferrell | Will Ferrell(人名,保留原文) |
Reformatted by reformat_english.py
优秀的创始人如何成为优秀的 CEO | Jonathan Lowenhar(Enjoy The Work 联合创始人)
文字稿
Lenny Rachitsky: 你基本上把所有时间都花在与创始人合作上,并从中研究他们,创建框架和培训,用在你的工作中。我想很多很多创始人想找的正是——我如何避免痛苦?
Jonathan Lowenhar: 做创始人是一种存在状态、一种态度。做 CEO 是一门手艺。越多的创始人能接受这是两件不同的事,而且两者对打造一家蒸蒸日上的创业公司同等重要,我们所有人就越好。
Lenny Rachitsky: 我其实已经有点厌倦谈论 founder mode 了,但你描述的东西感觉就是 founder mode 和 manager mode。
Jonathan Lowenhar: Founder mode 让我很生气。那篇文章让我上火。它真的像是一个借口。我们在给创始人一个可以不学这份工作的许可。问题不是 manager mode 不好,而是最优秀的 CEO 知道何时校准,知道哪个模式在什么时候需要。
Lenny Rachitsky: 你谈到过,创业旅程有两个阶段,大多数人只关注第一阶段。
Jonathan Lowenhar: 第一阶段是做出人们愿意买单的东西。第二阶段,那个我们不谈的阶段——是现在你必须围绕那个人们愿意买单的东西建立一家公司。建立公司的过程永远是一样的。我不管它是医疗器械、金融科技、硬件还是消费品。
Lenny Rachitsky: 你提出了一套方法论,叫做 Magic Box paradigm,帮助创始人思考如何长期走向一次成功的退出。
Jonathan Lowenhar: 传统销售流程是这样的:你列出一张可能收购你的公司清单,去联系他们,然后希望能达成交易。Magic Box 认为,早期创业公司最好的结果不是这样发生的。你永远不出售。事实上,是 you seduced a buyer(你吸引了一位买家)。他们看到了那个幻想,他们爱上了。
嘉宾介绍
Lenny Rachitsky: 今天的嘉宾是 Jonathan Lowenhar。Jonathan 经营着一家叫 Enjoy The Work 的公司,这些年来我从很多人那里听到过关于它的好评。他们公司有一个单一使命:帮助创始人成为优秀的 CEO。他们通过辅导和顾问服务的结合来实现这一目标,这些服务根植于他们对最优秀的创业公司如何运营的研究。他们把这些经验教训融入框架、建议和培训中,提供给他们的 CEO。他们的洞察——你在我们的对话中也会听到——是大多数创始人并不是一上岗就知道怎么当 CEO 的,这包括学习如何招聘、如何管理财务、制定增长策略、路线图规划、人员管理,以及许多其他没人教创始人的技能。
在我们的对话中,Jonathan 分享了他和他的团队观察到的最常见的 CEO 失败模式、成功出售创业公司的 Magic Box paradigm、大量关于寻找和招聘顶尖人才的建议、构建可复制的 go-to-market(市场进入)节奏的框架、为什么以及如何在作为创始人时学会更多地信任自己的直觉,还有更多内容。我们本可以再聊好几个小时。也许他会再来分享更多建议。如果你是创始人,或者有朝一日希望成为创始人,这期节目就是为你准备的。如果你喜欢这档播客,别忘了在你最喜欢的播客应用或 YouTube 上订阅和关注。这是避免错过未来节目最好的方式,也对播客帮助极大。好了,下面有请 Jonathan Lowenhar。Jonathan,非常感谢你的到来。欢迎来到播客。
Jonathan Lowenhar: Lenny,我真是太兴奋了。
Lenny Rachitsky: 我也是。我之所以兴奋能请你来这档播客,是因为你基本上把所有时间都花在与创始人合作上,并从中研究——什么让他们痛苦、什么导致他们失败、什么让他们陷入挣扎——然后你把这些转化成框架和培训,用在你的创始人工作中。我想很多很多创始人想找的正是——我如何避免痛苦?我如何避免那些我很可能会撞上的坑?在此基础上,能简要地帮大家了解一下你做什么、你的机构为创始人做什么、你如何与创始人合作吗?
Jonathan Lowenhar: 好,谢谢。我讲一段起源故事,我觉得它最终能回答这个问题。
Lenny Rachitsky: 来吧。
起源故事:每家运营良好的公司都运转得一样
Jonathan Lowenhar: 我经营过好几种不同类型的公司,彼此差异很大。我为一家上市公司管理过一个大部门,然后做了私募股权 CEO,之后又连续做了两家创业公司。第一家走得不远,但我们把它卖了;第二家走得非常远。当我离开第二家公司时,我和许多创始人一样,身体状况极差——超重 25 磅,睡眠不足,各种问题都有。我花了几个月恢复健康,然后回顾职业生涯中的那些经历。当时我注意到的一件事是:所有那些公司,当它们到了一个好的状态、开始运转良好时,它们的运转方式都是一样的。这怎么可能?上市公司、私募股权、创业公司、早期阶段、成长阶段——当它们运转良好的时候,竟然都是以同样的方式运转良好的?
我开始痴迷于这个问题,它让我认识到:每一家运营良好的公司都有一个节奏。这种节奏非常鲜明,你不会错过它。你不可能看不见。你只需要通过隐形摄像头观察一家企业几天,就能看到这个规律。为什么有些创业公司能达到这种状态,有些却不能?一个创始人是如何学到这个节奏的?他们如何学会把一家公司运营好?我开始执着地向投资人问这个问题,我问他们,Lenny,我反复问他们同样的三个问题,一遍又一遍。
第一个问题是:请向我描述你心目中理想的创始人。什么样的创始人才是好创始人?答案出奇地一致。投资人会使用一些词,意思是韧性、毅力、勇气和洞察力。我说,“很好。问题二:请描述一位优秀的创业公司 CEO。“他们完全不用那些词。这怎么可能?取而代之的是,他们描述的是技能。这是一个知道如何做产品、卖东西、招人、融资、组织人员、做财务规划的人。第三个问题,也是我最后一个问题:那创始人如何在边做这份工作的同时学会这些技能?我得到的是一片茫然的死盯着,一次又一次。这把我引上了现在我和同事们已经走了十年的这条路——好,那我们怎么帮助创始人学会这些技能,让他们的风险投资人不会炒掉他们,让他们能够真正去打造自己想打造的公司,并且在岗位上待到自己想待多久就多久?这就是起源,这就是我走上这条路的起点。
Founder Mode 与 Manager Mode
Lenny Rachitsky: 显然现在有一个关于 founder mode 的新梗。我其实有点厌倦讨论 founder mode 了,但你描述的这些感觉就像是 founder mode 和 manager mode。你基本上两者都得擅长。后面那部分几乎就是 manager mode。可以这样理解吗?
Jonathan Lowenhar: 没错。Founder mode 让我很恼火。那篇文章真的把我惹火了。
Lenny Rachitsky: 说说看。
Jonathan Lowenhar: 那篇文章感觉像是一个借口。我们在给创始人一张不必学习如何做这份工作的通行证。想一想一家不断上升的创业公司——首先是一个”我必须发明点东西”的阶段,然后要想办法把客户带到这个发明面前,看看它是否管用;接着要围绕它搭建一个商业模式,看看是否存在某种可复制的方式来吸引、赢得、部署客户,并用解决方案让他们满意。好,接下来要创造大量的需求,再建起一个能承接这些需求的运营体系。哦对了,在某个时间点还得想办法把正向收入转化为正向现金流。一个独自写代码的创始人,居然可以不去提升技能学会做所有这些事情——而且那篇文章甚至暗示学习做那些事情是一种负面——这对我来说简直荒唐至极。
创办一家公司所需的能力,与发展、规模化、退出一家人公司所需的能力是不同的,而最优秀的创业公司 CEO 会在一路上学完全部这些东西。学习的路径有很多,我不是说只有一条路,但 founder mode 几乎就是一个不去学习的借口。我确实认为创始人的独特之处——也许那篇文章想说的方向是这个——与被空降进来的职业雇佣 CEO 不同,创始人了解建造这家公司的一切内情,他们可以下钻到最细粒度的层面,在任何位置发挥作用。他们可以深入一个产品功能,可以加入一场客户对话或合作伙伴对话,可以找一位仍在做 IC(individual contributor)的老员工聊,产生实际影响力,然后再回到高处——前提是他们经过了训练——重新坐进驾驶舱运营公司。对我来说这才是区别所在。不是 manager mode 不好,而是最伟大的 CEO 知道何时切换到所需的模式。
Lenny Rachitsky: 我很喜欢这个说法。很高兴我们聊到了这里。我本来没打算聊 founder mode 的,但我认为这对创始人们以及为创始人工作的人来说都很有帮助。顺着这个思路,你有一个非常有用也非常好玩的思维模型,用来思考创始人常见的失败模式。你有一些我特别喜欢的标签,这其实也是我第一次听说 Enjoy The Work 的契机——就是你们用的那些标签——而且你对创业公司的失败模式也有一个类似的思维模型。能不能分享一下你们总结出来的这些模式?
创业公司与 CEO 的常见失败模式
Jonathan Lowenhar: 我们确实用了一些带点喜剧色彩的方式来处理这些东西。就像我之前跟你分享过的,我们公司的名字不是随便起的。如果我们不能保持玩乐的心态——我们可以认真对待工作,但不认真对待自己——所以我们确实挺爱胡闹的。我想先把公司的失败模式和 CEO 的失败模式分开来看。公司层面的那些没那么喜剧化,但都是我们反复看到的。第一,你选错了市场。我觉得这个不需要多费口舌,你之前的很多嘉宾都谈过这一步的重要性——它做不好,其他一切都不重要了。第二,回到我们刚才讨论的——做出人们愿意买单的东西,你得做出对的产品。没问题。第三,创始人之间的关系。我们喜欢开玩笑说,更多公司死于自杀,而非他杀。这话听起来残酷,但事实就是——如果掌管企业的那两三个人没法好好相处,其他什么都不重要了,一切都会分崩离析。第四,执行。而执行这个话题就把我们引回到 CEO 身上了。
好,接下来就是一些好玩的部分了。第一个是”机器人 CEO”——这种人认为创业公司里不应该存在任何情绪。对此我们用一个很简单的公式来训练他们:情绪是混乱的,人类有情绪,创业公司需要人类,因此创业公司是混乱的。
Lenny Rachitsky: 我喜欢这个建议的工程思维风格,很适合机器人。没错。
Jonathan Lowenhar: 另外一个稍微更体面一点的说法是,我们的 CEO 希望团队有紧迫感、有激情、有热情。他们希望员工拼命工作,拿着低于市场的薪酬,通常抱着一份可能要到五到十甚至十二年后才能兑现价值的股权承诺。他们希望员工带来所有这些情绪,但同时要求员工精准地切除那些”不方便”的情绪。这就是”机器人 CEO”——相信我们可以雇佣一群机器人,按一下按钮它们就把事办了。
第二种是”讨好型 CEO”。这种人更在乎被人喜欢,而不是经营企业。他们没法告诉任何人坏消息,没法做裁决,凡事都要达成共识——而这根本不可能。
完美主义者 CEO
Jonathan Lowenhar: 如果你手下有一群有思想的员工,他们一定会争论、辩论,你也希望他们这样做。但到了某个节点,你必须拍板:“不,我们往左走,不往右走。“或者,“你们俩需要找个房间把这件事解决掉。“又或者,“嘿,你刚才的表现不是我期望的表现方式。“讨好型 CEO 什么都不做。他们只会躲起来祈祷问题自行消失,但问题不会消失。
下一种是完美主义者 CEO。我想说,这类 CEO 拥有最漂亮的产品,在申请破产的前几分钟才交付出来。这种人远远更关心自己是否正确,相信永远存在一个正确答案,而不是推进事情向前。
这会给企业带来两个问题。一是你很慢,二是你永远不会下任何赌注,因为你建立的团队会意识到 CEO 不允许犯错,所以你不能反对,不能用直觉,不能凭感觉。一切都必须完全是事实依据的,而这在早期创业公司中根本不可能。在早期创业公司里,你的问题比答案多。一切都是视情况而定的。这不像是看 CSI 创业版,你能看到一段视频说”哦,看,就是那个人干的”。不,我们有一堆零散的数据点,你得自己得出结论。
愤怒型 CEO
下一种是愤怒型 CEO。几年前我有一个创始人,我们在他的领导团队中观察到了一种模式。一天早上我们通了电话,我说:“我有一个理论,可能只是一种说法,我也可能搞错了,但我想跟你分享。“他说:“好。“我说:“我觉得你每天早上醒来的时候就是愤怒的,而你自己并不知道。然后你到了办公室,拿第一个跟你打照面的员工撒气,因为一些完全无关的事情,就因为你在生气。几个小时后你意识到了这一点,然后道歉。你的团队还没有辞职,因为他们相信你本质上是个好人,只是自控力不行。“然后我跟他说:“而且你刚有了第一个孩子。我的猜测是——我不是心理学家,也不是治疗师——你在重演自己人生中经历过的一些东西。你想改变这个吗?”
他的回答是想的。我说:“好消息是因为你说了’想’,我们可以做点什么;坏消息是我他妈也不知道该怎么办,那不是我的工作。“关键在于,没有人愿意为一个愤怒的人工作。我不管股权潜力值多少钱,没人愿意为这样的人工作,一旦他们在别处看到更好的机会,就会离开。
自由放任型 CEO
下一种是让我特别抓狂的,就是自由放任型 CEO,他们荒谬地相信我可以雇佣一群优秀的人,然后完全不管他们,让市场自行运转,他们就会把所有事情做对。Lenny,我从没见过任何一个不需要好的管理就能发挥潜力的人,而自由放任型 CEO 相信管理是不需要的,所以他们最终发现的是,一群非常优秀的人在做一些完全脱节的事情,目标无法达成。
刹车型与油门型
每一位 CEO 归根结底都可以简化为两种角色之一:要么习惯踩刹车,要么习惯踩油门。那些习惯踩刹车的,我的意思是他们不想花任何钱,所以开着这辆漂亮的跑车,全程一直踩着刹车。没错,他们不会把钱烧完,但他们也会被其他所有人甩在后面,错失机会。他们的机会在于,哪些地方可以下赌注?哪里可以真正降挡,让自己在市场中赢得机会?另一类是踩油门的,我们都见过这种人。他们很快就会烧光所有的钱,这也关联到我们另一种有问题的 CEO 类型——“先开火再瞄准”型。
“先开火再瞄准”型 CEO
大多数 CEO 都很不擅长规划,原因在于湾区有一个鲜为人知的秘密:大多数 CEO 之前从未经营过企业。规划不一定是那种从八月开始到二月结束的、沉重的官僚式数月流程,但一点自下而上的规划是需要的——我们在试图实现什么?如何量化?需要什么资源?谁负责做什么?如何缩短反馈周期,让我们在一周、一个月、两个月后就知道自己是否在正确的轨道上?“先开火再瞄准”型 CEO 说:“我不想做这些。“因为他们是即兴发挥型的人,只想下赌注、开枪,这正是让公司起步的方式,也是让公司破产的方式。
微操型 CEO
微操型则恰恰相反,是自由放任的反面。他们相信无论有多少员工,自己都能把工作做得更好。这个类型的问题在于,这对手下的人来说是极大的不尊重。我们认为——这话有点刺耳——每个为创始人工作的人都可以归入两种类型之一:要么是成年人,要么是孩子。我有个三岁的女儿,她太棒了,我完全爱她。但如果她没有足够的结构和大量的监督,她会撞上各种东西——撞到东西上、从东西上掉下来、穿破东西。但成年人不需要被全程指示和时刻监视。恰恰相反,我们达成一致:成功的标准是什么,资源是什么,然后放手让他们去做,有问题他们会来找你。微操型 CEO 看不到这两种人之间的区别。他们不信任任何人,而这其实是层层剥开最核心的东西,所以他们想做所有人的工作,这会一直奏效,直到所有人辞职。
Lenny Rachitsky: 太精彩了。好的,让我来总结一下你刚才说的这些标签,方便大家对应。我这儿都记下来了:机器人 CEO、完美主义者 CEO、讨好型 CEO、微操型、自由放任型、先开火再瞄准型、踩刹车型以及踩油门型,还有你说的,永远受欢迎的愤怒型 CEO。
Jonathan Lowenhar: 你全都记下了。
Lenny Rachitsky: 大家听到这些,我想很多人会自我对应上好几种——“我有这个特点,也有那个特点”——这不是非黑即白的。没有人会说”我是一个百分之百的机器人 CEO,需要改正”。更像是饼图之类的,我不知道该用什么图形来比喻?基本上每个人都有那么一点。
Jonathan Lowenhar: 没错。我很喜欢在台上做这个演讲,然后观察台下的不同创始人在不同时刻尴尬地缩一下,但这并不意味着他们都只是其中某一种。如果他们完全是其中某一种,甚至不愿意接受自己可能或多或少带有其中很多种需要改进的地方,那他们大概也不可指导,也不会来听这个演讲。
Lenny Rachitsky: 我想象每种类型都有其独特之处,这是一段需要持续自我修炼的旅程。我想问一下,在这些 CEO 类型标签中,你发现最常见的问题是什么?最常见的类型是哪个?你通常建议他们具体从哪些方面着手来改善?
“先开火再瞄准”是最常见的 CEO 类型
Jonathan Lowenhar: 我认为”先开火再瞄准”是我们所见最常见的类型,而且过去几年这种问题还在不断加剧。不久之前,CEO 们还可以靠轻松获取资本来掩盖执行力的不足。而近几年,我们对创始人作为经营者的能力要求越来越高。成为更好的经营者,意味着最终要走上这样一条路:更清晰地管理现金流入和流出企业。这不会凭空发生。“先开火再瞄准”型 CEO 大概都经历过这样的痛苦——他们下了大量赌注,也许事后做了衡量,但一次次地错了,而且错的方式代价不菲。于是他们举手说:“我看明白了,我想在这方面变得更好。“最基本的商业设计和商业规划,并不是什么大公司的官僚做派。它是一种有条理的思考练习,起点是:我们要从什么目标往回推演?
因为无论愿意与否,Lenny,任何公司在任何时候,都在从以下四件事之一往回推演:我在从退出往回推演;我在从下一轮融资往回推演;我在从盈利往回推演;或者我在从关停往回推演。我们不太谈论第四种,但我必须选一个,我必须选一座山顶。大多数时候,他们选择的是融资。然后我们会问那位创始人:你了解你的市场,你了解你的投资人,你也了解下一轮潜在的投资者,我们做了一些情报工作——要解锁下一轮融资,哪些条件必须成立?这个回答既有定性的部分,也有定量的部分,但我们会把它写下来。我们需要在 go-to-market 方面做得更好;我们需要拿下第一个合作伙伴;我们需要发布下一版产品并展示这个水平的效能、用户参与度等等。我们能不能把这些具体化?可以。我们能不能梳理清楚,按照什么节奏、采取哪些行动,才能解锁那套量化的成果?可以。
我们能不能理解做这些事需要什么资源?承认中间有些部分我们可能需要眯着眼看(模糊估量),但答案依然是肯定的。现在我们有目标了。如果我们有一种包含问责制的文化,有一套沟通架构——即关于我们如何开会、如何分享信息、如何讨论问题、如何突破瓶颈,都有一些固定仪式——那么现在我们有了一个计划,也有了问责机制。我不再需要一直凭直觉猜测。而这只对那种会说”我的即兴发挥把我带到了今天,但我不认为它能把我带到明天”的 CEO 才有效。
很久以前我给一个人工作,他有句口头禅——他大概有七八句这样的口头禅,翻来覆去地用,很难不全部记住。其中一句是:“如果你一直做你正在做的事,你就会一直得到你正在得到的结果。“对于那些意识到这种模式在规模化后会成为软肋的”先开火再瞄准”型的人来说,对治之道就是从良好的规划开始。
Lenny Rachitsky: 有意思的是这竟然是最常见的 CEO 类型,而在 founder mode 的语境下,似乎只会进一步加剧这一倾向。founder mode 的那个梗——就是那些让你抓狂的事——说得通。很好。
四条回推路径与退出
好的,我很高兴你提到”退出”基本上就是这四条回推路径之一,因为这正是我接下来想聊的。我想谈谈你们教授的那些具体的框架、技能和方法论,其中一个——我想直接跳到卖掉公司这个终点。之所以想聊这个,是因为如果你想想看——你告诉我我说得对不对——大多数成功的创业公司,最终的结局都是卖掉公司。这是最可能的成功路径,对吧?
Jonathan Lowenhar: 是的,远超其他选项。
Lenny Rachitsky: 对,因为另一个选项是 IPO,或者就永远私有运营下去。再不然就是失败,基本上就是关张。所以在成功选项中,最常见的就是出售。与此同时,创始人从来没做过这件事,完全不知道自己在干什么。而对面往往已经做过很多次了,所以这是一件相当凶险、令人恐惧、赌注极高的事情,而且必须临场学习。你提出了一套方法论,叫做 Magic Box paradigm,我非常喜欢,它帮助创始人思考如何长期导向一次成功的退出。能讲讲这是什么吗?
Magic Box Paradigm
Jonathan Lowenhar: 可以,我想说明功劳归属。有一本同名的书,叫《Magic Box Paradigm》,作者是一位独立银行家 Ezra Roizen。这本书非常棒,Ezra 本人也非常出色。
我们所做的,是把它操作化了,这样我们就可以一遍又一遍地教给创始人。如果创始人想在这个环节雇一个银行家——因为我们不是银行家,我们不做商务拓展,我们不以那种方式收费,我们是老师——想雇的话,去找 Ezra 就好。但这个方法论本身,是对风险投资和风投董事会长期以来判断一家创业公司是否”准备好被卖”的思维方式的一次反转。它与创始人听过的许多建议截然相反。获得被收购的机会有两种方式。这是刻意的简化。第一种是挂一个”出售”的牌子。这是传统的出售流程。你列出一份可能收购你的公司清单,你搞清楚买家的类别、对应的公司、里面的联系人。你发消息说”我们对交易持开放态度”,或者类似的委婉说法。你联系他们说:“我现在可以给你一些信息,先签一份保密协议,在某个日期之前给我一份意向书。“然后你走完一套流程,祈祷到最后有不止一个竞标者,试着把他们往上抬价,签署条款清单。然后他们会一路重新谈判,一直到你快死的地步,你祈祷最终能成交。
Lenny Rachitsky: 听起来非常熟悉。
Jonathan Lowenhar: 任何一个经历过几次的创始人,这个流程都会直击他的神经系统。因为天哪,这真是一个令人煎熬的过程。Magic Box 所论证的是,对早期创业公司来说,最好的结果并不是这样发生的。你从来不是”待售”的。事实上,是你吸引了一个买家,你把对方拉了进来。Magic Box 的工作分三个阶段:学习幻想、验证幻想、量化幻想。
那么我说的”幻想”到底是什么意思?你是一家早期创业公司,你遇到了一家与你同行业、同领域的公司,他们的规模远超你,是一家大企业。一般来说——这里再做一个过度简化——大公司对小公司感兴趣,是因为它们的技术;小公司对大公司感兴趣,是因为它们的渠道。大公司里有某个人对你产生了着迷。
着迷的是什么?他脑海中看到的是:“哦,有意思。如果我买下你的公司,这件事就会发生。“最经典的例子是 Instagram。这是这方面的头号案例。Lenny,你还记得他们被现在的 Meta 收购时有多少收入吗?
Lenny Rachitsky: 我记得是零。
Jonathan Lowenhar: 我记得也是零。
Lenny Rachitsky: 好。
Jonathan Lowenhar: 你还记得收购价是多少吗?
Lenny Rachitsky: 十亿美元,在当时看来简直荒谬。
Jonathan Lowenhar: 从历史上看,Facebook 用任何数学模型都无法证明十亿美元的合理性。它只能基于未来来建模。这正是 Magic Box paradigm 的典型体现。他们幻想加入 Instagram 会扩大广告收入。他们找到了某种方式来证明这一点。我稍后会解释我所说的”证明”是什么意思。然后他们的量化是基于未来的。这就是 Magic Box 方法与传统方法的区别。传统方法基于过去,Magic Box 基于未来。
让我讲个故事。我们投资的一家建筑科技公司,他们的技术能够从施工现场的摄像头数据中提取信息用于项目规划。当时还没有人在做这件事。业务发展得不错。我们帮助创始人创办了公司,推动第一个产品上市,完成了几轮融资。产品基本可用。但随着推进,我们不确定它是否具备风险投资级别的规模。同时,一些大型建筑科技公司、房地产公司和开发公司在向我们靠拢。其中有一家公司说:“嗯,我们在建筑规划方面很擅长,而且我们收集了大量根本没用过的视频数据。“对方产品部门的那位 champion(推动者),他有了一个幻想——“天哪,我们把你们的视频分析平台接入我们做的事里,我的业务就会变成这样。”
需要注意的是,坐在对面的是一个人。我之所以特别强调这一点,是因为你不是在向一家公司销售。Magic Box 的核心是找到那个人。你要找的是对方的 champion,那个因为自身原因——职业发展、金钱、声誉等等——而被驱动的人。他们看到了这个幻想,他们爱上了它。这个人说:“我爱死这个想法了。如果我能把安防数据整合到我的产品组织里……现在我需要证明这个幻想。”
在这种流程中,champion 的不同之处在于,他们想找到说”是”的办法。他们不是在找说”不”的理由。这就引出了在 Magic Box 过程中你会遇到的四种角色。可能还有第五种。你会遇到你的 champion,你会遇到你的 advocates(支持者),你会遇到你的 blockers(阻碍者),你还会遇到你的 buyer(决策者)。你可能还会在途中遇到 Corp Dev(企业战略发展部门)。
让我分别讲讲这些人。Champion 是那个坠入爱河的人。他们是怀有幻想的人,是替你据理力争的人,是你不在场时为你战斗的人。他们会给你发消息,告诉你一些他们可能不应该告诉你的关于公司的事。
Buyer,他们只关心数字。可能是一个委员会,可能是一个小组,IC、EC、投资委员会,等等。他们是真正能批准交易的人。他们关注的是商业案例。
Advocates……Lenny,你下国际象棋吗?
Lenny Rachitsky: 下过,是的。
Jonathan Lowenhar: 你下过。那么 advocates 就像是棋子——小卒。他们完全不重要,直到他们变得极其重要。这些人就是,比如说,你作为 CEO 正在和潜在 buyer 开会,Zoom 通话里莫名其妙有 12 个人,但只有两个人在说话。另外 10 个可能就是 advocates。他们在为你加油,但不会冒任何政治风险。他们的价值在于给你提供情报。
Magic Box 中的四种角色
Blocker,这是那个不能说”是”、但能说”不”的人。这是 OPSEC(运营安全部门),这是 Procurement(采购部门),这是 Legal(法务部门)。你会在 Magic Box 的博弈过程中遇到所有这些角色。你的 champion 只希望交易达成,因为他们已经深深爱上了。所以接下来发生的事情是,他们构想了一个幻想,而你作为 CEO 需要全力拥抱它。这不是企业级销售。我不是在试图把我手里的东西卖给你。我只是想找到说”是”的方式。
所以,在我的故事中,当那个人说”我们能不能把我们一直收集的所有视频数据提供给你,然后你们就能增强我们预测大型建筑项目是否按时完成的能力”——我希望 CEO 只说一句话:“我们可以做到。“
第二阶段:证明
现在进入第二阶段,我需要证明它。因为我有一个想说”是”的 champion,证明过程可以非常简单。证明之所以如此重要,不是为了说服 champion——他们已经爱上了这个幻想,早已被说服了。是因为在几乎所有情况下,都是大公司买小公司,你的 champion 没有独断权。他们需要在内部推动这个交易。他们必须获得谁的认可?前面提到的 buyer。他们必须能够扛住前面提到的 blockers。
所以最终,当他们向负责的委员会提案时,那个委员会会说:“我们有什么证据证明它有效?“我们只需要能够为 champion 提供足够的证据。所以在这个案例中,我们对 champion 说:“把视频数据给我们,我们会提供你需要的证据。“因为我们面对的是一个不是愤世嫉俗者的 champion——champion 本来就不是——我们可以告诉他们:“用这种方式、这种格式提供数据,之后我们会给你这些结果。我们达成一致了吗?“我们其实已经知道自己会赢下这个证明环节,而这在这些博弈中至关重要。
第三阶段:量化
第三,量化。到这个时候,我们还没有挂牌出售,但我们已经在对方身上消耗了大量精力,对方也清楚这一点。所以我们让 CEO 对他们说出以下这番话:“我的董事会在问问题了。他们想知道为什么我们在一件并非核心业务的事情上花费这么多精力,而且我们并不是在向你销售产品。我相信这件事如果合作会有多么令人兴奋,但我觉得我们需要做些算术。这样我就能向董事会解释这件事为什么可能重要。让我们假设这一切都行得通——因为肯定会行得通的——一年后或者五年后,你们的业务会发生什么变化?“Champion 会告诉你:“留存率会变成这样,或者交易规模会变成那样,或者市场份额会这样增长。“然后你对他们说:“太好了。听着,我会建一个粗糙版本的模型。你告诉我哪里对了、哪里错了,但我 16 天后有一个董事会,我需要能够向他们解释清楚为什么我在这件事上花了这么多精力。”
你建好模型,交给他们。只要他们对你的模型有任何回应,你就赢了。因为你已经把历史和未来切割开来,你现在玩的已经是未来的游戏了,你玩的就是 Instagram 那个案例里的逻辑。我前面描述的那家公司,最后的结局是这样的——它的收入不到 200 万美元。我们融 B 轮的前景看起来很低。我们还没有盈利。而那次退出对联合创始人及其家族来说是改变代际命运的财富。CEO 后来在那家上市收购方公司待了两年多。技术确实被整合了,但花了很长时间,他们不得不做大量改动,当然远远超出了尽调过程中所设想的。但各方都很满意。如果我们没有这样做,如果我们只是挂牌待售,那家公司连一块钱都卖不到。
补充要点
Jonathan Lowenhar: 这里还有几个非常重要的补充要点。对于在座的任何正在考虑从退出出发反向规划的创始人,有两件事我真的想强调。第一,幻想远不止”你能给对方业务带来什么变化”那么简单。幻想还包括”你的账目是规范的”、你所有的投资者都会同意这笔交易并且你能获得一致同意、你的核心团队成员会留下来、你是一个让人愉快的合作对象。拜托,创始人,千万不要在任何时候戳破这个幻想。
所以,无论买方脑海中正在形成什么样的想象,你要去了解它。让所有人都从中受益,活在那个所有人都是赢家的游戏里。第二,关于 Corp Dev,他们可能会在看台上出现。Corp Dev 是做交易的。他们不是交易的发起人,不是 champion,也不是 buyer。他们是专业的谈判专家。他们的工作是推动交易并促成交易。最重要的一点是,他们可以成为一个杠杆点,推动交易以一定的流程、节奏和紧迫感向前推进。因为交易要么有势能,要么就会死掉,而 Corp Dev 在这方面能帮上忙。
第二,他们的谈判能力远在你之上。所以面对一个比你更强的谈判者,你唯一能做的、努力拉平差距的方法,就是把谈判变成异步的。所以创始人朋友们,跟我念,我现在直接跟你们说话。你要对 Corp Dev 说:“你知道,这个决定不是我一个人能做的。我很喜欢你刚才说的,我对这个机会也很兴奋。等我看到书面版本后,我可以跟顾问、律师、联合创始人等人沟通讨论。“但不要在实时对话中谈判。你会输的。
Lenny Rachitsky: 我得说刚才那段听起来非常令人愉悦。我从来没听过 M&A 策略被讲得这么有趣。它让我都想卖一家公司了。就像,“好吧,我们干吧。我热血沸腾。“我觉得你都说到了。我还有几个问题。
有趣的是,中间那部分……感觉很像企业销售,很多创始人对此很熟悉。搞清楚利益相关者是谁,推动事情向前发展。这里是你的 champion,这里是你的 blocker,这里是你的 buyer。关于这点你有什么想补充的吗?跟很多创始人可能熟悉的企业销售相比,最大的不同是什么?还是说两者非常相似?
诱惑与企业销售的区别
Jonathan Lowenhar: 嗯,我觉得有三点不同。第一,在企业销售中有很多时候我们会试图推动一个紧迫事件。但在诱惑策略中,这一招行不通。我们经常用的一个轻松比喻是——你已经和这个人交往了一段时间,这个人可能就是对的人,但对方还没完全确信应该共度一生,你们正坐在晚餐桌前。而在企业销售中,你急于达成交易。你急于推进这段关系,搬在一起,订婚,诸如此类。所以你可能会倾向于说:“嘿,要么我们把这段关系推到下一步,要么有一大堆人在盯着我,我要去约会别人了。”
这种对话从来不会有好结果。而在 Magic Box 中,创始人也急于做同样的事,认为竞争能提升自己的交易规模,但事实上我认为在舞蹈的最后阶段之前,这更多地是一个负面信号。所以在企业销售中我在推,而在 Magic Box 中,我始终在诱惑,我永远、永远不在推。所以我可能会说这样的话:“嘿,我打算在 Q1 融下一轮,因为我一直打算独立做这门生意。现在我真正想做的,就是赢。我只想让我的产品进入尽可能多的客户手中。无论是按我原来的计划自己做,还是跟某个合作伙伴一起做,还是在别人的屋檐下做,说实话我无所谓。但我有一家公司要运营,我打算在 Q1 去融下一轮。如果我融了,可能就太贵了,这笔交易就不太可能了,而且我的董事会也希望我继续往前走。“我在诱惑。我从不在推。
[广告部分已跳过]
如何开始建立关系
Lenny Rachitsky: 好的,我作为一个创始人来思考这些,我觉得他们可能会好奇的是第一步——找到那个人,开始构建那个幻想。你对那些觉得”我们可能需要卖掉这家公司”的创始人有什么建议吗?他们可以怎么做来开始建立这些关系、找到那个人、在对方心中构建这个幻想?
Jonathan Lowenhar: Ezra 在书中做得非常好。再说一次,关键是不能显得在推销。我们有一家公司,大概还剩 20 个月的资金,两个联合创始人和我们的团队都确信:“这不是一门风险投资级别的生意。我们原以为可能是,但它不是。跟每个企业客户做成一笔交易耗时太长,而那笔交易本身也没那么有意思。“这让人失望,但至少我们很诚实。“好吧,那我们要卖给谁?来玩这个游戏吧。”
所以我们从类别开始,买方的类别。以我脑子里的这个具体例子来说,ERP 公司可以是一个买家,大型银行可以是一个买家,像 Microsoft 这样的大型软件公司也可以是一个买家。有几个不同的类别。然后我们说:“好,这些类别里哪些公司说得通?“他们有收购意愿,有足够的资产负债表支撑。有 Corp Dev 部门,所以我们知道他们确实懂这一行。理想情况下,跟核心团队或顾问或董事会成员已经有现成的关系。列一张清单。
现在,我们怎么在不卖东西的情况下见到他们?书中有我非常喜欢的一个例子,一家小创业公司想认识某个领域的行业领袖,于是他们让公关公司组织了一个圆桌论坛,联系潜在买方的 CEO 们说:“我们正在组建一个关于 X 领域全球顶尖专家的圆桌。我们会邀请四个人,你、名人二号、名人三号,还有第四个人”——那就是我们的创业公司 CEO。突然之间你就以同等的身份坐在了同一张桌子前。这完全是另一种对话。
第二个方法,这听起来可能有点傻,但我毫不夸张地说,它真的管用。如果你是 CEO 创始人,在 LinkedIn 上有这个头衔,你会惊讶于你能收到多少回复。所以我们列了清单,然后开始给目标名单上的 CEO 或 CPO 或 CFO 发送连接请求,说的就这么简单:“你在做的事情真的很酷。我们也是。你愿不愿意就聊 30 分钟?因为我不知道会聊出什么,但我觉得会很有趣。“就保持这种非正式的程度。这是对等的关系。我不是在向你推销任何东西。
建立关系的策略(续)
如果你能关联到他们发过的某条帖子或做过的某次演讲,那就更好了。但我们发现,毫无例外地,总会有一个概率出现——四分之一、五分之一或六分之一的回复率,“嗯,听起来挺有趣的。“很多 CEO 从来不跟创业公司交谈,而这对他们来说是新鲜的,尤其是当你带着一种”我只是想进行一次有趣的、思想层面的交流”的能量出现时。
首次对话的目标
Jonathan Lowenhar: 在第一次对话中你要寻找的东西——这也是我们要求 CEO 们去做的——就是问这样的问题:“接下来一年你最关心什么?你的核心任务是什么?你的部门呢?哪些事情让你夜不能寐?最大的风险点在哪里?如果对接下来一年做一个事前复盘,什么东西可能毁掉一切?“这类开放性的问题,因为我们希望我们的 CEO 去倾听,去寻找那个幻想——看看他们关心的东西和我们可能——稍微眯着眼睛说——我们能做的事情之间是否存在某种交集。
Lenny Rachitsky: 这很有意思,因为听起来这里有一个 jobs-to-be-done(待办任务)框架的影子,或者说就是”他们需要完成的工作任务是什么?“你要解决的痛点是什么,然后围绕”如果你能解决这个问题,对他们来说会有多棒”构建一个幻想。
Jonathan Lowenhar: 最理想的情况是他们自己说出来,你只需以积极倾听的方式将其反射回去。
Lenny Rachitsky: Chris Voss 式的谈判风格。好的,Jonathan,你是那种每一话题都够做整期节目的嘉宾,所以我知道这里还有太多可以聊的。我想换个话题,但在离开这个话题之前给大家留两点——一是如果他们想更深入地了解这套方法论,你提到了一本书,叫 Magic Box Paradigm,作者是 Ezra Roizen,对吧?
与 Jonathan Lowenhar 合作
如果公司正处于这个过程中,开始思考这件事了,找你并说”嘿,帮我走完这个流程”有意义吗?我知道你说过”去找投资银行家”。还是说”嘿,让 Jonathan 来帮忙”,或者让你团队的人来帮他们更合适?
Jonathan Lowenhar: 我们会遇到两类创始人。第一类创始人说,帮我解决业务中的这个部分,完全是事务性的。我想融下一轮,或者我招聘做得不好,或者我的联合创始人之间相处不好,或者我想卖掉公司。坦白说,这对我来说不感兴趣。这不是我们做的事。去找一个感兴趣的人——我不是在贬低谁——但就像一把螺丝刀,修一个东西的那种,去修那一个东西就好。然后我们会遇到第二类创始人,这类创始人——多半是对自己说的,因为这是唯一安全的听众——会意识到:我现在的 CEO 水平和公司需要我达到的 CEO 水平之间存在差距。有些技能我很擅长,但也有一些方面,如果我真的对自己诚实,如果我听内心那个微弱的声音,我知道自己在这些方面很薄弱,或者不够好,或者对这些方面有某种冒名顶替综合征——如果我不在这些方面变得更强,那就危险了。这就是我们合作的对象。就是当他们在乎到这种程度——既在乎硬技能的提升,也可能在乎软技能的发展——在成为优秀 CEO 的道路上。
CEO 的三项核心工作
如何卖掉公司,是技能之一。我们教所有创始人这些内容——包括招聘、管理和规划。我不在乎具体是什么。对我们每一位创始人,我们都会做一个审计,说:这是你擅长的,这是你糟糕的,这是你从没做过的。鉴于公司当前所处的阶段,你想先从哪个开始提升?
Lenny Rachitsky: 很好的过渡,正好引向我想聊的下一个话题——招聘。我经常听到说创始人的核心工作就是融资和招募优秀团队。基本上这就是他们的主要目标。招到优秀的人,你雇来的人塑造了你的公司,创造了文化。这件事必须做对。但跟卖公司类似,大多数创始人从来没有真正大规模招聘过,从来没有为各种不同的技能组合招过人。我知道你们花很多时间帮助创始人招聘、寻找优秀人才。你能不能分享一下你们给创始人的关于如何找到并招到优秀人才的建议?
Jonathan Lowenhar: 好的。我们实际上认为 CEO 有三项工作。你说的两项我们同意,但我们认为还有第三项。第一项,确保每个人都知道我们要去哪里。第二项,为团队选择合适的人。第三项,给这些人赢得胜利所需的工具。你可以把这些抽象理解,但——
Lenny Rachitsky: 我喜欢这个框架。
招聘方法论
Jonathan Lowenhar: ……大多数创始人在招聘方面真的很差。他们会陷入各种非常常见的人类偏见。那些偷懒的——回到自由放任——觉得这就是赌博:哦太好了,他们在 Meta 和 Salesforce 工作过,那就招进来,纯粹是在赌。有一项工作由 Geoffrey Smart 和 Randy Street 完成,后来被整理成一本出色的书。我来确保名字说对了——Geoffrey Smart 和 Randy Street。他们在九十年代中期就有一家咨询公司。然后在 2007 或 2008 年写了一本书,叫 Who: The A Method for Hiring(《谁:A 级招聘法》)。我们把那本书的方法论进行了实操化,并在此基础上做了扩展,因为我们发现其中有些部分已经有点过时了,但它今天依然像以往一样适用。
我认为创始人经常犯的三个核心错误,其实很容易纠正。第一个是,你应该招那些已经做过你接下来需要他们做的事情的人。我知道这听起来很简单,但创始人不是这样思考招聘的。他们从职位描述开始。我们长期以来一直被教导这样做。从职位描述开始。这是一个错误。正确做法是——假设现在是 12 个月后,你招了这个人,他们今天入职,12 个月过去了,你们在开香槟庆祝,因为一切太棒了。业务发生了什么变化?12 个月后的成功是什么样子?把它记录下来。然后在面试候选人的时候,去找那些已经做过这些事情的人。
第二,你面前这个人是否有创造”狂热粉丝”的履历?书里谈到了一个概念:你的职业生涯是被”拉着走”还是被”推着走”。如果你在 A 工作中表现出色,那么大概率在 B 工作中,A 工作中与你有关联的人会把你拉到下一个事情,然后再拉到下一个,再拉到下一个,你永远不需要找工作,因为你足够优秀。如果你看到了这样的履历,叮叮叮叮叮——非常有吸引力的候选人。
第三,核心价值观非常重要。文化不是偶然发生的。规模化的文化,是将对企业重要的事进行编码,并将这些价值观的践行仪式化。它始于创始人是谁,然后会向外扩散——只要创始人保持高度一致。但这也意味着你需要一套方法论来评估你面前的下一个人是否真正代表你的价值观。我们把面试阶段的设计跟书中的思路类似,用语略有不同,但我们认为应该有一个文化面试、一个职能面试和一个技术面试,它们的设计目的是回答这些问题:他们是否真的做过这类工作?他们在职业生涯中是被拉着走还是被推着走?他们是你那种人吗?
价值观面试
Lenny Rachitsky: 关于最后这一点,其实很有意思——在 Airbnb,确实有一个核心价值观面试团队。他们专门研究创始人 Brian、Joe 和 Nate 各自看重什么,然后将其编纂成公司的核心价值观。这个团队是精挑细选的,在每轮面试中都会对候选人进行价值观评估。
Jonathan Lowenhar: 这是一个极好的例子,说明价值观面试与职级无关。因为在公司发展的每个阶段,你都能找到那些最好的价值观大使、最好的价值观践行者。请让他们来参与面试。而且他们自己也乐在其中,因为他们是在守护自己的城堡。他们热爱自己的工作环境,希望保持下去。
Lenny Rachitsky: 确实如此,那个团队非常特别,能加入是一种荣誉。让我总结一下你刚才分享的内容——信息量太大了,源源不断。关于招聘,你的建议是:第一,找那些已经做过这件事的人;第二,找那些被前同事从一个工作拉到另一个工作的人——有人欣赏他们的工作,希望他们加入新公司;第三,他们的价值观与创始人和公司的价值观匹配。对吗?
Jonathan Lowenhar: 对。对于招聘人员来说,有一个很简单的方法可以过滤掉大量涌入漏斗顶端的低质量候选人:哪怕在求职信阶段就问一个问题——你的前任老板中,有几个愿意拿起电话说你很厉害?如果回答中有任何犹豫,很好,直接跳过。
关于招聘初级人才
Lenny Rachitsky: 这里有几个后续问题。第一个是,关于”招那些已经做过这件事的人”这一点,这显然意味着不太应该招聘初级的新人。那么,什么时候适合招聘更有雄心、更聪明、能够快速上手的初级人才呢?对此你怎么看?
Jonathan Lowenhar: 我们旗下有一家公司正在招聘一批相对初级的客户经理(account exec),目标是毕业两年左右的人。这意味着他们大概率没有三年完成业绩指标(quota)的记录和类似经历——你懂的。那么,怎么招”已经做过这件事”的人?我们知道 12 个月后的成功是什么样子:对于这个岗位,他们学会了如何开拓客户,能够建立 X 规模的销售管线(pipeline),并完成 Y 的业绩,等等。那么我们在他们的经历中寻找什么?任何形式的销售经验。他们可能卖过女童子军饼干,卖过活动门票,或者在非营利组织工作过。无所谓,但我要看到他们卖过东西的证据,看到他们敢于打电话、出现在会议或活动现场的证据。所以,“做过这件事”应该被创造性地理解和评估。
Lenny Rachitsky: 明白了。
三种高管原型:架构师、优化师与扩张师
Jonathan Lowenhar: 对于更高级的岗位,我要求明确的证据。比如,对于高管,Lenny,我们认为创业公司随着发展最终会雇佣三种类型的高管:架构师(architect)、优化师(optimizer)和扩张师(scaler)。以销售为例。架构师是指那些需要从零搭建打法手册(playbook)的人。他们会不太自在地紧贴创始人,观察和倾听,听录音,反复请教,把创始人身上的魔法提炼出来——哦,原来她或他达成交易的那套”舞步”是这样的——然后写出第一版打法手册。这个编纂的目的,是让你可以招募第一个客户经理、第二个客户经理,因为回到我们之前的说法,客户经理在这种”成年人与孩子”的动态关系中是孩子,你需要给他们结构才能让他们赢。这就是架构师。优化师,是指从几个客户经理扩展到十到十五个的阶段——现在我们有必须达成的目标,业务达到了更高的专业化水平和期望值,你需要优化早期的打法手册,从中挖掘更高的效率和绩效。
扩张师则在思考:好,现在我如何找到杠杆?如何让客户经理数量增长十倍?如何让其他人为我销售?他们都叫销售副总裁或首席收入官,但他们是完全不同的原型。同样的人物类型也存在于工程、产品等部门。在这些情况下,我只愿意招做过架构师的人来当架构师。如果他们只做过优化师,他们会失败,因为他们从未从零编写过打法手册。
Lenny Rachitsky: 这让我想起最近的一次对话。在我的峰会上,我和 Shreyas Doshi 做了一场现场播客录制,他谈到很多人在工作中非常沮丧,本质上就是因为他们处于错误的那种角色里。你享受某种类型的工作,但你的岗位要求的不是那种类型——无论是扩张还是优化。这提醒我们,如果你在工作中感到沮丧,很可能是因为你被期望产出的工作类型与你不匹配。
可持续成功的三个条件
Jonathan Lowenhar: 我脑海中的画面是,有时候和我以及我的同事交流,可能会感觉有点像”被框架淹死”。我们干什么都有一个框架。在这个例子中,我认为如果你想在任何工作中持续成功——我不管是什么工作——三件事必须同时成立:你得擅长它,你得喜欢它,市场得在乎它。如果其中任何一条不成立,你待不了多久。
Lenny Rachitsky: 是的。这也呼应了你们公司的名字——Enjoy The Work——必须享受这份工作才能持续。好,关于招聘还有一个后续问题,然后我想聊聊另一个话题。同样,我觉得这里面的每一个话题都能聊一两个小时。我注意到一个反复出现的主题:用逆向工作法来指导今天的行动。之前你谈到从企业下一步想要的结果逆向工作——无论是融资、退出还是关停。在招聘上也有类似的建议:从你希望这个人在第一年达成的目标逆向工作——无论是推动产品的某种增长,还是推动销售。关于逆向工作法相比传统招聘方式——比如你提到的从职位描述出发——还有什么要补充的吗?
招聘从来不是目标
Jonathan Lowenhar: 招聘从来不是目标。而我们最常从创始人那里听到的第一句话恰恰是”我必须招这个人”。这非常危险,容易引发确认偏误(confirmation bias)。招聘经理总是受这种偏误影响最深的那个人。而且说到底,招聘从来不是目标。我们会一遍又一遍地把他们拉回来:三个里程碑中哪个重要?融资、退出、盈利。比如,要实现融资,业务需要发生什么变化?如何量化这个变化?用某种目标设定框架——OKR、EO,无所谓。所有目标设定框架的骨架都一样:有描述,有量化,有需要完成的工作,有明确责任人和明确约定的问责仪式。
Jonathan Lowenhar: 所以一旦我量化了”需要完成哪些工作”,我就知道需要什么资源来推进这些工作,因此也就知道需要什么样的人才——不管是招聘还是外部租赁。推动对话的应该是这些,而不是”天哪,我需要再招一个 PM”。不,应该是:这些是我们今年最重要的功能集;现有资源和所需资源之间的差距就在这里——这就是我们要招聘这个岗位的原因。而 12 个月或 6 个月之后成功是什么样子,是这样的。这样就把所有事情都与”业务会发生什么变化”联系起来了。
这是我们在与创始人合作中反复出现的主题。Lenny,他们陷得那么深,几乎没有时间跳出日常事务俯瞰全局。这就是”在业务中工作”与”在业务上工作”的区别。我们的很多工作就是把创始人从日常事务中拉出来——日常事务极其重要,绝无贬低之意——然后让他们思考:我要去哪里,为什么,我如何衡量沿途的进展。所以我们对他们做的很多事情就是:我想听听你认为成功是什么样子。我会提出质疑,做压力测试。我们能不能把它定义清楚?能不能就谁需要沿途做什么达成一致,以及我们如何持续检查以保持反馈回路短促?好了,现在可以回去做业务了,一周或一个月后我们再检查一次。
go-to-market 的四模块框架
Lenny Rachitsky: 太好了。这恰好引出了我想花时间讨论的最后一个板块:增长和 go-to-market。这也是很多创始人从未涉足过的领域。很多创始人的想法是:嘿,我有个好主意,我要做出一个很棒的产品。我知道怎么做,我知道市场需要什么。但构建一个 go-to-market 体系把产品交到用户手中,是完全不同的技能。我们在播客上花了很多时间讨论这个话题。你有一个很酷也很简单的框架来思考 go-to-market。大家总是在说,哦,你需要一个 go-to-market 战略。请谈谈你如何引导创始人思考:拼出一个 go-to-market 计划需要什么,如何把它变成可重复的打法,而不是”我就去找人推销”。
Jonathan Lowenhar: 我们的创始人,即使是最有能力的,也觉得这个话题相当令人窒息,因为它涉及太多分支领域。所以我们确实努力把它提炼成一口口可以消化的模块。我们把它分成四个部分。
第一个是理想客户画像(ideal customer profile)。我们到底想卖给谁?他们的资质标准是什么?我们会用什么探索问题来确认这些资质?淘汰条件(kill criteria)是什么,以便判断这是不是虚晃一枪、这个人其实不是目标客户?
第二个模块,宽泛地叫做营销。但营销里面也包含定位。那么我们相对对手的独特差异点(uncommon denominator)是什么?我们的竞争对手是谁?是具体的公司还是某种现状?他们擅长什么?我们擅长什么?我们有什么是他们做不到的?然后我们如何在世界上表达这些?这就是品牌、物料和视觉识别等工作。
第三个是需求获客(demand gen),我们简化来说就是:怎么找到我们想要的人?我一直很喜欢 Gabriel Weinberg 写的那本《Traction》……抱歉我忘了合著者的名字了,Jason Mares?抱歉。书里谈到所有公司都可以利用的 19 个获客渠道,这些渠道对大家都一样。这本书出版有几年了,所以之后又出现了几个新渠道。但我们试图帮助创始人拓宽视野的点是:与其只想着用你在上一家公司用的方式去获取下一个客户——可得性偏差(availability bias)——不如想想这些渠道中哪些在当下最合理。一个简单的 2×2 矩阵就能派上用场,做一些实验,做一些书面脑暴法(brain writing)。我很喜欢书面脑暴法,而不是头脑风暴(brainstorming)。我知道你在之前的播客里也谈过这个。然后是高影响力、低投入——我们能不能想出每个渠道想做的三四个实验?去试试吧。
第四个是销售。这就是打法手册(playbook)的标准化。我们怎么进行对话?怎么做探索?怎么处理异议?怎么做演示?怎么推进成交?如果我们能搞定这四个模块,接下来就可以谈部署、客户成功、向上销售(upselling)、客户管理等话题了。这些都是好问题。天哪,我的装机基数(install base)太大了,我需要管理它——太好了,这真是个该死的好问题。但我们试图把从”个人销售”到”构建机器”的这种复杂性拆解成这四个模块:我要卖给谁?我们想对外表达什么?我们怎么触达他们?我们怎么成交?
书面脑暴法(brain writing)
Lenny Rachitsky: 太棒了。我本来想总结一下的,你总结得非常好。在我们继续之前,你提到了书面脑暴法这个词。它是什么意思?
Jonathan Lowenhar: 哦,我第一次听说这个是从 Adam Grant 那里。我不知道他是不是这个想法的原创者。头脑风暴——你在和 Annie Duke 的播客里也谈到过——会议可以变得多么可怕的强制性。
Lenny Rachitsky: 特别是在头脑风暴方面。
Jonathan Lowenhar: 特别是在头脑风暴方面。而我们的很多创始人没有意识到的是,他们觉得自己只是和一群自己尊敬的人围坐在桌旁,可以像平级一样讨论。不,你做不到。你是创始人。你的声音上天然带着一个扩音器,哪怕你自己听不到。所以如果你真的想听听团队怎么说,就必须把扩音器调低。书面脑暴法就是:我提出一个想法,然后希望大家写下来并发表意见……可以是问卷,可以是共享文档,什么都行。我倾向于通过某种方法论,让大家以异步的方式分享自己的观点、评论、修改、想法,在此之前没有人能看到其他人的内容,最理想的情况甚至不标明作者。
然后当创始人也发表意见时,你不知道哪个是他们的,他们只是群体的一部分。让大家阅读所有内容。我甚至喜欢 Amazon 的做法:会议的前 10 分钟,大家就是安静阅读,这样所有人都完全沉浸其中,然后再开始讨论。这样做的好处是减弱会议中的创始人效应。
Lenny Rachitsky: 你总是充满了金句。刚才这个看似随意的题外话,我觉得对很多团队都可能带来变革。所以这里的建议就是:当你们想构思和头脑风暴的时候,不要去一个大房间,把便利贴贴在墙上,随口说想法、展开讨论。而是让每个人单独坐下来思考,写下自己的想法,创始人提出:这是一个问题,这是我们想要攻克的课题。
Jonathan Lowenhar: 这样做还有一个好处:让快思考者和慢思考者、内向者和外向者之间的竞争环境变得平等。因为在你的团队里他们可能有同等的才华,但如果你做实时头脑风暴,你就压制了所有那些更喜欢先坐下来好好想想的人。
go-to-market 框架回顾
Lenny Rachitsky: 我就是这样的。这正是我的工作方式。我需要思考和消化。我不是那种当场就能快速反应的人。所以我百分之百赞同这个方法。让我回到你的 go-to-market 框架。我把笔记调出来了。基本上,如果你是创始人,甚至是产品构建者,你在思考”我该怎么做……人们一直告诉我需要一个 go-to-market 计划,我需要让这个东西增长。我该怎么想这个问题?“你基本上是说有这四个层面需要考虑:你卖给谁?你如何激励他们、让他们对购买你的产品感到兴奋?你如何触达他们?然后你如何成交?
Jonathan Lowenhar: 对。
Lenny Rachitsky: 幸运的是,关于这四个层面中的每一个,我都有播客和Newsletter文章,如果大家想深入探索每个部分的话。我有理想客户画像(ideal customer profile)的模板、营销建议,所有这些东西。所以好消息是,有大量内容供人们阅读和探索。我想问你,当你接触一个创始人,或者创始人来找你说”我需要搞清楚 go-to-market 的打法”时,你通常觉得哪里投入产出比最高?是从头到尾按顺序来,还是说某个地方可能需要花更多时间?
最昂贵的错误:没有选好客户
Jonathan Lowenhar: 早期阶段的创始人——这当然对初次创业者来说比老手更适用,Lenny,因为老手已经学到了这个教训。初次创业者就像二十多岁的人第一次在酒吧社交,任何跟他们有眼神交流的人,就足以让他们说”我想跟你约会”。就这样。没有任何筛选标准,就像”天哪,他们喜欢我,我答应了”。这就是一直困扰初次创业者的错误。老手以及那些被我们指导过的人则不同。我们会说,想象你能在实验室里,在培养皿中培育出你完美的客户——他们会是什么样子?如果你已经有一些装机基数(install base),我会问这个问题。前几天我刚刚跟一个创始人做了这件事。他们是做大企业猎鲸式销售的。他们有四个大客户。
Lenny Rachitsky: 等一下,猎鲸……是指追富豪还是真正的鲸鱼?
Jonathan Lowenhar: 企业级销售的极端形式。
Lenny Rachitsky: 好的好的,明白了。我倒想看看一个猎鲸创业公司。好的,继续。
Jonathan Lowenhar: 我说,那你四个客户里你最喜欢哪个?哪个客户如果我打电话过去,他们会对你赞不绝口,会迫不及待地想要向别人宣扬你为他们做了什么?他们说,哦,那很清楚,是四个中的这一个。很好。跟我讲讲他们。然后你开始从中发现和拆解的是,创始人确实有一个理想画像。他们确实有一个梦想。当然,这里有各种风险——市场是不是太小了?如果收得太紧,市场是不是不够大?创始人经常被这些担忧困住,这是一个错误。因为我们在一开始所寻找的,只是一个白热化的机会核心——一小群人,他们是狂热粉丝,获得了巨大的价值。相邻领域和扩张的事可以以后再操心。我喜欢提醒他们,Amazon 起初只卖书。我们可以从一件事开始,把它做到极致。所以创始人经常卡住的地方在于,他们没有深思熟虑理想客户画像(ideal customer profile)就开始销售,没有思考筛选标准,没有思考能触及目标的探询问题,而最重要的是,没有思考淘汰条件(kill criteria)——如果这个条件成立,就不要签下他们,即使他们想跟你约会。
Lenny Rachitsky: 我很高兴你提到这一点,因为这正是我所相信的,也是在这个播客上经常听到的:在早期阶段,选择客户的重要性被严重低估了。如果你想想你描述的那个漏斗——弄清楚你卖给谁、如何激励他们、找到他们、然后卖给他们——这一切都从”你在追求谁”开始自上而下地流动。如果你知道你在跟谁对话,你就知道如何激励他们,反过来则不行。如果你对所有人一视同仁——
Jonathan Lowenhar: 这是那四个层面中最昂贵的错误。
从现实出发的规划
Lenny Rachitsky: 好的。关于 go-to-market 或增长,在我们结束对话之前,还有什么你认为值得提及的吗?
Jonathan Lowenhar: 有一点我想分享的,这回到了我们之前讨论的”先瞄准、再开火、再校准”。我们刚才描述的其实隐含着一个数学漏斗。创始人在做来年规划时经常犯这样一个错误:我需要达到这个营收来支撑这个估值倍数,然后漏斗里所有的数学都变成了一个填空数字——这是致命的。正确的做法应该是:过去三个月、六个月、九个月、十二个月的真实数据是什么?然后基于这些数据,我能够合理地做出哪些假设,配合我计划如何影响这个漏斗的方式,来推算一年后我会到达哪里?这样做可以降低你规划过程中带入的偏误。
但如果创始人从一个”我必须达到三百万否则我们就完了”的出发点开始,你已经完了。正确的做法是:我真正相信我能通过哪些方式到达那个目标——改变漏斗顶部、改变各环节转化率、改变交易规模或交易周期等等——这些基于我最近的历史数据。然后围绕”我认为业务在保持一定进取心的情况下合理能达到的位置”与”我认为财务上需要达到的位置”之间的差距展开对话,因为这才是更成熟的对话方式,也是那种”先瞄准、再开火、再校准”式 CEO 所欠缺的对话。这也是过去几年当资本退潮后,大多数创始人才开始学会进行的对话。
信任你的直觉
Lenny Rachitsky: 我很喜欢这一点。我特别喜欢你的建议总是这么务实、这么实在。说到这个,我给你指导的一位创始人发了邮件,问他”Jonathan 来上播客的时候我该问什么?”
Jonathan Lowenhar: 糟了。
Lenny Rachitsky: 他说了一些真的很……挺好的。他说的话让我很意外。他说他从你这里学到的最大一课是,作为创始人,在整个创业旅程中要更多地信任自己的直觉。你能谈谈这个吗?这是你学到的、观察到的,也许是被创始人低估的东西?
Jonathan Lowenhar: 作为创业公司 CEO,不可能不面对许多存亡攸关的时刻。我的公司能活下来吗?我是不是犯了一个错误?我以后还能被录用吗?我应该现在就把公司卖了吗?我应该跟联合创始人分道扬镳吗?我应该裁掉这个关键员工吗?这些时刻我们每个人都会遇到。而恐惧不是一个好的决策者。我们的大脑杏仁核在这些时刻是一个非常糟糕的决策者。
所以我们经常会跟面对这种场景的创始人——我认识你说的那位 CEO,他正在面对这样的场景——我们会对他们说:“你知道那个当你真正安静下来时会听到的小小声音吗?那个安静的声音说’你应该跟这个人结婚’,‘你应该接受这份工作’,‘你应该创办这家公司’,‘小心那个人,他有问题’。” Lenny,大多数时候当我这样表述时,对面的人会说:“是的,我知道那个声音。“我会问:“你怎么听到它的?“他们的回答通常是某种版本:“我必须让自己非常独处、非常静止、非常安静,在海滩上散步,听音乐,健身,陪我的宠物玩。“
相信直觉,而不是恐惧
Jonathan Lowenhar: 我告诉他们,那个声音才是真正的你。它不是你的大脑。你的大脑只是一个工具。就像我们的手、我们的脚一样,只是一个工具。它是一台模式识别机器。但真正的你是谁——如果你能观察自己的大脑,你知道自己在想什么,比如”哦,看我的大脑在做什么”——那就意味着你不是你的大脑。你是别的什么东西。那就是那个小小的声音,而那个小小的声音通常是对的。我们生活中搞砸的时候,就是我们不再倾听那个声音的时候,当我们生活中的混乱和躁动盖过了那个声音的时候。
所以每当我们的创始人面对那种时刻,我们不会给一个框架,不会给一套打法手册(playbook),甚至也不会给出方向性的建议说”你应该往左走,我见过这种情况,往左走”。不是这样的。我信任创始人的直觉。如果创始人说这家公司还能行,或者这个联合创始人不合适,或者”是时候卖掉了,我加入”——我们就全力支持他们。我们努力成为他们生命中唯一完全站在他们这边的人,因为我们不坐在 CAFS 桌子的优先席上。我们不是受托人,不是董事会成员,不是联合创始人,这些都不是。所以在那些时刻,我们只会说:“你能让自己真正安静下来吗?”
你说的那位创始人,我心里有这个故事。他当时正面临与联合创始人分手的时刻,我问他——因为他很擅长让自己安静下来——“很久以前那个声音对你说了什么?“那个声音告诉他:“这不是合适的搭档。这行不通。他相信的东西和我相信的不一样,这会很糟糕。“但他的大脑杏仁核(lizard brain)不愿相信这一点,所以又拖了一年。
Lenny Rachitsky: 哇。我听这整段建议的时候浑身起鸡皮疙瘩。我很喜欢它同样非常适用于生活本身,不仅仅是做创始人。这是一个很好的提醒,要更多地信任那个声音。有趣的是,这和 founder mode 也有点关联,我很好奇你怎么看——很多 founder mode 的建议是说信任你的判断,不要雇人来把事情委托出去。你认为 founder mode 的核心理念和”你应该更多地信任自己的直觉”之间有区别吗?
Jonathan Lowenhar: 直觉,在我看来,来源于对自我的深刻理解,以及获得安静的能力和保持良好状态的能力——也就是说你睡得好、吃得好、你的世界里有足够的爱。而我认为 founder mode 可能会造成混淆的是,有人觉得”我的直觉告诉我应该替他们做这份工作,然后开除这三个人”。那不是直觉,那是反应,是恐惧的应激。而当创始人说”我认真想过这件事,我感受过了,我看清楚了。我需要解散整个 go-to-market 团队重新来过。这行不通,我有数据支持这一点,而且我知道这行不通。“我会说:“那就这么干吧。我全力支持。我们来做。”
Lenny Rachitsky: 我觉得你描述的情况很多人都有感受,但要花一年、两年、三年、很多年才能真正意识到。你这里的建议是试着更多地倾听那个声音,更多地信任它。是的。哇。好的。Jonathan,转换一下话题,你还有什么想留给听众的吗?最后一条建议?在你认为可能有帮助的任何东西?在我们进入一个非常令人兴奋的快问快答环节之前?
创始人是一种状态,CEO 是一门手艺
Jonathan Lowenhar: 做创始人是一种存在状态。它是一种态度、勇气、本能,是一种不顾各种证据表明你在浪费时间、仍然能够坚持下去的能力。而做 CEO 是一门手艺。越多的创始人能接受这是两件不同的事情,而且它们对于建立一个蒸蒸日上的创业公司同等重要,我们所有人就都会越好。所以我鼓励每一位想要做出一番事业的创始人,除了经营公司之外,也要去磨练你的手艺。对自己诚实面对——这些是我做得不好的事情。我不会看财务报表。我的董事会开得很糟糕。我和领导团队开的一半会议,大家走出来都说我们刚才到底完成了什么?或者我到工作日结束时心想,我今天什么都没完成。这些都是没有认真对待这门手艺的表现。我就说到这里。
Lenny Rachitsky: 我很喜欢这个观点。我觉得在我们的对话中我犯了一个错误,把创始人和 CEO 混为一谈,默认它们是同一回事。我真的很感谢你再次向人们指出,你需要开始认识到的一个重大区分是:创始人是创始人,CEO 是 CEO。通常是同一个人,但它们是大脑的不同部分,不同的技能组合。
Jonathan Lowenhar: 那我现在已经从我坐了很久的那个非常尴尬的肥皂箱上下来了,你准备好了我们随时可以进入快问快答。
快问快答
Lenny Rachitsky: 那么,我们到达了非常令人兴奋的快问快答环节。Jonathan,你准备好了吗?
Jonathan Lowenhar: 准备好了,准备好了。
Lenny Rachitsky: 第一个问题,你向其他人推荐最多的两三本书是什么?
Jonathan Lowenhar: 我推荐最多的商业书第一名是 Patrick Lencioni 的《团队协作的五大障碍》。我确实认为一切最终都归结于团队。对的团队可以解决所有问题。那本书是对领导团队中最常见的问题原型的一次精彩提炼。所以这是第一名。
Lenny Rachitsky: 太棒了。还有别的推荐吗?
Jonathan Lowenhar: 第二本更偏个人层面。是一本叫《不羁的灵魂》的书,作者 Michael Singer。至少对我个人而言,它是第一个让我接触到这个理念的书——我不是我的大脑,我的大脑可以是一个很好地服务于我的工具,但有时候也会不是。所以这是第二本。
Lenny Rachitsky: 我开始读过那本书,但一直没读完,所以这是一个很好的提醒,让我再试一次。第二个问题,你有最近很喜欢的电影或电视剧吗?
Jonathan Lowenhar: 我刚看完一部真的很喜欢的——顺便说一下,我家里有一个三岁的孩子,所以我现在消费的内容量大幅减少了。我妻子和我刚看了《威尔与哈珀》。这是 Will Ferrell 和他一位非常亲密的朋友的纪录片,那位朋友最近刚刚完成了性别转换。他们一起自驾穿越全国,真的太棒了。又甜蜜又动人,是我最近看过的最好的东西之一。
电视剧的话,《流人》,我彻底上瘾了。我才看到第二季中间,但我已经不惜牺牲睡眠来看更多了。
Lenny Rachitsky: 这两部我都喜欢。我刚看了《威尔与哈珀》,完全同意你的感受。我本来没打算看。我岳母开始看了,我心想,哇,这真的很好看。它也很有趣,那种有意义的有趣。
Jonathan Lowenhar: 里面有很多非常甜蜜的时刻。顺便说一句,那是 2020 年,大概是 2020 年 4 月,我们一群非常亲密的朋友说:“我们怎么保持联系?“于是我们发起了所谓的”电影俱乐部”,我们会定期选一部电视剧或电影,各自分开看,每两周晚上在 Zoom 上聚一次,聊我们刚看过的内容。
Lenny Rachitsky: 我喜欢这个。
Jonathan Lowenhar: 有些选得很好,有些很糟糕。但《威尔与哈珀》是我们最近看的一部。
Lenny Rachitsky: 哦,真是个很棒的传统。好,我们继续。你最近有没有发现一个你非常喜欢的产品?可以是一个应用,也可以是某个实物。
Jonathan Lowenhar: 两个,其中一个我要王婆卖瓜一下,但我确实很喜欢。第一个是 Aura Frames,这是数字相框。它们非常棒。用户体验极其出色,画质也很好,简直就是艺术品。祖父母、岳父母、父母,我们家有好几个,全家人都爱不释手。
Lenny Rachitsky: 确认一下,就是一个可以放数字照片的相框,你可以把它送给妈妈,让她不管住在哪里都能看到你家孩子的照片,对吗?
Jonathan Lowenhar: 对,而且它的软件操作之简便加上画质之出色,比我试过的任何同类产品都好,而且我试过很多。A-U-R-A Frames,这不是 Enjoy The Work 的公司,纯粹是我个人的狂热推荐。
第二个是 Enjoy The Work 旗下的一家公司,叫 Augie Studio。A-U-G-I-E Studio。它就是视频版的 Canva。它能让完全没有任何工程技能的人,无需编写代码就能创作视频,而且配备完整的编辑工具。瞬间就能在几分钟内制作出带品牌标识、高保真、高质量的商业视频,毫不费力。非常了不起。它由两位媒体科技领域的联合创始人创建,在 ChatGPT 出现之前就在做这个产品,现在就是以这样的速度在增长,非常有意思,创始人也很棒。所以就是 A-U-G-I-E Studio。
Lenny Rachitsky: 听起来太棒了。Augie Studio,我也能用得上。听起来很赞。还有两个问题。我觉得这个问题会是个好问题。你有没有一个最喜欢的人生座右铭,经常回过头来觉得有用并在生活中践行的?
Jonathan Lowenhar: 第一个,也是我最常提到的,就是:人生只有一次。简单说一下背景故事,我知道这是快问快答环节,但我讲故事总忍不住。很多年前我和一个女性朋友一起散步。我们每月这样做一次,总有一个固定的仪式:先互相更新一下各自的生活近况。于是我用这样的方式开场:“家庭方面有个更新,然后是工作方面,再然后是社交生活。“她说:“不不不不不,停。那全是扯淡。人生只有一次。别再假装它们之间有那些不存在的隔墙。“从那以后我就一直践行这句话。
所以我努力做到——这句话让我能以同样的方式出现在任何场合。如果我们在一起喝杯啤酒或吃顿饭,或者我和我的联合创始人或客户坐在一起,都无所谓,我在任何地方都是同一个自己。我享受工作的方式之一,就是与 Enjoy The Work 的每个人建立真正的友谊、真正的亲密关系,也包括我们的客户,我想要那种深度的对话。我不想要工作环境里那种冷冰冰的东西,和我的个人生活、家庭生活割裂开来。我就是同一个人。
Lenny Rachitsky: 这句话就是——人生只有一次。
Jonathan Lowenhar: 人生只有一次。
Lenny Rachitsky: 人生只有一次。最后一个问题。你曾经在赌场工作过,好像是一家 Harrah’s 赌场,对吗?
Jonathan Lowenhar: 我的第一个职业就是在赌场行业。
Lenny Rachitsky: 好的。
Jonathan Lowenhar: 但在我继续说之前,你的问题是什么?
Lenny Rachitsky: 问题是,那段经历中有没有什么有趣的故事、体验或教训可以分享的?也许跟黑帮有关,或者作弊之类的?我想那应该是一段独特的人生经历。
赌场世家的故事
Jonathan Lowenhar: 那我先讲一个我最喜欢的家族故事,然后简短收尾。是的,我的家族在赌场博彩行业,以这样或那样的形式,已经延续了好几代。我的曾祖母经营过非法扑克牌局。我祖父在加油站经营过数字赌博。我父亲从 70 年代大西洋城时期就一直在赌场行业。我姐姐是一位知名的博彩业律师,而我在这个行业也干了十二年,这就是我的家族。而且 Lenny,直到我二十多岁的时候,我才意识到这些有什么不正常。
我满了 21 岁——对,我已经很老了,年份我就不说了,开玩笑的。总之我满了 21 岁,我们全家去拉斯维加斯旅行,因为对我们来说这很正常。我父亲在那边有很多工作,所以他帮我们订了酒店房间什么的。我之前从没去过那里,而且我刚好刚满 21 岁,所以我父母说:“你有 300 美元可以用来赌博。我们要在这里待五天。“这是一次度假。我祖父母也要来。我叔叔婶婶也要来,他们还鼓励我说:“这全看你自己,但尽量别在第一天晚上就全输光。“这个建议倒也给得不错。我当时才 21 岁,说白了就是个大傻小子。不过,我去那边的另一个目的是面试一份暑期实习。我当时是大学生,马上要升大三。
300 美元变 40,000 美元
于是我们到了,我立刻就坐到某张赌桌前开始玩。第一个晚上我就把 300 美元变成了几千块。那种感觉既刺激又疯狂,诸如此类。到了第三天晚上——这在拉斯维加斯待太久的人身上都会发生——我们所有人都神志不清了,因为大家都在通宵熬夜,又疯又傻。我父母让我——顺便说一下,那时候还没有手机——他们问我:“你能撑着别睡吗?你叔叔婶婶今晚会很晚到。他们会打电话到房间。你下楼接一下他们打个招呼?“没问题。于是我大概十一点半接到电话。他们到了。我下楼来到赌场大厅。我们住的是拉斯维加斯希尔顿酒店,现在已经改名了。我下楼到处找不到他们。我想,好吧,我口袋里有现金,而且反正也醒了,不如去赌一把。
没过多久,Lenny,我遇到了一个 369,000 次才会出现一次的概率事件,我赢了 35,421.92 美元。整个行程下来,我把 300 美元最终变成了赢下 40,000 美元,而我当时才刚满 21 岁,这也成了我此后人生中的一个信条——有些人听了会翻白眼——那就是:赌博是能赢钱的。
Lenny Rachitsky: 我喜欢你连具体金额都记得这么清楚。你玩的什么游戏能赢这么多钱?
Jonathan Lowenhar: 我主要玩的是加勒比梭哈扑克(Caribbean Stud Poker),这种游戏完全没有任何技巧可言。你拿到五张牌,庄家拿到五张牌,谁赢就是谁赢,如果你的牌型特别罕见,还会有额外的赔率。而我被发到的五张牌是黑桃 3、4、5、6、7——五张牌组成一个同花顺。
Lenny Rachitsky: 我还以为你会说老虎机之类的。我喜欢你坐在那里打扑克就把 300 美元变成了 40,000 美元。
Jonathan Lowenhar: 甚至都不算真正的扑克。
Lenny Rachitsky: 这个故事太棒了。很高兴我问了这个话题。Jonathan,今天这期太精彩了。我觉得这次对话能帮到很多创始人。最后两个问题。大家在哪里可以找到你们?什么样的人适合?关于 Enjoy The Work 大家需要知道什么?最后,听众朋友们能怎么帮到你?
Jonathan Lowenhar: 很好。那我把这三个问题一个个回答。第一个,网站是 enjoythework.com,或者直接在 LinkedIn 上找我。我不难找。给我们发个消息就好。
Jonathan Lowenhar: 什么样的人适合联系我们,这很简单。如果你是一位创始人或 CEO,你心里清楚,你目前经营企业的方式、公司的发展状态,与它本可以达到的状态、你本可以采用的经营方式之间存在差距——如果存在这样的差距,我们就是来帮忙的。不过我们的专业领域,正如我们这次对话中所聊到的,是公司建设。所以如果你只有一个餐巾纸上的创意,或者一个还没确定的实验性项目,我们帮不上忙,那不是我们擅长的。但如果你已经有了一些值得追踪的线索——业务开始跑起来了,你处于 A 轮到 B 轮甚至更后面的阶段,而且你知道还能做得更好,你也看到了那种可能性——这正是我们能帮上忙的地方。给我们发个消息,很乐意聊聊。
我们非常希望能从听众那里得到帮助。我们是极其贪婪的读者。我们做的所有事情就是研究最优秀的创业公司是如何做某件事的——从小事比如他们怎么开全体员工大会或团建活动,到大的元话题比如到底什么才是可复制的 go-to-market?或者怎样做财务规划才是真正有用的?或者怎么设定目标才不会让你翻白眼?我们持续从播客主播、作者和记者的生态系统中学习,比如去看看这个材料。所以如果听众朋友们在运营创业公司的某个话题上有自己喜欢的资源,请发给我。我们最爱的就是阅读和消化这些东西。
Lenny Rachitsky: 太好了。发送的最佳方式是通过 Enjoy The Work 网站或者 LinkedIn。
Jonathan Lowenhar: 没错。
Lenny Rachitsky: 太好了。Jonathan,非常感谢你来做这期节目。
Jonathan Lowenhar: Lenny,这真的太好玩了。谢谢大家听我讲那些疯狂的赌场故事。
Lenny Rachitsky: 我还想听更多,但我们得结束了。大家再见。
感谢大家的收听。如果你觉得这期节目有价值,可以在 Apple Podcasts、Spotify 或你喜欢的播客应用上订阅本节目。也请考虑给我们评分或留言,这真的能帮助其他听众找到这个播客。你可以在 lennyspodcast.com 找到所有往期节目或了解更多关于本节目的信息。下期再见。
术语表
| 原文 | 中文 |
|---|---|
| account exec | 客户经理(account exec) |
| active listening | 积极倾听 |
| Adam Grant | Adam Grant(人名,保留原文) |
| adjacency | 相邻领域 |
| advocate | advocate(支持者) |
| Annie Duke | Annie Duke(人名,保留原文) |
| architect | 架构师(architect) |
| Augie Studio | Augie Studio(品牌名,保留原文) |
| Aura Frames | Aura Frames(品牌名,保留原文) |
| availability bias | 可得性偏差(availability bias) |
| blocker | blocker(阻碍者) |
| bottoms up planning | 自下而上的规划 |
| brain writing | 书面脑暴法(brain writing) |
| brainstorming | 头脑风暴(brainstorming) |
| buyer | buyer(决策者) |
| Caribbean Stud Poker | 加勒比梭哈扑克(Caribbean Stud Poker) |
| champagne | 香槟(庆祝) |
| champion | champion(收购交易中的内部推动者,保留原文) |
| Chris Voss | Chris Voss(人名,保留原文) |
| compelling event | 紧迫事件 |
| confirmation bias | 确认偏误(confirmation bias) |
| construction tech | 建筑科技 |
| Corp Dev | Corp Dev(企业战略发展部门,Corporate Development) |
| CSI | CSI(犯罪现场调查,电视节目名,保留原文) |
| demand gen | 需求获客(demand gen) |
| discovery question | 探询问题(discovery question) |
| EC | EC(执行委员会,Executive Committee) |
| Enjoy The Work | Enjoy The Work(公司名,保留原文) |
| ERP | ERP(企业资源计划,Enterprise Resource Planning,保留原文) |
| Ezra Roizen | Ezra Roizen(人名,保留原文) |
| Five Dysfunctions of a Team | 《团队协作的五大障碍》 |
| founder mode | founder mode(创始人模式) |
| funnel | 漏斗(funnel) |
| Gabriel Weinberg | Gabriel Weinberg(人名,保留原文) |
| Geoffrey Smart | Geoffrey Smart(人名,保留原文) |
| go-to-market | go-to-market(市场进入) |
| Harrah’s | Harrah’s(赌场品牌名,保留原文) |
| IC | IC(投资委员会,Investment Committee) |
| ideal customer profile | 理想客户画像(ideal customer profile) |
| imposter syndrome | 冒名顶替综合征 |
| indication of interest | 意向书 |
| install base | 装机基数(install base) |
| jobs-to-be-done | 待办任务 |
| Jonathan Lowenhar | Jonathan Lowenhar(人名,保留原文) |
| kill criteria | 淘汰条件(kill criteria) |
| laissez-faire | 自由放任 |
| Legal | Legal(法务部门) |
| Lenny Rachitsky | Lenny Rachitsky(人名,保留原文) |
| lizard brain | 大脑杏仁核(lizard brain) |
| luminary | 行业领袖 |
| Magic Box paradigm | Magic Box paradigm(方法论名称,保留原文) |
| manager mode | manager mode(管理者模式) |
| Meta | Meta(公司名,保留原文) |
| Michael Singer | Michael Singer(人名,保留原文) |
| micromanager | 微操型(管理者) |
| Movie Club | 电影俱乐部 |
| NDA | NDA(保密协议,Non-Disclosure Agreement,保留原文) |
| OPSEC | OPSEC(运营安全部门,Operations Security) |
| optimizer | 优化师(optimizer) |
| Patrick Lencioni | Patrick Lencioni(人名,保留原文) |
| pipeline | 销售管线(pipeline) |
| playbook | 打法手册(playbook) |
| pre-mortem | 事前复盘 |
| Procurement | Procurement(采购部门) |
| qualification | 筛选标准(qualification) |
| quota | 业绩指标(quota) |
| Randy Street | Randy Street(人名,保留原文) |
| raving fans | 狂热粉丝 |
| re-trade | 重新谈判 |
| scaler | 扩张师(scaler) |
| series B | B 轮融资 |
| Shreyas Doshi | Shreyas Doshi(人名,保留原文) |
| Slow Horses | 《流人》 |
| solicitous | 推销式的 |
| term sheet | 条款清单 |
| The Untethered Soul | 《不羁的灵魂》 |
| uncommon denominator | 独特差异点(uncommon denominator) |
| upselling | 向上销售(upselling) |
| venture scale | 风险投资级别 |
| whale hunting | 猎鲸式销售 |
| white-hot center | 白热化核心 |
| Who: The A Method for Hiring | 《谁:A 级招聘法》 |
| Will & Harper | 《威尔与哈珀》 |
| Will Ferrell | Will Ferrell(人名,保留原文) |
此文档由 AI 分片翻译(translate_long_document)