规模化 Ramp 的经验 | Sri Batchu (Ramp, Instacart, Opendoor)
Lessons from scaling Ramp | Sri Batchu (Ramp, Instacart, Opendoor)
Sri Batchu: I do think there’s actually a general path that most B2B companies take and should take. My view is you start off with founder-led sales, the early team needs to know how to actually sell. Then you hire your first couple of salespeople, then you start some very low cost targeted marketing efforts. So whether it’s content, community, small scale events, and then PR, after all of that is when you start paid and brand effort and then SEO probably start around the same time that you start paid marketing efforts. The reason for the progression the way I’ve described it is the channels get more expensive as you go farther along and they get more effective as you understand more about your customers.
Lenny: Welcome to Lenny’s Podcast where I interview world-class product leaders and growth experts to learn from their hard one experiences building and growing today’s most successful products. Today my guest is Sri Batchu. Sri was VP of Ops at Opendoor, then head of growth at Instacart, and currently he’s the head of growth at Ramp, which as you’ll hear at the top of the episode, is the fastest growing SaaS business and the fastest growing FinTech business in history. They hit a hundred million dollar yearly run rate in two years, which is absurd, and in the last year grew 4X during a period where most companies barely grew at all. I recently did a newsletter post on how Ramp builds product with their VP of product, Geoff Charles. And in this episode, we zeroed in on Ramp’s approach to growth. We chat about what Ramp did in the early days to kickstart growth, how they mostly grow these days, how their growth team is structured, their prioritization framework plus their north star metrics.
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Sri, welcome to the podcast.
Sri Batchu: Thank you, Lenny. Thanks for having me. I’m a huge fan and I’ve been following the podcast and the newsletter. So excited to be on here.
Lenny: Really appreciate that. So let’s talk about Ramp. So Ramp where you lead growth is apparently one of the fastest growing products in history. I believe it’s the fastest growing SaaS product and business and also the fastest growing FinTech business. So first of all, is that generally true and correct?
Sri Batchu: Yeah, I mean I’m sure you know of Packy and he’s done a great analysis where he shared this work and compared us to a bunch of other companies and when he released this a year ago, we were the fastest growing company to a hundred million dollars of annualized revenue at the time. I don’t know if there’s been others since, but certainly not in the FinTech category as far as I know.
Lenny: Okay. So you said the fastest growing to a hundred million. I think it took two years to get to a hundred million and run rate, right?
Sri Batchu: Exactly.
Lenny: That’s insane because rarely is there all of this money sitting around for a company to just come in and accumulate and grab from people and provide that amount of value. So that’s an insane stat. Maybe another question along these lines, is there any other just stats you could share, but just the scale of Ramp or just the speed that Ramp has grown?
Sri Batchu: We publicly disclosed that last year we grew Forex on top of that, very sizable based from the year prior and Okta actually released some recent stats on fastest growing software companies among SMB and mid-market and Ramp was by far the fastest growing despite the fact that a bunch of others on the list were materially smaller. The company’s still very lean for the amount of growth. We’re under 500 people roughly today at that scale and that’s definitely have a much higher revenue per employee than some of our other competitors and others in the space. And yeah, I mean we’ve got a very thoughtful and smart finance team that I’ve worked with actually closely our old head of strategic finance at Instacart and they set ambitious goals for us on growth and I’m happy to say we’ve consistently beat those ambitious goals over the last 16 months or 18 months since I’ve joined.
Lenny: Which is especially challenging in this environment. So it’s extra meaningful. Okay, so here’s the big question I want to start off with. I know you weren’t there at the beginning of Ramp’s journey, but from what you know, what do you think the team did early on to seed this level of growth and success other than just building an awesome product that people really love? And if that’s the answer, that’s fine, but usually that’s part of it. I’m curious just like is there some clever unique tactics that they used to help create that incredible growth from the beginning?
Sri Batchu: I think you’re certainly right on the product side. Obviously you’ve recently written about Ramp’s product engine with Geoff and that there’s been incredible product market fit because of the product team that deeply understood the customer experience and I think that’s certainly helped initial word of mouth. One thing that I did want to point out that Ramp did that was interesting is obviously Eric and Karim, the co-founders of Ramp, were previous founders of another company that they had a successful exit on.
Sri Batchu: So they had a strong reputation as founders and came in with the right set of experience to build Ramp and one of the things that they did is what I call cap table as a growth strategy where they did a great job of getting a large number of early stage founders and other influential operators and advisors onto the cap table at the company. And many of our initial customers were these companies that were on the cap table or the founders were on the cap table for. And Ramp today is actually not majority startups or tech companies anymore. The vast majority of our customers are mid-market and enterprise. That’s where our revenue comes from. But there’s a lot of love among the tech founder community because of the early days, both the product quality as well as all of these investors that Ramp got.
Lenny: Wow. I have not heard of this strategy before and I didn’t know this was actually a big part of the initial story. So is there examples of folks that they had on their cap table that are examples of folks that helped them grow initially like this?
Sri Batchu: One example that I can think of is Eight Sleep founder, he’s been very close to the Ramp team, same with the Pod founder and then a bunch of VC firms that are investors in the company are also customers of the company.
Lenny: Do you know if the strategy there was VCs who connect them to small companies that would use Ramp or is it directly founders of companies that would immediately use Ramp?
Sri Batchu: Yeah, I’ll say it was more founders and executives of customers that can use Ramp. Certainly we have a fantastic group of very sophisticated investors who have made introductions to Ramp as well and that helped. But I will say that is not as big of a channel as one might expect because companies have their own decision making frameworks for selecting a product like Ramp and the investor opinion and recommendation matters, but turns out it doesn’t matter maybe as much as another customer who’s actually used the product that they know or are actually experiencing the product.
Lenny: Amazing, awesome tactic. I’ve not heard of that before. In terms of growth, how much of growth of early Ramp was new customers versus expansion within existing customers? Because what’s cool about credit card is people spend more, you make more money because you’re taking a piece of that. So roughly how much of the growth insanity over the first couple of years was from expansion within existing customers?
Sri Batchu: Obviously many of our early customers have grown quite a bit and our whole strategy is to save companies time and money so they can redeploy that in other ways for their own growth or other objectives. And we obviously are growing our product suite as well like BillPay, Flex, et cetera, where our customers can spend more money on Ramp and get more value out of Ramp. Having said all of that, what’s interesting is that the vast majority of our growth back then and even to this day is via new customer acquisition. It’s just we are adding so many more customers that the growth of our customers while strong and important part of our growth lever is not nearly as material as you might think.
Lenny: Okay, awesome. So that’s a good segue to the next question I had, which is if you’re going to create a pie chart of how Ramp grows and ideally if you could even share early on and then now, how does that pie chart look? What are the slices of that pie and then what are the rough percentages of where growth comes from for Ramp?
Sri Batchu: Rather than going into the specifics, one thing I’ll say about the growth system today is if you were to look at what percentage of our business comes from outbound sales, paid marketing, field, and then a bunch of other channels and then you compare it against industry benchmarks, I think the secret sauce of Ramp is not that we’ve found a channel that’s unique and that we’ve over-invested or under-invested. I don’t think our distribution would be not that far off from looking at other companies at our size and stage.
I think what we’ve done differently is we’ve really focused on making all of those investments very much driven by technology and data. And so one example that I’ll give you is that our sales teams are actually incredibly efficient by any metric that we look at and we obviously benchmark them. And the reason for that is because we actually have a growth engineering team that’s dedicated to supporting that efficiency but including adjusting third party data and using AI to automate much of their workflow, et cetera. And we’ve been doing this well before AI has become the buzzword for a lot of folks, but this is something we’ve had this team for almost two years now that that’s been working on sales automation and data to just make our sales teams more efficient. That’s just one example, but we’ve got similar types of mandates for every channel that we invest in and thinking about how do we inform this better customer and prospect data and how do we automate and technologize it so that we can build that competitive mode for each channel.
Lenny: I’d love to learn more about this growth eng team that works with sales. How is that structured maybe as the first question and then just what are their goals? How do you measure their progress and success?
Sri Batchu: A lot of companies do it differently. I think what works really well with Ramp is that we have the same shared goal, which is the pipeline driven and the payback period of the channel. It’s unique to Ramp where the engineers feel ownership of the quota. They’re not owning product metrics or what have you, they’re obviously of course interim and input metrics that are important, but they really do feel accountable for the pipeline driven and the efficiency driven by that team. And I think that naturally allows them bottom up to come with the right projects that they think will have maximal impact on efficiency and top line.
Lenny: So what are the sorts of things they do for a sales team? Is it like they help them prioritize leads or is it they help craft their messaging? Which parts are maybe most important?
Sri Batchu: All of the above, helping find the right prospects, sending them the right messaging as well as prioritizing responses and drafting potential responses for the team as well.
Lenny: Fascinating. How much impact have you seen that has on sales?
Sri Batchu: It’s incredibly helpful to our sales team and it’s one of our most efficient channels as I’ve mentioned. So I think that there is something unique about our ability to bring technology to every channel.
Lenny: Super interesting. Maybe on that topic, can you just talk about how your growth team is structured at Ramp? What are the kind of sub-teams and how do you think about?
Sri Batchu: We’ve got an organization today that might evolve and if we get to that topic we can talk about it, but historically the way we’ve been organized is we’ve got channel based teams that are deploying spend in a given channel. So we’ve got a paid marketing team, a lifecycle CRM team, we’ve got a field marketing team, et cetera. And then we’ve got a product engineering team that is supporting growth and sales and helping each of these channels be more effective that’s dedicated to growth. And then separate from that, we’ve got a small kind of what I call an innovation or skunk work type of team that works on cross-channel. Just things that don’t neatly fit into a box that we think could be cool or fun to try to just do more experimentation that is cross-channel, cross-team.
Lenny: Definitely sounds like the most fun team. What are some of the things they’ve done or work on in the skunk works team?
Sri Batchu: They’ve done testing of new channels that don’t necessarily fit into very… And that includes new online platforms. They’ve done some interesting stuff on TikTok and Reddit and other places, things like that. They’ve focused on referrals and how to make that a more delightful experience for the customers, first party events, things like that. Things that are often smaller scale and if they work we can invest more and make them larger scale later.
Lenny: I love it. So the teams roughly is there’s a paid growth team that just works on paid growth optimization, lifecycle CRM team basically it’s like emails I imagine is a big part of that.
Sri Batchu: Yeah, exactly.
Lenny: Then there’s a field sales support team and then there’s the sales team, kind of eng sales team that you talked about and then I also imagine there’s like a self-serve.
Sri Batchu: Yeah, exactly. There’s a self-serve activation eng team as well. And then of course there’s SEO and website and bound lead channel management team.
Lenny: And then this awesome skunk works team. I love it. Okay, so shifting a little bit, something that comes across often and consistently with Ramp, and this came across very clearly in the post that I did on how Ramp builds product with Geoff is velocity and how important velocity is at Ramp. There’s this awesome quote that I’ll read here from Keith Rabois who I think led many of the rounds of Ramp. He started Founders Fund, famous investor. He said that, “Ramp’s product velocity is absolutely unprecedented in my 21 years working with technology businesses.” So here’s my question to you. Can you just talk about what that actually looks like and feels like working inside Ramp with this intense velocity?
Sri Batchu: Yeah, it is a great question and Keith is amazing and then probably one of the smartest investors that I’ve ever had a good fortune of working with both here as well as at Opendoor, and I’ll say he’s absolutely right about that. And what you see internally is what I’ll say is razor-sharp focus on reducing cycle time and bias to action and how do we reduce cycle time. I think it’s basically the core of it culturally to me is getting people to think about smaller units of time for decision making. It seems obvious but I think you really have to reinforce it culturally. So one thing that Eric, our CEO, does, which I don’t know if you’ve heard externally, is we have days.ramp.com where we can see how many days it’s been since the founding of Ramp internally and it’s day 1,529 at Ramp. He has that number of days at every board meeting, at every all hands.
It’s just to remind people that we don’t work in years, quarters, weeks, we work in days. Each day matters and so never put out something tomorrow that you know can get done today. And that bias to action really permeates not just in the product teams but everywhere. So our growth team, which as I’ve just described, is extremely cross-functional, a lot of marketing folks and other expertise on the team, but we work a lot like a product team, we work on two-week sprints, we cross-prioritize across these teams and we work all together rather than in separate silos within the growth team.
Lenny: So I pulled up the site you just mentioned, days.ramp.com, and not only is it days since launch, which is 1,529 when I’m looking at it, there’s a many decimal points that are counting up. 1,529.43453142. Oh my god. Okay. Is that a new addition, the decimal points?
Sri Batchu: No, I think that’s always been there. It’s just amping it up, how much time is passing. It could be stressful at times, but I think that the mitigating factor is that it’s been able, as you know, A players want to work with A players attract A players and retain A players, and Ramp has done a really great job of hiring people that are fantastic that can work in this environment well and are motivated by the success and the winning from this sort of culture.
Lenny: Yeah, I was actually talking to Eric about it for another piece I’m working on and he was showing me some early board decks in every deck as you said has day 544 of Ramp. So it’s very real what you’re talking about. Is there anything else that just as someone that came into Ramp from other traditional companies that also move really fast, Instacart and Opendoor, that is just like holy moly, this is velocity? You talked about a few things but is there anything just like holy shit?
Sri Batchu: You can see the cycle time thing in terms of responsiveness from everybody at Ramp and I think typically what you tend to see is as companies get bigger, they evolve off of Slack to email and everything just moves a little bit slower and there’s process and then there’s obviously a lot of good parts of that but Ramp, what I noticed when I joined and true to this day is how quickly people will respond on Slack and jump on things and even if they don’t complete it, there’s very clear action item on who the owner will be and what the deadline will be even if it’s not. And that to me was always very impressive just about… And I think it’s one of those things we build in public, so everything is very visible so you can see how this is working across teams and I’m glad that we’ve been able to maintain that culture even as we’ve gotten much bigger.
Lenny: There’s two effects of that I imagine. One is how do you stay in the flow and get work done if you’re just expected to constantly respond? How does that actually work?
Sri Batchu: I don’t think the expectation is necessarily that one constantly responds, but it is something that I have seen people are good at. And so I think one of the things that, again, not like a novel productivity tool, but something that Ramp does do is just trying to think about focus time and response times and using calendar blocking to really effectively manage your time that way. And then doing calendar audits of yourself as well as of your team to say, okay, what are your highest priorities for this week, this day, this month? And how does your calendar reflect your priorities? Because in many ways you ship your calendar and so thinking about how are you spending your time and then blocking your time accordingly.
Lenny: And is this mostly a cultural just this is how we operate or is there a principles or sorts of processes that are set up to help people do those sorts of things?
Sri Batchu: Yeah, it’s cultural in terms of how we operate, but we also have templates. Our people team has a template on how to do a calendar audit properly and things like that. So we’ve tried to create some learning materials as well for folks that are new to get into the flow of way of working.
Lenny: Awesome. Okay, so then the other elephant in the room with talking about working really fast and hard and responding really quickly is work-life balance and burnout and things like that. One thing I’ll say is I believe in working really hard and working long hours as a important ingredient to success. I know there’s been a bit of a backlash against that and just like, no, you shouldn’t work really hard, you can be successful without doing that. I don’t think that’s true. So with that said, I guess what have you learned and what do you think Ramp has learned about how to find that balance and not just-
Sri Batchu: Yeah. I completely agree with you. I do think, especially earlier in your career, hard work is so important both for learning but also impact and it’s a tough balance that a lot of successful companies struggle with. I think my biggest learnings is it’s, A, some of it is like self-selection, right? You’re hiring people that are excited about doing this work and this way of working, but at least I tend to find the people that I’ve worked with that are highly successful, ours are not the problem. It’s really autonomy, flexibility, and mission alignment and the general happiness they get from their work. And so that’s what I try to focus on, which is not the hours that someone’s put in, but quality of the work and the impact. And I think a big part of the push to having great results and working hard is really being grateful and appreciating the team when they do push themselves and celebrating wins.
And I think we could always be doing a better job, but I think we’ve historically done a great job at that, at celebrating wins big and small. And I think part of the culture of building in public and open internally helps with that. So people are always sharing their wins. And then it’s a very one funny stat that I don’t know if other companies track is we track engagement during all hands on the Zoom to see what percentage people participate. And it’s usually close to a hundred percent, like people are talking, the entire company is talking on the Zoom chat because they’re excited about the wins that their friends and colleagues are shipping and the things that we’re talking about in the audience.
Lenny: How do you actually track engagement? Someone sitting there watching who’s in the chat?
Sri Batchu: No, it must be some tool our IT team can do it. It can say what percentage of participants chatted or something like that.
Lenny: I see. So it’s not like who’s looking at the screen, it’s like who’s talking in the chat?
Sri Batchu: Yeah, exactly. Or reacting in the chat, et cetera.
Lenny: That’s awesome. And it’s not like you must engage, it’s more just like are we delivering the content.
Sri Batchu: No. And by the way, this is probably the first time I’m sharing this. I don’t think brand employees necessarily know this. I don’t think we’ve actually shared this. I just heard it from our IT person recently and I thought that was a fun stat.
Lenny: I love that because it’s more just like are we providing value to people or are they actually excited and interested in this sort of thing? I was going to add onto your point about how working hard and working long hours can be seen as this like, “Oh, this sucks. I wish I was at home watching Netflix,” but I find that the most fulfilling parts of my career or where I was just working insanely hard for a long time, as long as that work was meaningful, exactly like you said, it was something that mattered and came out and shipped and people were excited about it and if it wasn’t like, “Oh, that was a waste of my life.” So that super resonates.
Sri Batchu: Yeah.
Lenny: I want to come back to growth for a moment. I had a couple more questions I wanted to ask here. You talked about some of these teams that you have around ways you’re driving growth. Is there an area you think you’re going to be investing more in over time or that you feel is working better? I know there’s trade secrets here that you don’t want to share necessarily, but just anything that you feel is people are maybe under-appreciating or under-investing in that you think you might invest in more?
Sri Batchu: What I’ll say on that front is, look, we, like everybody else, are always focused on driving more efficiency in our growth engine. There are some channels that, and we have a diversified portfolio of bets, right? One thing that’s interesting about the world of growth today is I think historically people that used to run growth were folks that had a marketing or a product background. And what you’re seeing these days I think are more folks like me who actually come from an investor and analytics background to lead growth teams because growth has become more and more about a diversified portfolio of bets at a reasonable ROI and building a system that’s designed around experimentation and data-oriented.
So the reason I say all of that is our goal is to over time, of course, make all of our channels more efficient, but also allocate more to channels that are more efficient as long as they’re scalable. And so the more that we can push customer awareness via owned and earned media, the better for us. And so we’ve got a few different strategies on that front, but we’re also working on making our other channels more efficient by the day.
Lenny: So mysterious, but I appreciate you sharing what you can. The point about the portfolio of bets is interesting because if you think about it, most companies initially grow from one. You talked about growth engines, that’s the same term I use. Usually there’s just one thing that helps you grow initially like SEO or word of mouth or maybe paid. And then eventually every single company basically ends up doing all the growth channels and then has a team dedicated to just keep optimizing SEO, keep optimizing referrals. So I think that’s a very typical path. And then it’s exactly said, how do we make each of these as efficient as possible?
Sri Batchu: Yeah.
Lenny: Maybe as another last question around Ramp’s growth. Is there any other just really surprising, interesting, really effective tactics that helped Ramp grow over time?
Sri Batchu: I think one thing that’s been interesting is Ramp’s ability to leverage PR as a growth machine. And as you’ve seen, we’ve got a fantastic PR and comms team and we get a lot of deserved good press through that. And one thing that’s been interesting is our fundraising also as a growth strategy not obviously explicitly we’ve got very clear goals for our fundraising, but what we have seen is anytime that we’ve been fundraising and we’ve been using that as an effective way of creating a market moment, it’s driven actually a non-trivial amount of top funnel for us.
Lenny: People always talk about PR being like, people over overinvest in PR, they think PR is going to be this magical growth lever, but it actually works sometimes and in my opinion, you have to have something really interesting for it to work and obviously you guys do, the company’s growing like crazy, which is innately an interesting story. The founders are really important and rarely is funding like an event anymore for most companies. So I mean this says a lot that people care about your funding.
Sri Batchu: What you say it is exactly right is you have to be thoughtful about your PR moments. Everybody wants to announce things about themselves that’s not necessarily interesting for the press or for an audience. And so thinking about how do you compile enough value to the general audience. So our fundraising announcements usually also have some additional color on something unique about the business that we share to provide more value to readers.
Lenny: And then there’s also newsletter people like me and Packy you mentioned who wrote about Ramp because it’s also just so interesting. What’s your sense of that versus traditional PR? There’s this, I don’t know, big debate of just traditional media’s no longer relevant. All these other people will go through newsletters and podcasts and things like that. What’s your sense there?
Sri Batchu: It’s what are the audiences that you get with each of these tactics. And so we do both obviously get some earned coverage in these newsletters and other tactics and we pay for some and we advertise in other cases. And what we tend to find is these are great reach, but they tend to work very well for actually hiring. It improves Ramp’s reputation as a company for recruiting and hiring, which helps and they help with certain audience of customers, which is typically tech founders and folks close to the tech ecosystem. But as I mentioned, the vast majority of the world is not startups and the majority of Ramp’s customers are no longer tech and startups. And so as we’re thinking about ways to grow. I think channels like these are one piece of the equation, but I think traditional PR will remain another really important piece because they just target a different audience.
Lenny: As you’re talking, I’m watching the days count up on the days that Ramp page still and stressing me out. I feel like keeping you from doing work to keep growing Ramp, but let’s keep going. I’m going to close this tab. You talked about growth engines. I’m curious what you’ve learned about building a growth engine in a company. And another way to put it is just a repeatable scalable growth process, whether it’s at Ramp or Opendoor, Instacart,
Sri Batchu: People talk a lot about what should the right design of the team be or profiles of people on the team, et cetera. And I’m happy to talk about what are the right profiles of people. I think that’s an important conversation. But I think design of the team, people often… I think it’s a red herring about team structure and team design and what’s the right one, et cetera. I think most of that is irrelevant. What actually matters is culture and rituals and cadences rather than the team itself.
And so what a great growth engine and a great growth team is one that where you set the culture, set very simple north star metrics, usually one, at most two. And you’ve created a culture of defining hypotheses that are data driven and a culture where that can be executed quickly and have an MVP mentality for product and non-product projects where people can fail and learn quickly and iterate quickly. So I think that part of it is more important than the specific people or their functions in many ways to me, especially when you’re starting to build a growth engine. It’s like can you build a set of people that can generate new ideas and evaluate them effectively and move quickly is really what you’re trying to design for.
Lenny: Let’s unpack some of this because this is great. So in terms of north star metrics, what are some examples in your experience of good north star metrics? Revenue is obviously a very common one, but often it is too high level. Do you have a sense of what a good north star metric is?
Sri Batchu: I like having two. One is something around volume and growth and you want that to be, A, very motivating and intuitive for people to understand and also, B, something that the growth teams can directly impact, right? Revenue is, for better or worse, more important to the company, but also much farther down the line of whether or not the growth team can impact that. And so at Instacart, for example, our north star metric for growth was monthly active orders. And that’s what we all rallied around and looked at every day, how are now doing? And then obviously we had a large growth in consumer engineering team at Instacart, 300 plus people. And so there are people working on every single corner of the app and outside of the app on acquisition to drive growth. And it’s like some of the stuff is minutia, right? It’s making the checkout flow slightly better or faster or something like that.
So that’s a good example. It’s like, okay, well, so we’re going to goal that team on MAO, how are they going to move monthly active orders by making the checkout flow slightly better? Maybe they can have an impact or maybe not. And so one of the things that we did is the actual local team has their own metric that they can directly influence. You want to actually hold people accountable for things that they can influence. And then we created via the finance and data team, a translation layer for every team’s metric into MAO.
It would be like if you got one extra weekly order because of your checkout flow from the same customer, it would have point X impact on the company’s MAO and then you would just roll up all project plans as well as project impact back into this singular MAO metric. And the other benefit of doing something like that is that it also helps you cross-prioritize much easier. Should we add more engineering to this team? Should we add more budget to that team? It’s like, okay, well what’s the MAO map? Where is there a more MAO per dollar or per engineer being built? And it just really helped us unify and move together.
Lenny: I have questions about this. This is great. By the way, why is it monthly active orders versus just monthly orders? How can you be an inactive order?
Sri Batchu: Sorry, orderer.
Lenny: Oh, okay.
Sri Batchu: So monthly active users basically is what it is, but we call them orders because users can just log in and not order, right.
Lenny: Got it.
Sri Batchu: You’re actually ordering on the platform.
Lenny: Yeah, I think there was this backlash against users at Facebook. I think it’s monthly active people and so I get it. Okay, understood. Interesting. So you find that instead of sub-teams having a different metric that we just know is good. That’s one of the variables in the formula of monthly active orders. You actually have a translation that converts that specific metric moving to the north star metric.
Sri Batchu: The team on their day-to-day for their sprints, whatever are looking at their own metric. But for the purpose of planning and resource allocation and reporting, we would use the translation layers to actually just look at everything on a MAO basis.
Lenny: Knowing those sorts of formulas are often not perfect, how much weight do you put into that formula specifically?
Sri Batchu: Yeah. And I think in general the planning process is not perfect. You can have a financial plan in Excel and the reality can diverge quite a bit. The only thing you can be certain of is that you’re not going to accomplish exactly the plan. So we did a couple of things to that. One is setting a culture of we know this isn’t perfect, this is like 70/30, 80/20, it’s to guide. So we wouldn’t use the translation factor to make a marginal decision if something is five or 10% off.
Those are done based on judgment because at the end of the day, regardless of what metric framework you use, marginal decisions are marginal for a reason. They’re really hard things to decide. And so the framework helped with just reducing the cognitive overload of decision making to only those that are marginal. So the ones that are obvious that are going to have big impact becomes clear even if the measurement framework isn’t perfect. And so that’s what we use. And the other thing that we just had as cadence is we would actually update all of the translations every six months for the new planning cycle based on new information that we knew on how moving X impacts MAO.
Lenny: Just to make it even more real, what are some examples of those lower level metrics? Is it increased conversion of sign up by X percent?
Sri Batchu: Any number of things. It would be actually load time of the app on open. There’s a team that’s trying to make that faster or more efficient because we know that that impacts whether or not the person actually ends up ordering if it takes five seconds to load versus two seconds to load. And so the full customer experience were all segregated into different teams that were optimizing just like how long does it take to open, number of searches that a user does on the app. We know the people… And number of items that are put into cart, like amount of time from cart to check out, things like that we literally just map out any user’s journey throughout the app and have separate engineering teams that are focused on that.
Lenny: And there’s essentially some kind of regression analysis that tells you here’s load times impact on MAOs.
Sri Batchu: Exactly. And the other thing that we did is just so we would’ve these translation factors, but we could also just see what the cumulative impact of all of the work is that Facebook did this too, which is just long-term holdouts for each surface area. So the checkout experience team that I’ve been talking about a lot for some reason would have their own holdout. And so we could see what the cumulative impact of monthly active orders on the people that got last half’s experience versus this half’s experience on the holdout. And that would make it very clear. So regression is one way to do it. And then basically effective A/B test, but was a small holdout.
Lenny: Is there a holdout for the performance team where someone just has a really slow version of Instacart?
Sri Batchu: I wonder actually, but there’s holdout for almost everything. There’s a holdout for ads, for example. So there are some lucky Instacart users out there that are not getting ads and they’ve never gotten ads because they’ve always been part of Instacart’s advertising holding.
Lenny: That’ll be a great revenue boost whenever they want to kill that holdout.
Sri Batchu: Can you imagine was a conversation internally on should there be a permanent holdout? Should it be last year’s experience? How should we think about, especially because it’s such a important driver of modernization?
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Maybe just one last question along this specific thread is this framework of having everything translated into a north star metric something you bring to every place you work now? And is this just something you recommend? For example, does Ramp approach things this way as well?
Sri Batchu: I think it depends on the size of the company. I think this actually becomes much more important as companies get bigger because there’s more teams to prioritize and more resources to cross-allocate. And having a common currency makes that a lot easier. And so we do something similar at Ramp as well where we have translation factors for all of the various things that the teams are doing that translate back to the north star for Ramp.
Lenny: Cool. And then are you up for sharing the Ramp’s north star metric or do you want to keep that part?
Sri Batchu: Yeah, I mean I can tell you what we used to do in the recent past we’re evolving some things and in the recent past it was for the growth team, the north star was dollars of SQL pipeline. So anything anybody did, we would try to estimate the impact into what would be the dollars of sales qualified lead pipeline generated for Ramp. So if the website team wanted to change language on the card’s landing page, their direct impact would be conversion rate of email submission or something like that would be what they would be optimizing for. And then we would have, okay, what does two bips of conversion rate mean for dollars of SQL pipeline? A lot or not a lot? And depending on that, it’s like, “All right, don’t waste your time doing that project. Let’s do something else instead.” So that just helps us score and prioritize efforts.
Lenny: Here’s a fun story. I actually tried to sign up for Ramp when I was starting this newsletter and business and it didn’t let me because I had a Gmail-
Sri Batchu: For Gmail, yeah.
Lenny: So I moved on and that would’ve been such a huge revenue opportunity. I’m just joking.
Sri Batchu: I know, I know. And I’m glad you brought that up because we are obviously aware of it and we are working on something for users that have put in a personal email address. in terms of how to reengage that.
Lenny: You’re about to 5X growth because I had no other domain at that point. Now I have Lenny’s newsletter and stuff, so it’s like, “Shit, I’m stuck.”
Sri Batchu: By the way, for anybody else that has that problem, they can just reach out to me, we’ll figure it out. The reason we don’t allow personal emails is because it’s just typically very low in tech users that are coming to the website that are putting in personal emails.
Lenny: Makes sense. I totally get it. I was not offended. I just like, all right. I had no way around it. That’s the problem. So I like that you guys are adding some path around it and you’re saying email you or reach out to you.
Sri Batchu: You can find me on Twitter or email me. I’m just as sribatchu@ramp.
Lenny: All right. You’re going to have the most sales leads of any person at Ramp when this comes up. Okay. One other thing I wanted to touch on is success metrics. You talked about one of the keys to success and this repeatable growth engine is clear success metrics. Is there any just learnings and tips you have for people when they’re thinking about success metrics?
Sri Batchu: Finding the right success metric, there usually should be two. There should be one on volume and another one on efficiency. And we can talk about what are good efficiency metrics and what are good volume metrics. On volume, I think the right success metric has a couple things that are important. One is there’s a clear linkage to value creation for the business. So if I move this metric that will drive revenue and which will drive equity value for the business or whatever it is that this particular. Metrics and for Facebook it was MAU, for Instacart, it was effectively monthly active orders, and it’s something that we know is important that will really drive the value for the business, but it needs to have the other component of it, which is it’s very intuitive for all of the people working internally to the company.
Sri Batchu: And it’s also clear, if they’re working on some minutiae, how that can impact and actually move the main metric. So it’s usually you have to find something that’s somewhere in between, not too far, too lag, towards revenue and value creation, but also not something that’s actually translatable to the efforts of various teams.
Lenny: Is there an example of a good success metric that just comes to mind to make this a little bit concrete for people?
Sri Batchu: It just depends on what goal at any given time is. Sometimes you’re trying to drive more users, sometimes you’re trying to drive more engagement and you can reorient the company on what you’re trying to do as the north star for growth during that period of time. So users, obviously we’ve talked about as a good one. For engagement, I’ve often found what really helps is, and you’ve done actually really good benchmarking at some point, the escape velocity metric for growth for a company, I think.
I don’t think you phrased it that way, but that’s [inaudible 00:45:18] for a given user, which is what does it take for somebody to become an engaged and active user or customer of a platform? And at Facebook, it was 10 friends the first seven days. At Instacart, it was three orders in the first month. And at Ramp, for our activation, I mean it’s very specific to Ramp, but we’ve got four events that the customer needs to do in the first 30 days. And if they do that, they have a high likelihood of being activated and successful. So our activation team focuses on that.
Lenny: The framework you just described reminds me Gibson Biddle has this really simple framework of gem where you can basically prioritize one of three things, growth, engagement, or monetization. And his advice is always just all of them are great, just make sure you’re all aligned on which one matters most at the time.
Sri Batchu: Yeah. And it is very similar to, we used to have this at Opendoor, and I think DoorDash also uses a similar framework, which is speed, quality, and cost. All three are important, but it’s very hard to optimize all three at the same time. So you need to have a particular prioritization. And I think growth teams can also use that as, okay, I think the way I about the growth team’s journey is step one is build a system that can move fast and then work on improving the quality and then work on optimization of cost after. So you pick which phase you’re on because you can’t do all three at the same time, whether it’s growth, engagement, monetization, or just the other way of framing on it.
Lenny: Speaking of metrics, I have this note here that you’re a big fan of payback period for measuring investment ROI versus CAC. Can you talk about why that is?
Sri Batchu: Yeah. CAC obviously gets thrown around a lot and a lot of people are like, “Okay, you have to be reducing your CAC, CAC, CAC, CAC.” There’s a fundamental flaw to it which obviously is that you’re focusing on cost and not the value derived. And so when you focus on CAC and reducing CAC, what tends to happen is you actually might be doing something very damaging where you’re succeeding in reducing CAC, but you’re actually bringing in customers that are less valuable because those are the ones that you’re able to attract with a lower CAC. And so reframing it away from CAC towards LTV is helpful and that’s better. So thinking about for better customers that are bigger, we want to spend more. So you might think, okay, well, LTV to CAC might be a better way of looking at that. I think the challenge with LTV to CAC especially for a lot of, even Ramp, it’s only four years old, is it’s really hard to predict LTV.
It’s like a DCF, it’s extremely assumption laden and it’s hard to know what the final value will be. And especially if you think your churn is low and your LTV is very high, you might end up spending a lot of money because you’re like, “Oh, my LTV to CAC is great.” And then a year or two into the business, you realize actually your churn is higher than you thought. Your initial customers aren’t representative of your long-term retention and all of a sudden you’ve destroyed a lot of value by looking at LTV to CAC, which is why I’m a big, big fan of payback period and actually being really thoughtful about that using contribution margin, not revenue or gross margin, like how long of contribution margin from this customer does it take to payback their cost? And setting this obviously is typically a mandate from the executive and board level on what is the payback period that we’re comfortable with, and then just orienting everybody towards driving that blended payback period down as much as possible.
Lenny: For folks that aren’t familiar with the concept of payback period or contribution margin, could you just briefly describe what those mean for listeners?
Sri Batchu: Yeah, so contribution margin is basically the profit that you make on a given customer after you take into account all of the variable costs. So including the cost of production as well as any other variable costs to serve that customer. So that might include support and other things that scale with your revenue. And then payback period is literally just how many months of that profit would it take to pay for? Let’s say it costs you $5,000 to acquire this customer and your estimated profit per month on the customer is 500. That is a 10-month payback period. So as I say that, I’m sure you’ve heard, you still have to make assumptions for payback period, but at least they’re more based in recency and you can evaluate them more quickly.
Lenny: Awesome. Thank you for doing that. Just a couple more questions around growth specifically. So there’s a lot of ways to grow through the history of a company. You can invest in SEO, you can invest in paid and sales and referrals and influencer marketing, brand marketing, billboards, all these things. Do you have an opinion on how to sequence these sorts of bets for a company, especially in B2B?
Sri Batchu: Of course, a lot depends on who your customers are, what your unique value propositions are and how competitive the space that you’re in. But I do think there’s actually a general path that most B2B companies take and should take frankly, which is my view is you start off with founder-led sales, like the early team needs to know how to actually sell, then you hire your first couple of salespeople, then you start some very low cost targeted marketing efforts. So whether it’s like content, community, small scale events, and then PR. After all of that is when you start paid and brand efforts. And then SEO probably start around the same time that you start paid marketing efforts.
The reason for the progression the way I’ve described it is the channels get more expensive as you go farther along and they get more effective as you understand more about your customers and they’re more scalable as well as you go farther along the list that I’ve described. And so that’s the intention behind sequencing in that way. SEO is a bit unique. The reason I recommend it later rather than earlier, even though it’s not necessarily that expensive, is just take some time to build. And without domain authority or backlinking or any media presence, you can end up just flailing with SEO, creating content and not getting any actual traction for a long time. So there’s usually a good inflection point for your company to double down on SEO efforts. And it’s somewhat a little bit later than some of the other times.
Lenny: This touches on a great line that you have around experimentation where you talk about how you don’t want to just fail fast with an experiment. You want to fail conclusively, if that’s the word. Is that right? And then can you talk about that?
Sri Batchu: Yeah, I talk a lot about that with my teams both here and other places, which is we celebrate failure. Growth experiments in my history are typically 30%-ish success rate. So the vast majority of things that you try don’t work. And so you want to create a culture where people aren’t afraid to take risks and aren’t afraid to fail. And for me, failure is not that you didn’t drive revenue, failure is not learning. So it’s really important that you learn when you fail. And so we celebrate failure as long as you’re learning and you can only learn if you’ve designed the right test and you failed conclusively because otherwise, I think many of us have been in situations where there’s intuition that something might work and it doesn’t work, and then you end up doing it over and over for years because every time a new executive or somebody else has the same idea, you try it again and it’s because you haven’t been able to design the test to fail conclusively, and it’s hard to do.
But at the end of the day, there’s only two ways to make an experiment successful. Either you have a very large M or have a very significant treatment, which is what you’re doing in the experiment itself. And in B2B, you don’t usually have the luxury of large M, which you do in consumer. Facebook can get stats taken in two hours. A B2B company could take two years to get the same number of touch points. And so to counteract that, I recommend people just trying to maximize the treatment effect, which is if you have a hypothesis that you’re testing, just throw all of the possible tactics and resources that you think would move that needle because you can always cost rationalize later if it works.
And so just maximize the treatment effect. And if with all of that it didn’t work, then you can say, “Hey, we’re not going to try this again because we literally did try everything that we could to test this hypothesis.” And if it doesn’t work in the best version and it’s expensive as it is, this is not worth spending more time on. But if it does work, great, then you do another version of the test with half the tactics or whichever tactics you think work better or worse and you optimize over time.
Lenny: Is there an example you could share when you did that?
Sri Batchu: I mean, account based marketing is something that is very common in enterprise software where you’ve selected certain customers that you think are high priority and you’re saying, “I want to touch them in as many nuanced ways possible to see if that drives conversion.” And this is something I’ve seen tried many times where people do it, but they do it halfway where they’re like, “Okay, tried these three things. Conversion of the control group wasn’t higher. And so we think this is not going to work.”
And then a new go-to market executive comes and they have to do it again. They have to do it again. They have to do it again. It’s a very common one wherever this happens. And so when we did it at Ramp, we did exactly what I just described, which is let’s really be thoughtful about the experiment design, both in terms of maximizing the number of people as well as maximizing the number of ways and types of ways that we’re effectively touching these target customers to show the value one way or the other.
Lenny: So what it sounds like is the hypothesis isn’t like this email will have a big impact on conversion. It’s like this strategy of coming after customers is what we’re testing.
Sri Batchu: That’s the example there. And I think for example, this kind of framework is more important for cross-functional, larger scale, bigger tests rather than an email modification. But we could even use it on a micro example, like an email modification where you are like, okay, I think this particular email is underperforming because it’s not talking to this part of the customer’s pain point or journey or what have you. And the simplest test would be, okay, let me make some tweaks to the text and edit that, and that could be the end of that test.
And if that doesn’t work, you’re like, “Oh, maybe those weren’t the right text edits. Let me do a different text edits or whatever.” And that’s fine, that’s low cost. It’s not the end of the world for you to be wrong there. But an alternative that you could do is like, oh, what are all of the things that I could change about this email in the same test? Is it the trigger of the email? Is it the text content of the email? Is it additional personalization? Is it the design of the email? Trying to think of what are all of the various levers that you think could be wrong and put them all together to test your hypothesis of this touchpoint is wrong and how do I improve that.
Lenny: Well, obviously the downside of that is if it doesn’t work, you don’t know if it’s like, oh, maybe it was this thing could have worked in the subject-
Sri Batchu: Yeah. So there’s always trade-offs on this. But what you’re hoping is you’ve done a complete refresh where you did all the things that you thought were intuitive that should work. And if it doesn’t work, then you’re like, “Okay, maybe my hypothesis is wrong.” But you’re right. There’s always going to be a challenge if maybe the execution is wrong and I did too many things potentially in that case.
Lenny: How does that go with the velocity culture? Is it just do those things real fast even though it’s not like micro optimize, it’s like go bigger but do them fast?
Sri Batchu: Yeah. Yeah. So that’s why I think it’s important to frame where this matters. And so I think I’m less worried about failing conclusively for things that you can fail really, really fast and just redo, right? Things like website conversion, email, et cetera. I’m more worried about that for things that take a while to plan and cost money, et cetera.
Lenny: Got it. Okay. Great. Maybe one last question around growth specifically. What are some of your favorite tools for the growth team, either internally, whatever you can share, or externally that just allow you to operate efficiently and effectively?
Sri Batchu: A couple of things that we’ve used, I mean, one simple thing is for sprint planning, actually, we use Airtable because the planning process and the scoring is so much more analytical and the translation layer. So we’ve got a template on how we do our sprint planning and how we translate the various impact metrics into the common currency, which I enjoy, but I don’t see it has to be Airtable. It’s just some form of organization that works well for that. In terms of a very tactical growth tool that we’ve enjoyed recently is we used this company called Mutiny, which is also around customer, which is a tool for website copy, personalization. So they hook up with our third party data sources that we pay for, and based on what we know about the customer as they’re landing on our page, we can personalize, copy, and design based on that. And that’s had material impact and allowed us to scale website experimentation.
Lenny: Amazing. And then are there internal tools you’ve built to help with experimentation or I don’t know, sharing data, dashboard? I don’t know, is there anything else that’s just like, wow, this really helps us move fast?
Sri Batchu: Eric, our CEO, has publicly talked about this. I think we as a company are very thoughtful about what we build in-house versus what we buy externally. I think a lot of engineering teams are often excited about building things in-house where there’s off the shelf products that could basically work externally. And Ramp has historically been good at not falling into that trap. And we use third party tools for a lot of our growth and experimentation for things that are not proprietary, strategic, et cetera, obviously. Some of the automation stuff that we’ve talked about, we’ve built all of that in-house in terms of prospecting, lead scoring, and how we talk to our customers. But for the most part, we use external tools. Instacart and Opendoor were not like that. We built our own internal experiment tracking systems, A/B testing frameworks and all of that in-house.
Lenny: That’s what I would’ve guessed about Ramp that it’s with speed, you got to not build stuff you don’t have to build. So that makes a lot of sense. Okay. Maybe one last topic to talk about. I want to talk about hiring. You have some really interesting approaches to how to think about hiring. One is I think you have a really interesting strategy for how to find the best companies and also the best people at each of those companies to go after if you’re hiring for specific role. Can you talk about how you think about that?
Sri Batchu: Gokul on Twitter has talked about some of those, which is there’s two ways to go about hiring great people. One way is basically a very thoughtful and tactical network search where let’s say you’re hiring for a head of SEO, you go ask your network of who is the best SEO person you know, get introduction to each of those folks, and then ask them who the best person that they know is. And you have a mapping of where are the best SEO teams and why. If you can’t get one of those people, 20, 30 people on your target list, you go down the list of, okay, what is the next best person? And you typically want to limit it to companies that are one to two stages of growth after you. So you want somebody that has seen your stage of growth and beyond at a company that has a reputation for craft and the field that you’re looking for. So that’s a very classic way of doing that, and I think that works really well for people and companies that are really well-connected.
So there’s another approach that I’ve actually used successfully is much more kind of data driven and external and not as network based, which is you can often look up data. [inaudible 01:02:14] is a lot of it is somewhat public, right? So you can look up information on which companies might be doing well. So for example, I’ll just pick like if you’re looking for great email marketing folks like CRM marketing lead or something like that, you can actually look up on similar web, what percentage of traffic shows up via email to companies websites. So you’ve got your target list of companies that are one or two stage beyond you that you respect as general companies. And you can go and see, okay, which ones of these are actually really effective at driving web traffic or app traffic or app downloads via their email. And then go try to source from those teams and companies. And I think people under-utilize that even though it’s very intuitive, it’s just not something that occurs to people to do.
Lenny: I love that. I’ve not heard that tip right there. The first piece, Google definitely recommends this, and I think the core part of that is the core theme here is find the companies that are the best at the thing you’re trying to hire for, and then figure out who at the company is the best once you start talking to people. I love it. Another strong opinion that I think you have is around paying people and how much to pay the best. Can you talk about that?
Sri Batchu: Yeah, I think there’s a lot of conversation around compensation is very much focused on equality and narrowing the gap and bands for compensation. And I think personally, I know it’s a bit of a spicy take maybe, but I think it’s the exact opposite direction of the conversation that companies should be having about compensation, which is I strongly, strongly believe that small teams of successful people can drive a lot more impact than larger teams of mediocre people.
And so I strongly believe you have to design a system where you’re able to reward 10X operators with 10X the comp. You certainly see that at the executive level. So if you look at the same executive at different companies at similar stages, the comp can be widely different based for a variety of reasons. But one of them is the perception of performance and potential by the management team. And I think people need to be thinking about how to do that across more levels, which is if you can do that, and if you do that well, I think you’re able to differentially hire and retain the best talent. And that’ll be a great competitive advantage for companies that can do that well.
Lenny: And do you think about this within a team pay the best people the most, or is it more only hire these 10X people and then pay everyone the most?
Sri Batchu: People think of the talent density of your company as dependent on hiring. And that’s obviously true. It’s an important part of the ecosystem and the first part, but it’s equally dependent on retention and performance management. A lot of companies can be good at hiring, but hiring has pretty high rate of false positive. Interview is the worst, best way to hire somebody. And then there’s lots of ways you can make the interviewing process better, make it more interactive, make it more effective, but at the end of the day, you still don’t know about someone until you really work closely with the new team, with the new mandate at your company.
So I think it’s not about necessarily hiring [inaudible 01:05:44] operators, obviously you’re looking for that, but it’s also about investing in people that are doing really well and accelerating their growth and rewards based on impact once they’re there and as well as managing out people directly that didn’t work out. And I typically think it’s almost never when I’ve had to part ways with people is because someone’s a bad actor. It’s almost always that it just wasn’t the right fit for whatever reason, for their skillset, for their life goals or whatever it may be. And it just wasn’t a fit for that role. And I think a lot of companies are hesitant to make those changes, and I think that’s how they bring their talent bar down, frankly.
Lenny: Absolutely agree. Sri, is there anything else that you wanted to touch on before we get to our very exciting lightning round?
Sri Batchu: I don’t know how many people will use this. I’m still surprised when new folks come to me and it’s like I need to write, by the way, a document of how do you work with me? Because I know it’s a lot of people have been talking about, I think [inaudible 01:06:51] Johnson’s talked about it too, but I say that my love languages are spreadsheets and frameworks. And one very simple one that I’ve always liked that sometimes people surprised to hear, but it’s most consultants know is what we call MECE, mutually exclusive, collectively exhausted set of things. So whenever you’re trying to attack a problem and trying to brainstorm solutions or what have you, I really like to remind the teams to think about MECE because when you think about that and evaluate your set of solutions with that framework in mind, I think you tend to find that you’ve catch more potential solutions and also you’ll feel comfortable that you’ve been comprehensive in your solution development. So anyway, just a little thing for people that are earlier in their careers to not forget.
Lenny: So let’s make it a little bigger than a little thing. So MECE, mutually exclusive, collectively exhaustive. Is there an example of what that may look like and or visualize for people to think about what this means in practice?
Sri Batchu: Yeah. I mean, I’ll give it really dumb example, but that will make the point hopefully. It’s like, okay, our profitability or our revenue growth has slowed down is the problem that you’re trying to solve. And so okay, you start with, okay, what does this mean? You’ve got revenue per user has gone down, or customer has gone down, or number of customers have slowed down. Okay, that’s step one of the MECE framework. Then it’s like, okay, where does the revenue come from? What are all the various products that revenue could be coming from? Has it changed on any one of them? And then customers, why have customers gone down? Is it new customer acquisition? Is it activation of customers that have signed up? Is it retention? And just breaking that problem. So at each layer you’ve collectively exhausted all of the possible ways that this problem could have arrived. And just having that framework whenever you approach every problem will prevent you from missing something important. And also just more generally give you an others’ confidence that you’re being comprehensive in your solution development.
Lenny: Got it. So one way to think about this in this specific case is just make a formula of all of the variables that play into the question you’re trying to answer.
Sri Batchu: Yeah, exactly.
Lenny: Awesome. Well, Sri, with that, we’ve reached our very exciting lightning round. Are you ready?
Sri Batchu: Yeah, let’s do it.
Lenny: What are two or three books that you’ve recommended most to other people?
Sri Batchu: I tend to find most business books can be decks, but one that I really like actually is Never Split The Difference by Chris Voss. It’s a negotiation book, find it super helpful for negotiation, but also for a lot of business decision making generally, to be honest, and life. And then I’m a big fan of sci-fi short stories, so anything by Ted Chiang or Ken Liu, I highly recommend.
Lenny: I love those both. On the first one I’m actually in the process of listening to it on audio and every time I’m in a place where I can negotiate something, I never remember anything that I’ve learned. Is there one thing that you’ve taken away from that book that stuck with you of like I use this?
Sri Batchu: I think that the core of the book really is about listening behind the problem of negotiation and what is the person really asking for. So his example of if you’re always trying to split things evenly, you’ll end up with one brown shoe, one black shoe, where neither of you are happy. And so rather than thinking about BATNA and ZOPA and all the other business school frameworks on negotiation, I think focus on deep down what does this other person want and how can I change the conversation about that rather than the thing that we’re arguing over.
Lenny: Awesome. Great. Next question. What’s a favorite recent movie or TV show?
Sri Batchu: I mean, obviously it won the Oscar, but I really enjoyed Everything Everywhere All at Once. I thought it was such a wonderful story and really I think it’s one of those… It’s funny. The movie can also be, I think, everything because there are just so many different reads that you can get about that. It’s about family, it’s about immigration, it’s about love. There’s a lot of really interesting themes explored via one movie.
Lenny: What’s a favorite interview question you like to ask?
Sri Batchu: I was going to say, oh, I like to ask other people.
Lenny: You like to ask. What did you think I was going to ask?
Sri Batchu: Oh, I thought what was my favorite interview question that you’ve asked or others have asked?
Lenny: Oh, I got to clarify this. Both are acceptable answers.
Sri Batchu: I was going to cheat on that one and say the one that you asked me right before, because I’m a big fan of actually movies and TV shows and people rarely ask about that interviews like this, but favorite interview that I’d like to ask candidates actually is what’s something that you’re really bad at but you still do and why?
Lenny: What do you look for in their answer when you ask them?
Sri Batchu: Yeah, a lot of people actually struggle with that question and can’t answer anything that they do that they’re bad at, which is a little bit of a yellow flag, which means that they’re only used to doing things that they’re successful at and they haven’t cultivated interests that are not correlated to their own success at doing something. And they haven’t taken the time to do that. And folks like that are going to run at the first sign of trouble and be like, “Oh, I’m not successful at this, so I’m going to move on.” And what I really want to see is people that show examples of things that they’re not successful at that they do for other motivations and goals and interests. And so if you can tell me a compelling story like that, it’s usually a winning answer so to speak.
Lenny: What is a favorite product or two that you’ve recently discovered that you love?
Sri Batchu: Carrie mentioned Eight Sleep once in this call. I love my Eight Sleep. I’m a big fan and they’re Ramp customers as well. And so that’s been a great pandemic purchase. So I guess maybe not as recent. And then maybe another one is Fellow coffee, their kettles I think just designed so beautifully. I don’t drink coffee, I drink tea, but I use my Fellow kettle for tea, and I think it’s just a delightful product to use.
Lenny: I got a Fellow kettle from my tea also, and I found that the flow of the water was too slow and it’s just standing here pouring this pour over.
Sri Batchu: Yeah. Yeah. So they do have a non-pour over kettle, which is what I have, which makes it easier.
Lenny: Okay. My mistake. Next question. What is something relatively minor you’ve changed in your product development process that you found to have a big impact on your ability to execute?
Sri Batchu: Yeah, I mean, I don’t know if this is minor or not, but one of the things that on the growth side, we used to have separate sprint planning for the product team, for the marketing teams, and each team had their own planning cycles. And one of the things that we did is we brought them all together into one. So the lifecycle marketers joined the product activation team sprint cycles, and so their projects and work are very tightly aligned and work in the same pace and system as the rest of the product team. And that’s had tremendous impact in our ability to work together.
Lenny: Final question, Ramp is all about helping people save money. I’m curious if you have any tips on just saving money.
Sri Batchu: I mean, it seems obvious, and I think I feel like negotiation’s already been the theme of this lightning round, but everything is negotiable when it comes to contracts. People think contracts are standardized for software and usually not. People are trying to sell you something they’re trying to grow too. They have their quotas to meet, they have their goals to hit. So I mean, Ramp obviously has a service for this if you wanted to scale these Ramps, but you can do this on your own. Always try to negotiate, be mindful of quarter ends for salespeople. And so if you can push something out till near the end of the quarter, you can ask for, “Hey, I’ll sign it by the end of the month if you give me a 10% discount,” will often work. So there’s tips like that you can do, but remember that you can always negotiate.
Sri Batchu: And then the second one is, I would say is just hire slower. I’m a big believer in, and Geoff talks about this too in your other interview, hiring based on slope rather than intercept, I think will work well for you and only hiring when people and teams are really stretched. I think this will serve you well both on cost and on impact. There’ll be plenty of scope for the people that you hire, and as I said, I’m a big believer in small teams accomplishing more like Ramp being like a fraction of the size of some of our competitors with similar orders of revenue.
Lenny: Sure. We’ve covered velocity, growth, hiring. So many topics, everything I was hoping we touch on. Two final questions, where can folks find you if they want to reach out and learn more and how can listeners be useful to you?
Sri Batchu: Yeah, I’m a big fan of the fun place of the cesspool of Twitter, so I have a public Twitter account that you can DM me. My DMs are open, it’s just my name’s sri_batchu. And in terms of listeners can be useful, honestly, I think I really enjoy meeting like-minded folks, and as I may have mentioned in other places, Ramp is growing incredibly well and we’re constantly looking to hire and we’re still hiring. So if you know best in class growth in marketing folks that they can recommend that we hire at Ramp, I’d love to hear.
Lenny: And I think the URL is ramp.com/careers. I just pulled it up.
Sri Batchu: Yep, that’s it. Thank you.
Lenny: All right, Sri, well thank you again so much for being here and for sharing so much.
Sri Batchu: Yeah, of course. Thank you.
Lenny: Bye, everyone. Thank you so much for listening. If you found this valuable, you can subscribe to the show on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, or your favorite podcast app. Also, please consider giving us a rating or leaving a review as that really helps other listeners find the podcast. You can find all past episodes or learn more about the show at lennyspodcast.com. See you in the next episode.
Glossary
| English | 中文 |
|---|---|
| account based marketing | 基于账户的营销 |
| annualized revenue | 年化收入 |
| backlinking | 反向链接(backlinking) |
| BATNA | 最佳替代方案(BATNA) |
| bips | 基点 |
| blended payback period | 混合投资回收期 |
| building in public | 公开构建 |
| Carrie | Carrie |
| Chris Voss | Chris Voss |
| common currency | 通用货币 |
| comms | 沟通 |
| contribution margin | 边际贡献 |
| cost rationalize | 成本合理化 |
| CRM | 客户关系管理系统(CRM) |
| data enrichment | 自动数据丰富 |
| DCF | DCF |
| domain authority | 域名权重(domain authority) |
| DoorDash | DoorDash |
| Eric | Eric |
| escape velocity metric | 逃逸速度指标 |
| FinTech | 金融科技 |
| founder-led sales | 创始人主导销售 |
| Founders Fund | Founders Fund |
| Geoff | Geoff |
| Gibson Biddle | Gibson Biddle |
| go-to market executive | 走向市场高管 |
| holdout | 对照组 |
| Instacart | Instacart |
| Keith Rabois | Keith Rabois |
| Ken Liu | Ken Liu |
| leads | 线索 |
| LTV | LTV |
| MECE | 相互独立、完全穷尽(MECE) |
| MVP mentality | 最小可行性产品心态 |
| north star metrics | 北极星指标 |
| OKR | 目标与关键结果 |
| Opendoor | Opendoor |
| owned and earned media | 自有媒体和赢得媒体 |
| Packy | Packy |
| payback period | 投资回收期 |
| pipeline | 销售管道 |
| portfolio of bets | 投资组合 |
| PR | 公关 |
| product market fit | 产品市场契合度 |
| prospects | 潜在客户 |
| quota | 销售配额 |
| referrals | 推荐 |
| regression analysis | 回归分析 |
| revenue per employee | 每员工收入 |
| roadmap | 路线图 |
| run rate | 年化经常性收入 |
| SaaS | 软件即服务 |
| SEO | 搜索引擎优化(SEO) |
| skunk work | 臭鼬工厂 |
| Slack | Slack |
| SMB | 中小企业 |
| SQL pipeline | 销售合格线索(SQL)管道 |
| Sri Batchu | Sri Batchu |
| startup credit | 初创公司信用额度 |
| Ted Chiang | Ted Chiang |
| TikTok | TikTok |
| top funnel | 顶部漏斗 |
| top line | 顶线 |
| translation layer | 转换层 |
| treatment | 实验干预 |
| treatment effect | 实验干预效果 |
| VC | 风投 |
| word of mouth | 口碑 |
| ZOPA | 可能达成协议的空间(ZOPA) |
Reformatted by reformat_english.py
作为历史上增速最快的SaaS企业之一,Ramp仅用两年便达到一亿美元年化收入,并在逆势中实现四倍增长。本期对话Ramp增长负责人Sri Batchu,深入拆解了这一成绩背后的底层逻辑。Sri结合其在Opendoor等企业的经验,指出B2B公司应遵循递进式的通用增长路径:从创始人主导销售起步,过渡到内容与社区等低成本营销,最后才引入付费与品牌投放。其核心洞见在于,随着对客户认知的加深,后期的高成本渠道才能发挥出真正的转化效能。此外,文章还细致剖析了Ramp内部的优先级排序框架、北极星指标,以及如何将“速度”内化为组织文化。对于关注企业规模化运作的读者而言,这是一篇兼具战略高度与落地细节的实用指南。
规模化 Ramp 的经验 | Sri Batchu (Ramp, Instacart, Opendoor)
B2B 公司的通用增长路径
Sri Batchu (00:00:00): 我确实认为,实际上有一条大多数 B2B 公司采取且应该采取的通用路径。我的观点是,你从创始人主导销售(founder-led sales)开始,早期团队需要知道如何真正地销售。然后你雇佣你的前几个销售人员,然后你开始一些非常低成本的有针对性的营销努力。所以不管是内容、社区、小规模活动,然后是公关(PR),在所有这些之后才是你开始付费和品牌努力的时候,然后搜索引擎优化(SEO)可能在你开始付费营销努力的大致同一时间开始。我所描述的这种递进的原因是,随着你走得更远,渠道会变得更昂贵,而随着你对客户了解得更多,它们也会变得更有效。
节目开场与嘉宾介绍
Lenny (00:00:43): 欢迎来到 Lenny’s Podcast,在这里我采访世界级的产品负责人和增长专家,以从他们构建和增长当今最成功产品的辛苦获得的经验中学习。今天我的嘉宾是 Sri Batchu。Sri 曾是 Opendoor 的运营副总裁,然后是 Instacart 的增长负责人,目前他是 Ramp 的增长负责人,正如你将在本期节目开头听到的,Ramp 是历史上增长最快的软件即服务(SaaS)业务和增长最快的金融科技(FinTech)业务。他们在两年内达到了一亿美元的年化经常性收入(run rate),这太荒谬了,并且在去年增长了 4 倍,而在这个时期大多数公司几乎根本没有增长。我最近和他们的产品副总裁 Geoff Charles 一起做了一篇关于 Ramp 如何构建产品的通讯文章。而在本期节目中,我们聚焦于 Ramp 的增长方法。我们聊了 Ramp 在早期做了什么来启动增长,他们现在主要如何增长,他们的增长团队是如何构建的,他们的优先级排序框架加上他们的北极星指标。
赞助商:Attio
Lenny (00:01:37): 还有,他们如何将速度运营化,这是他们团队文化的核心。Ramp 是一家非常特别的、显然正处于一段不可思议的旅程中的公司,我非常激动能分享这一瞥他们如何运作。在我们的赞助商简短讲话之后,请享受这一期与 Sri Batchu 的节目。本期节目由 Attio 为您带来,它是一种新型客户关系管理系统(CRM),强大、灵活,并且围绕您的数据构建。传统的客户关系管理系统是为一个拥有完全不同的速度、规模和数据需求的不同时代而构建的。Attio 是不同的。它允许您快速构建一个匹配您独特工作流和数据结构的客户关系管理系统。在连接您的电子邮件和日历的几分钟内,您将拥有一个已经设置好的客户关系管理系统,包含完整的客户资料和自动数据丰富(data enrichment)。您还将在指尖拥有实时动态报告。不再有缓慢的部署、过时的用户体验或乏味的手动数据输入。
Lenny (00:02:32): 有了 Attio,您可以随时随地构建和调整您的客户关系管理系统,无论您的商业模式或公司阶段如何。Attio 是为高速增长的初创公司准备的客户关系管理系统。今天就开始,并在 attio.com/lenny 获得第一年 15% 的折扣。那就是 A-T-T-I-O.com/lenny。
赞助商:Coda
本期节目由 Coda 为您带来。您听我谈论过 Coda 是如何将这一切汇集在一起的文档,以及它如何能帮助您的团队运行得更顺畅、更高效。我亲身体会到这一点,因为 Coda 对我来说就是这样。我每天使用 Coda 来整理我的通讯内容日历、我的播客采访笔记,以及协调我的赞助商。
Lenny (00:03:11): 最近,我实际上写了一整篇关于 Coda 的产品团队如何运作的文章,在那篇文章中他们分享了十几个他们在内部用来运行其产品团队的模板,包括管理路线图(roadmap)、他们的目标与关键结果(OKR)流程、获取内部反馈,而且本质上他们的整个产品开发过程都是在 Coda 中完成的。如果您团队的工作分散在不同的文档、电子表格和一堆工作流工具中,这就是为什么您需要 Coda。
Lenny (00:03:36): Coda 将数据放在一个集中的位置,无论格式如何,消除了可能减慢您团队速度的障碍。Coda 允许您的团队在相同的信息上操作并在一个地方协作。利用这个专为初创公司提供的特别限时优惠。今天在 coda.io/lenny 注册,并在您的第一张账单上获得一千美元的初创公司信用额度(startup credit)。那就是访问 C-O-D-A.io/lenny 注册并获得 1000 美元的初创公司信用额度。Coda.io/lenny。
Ramp 的增长速度验证
Lenny (00:04:10): Sri,欢迎来到播客。
Sri Batchu (00:04:12): 谢谢你,Lenny。感谢你的邀请。我是超级粉丝,我一直关注着这个播客和通讯。所以很激动能来到这里。
Lenny (00:04:18): 非常感谢。那我们谈谈 Ramp 吧。所以你领导增长的 Ramp 显然是历史上增长最快的产品之一。我相信它是最快增长的 SaaS 产品和业务,也是增长最快的金融科技业务。所以首先,这大体上是真的和正确的吗?
Sri Batchu (00:04:38): 是的,我的意思是,我相信你知道 Packy,他做了一个很棒的分析,在其中他分享了这项工作并将我们与一堆其他公司进行了比较,当他在一年前发布这个时,我们是当时达到一亿美元年化收入(annualized revenue)增长最快的公司。我不知道从那以后是否有其他的,但据我所知,在金融科技类别中肯定没有。
Lenny (00:04:58): 好的。所以你说的是增长最快达到一亿美元。我认为达到一亿美元年化收入花了两年时间,对吧?
Sri Batchu (00:05:03): 完全正确。
Lenny (00:05:03): 这太疯狂了,因为很少会有这么多钱放在那里让一家公司直接进来积累并从人们那里抢走并提供那么多的价值。所以这是一个疯狂的统计数据。也许沿着这些方向的另一个问题是,还有没有其他你能分享的统计数据,仅仅是关于 Ramp 的规模或者仅仅是 Ramp 增长的速度?
Sri Batchu (00:05:23): 我们公开披露了去年我们在那基础上增长了 Forex(应为 4X),这是在去年非常大的基数上,而且 Okta 实际上发布了一些关于中小企业(SMB)和中端市场增长最快的软件公司的最新统计数据,尽管名单上的其他一些公司在规模上要小得多,但 Ramp 显然是增长最快的。对于这么大的增长量,公司仍然非常精简。在那种规模下我们今天大约不到 500 人,而且这绝对拥有比我们其他一些竞争对手和该领域的其他公司高得多的每员工收入(revenue per employee)。是的,我的意思是,我们有一个非常有思想和聪明的财务团队,实际上我和我们以前在 Instacart 的战略财务负责人紧密合作过,他们为我们设定了雄心勃勃的增长目标,我很高兴地说,自从我加入以来的过去 16 个月或 18 个月里,我们一直持续击败那些雄心勃勃的目标。
早期的增长策略
Lenny (00:06:16): 在这样的环境中这尤其具有挑战性。所以这格外有意义。好的,那么这就是我想开始问的大问题。我知道你在 Ramp 旅程的开始时并不在那里,但据你所知,除了只是构建一个人们真正喜爱的极好产品之外,你认为团队在早期做了什么来播下这种级别的增长和成功的种子?如果那是答案,那没问题,但通常那只是一部分。我好奇的是,他们是否使用了一些巧妙的独特策略来帮助从一开始就创造那种令人难以置信的增长?
Sri Batchu (00:06:49): 我认为你在产品方面当然是对的。显然你最近和 Geoff 一起写了关于 Ramp 的产品引擎的文章,并且因为有深度理解客户体验的产品团队,所以有了令人难以置信的产品市场契合度(product market fit),我认为那当然帮助了最初的口碑(word of mouth)。我确实想指出一件 Ramp 做的有趣的事情是,显然 Ramp 的联合创始人 Eric 和 Karim,是另一家成功退出的公司的前创始人。
Sri Batchu (00:07:15): 所以他们作为创始人拥有强大的声誉,并带着构建 Ramp 所需的恰当经验而来,他们做的一件事是我所说的把资本结构表作为增长策略,他们在将大量早期阶段创始人以及其他有影响力的运营者和顾问引入公司的资本结构表方面做得非常出色。我们最初的许多客户就是这些在资本结构表上的公司,或者其创始人在资本结构表上的公司。而 Ramp 如今实际上已不再是初创公司或科技公司占多数了。我们绝大多数的客户是中型市场和大型企业。那才是我们收入的来源。但在科技创始人社区中有很多喜爱,因为早期的缘故,既有产品质量的原因,也有 Ramp 获得的这些投资者的原因。
Lenny (00:08:08): 哇。我以前没听说过这个策略,我也不知道这实际上是早期故事的一个重要部分。那么有没有一些他们在资本结构表上的人的例子,能说明是这些人帮助他们像这样最初增长起来的?
Sri Batchu (00:08:20): 我能想到的一个例子是 Eight Sleep 的创始人,他与 Ramp 团队一直很亲近,Pod 的创始人也是如此,然后还有一批投资了该公司的风投公司,同时也是该公司的客户。
Lenny (00:08:32): 你知道那里的策略是风投将他们连接到会使用 Ramp 的小公司,还是直接就是会立即使用 Ramp 的公司创始人?
Sri Batchu (00:08:43): 是的,我想说更多的是能够使用 Ramp 的客户的创始人和高管。当然我们有一群非常出色的资深投资者,他们也向 Ramp 做了引荐,这很有帮助。但我想说这并不像人们预期的那样是一个大的渠道,因为公司有他们自己的决策框架来选择像 Ramp 这样的产品,投资者的意见和推荐很重要,但结果发现,它的重要性可能不如另一个真正使用过他们所知道的产品的客户,或者正在实际体验该产品的客户。
新客获取与存量扩张
Lenny (00:09:17): 太棒了,绝妙的策略。我以前没听说过这个。在增长方面,早期 Ramp 的增长中有多少是来自新客户,有多少是来自现有客户的扩张?因为信用卡很酷的一点是,人们花得越多,你赚得就越多,因为你从中抽取一部分。那么粗略地说,前几年那种疯狂的增长中,有多少是来自现有客户的扩张?
Sri Batchu (00:09:39): 显然我们的许多早期客户已经有了相当大的增长,而我们的整个策略是节省公司的时间和金钱,以便他们可以通过其他方式将这些重新部署到他们自己的增长或其他目标上。而且我们显然也在扩展我们的产品套件,比如 BillPay、Flex 等等,在这些产品上我们的客户可以在 Ramp 上花更多的钱并从 Ramp 中获得更多价值。尽管说了这么多,有趣的是,我们那时乃至今天绝大部分的增长都是通过新客获取实现的。只是我们增加的客户数量如此之多,以至于我们客户的增长虽然强劲且是我们增长杠杆的重要组成部分,但远没有你想象的那么具有实质性。
增长渠道的构成
Lenny (00:10:21): 好的,太棒了。这很好地过渡到了我的下一个问题,那就是如果你要画一个饼图来展示 Ramp 是如何增长的,理想情况下,如果你能分享早期和现在的情况,这个饼图看起来是什么样的?这个饼图的各个板块是什么,然后 Ramp 的增长来源的大致百分比是多少?
Sri Batchu (00:10:37): 与其深入具体细节,关于今天的增长系统我想说的是,如果你看看我们业务中有多少比例来自主动销售、付费营销、现场销售,然后是一堆其他渠道,然后将它与行业基准进行比较,我认为 Ramp 的秘诀并不在于我们找到了一个独特的渠道,也不在于我们过度投资或投资不足。我不认为我们的分销渠道构成与和我们同等规模和阶段的其他公司相比会有多大偏差。
Sri Batchu (00:11:10): 我认为我们做得不同的一点是,我们真的非常专注于让所有这些投资都由技术和数据驱动。所以我将给你举的一个例子是,无论从我们查看的任何指标来看,我们的销售团队实际上都极其高效,我们显然会对他们进行基准测试。原因在于我们实际上有一个专门支持这种效率的增长工程团队,包括调整第三方数据以及使用 AI 自动化他们的大部分工作流程等等。而且我们在 AI 成为许多人的流行语之前很久就已经在这样做了,这是我们拥有这个团队近两年的事情了,他们一直致力于销售自动化和数据,只是为了让我们的销售团队更高效。这只是一个例子,但我们对投资的每个渠道都有类似的使命,思考我们如何用更好的客户和潜在客户数据来赋能,以及我们如何将其自动化和技术化,以便我们能为每个渠道建立那种竞争模式。
增长工程团队
Lenny (00:12:13): 我很想多了解一些这个与销售合作的增长工程团队。也许第一个问题是它是如何构建的,然后他们的目标是什么?你们如何衡量他们的进展和成功?
Sri Batchu (00:12:24): 许多公司的做法不同。我认为在 Ramp 非常有效的一点是,我们拥有相同的共同目标,即该渠道贡献的销售管道(pipeline)和投资回收期(payback period)。这是 Ramp 独特的地方,工程师们对销售配额(quota)有主人翁感。他们不负责产品指标之类的东西,显然当然有一些重要的中期指标和输入指标,但他们确实觉得自己对由该团队驱动的销售管道和效率负责。我认为这自然地让他们能够自下而上地提出他们认为对效率和顶线(top line)有最大影响的正确项目。
Lenny (00:13:04): 那么他们为销售团队做的是哪些事情呢?是帮助他们确定线索(leads)的优先级,还是帮助他们构思信息传递?哪些部分可能是最重要的?
Sri Batchu (00:13:15): 以上全部,帮助找到合适的潜在客户(prospects),向他们发送正确的信息,以及确定响应的优先级,并为团队起草潜在的回复。
Lenny (00:13:26): 太迷人了。你看到这对销售产生了多大影响?
Sri Batchu (00:13:30): 这对我们的销售团队极其有帮助,正如我提到的,这也是我们最高效的渠道之一。所以我认为我们在将技术引入每个渠道的能力上有一些独特之处。
增长团队的整体架构
Lenny (00:13:41): 超级有趣。也许关于那个话题,你能谈谈你们在 Ramp 的增长团队是如何构建的吗?有哪些子团队,你是怎么考虑的?
Sri Batchu (00:13:50): 我们目前有一个组织架构,它可能会演进,如果我们谈到那个话题我们可以讨论它,但从历史上看,我们组织的方式是我们有基于渠道的团队,他们在特定渠道中部署支出。所以我们有一个付费营销团队,一个生命周期客户关系管理系统(CRM)团队,我们有一个现场营销团队等等。然后我们有一个支持增长和销售的产品工程团队,帮助这些渠道中的每一个都更有效,这个团队是专门致力于增长的。然后与此分开的,我们有一个小型的我称之为创新或臭鼬工厂(skunk work)类型的团队,他们从事跨渠道的工作。只是一些不能很好地归入某个框框的事情,我们认为这些事情可能很酷或很有趣,可以尝试做更多跨渠道、跨团队的实验。
Lenny (00:14:37): 听起来绝对是最有趣的团队。他们在臭鼬工厂团队里做过或正在做些什么?
极致的产品速度
Sri Batchu (00:14:42): 他们对不一定非常契合的……新渠道进行了测试,这包括了新的在线平台。他们在 TikTok、Reddit 和其他地方做了一些有趣的事情,诸如此类。他们专注于推荐,以及如何为客户带来更愉悦的体验,第一方事件等等。这些通常是较小规模的尝试,如果有效,我们可以投入更多,稍后将其扩大规模。
Lenny (00:15:16): 我很喜欢。所以团队大致上有一个付费增长团队,只负责付费增长优化,生命周期客户关系管理系统团队,我想基本上邮件是其中很大的一部分。
Sri Batchu (00:15:26): 是的,完全正确。
Lenny (00:15:27): 然后有一个现场销售支持团队,接着是销售团队,也就是你提到的那种工程销售团队,然后我想应该还有自助式服务。
Sri Batchu (00:15:37): 是的,完全正确。也有一个自助式激活工程团队。当然还有搜索引擎优化、网站和入站线索渠道管理团队。
Lenny (00:15:47): 然后就是这个很棒的臭鼬工厂团队。我很喜欢。好的,那么稍微转个话题,关于 Ramp 经常且一致展现出来的东西,在我和 Geoff 一起写的关于 Ramp 如何打造产品的文章中,这一点也非常清晰地体现出来,那就是速度,以及速度在 Ramp 有多么重要。这里有一句很棒的话,我读一下,来自 Keith Rabois,我想他主导了 Ramp 的很多轮融资。他创立了 Founders Fund,是著名的投资人。他说,“在我从事科技商业的 21 年里,Ramp 的产品速度绝对是史无前例的。”所以我的问题是,你能不能谈谈在 Ramp 内部,带着这种极致的速度工作,实际上看起来和感觉起来是什么样的?
Sri Batchu (00:16:30): 是的,这是一个很好的问题,Keith 很棒,可能是我在这里以及在 Opendoor 都有幸合作过的最聪明的投资人之一,我要说他在这一点上绝对正确。你在内部看到的是,我可以说是对缩短周期时间和行动偏见的极其敏锐的关注,以及我们如何缩短周期时间。我认为在文化上,它的核心基本上就是让人们以更小的时间单位来思考决策。这看起来很明显,但我认为你真的必须在文化上去强化它。所以我们的 CEO Eric 做的一件事,我不知道你在外部有没有听说过,是我们有 days.ramp.com 这个网站,我们在内部可以看到自 Ramp 成立以来已经过去了多少天,在 Ramp 是第 1529 天。他在每次董事会会议、每次全体大会上都会带上这个天数。
Sri Batchu (00:17:28): 这只是为了提醒人们,我们不是以年、季度、周为单位工作,我们是以天为单位工作。每一天都很重要,所以永远不要把你知道今天能做完的事情推迟到明天。这种行动偏见真的不仅仅渗透在产品团队中,而是渗透在每一个地方。所以我们的增长团队,正如我刚才描述的,是极其跨职能的,团队里有很多营销人员和其他专家,但我们的工作方式很像产品团队,我们以两周的冲刺为单位工作,我们在这些团队之间进行跨团队优先级排序,我们是一起工作,而不是在增长团队内部各自为政。
Lenny (00:18:08): 所以我打开了你刚才提到的网站 days.ramp.com,它不仅有自发布以来的天数,我看的时候是 1529 天,还有很多在不断增加的小数位。1529.43453142。我的天。好吧。这个带小数位是新加的吗?
Sri Batchu (00:18:29): 不,我想那个一直都在。它只是在放大时间的流逝。这有时可能会让人感到压力,但我认为缓解因素是,正如你所知,A级选手想和A级选手一起工作,吸引A级选手并留住A级选手,而 Ramp 在雇佣那些非常优秀、能够很好地在这种环境下工作、并受到这种文化带来的成功和胜利所激励的人方面,做得非常好。
Lenny (00:18:58): 是的,实际上为了我正在写的另一篇文章,我和 Eric 谈论过这件事,他给我看了一些早期的董事会幻灯片,正如你所说,每份幻灯片里都有 Ramp 的第 544 天。所以你说的这些是非常真实的。有没有什么其他的事情,作为一个从其他也动作非常快的传统公司——Instacart 和 Opendoor——来到 Ramp 的人,让你觉得“天哪,这才是速度”的?你谈到了几点,但有没有什么让你惊呼“我靠”的?
Sri Batchu (00:19:26): 你可以从 Ramp 每个人的响应速度中看到这种周期时间的问题,我认为通常你倾向于看到的是,随着公司变大,他们会从 Slack 演进到使用电子邮件,一切都会变得稍微慢一些,有了流程,然后这显然有很多好处,但是在 Ramp,我加入时注意到的、并且至今依然如此的是,人们在 Slack 上的回复速度有多快,跳上去处理事情有多快,即使他们没有完成它,也会有一个非常清晰的行动项,说明负责人会是谁,截止日期会是什么时候,即使并没有完成。这对我来说一直非常令人印象深刻,关于……而且我认为这是我们公开建设的事情之一,所以一切都是非常可见的,你可以看到这如何在各个团队中运作,我很高兴即使在我们变得大得多的时候,我们也能维持这种文化。
Lenny (00:20:21): 我想这会有两个影响。一个是,如果你只是被期望不断回应,你如何保持心流并完成工作?这实际上是如何运作的?
Sri Batchu (00:20:31): 我不认为期望一定是让一个人不断回应,但这是我看到人们很擅长的事情。所以我认为其中一件事,同样,不是一个新颖的生产力工具,而是 Ramp 确实在做的事情,就是尝试思考专注时间和响应时间,并使用日历阻塞来非常有效地管理你的时间。然后对你自己和你的团队进行日历审查,说,好的,你这周、今天、这个月的最高优先级是什么?你的日历是如何反映你的优先级的?因为在很多方面,你交付的是你的日历,所以思考你是如何花费时间的,然后相应地阻塞你的时间。
Lenny (00:21:15): 这主要是一种文化,也就是我们的运作方式,还是说有一些原则或某种流程被建立起来以帮助人们做这类事情?
Sri Batchu (00:21:24): 是的,就我们的运作方式而言,它是文化上的,但我们也有模板。我们的人力团队有一个关于如何正确进行日历审查的模板等等。所以我们也试图为新来的人创建一些学习材料,让他们进入这种工作方式的节奏中。
工作与生活的平衡
Lenny (00:21:45): 太棒了。好的,那么在谈论工作非常快、非常努力、响应非常迅速时,房间里的大象就是工作与生活的平衡以及职业倦怠之类的事情。我想说的是,我相信非常努力地工作和长时间工作是成功的重要因素。我知道最近对此有一些反对声音,就像是,不,你不应该那么努力工作,不那样做你也能成功。我不认为那是真的。话虽如此,我想知道你学到了什么,以及你认为 Ramp 在如何找到这种平衡而不是仅仅——
Sri Batchu (00:22:17): 是的。我完全同意你的看法。我确实认为,尤其是在你职业生涯的早期,努力工作对于学习和影响力都极其重要,这是一个许多成功公司都在努力应对的艰难平衡。我认为我最大的心得是,第一,其中一部分就像是自我选择,对吧?你雇佣的是对做这项工作和这种工作方式感到兴奋的人,但至少我倾向于发现,与我共事过的非常成功的人,我们的情况不是问题所在。真正重要的是自主性、灵活性、使命一致性以及他们从工作中获得的整体幸福感。所以我努力关注的正是这些,而不是某个人投入了多少小时,而是工作的质量和影响力。我认为推动取得巨大成果和努力工作的很大一部分,其实是在团队确实全力以赴时对他们表示感激和欣赏,并庆祝胜利。
Sri Batchu (00:23:23): 我认为我们总是可以做得更好,但我认为我们在这方面历来做得很好,庆祝大大小小的胜利。我认为公开构建(building in public)和内部开放的文化的一部分有助于这一点。所以人们总是在分享他们的胜利。然后有一个非常有趣的数据点,我不知道其他公司是否追踪,就是我们在 Zoom 上的全员大会上追踪参与度,看看有多少比例的人参与。通常接近百分之百,就像人们在交谈,整个公司都在 Zoom 聊天框里交谈,因为他们为朋友和同事发布的胜利以及我们在会上谈论的事情感到兴奋。
Lenny (00:24:05): 你们实际上是如何追踪参与度的?有人坐在那里看着谁在聊天吗?
Sri Batchu (00:24:08): 不,肯定是我们 IT 团队可以用某种工具做到。它可以显示有多少比例的参与者发了言之类的。
Lenny (00:24:15): 我明白了。所以不是看谁在看屏幕,而是看谁在聊天框里发言?
Sri Batchu (00:24:18): 是的,完全正确。或者在聊天框里回应等等。
Lenny (00:24:21): 太棒了。而且这并不是说你们必须参与,而更像是我们在提供内容。
Sri Batchu (00:24:26): 不是。顺便说一句,这可能是第一次分享这个。我不认为品牌员工一定知道这个。我不认为我们真的分享过这个。我最近刚从我们 IT 人员那里听到,我觉得这是一个有趣的数据。
Lenny (00:24:38): 我喜欢这一点,因为它更像是我们在为人们提供价值,还是他们真的对这类事情感到兴奋和感兴趣?我想补充一点你关于努力工作和长时间工作可以被看作“哦,这太糟糕了,我希望我能在家里看 Netflix”,但我发现我职业生涯中最充实的部分,或者我疯狂努力工作了很长时间的地方,只要这项工作是有意义的,完全就像你说的,它是重要的,并且出来并发布了,人们对此感到兴奋,而不是“哦,那浪费了我的生命”。所以这引起了强烈的共鸣。
Lenny (00:25:09): 是的。
回归增长话题
Lenny (00:25:10): 我想暂时回到增长的话题上。这里我还有几个问题想问。你谈到了你们拥有的一些关于推动增长方式的团队。你是否认为有一个领域你们会随着时间的推移投入更多,或者你觉得哪个领域效果更好?我知道这里有机密,你不一定想分享,但只要是你觉得人们可能低估或投入不足,而你认为可能会投入更多的任何事情?
Sri Batchu (00:25:34): 在这一点上我想说的是,看,我们和其他人一样,总是专注于在我们的增长引擎中推动更高的效率。有一些渠道,而且我们有一个投资组合(portfolio of bets),对吧?当今增长领域有趣的一点是,我认为历史上过去负责增长的人通常是具有营销或产品背景的人。而现在你看到的,我认为有更多像我这样的人,实际上是来自投资和分析背景来领导增长团队,因为增长已经越来越多地关于在合理投资回报率下的多样化投资组合,以及建立一个围绕实验和数据导向设计的系统。
Sri Batchu (00:26:22): 所以我之所以说这些,是因为我们的目标是随着时间的推移,当然,使我们所有的渠道更有效率,但也要在可扩展的前提下,将更多资源分配给更有效率的渠道。因此,我们越是能通过自有媒体和赢得媒体(owned and earned media)推动客户认知,对我们越有利。所以我们在这一方面有一些不同的策略,但我们也在日复一日地努力使我们其他渠道更有效率。
Lenny (00:26:54): 如此神秘,但我很感激你分享了你能分享的。关于投资组合的观点很有趣,因为仔细想想,大多数公司最初都是从单一渠道增长的。你提到了增长引擎,这也是我使用的术语。通常只有一件事能帮助你最初增长,比如搜索引擎优化或口碑,也可能是付费。然后最终,每家公司基本上都会做所有的增长渠道,然后有一个团队专门致力于不断优化搜索引擎优化,不断优化推荐(referrals)。所以我认为这是一个非常典型的路径。然后正如所说,我们如何使这些渠道中的每一个都尽可能高效?
Sri Batchu (00:27:28): 是的。
Lenny (00:27:29): 也许作为关于 Ramp 增长的最后一个问题。是否还有其他任何真正令人惊讶、有趣且非常有效的策略帮助 Ramp 随着时间推移而增长?
Sri Batchu (00:27:41): 我认为有一件事很有趣,那就是 Ramp 将公关作为增长机器的能力。正如你所见,我们有一个出色的公关和沟通(comms)团队,我们通过它获得了很多理所应当的好报道。而有趣的一件事是我们的融资也作为一种增长策略,显然我们不完全是这样的,我们对融资有非常明确的目标,但我们看到的是,每当我们进行融资,并以此作为创造市场时刻的有效方式时,它实际上为我们推动了相当可观的顶部漏斗(top funnel)。
公关与新媒体策略
Lenny (00:28:22): 人们总是谈论公关,人们在公关上过度投资,他们认为公关将成为一个神奇的增长杠杆,但它有时确实有效,在我看来,你必须有真正有趣的东西才能让它发挥作用,显然你们有,公司疯狂增长,这本身就是一个有趣的故事。创始人非常重要,而且现在对于大多数公司来说,融资很少再像是一个事件了。所以我的意思是,人们关心你们的融资,这说明了很多问题。
Sri Batchu (00:28:51): 你说的完全正确,你必须对你的公关时刻深思熟虑。每个人都想宣布关于自己的事情,但这不一定对媒体或受众有趣。所以要思考如何为普通受众整理出足够的价值。因此,我们的融资公告通常也会对业务中独特之处提供一些额外的细节,我们分享这些是为了给读者提供更多价值。
Lenny (00:29:20): 然后还有像我和你提到的 Packy 这样的时事通讯作者写了关于 Ramp 的文章,因为这也太有趣了。你对这个与传统公关相比有什么感觉?有这样一个,我不知道,巨大的争论,只是传统媒体不再相关了。所有这些其他人都会通过时事通讯和播客之类的东西。你对此有什么感觉?
Sri Batchu (00:29:38): 关键在于通过每种策略你能触达到哪些受众。显然,我们两者都做,既在这些时事通讯和其他策略中获得一些赢得报道,也会付费购买一些,在其他情况下我们会做广告。我们往往发现这些渠道的覆盖面很广,但实际上对招聘非常有效。它提升了 Ramp 作为一家公司在招聘和雇佣方面的声誉,这很有帮助,并且它们对特定客户群体也有帮助,通常是科技创始人以及接近科技生态系统的人。但正如我提到的,世界上绝大多数不是初创公司,而且 Ramp 的大多数客户也不再是科技公司和初创公司。因此,在思考增长方式时,我认为像这样的渠道是等式的一部分,但我认为传统公关(PR)仍将是另一个非常重要的部分,因为它们针对的是不同的受众。
Lenny (00:30:38): 你说话的时候,我看着 Ramp 那个倒计时页面上的天数不断增加,让我感到很焦虑。我觉得我好像在阻碍你去做推动 Ramp 增长的工作,但我们继续吧。我要关掉这个标签页了。你提到了增长引擎。我很好奇关于在公司内部构建增长引擎你学到了什么。换种说法,就是一个可重复、可扩展的增长流程,无论是在 Ramp 还是 Opendoor、Instacart,
增长引擎的构建与团队文化
Sri Batchu (00:31:03): 人们经常谈论团队应该有怎样的正确设计,或者团队中人员的画像等等。我很乐意谈论什么样的人员画像是合适的。我认为这是一个重要的讨论。但我认为团队的设计,人们经常……我认为关于团队结构、团队设计以及什么是正确的设计等等,这些都是障眼法。我认为其中大部分是无关紧要的。真正重要的是文化、仪式和节奏,而不是团队本身。
Sri Batchu (00:31:35): 因此,一个优秀的增长引擎和一个优秀的增长团队,是那种你设定了文化,设定了非常简单的北极星指标(north star metrics),通常是一个,最多两个的团队。并且你建立了一种定义数据驱动假设的文化,以及一种能够快速执行的文化,对产品和非产品项目抱有最小可行性产品心态(MVP mentality),让人们能够快速失败、快速学习和快速迭代。所以我认为这部分在很多方面比特定的人员或他们的职能更重要,尤其是当你开始构建增长引擎时。就像你真正想要设计的目标是,你能否建立一群能够产生新想法、有效评估它们并快速行动的人。
Lenny (00:32:29): 我们来详细拆解一下这些,因为这太棒了。那么关于北极星指标,根据你的经验,有哪些好的北极星指标的例子?收入显然是一个非常常见的指标,但通常它太高层了。你对什么是好的北极星指标有感觉吗?
Sri Batchu (00:32:43): 我喜欢有两个。一个是关于体量和增长的,你希望它,A,非常具有激励性并且让人们直观地理解,同时,B,是增长团队可以直接影响的东西,对吧?收入不管怎样对公司来说更重要,但在增长团队是否能影响它这方面,也离得更远。因此,例如在 Instacart,我们增长的北极星指标是月活跃订单数。这就是我们所有人团结在一起每天查看的东西,我们现在做得怎么样?然后显然,我们在 Instacart 有一个庞大的消费者工程增长团队,300 多人。因此有人在应用的每一个角落工作,在应用之外做获客以推动增长。这就像有些东西是细枝末节,对吧?比如让结账流程稍微好一点或快一点之类的东西。
Sri Batchu (00:33:42): 所以这是一个很好的例子。就像是,好吧,那么我们要用月活跃订单数(MAO)来为那个团队设定目标,他们怎么通过让结账流程稍微好一点来提升月活跃订单数呢?也许他们能产生影响,也许不能。所以我们做的一件事是,实际的基层团队有他们可以直接影响的自己的指标。你希望真正让人们对他们能够影响的事情负责。然后我们通过财务和数据团队,为每个团队的指标创建了一个转换为 MAO 的转换层。
Sri Batchu (00:34:13): 就像是,如果你的结账流程让同一个客户多下了一笔每周订单,它会对公司的 MAO 产生 X 点的影响,然后你只需将所有项目计划以及项目影响汇总回这个单一的 MAO 指标中。这样做还有一个好处是,它也能帮助你更容易地进行跨团队优先级排序。我们应该给这个团队增加更多工程师吗?我们应该给那个团队增加更多预算吗?就像是,好吧,那么 MAO 图是什么样的?在哪里每投入一美元或每位工程师能产生更多的 MAO?这确实帮助我们统一并共同前进。
Lenny (00:34:52): 我对此有一些疑问。这太棒了。顺便问一下,为什么是月活跃订单,而不仅仅是月订单?订单怎么会有不活跃的?
Sri Batchu (00:35:00): 抱歉,是月活跃下单者。
Lenny (00:35:02): 哦,好的。
Sri Batchu (00:35:03): 所以基本上它就是月活跃用户,但我们叫它们订单,因为用户可以只是登录而不下单,对吧。
Lenny (00:35:08): 明白了。
Sri Batchu (00:35:09): 你实际上是在平台上下了单。
Lenny (00:35:11): 是的,我想在 Facebook 曾有对“用户”这个词的抵制。我想他们用的是月活跃人数,所以我懂了。好的,理解了。很有趣。所以你发现,与其让子团队有一个我们只知道它很好的不同指标,而这个指标只是月活跃订单公式中的一个变量,你实际上有一个转换,将那个特定指标的变动转换为北极星指标。
Sri Batchu (00:35:36): 团队在日常工作中,为了他们的冲刺等等,看的是他们自己的指标。但出于规划和资源分配以及汇报的目的,我们会使用转换层,实际上只是在 MAO 的基础上查看一切。
Lenny (00:35:49): 知道这类公式通常并不完美,你具体赋予这个公式多大的权重?
Sri Batchu (00:35:56): 是的。而且我认为总的来说规划过程并不完美。你可以在 Excel 里有一个财务计划,但现实可能会偏离很多。你唯一可以确定的是,你不会完全实现这个计划。所以我们对此做了几件事。一个是建立一种文化,我们知道这不完美,这就像 70/30,80/20,它是用来指导的。所以我们不会在某个东西有 5% 或 10% 的偏差时,使用转换因子来做微小的决策。
Sri Batchu (00:36:29): 那些是基于判断来做的,因为归根结底,不管你使用什么指标框架,边际决策之所以是边际的是有原因的。它们真的是很难决定的事情。因此,这个框架有助于仅仅将那些边际决策的认知超载降下来。所以即使是衡量框架不完美,那些明显会产生大影响的事情也会变得清晰。这就是我们使用的。另一件我们作为节奏保留的事情是,我们实际上会每六个月根据我们已知的关于移动 X 如何影响 MAO 的新信息,为新的规划周期更新所有的转换。
Lenny (00:37:10): 为了让它更具体,那些下级指标有哪些例子?是注册转化率提高了 X% 吗?
Sri Batchu (00:37:17): 各种各样的事情。实际上可能是打开应用时的加载时间。有一个团队正试图让这个更快或更高效,因为我们知道,如果加载需要五秒对比两秒,这会影响这个人最终是否真的下单。因此,完整的客户体验全部分配给了不同的团队,这些团队在优化比如打开需要多长时间,用户在应用上进行的搜索次数。我们知道人们……以及加入购物车的商品数量,比如从购物车到结账的时间,类似这样的事情,我们简直就是把任何用户在整个应用中的旅程都映射出来,并让独立的工程团队专注于这些。
Lenny (00:38:04): 本质上会有某种回归分析(regression analysis)告诉你,这是加载时间对 MAO 的影响。
Sri Batchu (00:38:10): 没错。我们做的另一件事是,这样我们就会有这些转换因子,但我们也能看到所有工作的累积影响是什么,Facebook 也这么做了,那就是为每个界面区域设置长期对照组。所以出于某种原因我一直谈论很多的结账体验团队会有他们自己的对照组。这样我们就能看到,获得上半期体验的人与获得下半期体验的人在对照组上对月活跃订单的累积影响是什么。那会让事情变得非常清楚。所以回归是其中一种方法。然后基本上是有效的 A/B 测试,但只是一个小型的对照组。
Lenny (00:38:46): 性能团队有没有对照组,就是某人只是用着一个非常慢版本的 Instacart?
Sri Batchu (00:38:51): 我其实也很好奇,但几乎所有的东西都有对照组。例如,广告就有对照组。所以外面有一些幸运的 Instacart 用户没有收到广告,而且他们从未收到过广告,因为他们一直都是 Instacart 广告对照组的一部分。
Lenny (00:39:08): 无论他们什么时候想取消那个对照组,这都将是一个巨大的收入提升。
广告对照组
Sri Batchu (00:39:13): 你能想象内部会有关于是否应该有一个永久对照组的对话吗?应该是去年的体验吗?我们应该怎么想,特别是因为它是现代化如此重要的驱动力?
Lenny (00:39:24): 本期节目由 Eppo 赞助播出。Eppo 是一个下一代 A/B 测试平台,由 Airbnb 校友为现代增长团队打造。像 DraftKings、Zapier、ClickUp、Twitch 和 Cameo 这样的公司依靠 Eppo 来驱动他们的实验。无论你在哪里工作,运行实验都变得越来越重要,但是没有能与现代增长团队技术栈集成的商业工具。这导致了浪费时间构建内部工具,或者试图通过笨重的营销工具来运行你自己的实验。
Lenny (00:39:51): 当我在 Airbnb 时,我最喜欢在那里工作的其中一件事就是我们的实验平台,在那里我能够按设备类型、国家、用户阶段对数据进行切片和切块。Eppo 做到了所有这些甚至更多,快速交付结果,避免已知漫长的分析周期,并帮助您轻松找到您发现的任何问题的根本原因。EPO 让您可以超越基本的点击率指标,转而使用您的北极星指标,如激活、留存、订阅和支付。Eppo 支持在前端、后端、邮件营销,甚至机器学习声明上进行测试。请访问 getE-P-P-O.com 查看 Eppo。也就是 geteppo.com,让您实验的速度提升 10 倍。
Ramp 的北极星指标
Lenny (00:40:31): 也许沿着这个特定线索的最后一个问题是,这种将所有东西都转化为北极星指标的框架,是你现在带到你工作的每个地方的东西吗?而这只是你推荐的东西吗?例如,Ramp 也是用这种方式处理事情的吗?
Sri Batchu (00:40:44): 我认为这取决于公司的规模。我认为随着公司变大,这实际上变得更加重要,因为有更多的团队需要确定优先级,以及有更多的资源需要交叉分配。而拥有一种通用货币让这变得容易得多。所以我们在 Ramp 也做了类似的事情,我们有所有团队正在做的各种事情的转换因子,这些转换因子转回 Ramp 的北极星。
Lenny (00:41:07): 酷。那么你愿意分享 Ramp 的北极星指标吗,还是你想保留那部分?
Sri Batchu (00:41:12): 好的,我的意思是我可以告诉你我们在不久前是怎么做的,我们正在演进一些东西,而在不久前,对于增长团队来说,北极星是销售合格线索(SQL)管道的金额。所以任何人做的任何事情,我们都会尝试估计其影响,即对为 Ramp 生成的销售合格线索管道的金额会有什么影响。所以如果网站团队想更改卡片着陆页上的文案,他们的直接影响将是电子邮件提交的转化率或类似的东西,这将是他们优化的目标。然后我们会问,好的,转化率的两个基点对 SQL 管道的金额意味着什么?很多还是不多?然后根据那个,就像,“好吧,不要把时间浪费在做那个项目上。我们改做点别的吧。”所以那只是帮助我们给努力打分并确定优先级。
Gmail 注册问题
Lenny (00:42:03): 这里有一个有趣的故事。当我开始做这个 newsletter 和生意时,我实际上尝试注册过 Ramp,但它没让我注册,因为我有一个 Gmail——
Sri Batchu (00:42:09): 因为 Gmail,是的。
Lenny (00:42:13): 所以我就继续往前走了,那本会是一个巨大的收入机会。我只是在开玩笑。
Sri Batchu (00:42:18): 我知道,我知道。而且我很高兴你提起这个,因为我们显然知道这件事,我们正在为输入了个人电子邮件地址的用户开发一些东西,关于如何重新吸引他们。
Lenny (00:42:30): 你们马上要实现 5 倍增长了,因为那时我没有其他域名。现在我有 Lenny 的 newsletter 之类的东西了,所以就像,“该死,我被卡住了。”
Sri Batchu (00:42:39): 顺便说一下,对于任何其他有那个问题的人,他们可以直接联系我,我们会搞定的。我们不允许使用个人电子邮件的原因是,来到网站输入个人电子邮件的用户通常技术含量非常低。
Lenny (00:42:51): 有道理。我完全理解。我没有被冒犯。我只是觉得,好吧。我没办法绕过它。这就是问题所在。所以我很喜欢你们正在增加一些绕过它的路径,而且你说可以发邮件或联系你。
Sri Batchu (00:43:02): 你可以在 Twitter 上找到我或者给我发电子邮件。就是 sribatchu@ramp。
Lenny (00:43:06): 好的。当这个发布时,你将会拥有 Ramp 任何一个人中最多的销售线索。
成功指标的建议
Lenny (00:43:06): 好的。我想谈的另一件事是成功指标。你谈到过成功的关键之一以及这个可重复的增长引擎是清晰的成功指标。当人们在思考成功指标时,你有什么学习心得和技巧吗?
Sri Batchu (00:43:26): 找到正确的成功指标,通常应该有两个。应该有一个关于数量的,另一个关于效率的。我们可以谈谈什么是好的效率指标,什么是好的数量指标。在数量方面,我认为正确的成功指标有几个重要的东西。一个是与企业的价值创造有清晰的联系。所以如果我推动这个指标,它将驱动收入,并将驱动企业的股权价值,或者无论这个特定的。指标,对于 Facebook 来说是 MAU,对于 Instacart 来说实际上就是月活跃订单,这是我们知道很重要的东西,它将真正驱动企业的价值,但它需要拥有它的另一个组成部分,那就是对于在公司内部工作的所有人来说,它是非常直观的。
Sri Batchu (00:44:17): 而且同样清晰的是,如果他们在处理一些细枝末节,那将如何影响并真正推动主要指标。所以通常你必须找到介于两者之间的东西,既不能太远、太滞后于收入和价值创造,也不能是实际上能直接对应各个团队努力的指标。
Lenny (00:44:39): 有没有一个好的成功指标的例子能立刻浮现在脑海中,好让人们觉得更具体一点?
Sri Batchu (00:44:44): 这仅仅取决于在任何给定时间的目标是什么。有时你试图推动更多用户,有时你试图推动更多参与度,你可以重新调整公司的方向,把你在那段时间内试图做的事情作为增长的北极星指标。所以用户,显然我们已经谈过这是一个好的指标。对于参与度,我经常发现真正有帮助的是,而且你在某个时候实际上做了非常好的基准测试,我认为是一个公司增长的逃逸速度指标。
Sri Batchu (00:45:15): 我不认为你是这样表述的,但这[听不清 00:45:18]对于一个给定用户来说,也就是一个人需要做什么才能成为一个平台的活跃和参与的用户或客户?在 Facebook,是前七天加 10 个好友。在 Instacart,是第一个月下 3 单。在 Ramp,对于我们的激活,我是说这对 Ramp 非常具体,但我们有四个事件是客户需要在前 30 天内完成的。如果他们做到了,他们就有很高的可能性被激活并取得成功。所以我们的激活团队专注于这一点。
衡量增长、参与度与变现
Lenny (00:45:49): 你刚才描述的框架让我想起 Gibson Biddle 有一个非常简单的 gem 框架,在这个框架中你基本上可以优先考虑三件事之一:增长、参与度或变现。而他的建议始终是,它们都很棒,只要确保你们对当时哪个最重要保持一致。
Sri Batchu (00:46:06): 是的。这非常类似于,我们在 Opendoor 以前也有这个,我认为 DoorDash 也使用类似的框架,也就是速度、质量和成本。这三个都很重要,但很难同时优化这三个。所以你需要有一个特定的优先级。我认为增长团队也可以把这个用作,好的,我认为我看待增长团队旅程的方式是,第一步是建立一个可以快速移动的系统,然后致力于提高质量,然后再致力于成本优化。所以你选择你处于哪个阶段,因为你不能同时做这三件事,无论是增长、参与度、变现,或者只是另一种表述框架。
投资回收期与获客成本
Lenny (00:46:49): 说到指标,我这里有一条笔记说你非常推崇用投资回收期来衡量投资的投资回报率,而不是 CAC。你能谈谈为什么吗?
Sri Batchu (00:47:02): 是的。CAC 显然被到处乱用,很多人会说,“好的,你必须降低你的 CAC,CAC,CAC,CAC。”这有一个根本性的缺陷,显然就是你在关注成本而不是衍生的价值。所以当你关注 CAC 并降低 CAC 时,往往发生的事情是你实际上可能在做一些非常有害的事情,你在降低 CAC 上取得了成功,但你实际上引入的是价值较低的客户,因为那些才是你能以较低 CAC 吸引到的人。所以将其从 CAC 转向 LTV 是有帮助的,而且那样更好。所以思考对于更好的、更大的客户,我们想花更多钱。所以你可能会想,好吧,LTV 与 CAC 的比值可能是一个更好的看待它的方式。我认为 LTV 与 CAC 的比值的挑战,特别是对于很多,甚至是 Ramp,它只有四年的历史,是很难预测 LTV。
Sri Batchu (00:47:57): 它就像 DCF,极度依赖假设,而且很难知道最终的价值会是多少。特别是如果你认为你的流失率很低而你的 LTV 非常高,你最终可能会花很多钱,因为你会想,“哦,我的 LTV 与 CAC 的比值很好。”然后在业务开展一两年后,你意识到实际上你的流失率比你想象的要高。你最初的客户并不能代表你的长期留存,突然之间你通过看 LTV 与 CAC 的比值破坏了很多价值,这就是为什么我是投资回收期的一个超级粉丝,并且实际上是真正深思熟虑地使用边际贡献来对待它,而不是收入或毛利,比如从这个客户身上需要多长时间的边际贡献才能收回他们的成本?设置这个显然通常是来自高管和董事会层面的授权,即我们对什么样的投资回收期感到满意,然后只是让每个人都致力于尽可能地降低那个混合投资回收期。
Lenny (00:48:56): 对于那些不熟悉投资回收期或边际贡献概念的人来说,你能简短地向听众描述一下它们是什么意思吗?
Sri Batchu (00:49:01): 是的,所以边际贡献基本上是你在考虑了所有可变成本后从给定客户身上赚取的利润。所以包括生产成本以及服务该客户的任何其他可变成本。所以这可能包括支持和随着你的收入扩展的其他东西。而投资回收期字面意思就是需要多少个月的这种利润来支付?假设你获取这个客户花费了 5000 美元,你在这个客户上每月的预估利润是 500。那就是 10 个月的投资回收期。所以当我说这些时,我确信你听说过,你仍然必须为投资回收期做假设,但至少它们更贴近当下,而且你可以更快地评估它们。
增长渠道的排序
Lenny (00:49:49): 太棒了。谢谢你解释这些。还有几个具体关于增长的问题。所以在一家公司的历史中有很多增长的方式。你可以投资搜索引擎优化,你可以投资付费广告和销售以及推荐和网红营销、品牌营销、广告牌,所有这些东西。你对于一家公司应该如何排序这些投资组合有什么看法吗,尤其是在 B2B 中?
Sri Batchu (00:50:10): 当然,很大程度上取决于你的客户是谁,你独特的价值主张是什么,以及你所处的领域竞争有多激烈。但我确实认为实际上有一条大多数 B2B 公司采取并且坦率说应该采取的通用路径,我的观点是你从创始人主导销售开始,就像早期团队需要知道如何真正销售一样,然后你雇用你的前几个销售人员,然后你开始一些非常低成本的定向营销努力。所以不管是内容、社区、小规模活动,然后是公关。在所有这些之后才是你开始付费和品牌努力的时候。然后搜索引擎优化可能大概在你开始付费营销努力的同时开始。
Sri Batchu (00:50:56): 我所描述的这种递进的原因是,随着你越往后走,渠道会变得更昂贵,随着你对客户了解越多它们会变得更有效,而且随着你在我描述的列表中越往后走,它们也更具可扩展性。所以这就是以这种方式排序背后的意图。搜索引擎优化有点独特。我建议它较晚而不是较早开始的原因,即使它不一定那么昂贵,只是它需要一些时间来建立。而且如果没有域名权重(domain authority)或反向链接(backlinking)或任何媒体曝光度,你最终可能会在搜索引擎优化上盲目挣扎,创造内容但在很长一段时间内没有任何实际成效。所以通常你的公司会有一个很好的拐点来加倍投入搜索引擎优化努力。它比其他一些时间点稍微晚一点。
实验的终极失败
Lenny (00:51:43): 这触及了你关于实验的一个很棒的观点,你谈到你不想仅仅在实验中快速失败。你想决定性地失败,如果可以这么说的话。对吗?然后你能谈谈这个吗?
Sri Batchu (00:51:57): 是的,我在这里和其他地方都与我的团队谈过很多关于这一点,也就是我们庆祝失败。在我的历史经验中,增长实验通常有 30% 左右的成功率。所以你尝试的绝大多数事情都不会奏效。因此你想要创造一种文化,让人们不害怕承担风险,也不害怕失败。对我来说,失败不在于你没有带来收入,失败在于没有学习。所以当你失败时学到东西是非常重要的。因此,只要你学到了东西,我们就庆祝失败,而只有当你设计了正确的测试并且决定性地失败了,你才能学到东西,因为否则,我想我们很多人都经历过这样的情况:直觉认为某些东西可能有效,但它没有效,然后你最终年复一年地反复尝试,因为每次有新的高管或其他什么人有同样的想法,你就再试一次,这是因为你没能设计出能让你决定性失败的测试,而这很难做到。
Sri Batchu (00:53:00): 但归根结底,只有两种方法能让实验成功。要么你有一个非常大的 M,要么有一个非常显著的实验干预(treatment),也就是你在实验本身中所做的。而在 B2B 中,你通常没有大 M 的奢侈,这在消费者领域你是有的。Facebook 可以在两小时内获取统计数据。一家 B2B 公司可能需要两年时间才能获得相同数量的接触点。因此为了抵消这一点,我建议人们尽量最大化实验干预效果(treatment effect),也就是如果你有一个正在测试的假设,就投入所有你认为能推动那个指标的可能策略和资源,因为如果它奏效了,你总是可以在之后进行成本合理化(cost rationalize)。
Sri Batchu (00:53:49): 所以就是最大化实验干预效果。如果用了所有这些都不起作用,那么你可以说,“嘿,我们不会再尝试这个了,因为我们真的是已经尝试了所有能做的来测试这个假设。”如果在最好的版本下都不起作用,而且它已经这么昂贵了,这就不值得花更多时间了。但如果它确实起作用了,太好了,那么你就可以用一半的策略或者你认为效果更好或更差的策略来做另一个版本的测试,并随着时间进行优化。
Lenny (00:54:17): 你能分享一个你这么做的例子吗?
Sri Batchu (00:54:19): 我的意思是,基于账户的营销(account based marketing)在企业软件中是非常普遍的,你选择了某些你认为高优先级的客户,然后你说,“我想以尽可能多细致入微的方式来接触他们,看看这是否能驱动转化。”这是我看到过被尝试了很多次的事情,人们做了,但他们只做了一半,就像,“好吧,试了这三件事。对照组的转化率没有更高。所以我们认为这行不通。”
Sri Batchu (00:55:00): 然后一个新的走向市场(go-to market)高管来了,他们必须再做一次。他们必须再做一次。他们必须再做一次。无论在哪里这都是一个非常常见的现象。所以当我们在 Ramp 做这件事时,我们完全按照我刚才描述的去做,也就是让我们真正对实验设计深思熟虑,无论是在最大化人数方面,还是在最大化我们有效地接触这些目标客户的方式和类型数量方面,从而以这种或那种方式证明其价值。
Lenny (00:55:31): 所以听起来假设不像是这封邮件会对转化产生很大影响。而是这种争取客户的策略才是我们正在测试的东西。
Sri Batchu (00:55:43): 这就是那个例子。我认为例如,这种框架对于跨职能、大规模的测试来说,比修改邮件更重要。但我们甚至可以把它用在一个微观的例子上,比如修改一封邮件,你觉得,好吧,我认为这封特定邮件表现不佳,是因为它没有切中客户痛点或旅程的这一部分,或者别的什么。最简单的测试就是,好吧,让我对文本做一些微调并修改它,那个测试可能就这么结束了。
Sri Batchu (00:56:24): 如果这不起作用,你会想,“哦,也许那些不是正确的文本修改。让我做不同的文本修改或者别的什么。”这没关系,这成本很低。你在这里错了也不是什么世界末日。但你可以做的另一个选择是,哦,在同一个测试中,我能改变关于这封邮件的哪些东西?是邮件的触发条件吗?是邮件的文本内容吗?是额外的个性化吗?是邮件的设计吗?试图想出所有你认为可能有问题的各种杠杆,并把它们放在一起,来测试你关于这个接触点有问题的假设,以及我该如何改进它。
Lenny (00:57:02): 嗯,显然这样做的缺点是,如果它不起作用,你不知道是不是像,哦,也许是因为标题里某个本来能起作用的元素——
Sri Batchu (00:57:08): 是的。所以这里总是有权衡的。但你希望的是你做了一个彻底的翻新,你做了所有你认为直觉上应该起作用的事情。如果它不起作用,你就会想,“好吧,也许我的假设是错的。”但你是对的。如果可能是执行错了,而我在那种情况下很可能一次性改了太多东西,那就总是会有挑战。
速度文化与实验规模
Lenny (00:57:29): 这与速度文化是如何契合的?是不是就是非常快地做这些事情,即使它不像微优化,而是像扩大规模但快速地做?
Sri Batchu (00:57:39): 是的。是的。所以这就是为什么我认为界定这种方法在何处重要是很关键的。所以我认为,对于那些你可以非常、非常快地失败并直接重做的事情,我不太担心是否决定性失败,对吧?比如网站转化、邮件等等。对于那些需要花一些时间计划并且花钱等等的事情,我更担心这个。
增长团队的工具
Lenny (00:58:05): 明白了。好的。太好了。也许还有一个关于增长的最后问题。对于增长团队来说,你最喜欢的一些工具是什么,无论是内部的,任何你能分享的,还是外部的,能让你们高效和有效地运营的?
Sri Batchu (00:58:19): 我们用过的一些东西,我是说,一个简单的事情是关于冲刺计划的,实际上,我们使用 Airtable,因为计划过程和评分要分析化得多,还有转换层(translation layer)。所以我们有一个关于我们如何做冲刺计划以及如何将各种影响指标转换为通用货币(common currency)的模板,我很喜欢这个,但我不认为它非得是 Airtable。它只是一种对那个目的运作良好的某种组织形式。在我们最近喜欢的一个非常战术性的增长工具方面,我们使用了一家叫 Mutiny 的公司,它也是面向客户的,这是一个用于网站文案、个性化的工具。所以他们接入我们付费的第三方数据源,根据我们在客户登陆我们页面时对他们的了解,我们可以基于此进行个性化文案和设计。这产生了实质性的影响,并允许我们扩展网站实验的规模。
Lenny (00:59:18): 太棒了。那么你们有没有构建什么内部工具来帮助进行实验,或者我不知道,共享数据、仪表板?我不知道,还有没有什么别的什么让人感觉,哇,这真的帮我们加快了速度?
Eric,我们的 CEO,已经公开谈论过这件事。我认为作为一家公司,我们在内部构建什么与外部购买什么方面非常深思熟虑。我认为很多工程团队经常对在内部构建东西感到兴奋,而实际上有现成的产品可以在外部使用。而 Ramp 历来都很擅长不落入那个陷阱。对于我们的很多增长和实验,对于非专有的、非战略性的等等事物,显然我们使用了第三方工具。我们谈到的某些自动化东西,在寻找潜在客户、线索评分以及我们如何与客户沟通方面,我们都是在内部构建了所有这些。但在大多数情况下,我们使用外部工具。Instacart 和 Opendoor 就不是这样。我们在内部构建了我们自己的内部实验跟踪系统、A/B 测试框架以及所有那些东西。
Lenny (01:00:25): 这和我对 Ramp 的猜测一样,为了速度,你绝不能去构建那些你没必要构建的东西。所以这非常有道理。好的。也许还有最后一个话题想聊聊。我想谈谈招聘。你在如何思考招聘方面有一些非常有趣的方法。其中一点,我认为你有一个非常有趣的策略,关于如果在为特定角色招聘时,如何找到最好的公司,以及这些公司里最好的人去争取。你能谈谈你是怎么想的吗?
寻找顶尖人才的策略
Sri Batchu (01:00:51): Gokul 在 Twitter 上谈论过其中一些,也就是招聘优秀人才有两种方法。一种方法基本上是非常深思熟虑和战术性的网络搜索,假设你正在招聘一位搜索引擎优化(SEO)负责人,你去问你的网络中谁知道最好的 SEO 人员,获得对每个人的介绍,然后问他们谁知道最好的人是谁。你会有一张关于最好的 SEO 团队在哪里以及为什么的地图。如果你无法得到那些人,你的目标名单上的 20、30 个人,你就顺着名单往下看,好的,下一个最好的人是谁?你通常希望将范围限制在比你领先一到两个增长阶段的公司。所以你想要一个在以其在你所寻找的领域的专业能力而闻名的公司里,经历过你目前的增长阶段以及之后阶段的人。所以那是一种非常经典的方法,我认为对于人脉非常广的人和公司来说,这非常有效。
Sri Batchu (01:01:56): 所以还有另一种我实际上成功使用过的方法,它更偏向数据驱动和外部导向,而不是基于网络的,也就是你通常可以查阅数据。[听不清 01:02:14] 很多数据在某种程度上是公开的,对吧?所以你可以查阅关于哪些公司可能做得好的信息。例如,我就随便举个例子,如果你在寻找优秀的电子邮件营销人员,比如客户关系管理系统(CRM)营销负责人或者类似的东西,你实际上可以在 similar web 上查阅,通过电子邮件进入公司网站的流量百分比是多少。所以你得到了一份你作为公司整体所尊重的、比你领先一到两个阶段的目标公司名单。然后你可以去看看,好的,这些公司中哪些实际上在通过电子邮件推动网站流量、应用流量或应用下载方面非常有效。然后去尝试从那些团队和公司挖掘人才。我认为人们低估了这种方法的运用,尽管它非常直观,但人们就是想不到去做这件事。
Lenny (01:03:03): 我喜欢这个。我以前没听过这个技巧。第一部分,Google 肯定推荐过这个,我认为那部分的核心,也是这里的主题,就是找到在你试图招聘的领域做得最好的公司,然后一旦你开始和里面的人交谈,就弄清楚公司里谁是最好的。我很喜欢。我认为你有的另一个强烈观点是关于付钱给人,以及给最好的人付多少钱。你能谈谈这个吗?
薪酬理念
Sri Batchu (01:03:30): 是的,我认为现在有很多关于薪酬的讨论非常侧重于平等、缩小差距和薪酬区间。我个人认为,我知道这可能有点激进,但我认为这恰恰与公司应该就薪酬进行的讨论方向相反,也就是我强烈、强烈地相信,成功人士组成的小团队比平庸人士组成的大团队能产生大得多的影响。
Sri Batchu (01:04:05): 因此我强烈认为,你必须设计一个系统,在这个系统中你能够用 10 倍的薪酬奖励 10 倍效能的执行者。你当然在高管层面能看到这一点。所以如果你看处于相似阶段的不同公司的同一位高管,薪酬可能会有很大差异,原因有很多。但其中之一是管理团队对其绩效和潜力的看法。我认为人们需要思考如何在更多层级上做到这一点,也就是如果你能做到,并且做得很好,我认为你就能够差异化地招聘和留住最优秀的人才。对于能做到这一点的公司来说,这将是一个巨大的竞争优势。
Lenny (01:04:48): 那么你是考虑在一个团队内给最好的人付最多的钱,还是更多是只招聘这些 10 倍效能的人,然后给所有人付最多的钱?
Sri Batchu (01:04:58): 人们认为你们公司的人才密度取决于招聘。这显然是正确的。它是生态系统的重要组成部分和第一部分,但它同样取决于留存和绩效管理。很多公司可能擅长招聘,但招聘有相当高的假阳性率。面试是招聘某人最不完美却又最好的方式。并且有很多方法可以改善面试过程,使其更具互动性,更有效,但归根结底,在你真正与新团队、在你们公司的新任务下密切合作之前,你仍然不了解一个人。
Sri Batchu (01:05:40): 所以我认为不一定非得是招聘[听不清 01:05:44]的执行者,显然你在寻找这样的人,但它同样关乎投资于那些做得非常好的人,并在他们入职后根据其影响加速他们的成长和奖励,以及直接管理淘汰那些不合适的人。我通常认为,当我不得不与某人分道扬镳时,几乎从来不是因为这人是个坏分子。这几乎总是因为不管出于什么原因,不管是技能组合、人生目标还是其他什么,只是不合适。而且仅仅是不适合那个角色。坦白说,我认为很多公司对做出这些改变犹豫不决,我认为这就是他们如何降低了人才门槛的原因。
Lenny (01:06:28): 完全同意。Sri,在我们进入非常激动人心的闪电问答之前,你还有什么其他想涉及的话题吗?
工作方法论
Sri Batchu (01:06:35): 我不知道有多少人会使用这个。当新来的人找我,说顺便我需要写一份关于如何与我合作的文档时,我仍然会感到惊讶。因为我知道很多人都在谈论这个,我想 [听不清 01:06:51] Johnson 也谈过这个,但我说我的爱的语言是电子表格和框架。有一个我一直很喜欢、有时人们听到会惊讶,但大多数顾问都知道的非常简单的框架,就是我们所说的 MECE,即相互独立、完全穷尽的事物集合。所以每当你试图攻克一个问题,试图头脑风暴解决方案之类的时,我真的很喜欢提醒团队去思考 MECE,因为当你考虑到这一点,并在心中带着这个框架去评估你的解决方案集合时,我认为你往往会发现你抓住了更多潜在的解决方案,并且你会感到放心,你在解决方案开发上是全面的。所以不管怎样,这只是给职业生涯早期的人们的一点提醒,不要忘记这一点。
Lenny (01:07:46): 那我们把这个小点稍微展开一点。所以相互独立、完全穷尽(MECE),有没有一个例子,能让人直观地看到它在实践中意味着什么?
Sri Batchu (01:08:00): 是的。我的意思是,我会举一个非常笨的例子,但希望能说明问题。比如,我们的盈利能力或收入增长放缓了,这就是你要解决的问题。然后好,你从这开始,这是什么意思?要么是每用户收入下降了,要么是客户下降了,要么是客户数量增长放缓了。好的,这就是相互独立、完全穷尽(MECE)框架的第一步。然后就像,好的,收入从哪里来?收入可能来自哪些各种各样的产品?其中任何一个有变化吗?然后关于客户,为什么客户下降了?是新客户获取?是已注册客户的激活?还是留存?就是这样拆解问题。所以在每一层,你都已经完全穷尽了这个问题可能产生的所有途径。只要在处理每个问题时都有这个框架,就能防止你遗漏重要的东西。而且更广泛地说,也能给他人信心,让他们相信你在解决方案开发上是全面的。
Lenny (01:09:11): 明白了。所以在具体情况中,思考这个问题的一种方法就是,把所有影响你试图回答的问题的变量列成一个公式。
Sri Batchu (01:09:19): 是的,完全正确。
Lenny (01:09:20): 太棒了。好吧,Sri,说到这里,我们已经到了非常激动人心的闪电问答环节。你准备好了吗?
Sri Batchu (01:09:26): 准备好了,开始吧。
Lenny (01:09:28): 你向别人推荐最多的是哪两三本书?
Sri Batchu (01:09:32): 我往往觉得大多数商业书其实可以做成幻灯片就行了,但我真正喜欢的一本是 Chris Voss 的 Never Split The Difference。这是一本关于谈判的书,我发现它对谈判超级有帮助,但老实说,对很多一般性的商业决策和生活也很有用。然后我是科幻短篇故事的超级粉丝,所以 Ted Chiang 或 Ken Liu 的任何作品我都强烈推荐。
Lenny (01:09:57): 这两本我都喜欢。关于第一本,我其实正在听它的有声书,但每次我遇到可以谈判的场合,我从来都想不起我学过的任何东西。有没有哪一点是你从那本书里带走并印在脑海里,觉得“我会用这个”的?
Sri Batchu (01:10:11): 我认为这本书的核心真的是关于倾听谈判问题背后的东西,以及这个人真正想要的是什么。所以他的例子是,如果你总是试图平分东西,你最终会得到一只棕色的鞋和一只黑色的鞋,你们俩都不开心。因此,与其思考最佳替代方案(BATNA)和可能达成协议的空间(ZOPA)以及所有其他商学院的谈判框架,我认为应该专注于深究这个其他人到底想要什么,以及我如何能改变关于那个的对话,而不是改变我们正在争论的东西。
Lenny (01:10:47): 太棒了。很好。下一个问题。最近最喜欢的一部电影或电视剧是什么?
Sri Batchu (01:10:51): 我的意思是,它显然拿了奥斯卡,但我真的很喜欢 Everything Everywhere All at Once。我觉得它是一个如此精彩的故事,而且我真的觉得它是那种……很有趣。这部电影本身也可以是,我觉得,包罗万象的,因为你可以从中得到太多不同的解读。它是关于家庭的,关于移民的,关于爱的。通过一部电影探索了很多非常有趣的主题。
Lenny (01:11:19): 你最喜欢问的面试问题是什么?
Sri Batchu (01:11:21): 我本来想说,哦,我喜欢问其他人。
Lenny (01:11:24): 你喜欢问。你以为我要问什么?
Sri Batchu (01:11:26): 哦,我以为你会问我最喜欢你或别人问过的面试问题是什么?
Lenny (01:11:30): 哦,我得澄清一下。两个都是可以接受的答案。
Sri Batchu (01:11:37): 我本来想在这个问题上投机取巧,说就是你刚才问我的那个,因为我其实是个电影和电视节目的超级粉丝,而在这样的访谈中人们很少问这个,但我实际最喜欢问候选人的面试问题是,有什么事情是你真的很不擅长,但你仍然在做,为什么?
Lenny (01:11:58): 当你问他们这个问题时,你在他们的回答中寻找什么?
Sri Batchu (01:12:01): 是的,其实很多人在这个问题上都很挣扎,说不出任何他们做但不擅长的事情,这有点像是一个黄牌警告,这意味着他们只习惯于做他们能成功的事情,而且他们没有培养与自己在做某事上的成功不相关的兴趣。并且他们也没有花时间去这样做。而这样的人在遇到麻烦的第一个迹象时就会逃跑,然后会说,“哦,我不擅长这个,所以我要换方向了。”而我真正想看到的是,那些能展示出为了其他动机、目标和兴趣而去做不成功之事的例子的人。所以如果你能给我讲一个那样引人入胜的故事,可以说通常就是一个获胜的答案。
Lenny (01:12:43): 最近发现的、你最喜欢的一两个产品是什么?
Sri Batchu (01:12:46): Carrie 在这次通话中提到过一次 Eight Sleep。我爱我的 Eight Sleep。我是它的超级粉丝,而且他们也是 Ramp 的客户。所以那是疫情期间的一个很棒的购买。所以我想可能不算太近期。然后可能另一个是 Fellow coffee,他们的水壶我觉得设计得太美了。我不喝咖啡,我喝茶,但我用我的 Fellow 水壶泡茶,我觉得它只是一个用起来令人愉悦的产品。
Lenny (01:13:15): 我也是为了喝茶买的 Fellow 水壶,但我发现水流太慢了,就站在这里一直倒这个手冲。
Sri Batchu (01:13:24): 是的。是的。所以他们确实有一款非手冲水壶,我用的就是那款,这样倒水更容易。
Lenny (01:13:29): 好吧。我的错。下一个问题。在产品开发流程中,你做过什么相对微小的改变,却发现它对你的执行力有很大影响?
Sri Batchu (01:13:42): 是的,我的意思是,我不知道这算不算微小,但在增长方面,我们过去为产品团队、营销团队分别做迭代规划,每个团队都有自己的规划周期。我们做的一件事是把它们全部合并成一个。所以生命周期营销人员加入了产品激活团队的迭代周期,这样他们的项目和工作就与其他产品团队非常紧密地保持一致,并以相同的节奏和系统工作。这对我们协同工作的能力产生了巨大的影响。
Lenny (01:14:19): 最后一个问题,Ramp 的核心就是帮助人们省钱。我很好奇你在省钱方面有没有什么建议。
Sri Batchu (01:14:26): 我的意思是,这似乎很明显,而且我觉得谈判已经成为这个闪电问答的主题了,但在涉及到合同时,一切都是可谈判的。人们认为软件合同是标准化的,但通常并非如此。人们试图卖给你东西,他们自己也在试图成长。他们有要完成的销售配额,有要达成的目标。所以我的意思是,如果你想扩大这些 Ramp,Ramp 显然有这方面的服务,但你自己也可以做。总是试着去谈判,留意销售人员的季度末。所以如果你能把某件事拖到接近季度末,你可以要求,“嘿,如果你给我 10% 的折扣,我就会在月底前签掉它”,这通常会奏效。所以你可以做诸如此类的技巧,但记住你总是可以谈判的。
Sri Batchu (01:15:10): 然后第二个,我想说就是慢点招人。我非常相信,而且 Geoff 在你的另一次采访中也谈到了这一点,基于斜率而不是截距来招聘,我认为这对你会很有效,并且只有在人和团队真正被拉伸时才招人。我认为这在成本和影响力方面都会对你大有裨益。你招来的人会有很大的发挥空间,而且正如我所说,我非常相信小团队成就更多,就像 Ramp 的规模只是我们一些竞争对手的一小部分,但收入却处于同一量级。
总结与联系方式
Lenny (01:15:47): 当然。我们涵盖了速度、增长、招聘。这么多话题,所有我希望我们触及的内容。最后两个问题,如果大家想联系你并了解更多,在哪里可以找到你?以及听众怎么能帮到你?
Sri Batchu (01:15:59): 是的,我很喜欢 Twitter 这个有趣的粪坑之地,所以我有一个公开的 Twitter 账号,你可以给我发私信。我的私信是开着的,就是我的名字 sri_batchu。至于听众怎么能帮到我,说实话,我觉得我真的很喜欢结识志同道合的人,而且正如我可能在其他地方提到过的,Ramp 增长得非常好,我们在不断寻找招聘机会,我们也还在招人。所以如果你认识顶级的营销增长人才,可以推荐我们在 Ramp 招聘他们,我很乐意听听。
Lenny (01:16:40): 我想链接是 ramp.com/careers。我刚刚调出来了。
Sri Batchu (01:16:43): 对,就是这个。谢谢。
Lenny (01:16:47): 好的,Sri,非常感谢你再次来到这里并分享了这么多。
Sri Batchu (01:16:49): 是的,当然。谢谢。
播客结语
Lenny (01:16:52): 再见,大家。非常感谢收听。如果你觉得这很有价值,你可以在 Apple Podcasts、Spotify 或你最喜欢的播客应用上订阅本节目。另外,请考虑给我们打分或留下评论,因为这真的能帮助其他听众找到这个播客。你可以在 lennyspodcast.com 找到所有往期节目或了解更多关于本节目的信息。下期见。
术语表
| 原文 | 中文 |
|---|---|
| account based marketing | 基于账户的营销 |
| annualized revenue | 年化收入 |
| backlinking | 反向链接(backlinking) |
| BATNA | 最佳替代方案(BATNA) |
| bips | 基点 |
| blended payback period | 混合投资回收期 |
| building in public | 公开构建 |
| Carrie | Carrie |
| Chris Voss | Chris Voss |
| common currency | 通用货币 |
| comms | 沟通 |
| contribution margin | 边际贡献 |
| cost rationalize | 成本合理化 |
| CRM | 客户关系管理系统(CRM) |
| data enrichment | 自动数据丰富 |
| DCF | DCF |
| domain authority | 域名权重(domain authority) |
| DoorDash | DoorDash |
| Eric | Eric |
| escape velocity metric | 逃逸速度指标 |
| FinTech | 金融科技 |
| founder-led sales | 创始人主导销售 |
| Founders Fund | Founders Fund |
| Geoff | Geoff |
| Gibson Biddle | Gibson Biddle |
| go-to market executive | 走向市场高管 |
| holdout | 对照组 |
| Instacart | Instacart |
| Keith Rabois | Keith Rabois |
| Ken Liu | Ken Liu |
| leads | 线索 |
| LTV | LTV |
| MECE | 相互独立、完全穷尽(MECE) |
| MVP mentality | 最小可行性产品心态 |
| north star metrics | 北极星指标 |
| OKR | 目标与关键结果 |
| Opendoor | Opendoor |
| owned and earned media | 自有媒体和赢得媒体 |
| Packy | Packy |
| payback period | 投资回收期 |
| pipeline | 销售管道 |
| portfolio of bets | 投资组合 |
| PR | 公关 |
| product market fit | 产品市场契合度 |
| prospects | 潜在客户 |
| quota | 销售配额 |
| referrals | 推荐 |
| regression analysis | 回归分析 |
| revenue per employee | 每员工收入 |
| roadmap | 路线图 |
| run rate | 年化经常性收入 |
| SaaS | 软件即服务 |
| SEO | 搜索引擎优化(SEO) |
| skunk work | 臭鼬工厂 |
| Slack | Slack |
| SMB | 中小企业 |
| SQL pipeline | 销售合格线索(SQL)管道 |
| Sri Batchu | Sri Batchu |
| startup credit | 初创公司信用额度 |
| Ted Chiang | Ted Chiang |
| TikTok | TikTok |
| top funnel | 顶部漏斗 |
| top line | 顶线 |
| translation layer | 转换层 |
| treatment | 实验干预 |
| treatment effect | 实验干预效果 |
| VC | 风投 |
| word of mouth | 口碑 |
| ZOPA | 可能达成协议的空间(ZOPA) |
此文档由 AI 分片翻译(translate_long_document)