参与度层级 | Sarah Tavel(Benchmark、Greylock、Pinterest)
The hierarchy of engagement | Sarah Tavel (Benchmark, Greylock, Pinterest)
Sarah Tavel: I think a lot of people think about markets almost like these bodies of water, it’s like it’s this big body of water that we’re going after. I actually think that the most interesting markets, you have to think of them like currents where you’re there’s something happening in the market that’s creating this current where you can have a plank of wood that you’ve put on the river and it’s going to pull you forward. Versus a market that doesn’t really have that momentum to it, you’re going to have to build something really big and fancy to make any progress. That’s why we care less about market size because really, what you’re looking for when you’re looking at a market, are what are the dynamics of change, what’s the current and momentum that’s going to pull the company and make the job easier for the founders to actually build something that endures.
About the Guest
Lenny: Today, my guest is Sarah Tavel. Sarah is a partner at Benchmark, one of the most preeminent venture capital funds in the world, where she focuses on investing in consumer and marketplace startups. Prior to Benchmark, Sarah was the first product manager at Pinterest. And though I normally have a policy against VCs on the podcast, as you’ll see, Sarah thinks very much like a product and growth leader. And I always learn a ton talking to Sarah about startups and marketplaces. We also learn in our conversation, she used to play rugby and was apparently one of the best tacklers in her league.
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Sarah, thank you so much for being here and welcome to the podcast.
Sarah Tavel: Super excited to be here.
Overview of Two Frameworks
Lenny: So you may or may not know this, but actually, normally have a policy of no VCs on the podcast. But you’re a very special VC because you’re a former product manager. Many people don’t know you were the first product manager at Pinterest. To me, you still think like a product manager so I’m very excited to break my rule and have you on the podcast.
Origins of Engagement Hierarchy
Sarah Tavel: Thank you for the exception.
Lenny: What I want to do with our time together is dig into two frameworks that you’ve developed and use with founders that you work with to help them build successful companies. One is focused around customer businesses, and one marketplace businesses.
Let’s just start with the first framework. I think you call it the Hierarchy of Engagement. Just to start, could you maybe just share a broad overview of this framework? And also, just where it emerged from, where you came up with this concept?
Picking the Core Action: Pinterest
Sarah Tavel: Sure. I think one thing you’ll notice about me is that I have an allergic reaction to vanity metrics, what people talk about as vanity metrics. When I made the transition from Pinterest, where I was leading product for the discovery team, so I was responsible for all the discovery surfaces on Pinterest. The home feed, the search, the recommendations, a couple other teams. Ultimately, what those teams were about was about engagement, increasing engagement of Pinterest. It was helping people, when they were on Pinterest, find something that they loved enough that they wanted to pin it to one of their boards.
When I started to meet with all these really talented consumer founders building consumer social products, this was during a time when everybody was getting excited about growth hacking. What you would see is that you would see all these founders coming in, and they all had these up and to the right graphs, whether it was sign-ups, or downloads, or MAUs. It felt to me like it wasn’t obvious that those metrics that they were all getting very attached, and focused on, and showing in these presentations was the wrong thing to focus on. It didn’t get to the heart of whether they were on the path to building enduring consumer social product. They were missing, at the core, the criticality of engagement.
I just started to feel this and it became like a pebble in my shoe. I started just to go through that process that you’ve gone through many times before of writing and distilling it, and that’s where I came up with this hierarchy. What you realize when you look at social products is that they’re almost is this action which I call the core action of that product that forms the foundation of the product. When a user completes this action, it’s clear that they both understand the utility of the product, they understand what that product is all about, and it’s an action that, if they perform the action, they’re very likely to come back. So for Facebook, the obvious action is friending, in the beginning days. For Pinterest, it’s pinning. I don’t know if you’re an Evernote user. For Evernote, it’s writing a note. When you perform that action, that means you’re an engaged user. Of course, there’s a lot of other actions that you have to do. You can follow people on Pinterest, you comment on Facebook. But the end of the day, if you’re not doing that action, you’re not really a user to the product. That’s why the MAU thing doesn’t really mean anything. It’s really looking at, I think, of users completing the core action. You can look at this as a cohort, weekly, daily, whatever the right cadence is. But that’s the foundation, that’s level one.
Activation and the Core Action
Lenny: Basically, there’s some definition of an active user that a consumer business basically needs to define, and essential figure out what is that action they’re taking that makes them an active user versus just opening up the app, or whatever it is. For Snapchat, it might be sending a snap.
Sarah Tavel: That’s right.
How to Use the Framework
Lenny: For What’s App, it might be sending a message. Okay, cool.
Layer Two: Retention Improves Product
Sarah Tavel: Yes. Yes. By the way, this action, it’s very important to pick the right action. You want to make sure it’s an action that scales to enough users. You want to think about, “If I think about my product roadmap and optimize for it, what do we end up doing?”
Just to give you a more concrete example, actually in the early days of Pinterest, we weren’t sure what it was. We had all these things we were measuring. We were measuring follows, we were measuring clicking through, liking something, pinning obviously, time on site. We would do these experiments and you would get all this different data where some things would go up, some things would go down. What were we optimizing for?
There’s something that’s really, really important about having that clarity of this is the action that is most important for our product. All things, our NUX has to lead to this. If a user isn’t doing this, then there’s something missing from their experience of the product. It’s super important to get real clarity and know exactly the one that you’re going to be picking to go forward.
Lenny: One more question along these lines. How do you think about this milestone versus the activation milestone for a new user? Do you find they’re often the same? Getting your user to that aha moment-
Layer Three: Self-Driving Network Effects
Sarah Tavel: Yes.
Lenny: Versus ongoing?
Growth and Re-engagement Loops
Sarah Tavel: Right. Part of it is how do you measure the success of your NUX, of the activation? To me, it is are you taking those new users and helping them understand the mental model of your product well enough that they start completing the core action.
Lenny: Awesome.
What Evernote Missed
Sarah Tavel: There was a NUCs once that we played with at Pinterest where we didn’t even teach people what pinning was. It was their feed magically appeared and it was a real … That was an example of okay, we have to help people understand that they are here to discover something and save it to their board.
The Trap of Broken Flywheels
Lenny: Just in case people don’t know what NUX is, new user experience. It’s just an acronym for new user experience.
Sarah Tavel: Thank you. Yes.
Why Consumer Products Must Self-Distribute
Lenny: Okay. Maybe one more just foundational thing that I think we maybe skipped is what’s the best way to think about using this framework? Is this essentially where you should focus your energy, on which elements of your product you should be driving, which metrics to focus on? Is that a simple way to think about … Basically, we’ve talked about layer one and there’s three layers. What’s the best way to think about, as you’re talking through this framework, of how to apply it and use it?
Sarah Tavel: In a way, you have to think holistically when you’re building these consumer products, when you’re designing it. But I think it’s very important, once you get the product out and you’re starting to optimize, to start thinking through each of the levels. That’s just very focusing, to help a founder understand, “What are the levers that I really have to be focusing on to improve?”
The Flip Side of Viral Growth
Lenny: Awesome. I want to come back to how to apply it, in maybe some examples, after we go through the three levels so I’ll turn it back to you.
Sarah Tavel: Perfect. Let’s say you’re building your product and you’re starting to see that you have users completing the core action. Then, the next challenge you have, and I’ve seen this many times before, is that then you have to figure out how to get those users to stick around. You want to retain those users. Obviously, if they do the core action once or twice, and then they run out of steam, you’re going to be in a really challenged position to build something that endures.
The test for me, of whether you’re building a product that has the ingredients to create a retentive product on a micro level, just at the user level, is that the product should get better the more you use it, and you’ll have more to lose by leaving it. I’ll give you a couple examples there, a couple of my favorite products.
Obviously, Pinterest. One of the features that I worked on when I was at Pinterest and we shipped was this idea of a picked for you feed. The idea was every time you pinned something to a board, we would take that information that the user gave us and use it to create recommendations in their home feed. It may have been the first algorithmic feed that was in a social product because, suddenly your home feed wasn’t just things and people that you followed. The truth is, people weren’t really following other people on Pinterest so we needed a way to make the experience get better the more you used it, so we started to do these recommendations in your home feed.
It was this experience that, the more you pinned, the more personalized your home feed got for you. Then, the more you pinned, you also had more to lose by leaving Pinterest because, all of a sudden, you had all your favorite books, articles you wanted to remember, the recipes that you were planning on cooking one day, the holiday planning that you were doing. So you wouldn’t abandon Pinterest because Pinterest was this repository for these different expressions of your identity, or these different bookmarks that you wanted to back to. That was this idea. It’s very important that the core action is the thing that you use as the product to make the experience better over time.
Evernote, another example. I don’t know if you’re an Evernote user.
The Trap of Anonymity
Lenny: No. I tried it once and it was way too complicated, and I gave up quickly.
Sarah Tavel: People still laugh at me for being an Evernote user.
Ways to Improve Retention
Lenny: Oh, wow.
Sarah Tavel: I’m a lifetime user.
The Importance of Focus
Lenny: Wow.
Most Common Founder Mistakes
Sarah Tavel: It’s one of those things that I take all my notes in Evernote. I dump documents in Evernote. What I means is that, the more I use it … Now I know that I can do a search in my Evernote and I’m going to find the document I’m looking for. Now, I can never leave Evernote. It has everything. I have thousands and thousands of documents in Evernote. That’s a product that’s incredibly retentive.
Lenny: Unless someone builds a great exporter, and then there goes that piece of friction.
Exploring Pinterest’s Core Action
Sarah Tavel: People keep telling me I need to move on to Notion or something else, but not yet. I will remain a dinosaur here.
Lenny: Wow. I love that that’s an example of someone can break that barrier and make it less retentive, by making it easier to get off.
YouTube’s Core Action: Subscribing
Sarah Tavel: Yes.
Summary of the First Framework
Lenny: It’s interesting growth strategy, basically.
Sarah Tavel: Yes. Yeah, it’s very true. Let’s say, now, you have a product, it’s growing, more people are completing the core action. When they complete that core action, the product gets more retentive for them. It gets better the more they use it, they have more to lose by leaving it. Then, your tall task, and this is the hardest thing to overcome, is how do you make the product self-perpetuating? This is where I love to think of every time a user users your product, let’s say they’re clicking on the mouse or they’re tapping on their phone, I love to think of it as this kinetic energy that they’re putting into your product. You’re taking that energy, and your job with a great product, is to take that energy and, as much as possible, convert it back to the experience that they’re having with your product.
Now, the biggest thing that you can do is a network effect. The more I pin something on Pinterest, the better the experience for every user on Pinterest. Every time I add a pin to a board, I’m creating a new edge in Pinterest Graph, that Pinterest then uses to create recommendations and enrich their understanding of all those objects on Pinterest. The network effect is the strongest thing that you can do. And obviously, if you have that, which all social products have to in some way, you have to spend time, as much as possible, just maximizing where that shows up, fine-tuning it, removing friction so that it’s a flywheel that spins faster and faster.
But, there’s other loops too, that you have to identify and then maximize. These are the growth and re-engagement loops. These are classic loops, you talk about these a lot, they exist in marketplaces and social products. How do you get it so that, as your users use the product, they want to share it with other people? They create metadata that you can then use for SEO. You have collaborative experiences that pull other people in. There’s all different things you can do here. And then, there’s also things that you can do to re-engage a user.
As an example, in the early days of Pinterest, if you pinned something, you’re pinning something that you found on Pinterest that somebody else pinned. So we would send a push notification, “Hey, Lenny, Sarah just pinned your pin to her art board.” Now, if you were a dormant user at that point, it’s been a couple weeks since you’d used Pinterest, that notification might pull you back into Pinterest and be like, “Hey, I wonder what other pins Sarah has on her art board.” It’s a great re-engagement loop where Pinterest doesn’t have to do anything there intentional. The user is creating the action that drives the outcome that Pinterest wants in that example.
Now, as much as I love Evernote, this is a place where Evernote obviously falls down. There’s no loops that they can take advantage of, that when I use the product, I make it better for you. There’s no loop where, when I use the product, I want to pull you into the product. They tried at some point, to do collaborative journals, it doesn’t work. That’s a place where, because of that, Evernote had to spend money to acquire users, they tapped out. They missed that level three.
There’s other examples I could speak to, of companies that weren’t able to transcend to level three, that you wouldn’t otherwise think. I think of companies like Houseparty and Clubhouse. What was interesting about both of those products is that you would think that the more users that came into Clubhouse or Houseparty, the faster the flywheel should spin. But the challenge was that they relied on push notifications. I don’t know if you had this experience, but let’s take Houseparty as an example. You started to follow a lot of people on Houseparty, and then all of a sudden, your push notifications just got overwhelming. Because it was a realtime product, that you had to use push noti cations to know the moment to join the product, but when you had so many push notifications because the more people you followed, the more notifications you had, you just get to this point where you start ignoring them. It becomes this thing where, even though the flywheel should be spinning faster, it starts breaking down. That’s the real tricky nuance in this level three.
The Marketplace Hierarchy Framework
Lenny: I think people hearing this are going to be like, “Okay, getting people to use your product more often, increase retention, make it viral basically,” it’s stuff they already know. But I think what’s powerful about this is this is just a lens, a clarifying lens on what is most important. There’s so many things you can be focusing on to increase your product’s success and help it grow. What I love here is just, “Here’s the three most important things, and then here’s the levels.” They build on each other. If you want to increase retention, get people to do the core action more often. If you want to help it grow, focus on helping it spread, self-perpetuate.
Marketplace Hierarchy: The GMV Trap
Sarah Tavel: Yeah, I know. That’s absolutely right. The importance of it is I can’t emphasize enough how important focus is when you’re building these companies. It’s so hard. There really isn’t a playbook. Every company, the ones that succeed have to be fundamentally different from anything that was before it. But there are these first principles of the ingredients that they all share, and you can use those ingredients to really focus you when you’re going through the inevitable growth curve and wanting to know, “Well, how do we maximize this moment? How do we really focus on the things that will set us most up for success?” That’s where I think a framework like this can be really clarifying.
Working Backwards: Core Marketplace Insight
Lenny: There’s a lot of depth behind each of these things that you’re being modest about. One is, with the top of this pyramid of making it self-perpetuating, the reason that’s really important is for a consumer app to work well most of the time, it has to be able to spread really cheaply. The cost of acquisition needs to be very low, unless you somehow figure out some paid ad strategy where you can make money with paid ads, which is very rare. So maybe speak to why that’s so important to a consumer product.
Sarah Tavel: Yeah. What are you trying to build with a consumer product? You’re not trying to build something niche. You want to build something that can be a mass-market, hundreds of millions of users, billions of users. It would take considerable capital to do that with marketing. There’s one example that we have so far, which is TikTok, of spending more than $1 billion, once they figured out actually the first two levels in order to grow. They didn’t actually put user acquisition spend behind TikTok until they had a product that was retentive, and then they know that they really wanted to maximize that. But every other social product has grown organically. They’ve been able to do so because they’ve figured out how to maximize these loops. Even TikTok got to millions over users before they spent all the capital to acquire those remaining users.
Layer One: Extreme Focus
Lenny: I didn’t know that number. TikTok spent $1 billion on paid ads-
Lessons from Food Delivery Wars
Sarah Tavel: Yes.
Understanding Happy GMV
Lenny: To get to where they are today?
Sarah Tavel: Yes.
The Thumbtack Dilemma
Lenny: Holy moly.
Sarah Tavel: Yes.
White-Hot Center and PMF Signals
Lenny: I knew it was many millions, but I didn’t realize it was $1 billion.
Sarah Tavel: Yes.
Layer Two: Tilting the Marketplace
Lenny: That just shows you how hard it is to break in and become a new social network, essentially, or a new social app.
Sarah Tavel: It is hard. And then, at the same time though, we do see exceptions to it where I still feel like consumers are hungry for new experiences. We’ve seen a couple over the last few years that have gone into tens of millions of users. Nothing that has really created the experience that’s sticky enough to pull minutes away from, really TikTok and Instagram, which just are these dominant forces right now.
The Tilting Loop
Lenny: Your message also reminded me of a recent guest post on my newsletter about this app Saturn, I don’t know if you read it.
More Forms of Growth Loops
Sarah Tavel: Oh, I didn’t. But I know of the app, and it’s just an awesome founder.
Lenny: Yeah. It was really interesting. They had a really interesting insight about, first of all, very few apps ever make it to the top of the app store that break through what’s already there. The ones that do almost always spend a few days there and then, are gone because it’s a one shot thing. What they basically talked about is many apps have this viral K-factor, where they spread like crazy, everyone starts using them, everyone’s in there. But then the opposite happens very quickly, too, where if a few people miss using it a few days, you go in there and it’s, “Oh, nothing’s happening here anymore,” and it quickly crumbles. Clubhouse essentially went through this, BeReal started go through this, where people stopped posting and then, “All right, forget this. Everyone’s gone.” Most apps have this destructive K-factor that kicks in, the same way it kicked in to get it to spread.
The Happiness Loop
Sarah Tavel: Yes. As people say, when something grows really quickly, it also can collapse really quickly.
Key Reminders for Tilting Marketplaces
Lenny: Yeah. Tough. I guess along those lines, is there anything you’ve seen or learned … The idea of this framework is to avoid that, essentially. But I guess, is there anything comes to mind to avoid that?
Supply-Side Concentration
Sarah Tavel: One other thing that I’ve seen that runs into a challenge, and I find it runs into a challenge particularly with level two, is anonymity. Anonymity is something where … Pseudo-anonymity and anonymity are very different concepts. With pseudo-anonymity, we have it on Twitter, you have it on Reddit. You have a persistent identity that you’re creating, and that identity then can have accruing benefits, mounting loss. My pseudo-anonymous account on Twitter that just flames other VCs … I’m just kidding.
Supply vs. Demand Dynamics
Lenny: This is breaking news.
The B2B Marketplace Homogeneity Problem
Sarah Tavel: I’m not funny enough to make something like that. But for the people who do have it, they get accruing benefits because they get people to follow them. And that’s the mounting loss too, where they’ve grown their identity on a platform even though it’s a pseudo-anonymous identity. The challenge when you have pure anonymity is that you don’t have that accruing benefit or mounting loss that happens.
I don’t know if you ever played with Secret, but it’s similar to TikTok or something like that. These are the types of experiences where, over time … The network effect doesn’t work because the anonymity creates the conditions for bad behavior, so that starts to pull down the community. And then, it is also the experience where you’d use a product and you can delete, and then come back three months later, and because of the anonymity aspect of it, your experience isn’t any different. I find anonymity, people keep trying it, and super talented founders keep hitting their head against that wall because it has the very early fun growth, but it just continues to be a product that isn’t able to persist without some persistent identity.
Competition and Marketplace Tilting Potential
Lenny: I’m going to pull on this thread of just ways to increase retention. Basically, this is one of the things, maybe the main thing you’re telling people to help increase retention, make it so that it’s really hard to leave. Before we get there, just to make it clear, is this framework mostly for social consumer products, or do you generalize it to consumer products?
Sarah Tavel: I think it’s consumer products in general.
Markets Can Be Un-tilted
Lenny: Okay.
Layer Three: Dominating the Market
Sarah Tavel: But it makes the most sense for consumer social.
TAM Is Less Important Than Thought
Lenny: Okay, got it.
Waves and Marketplace Momentum
Sarah Tavel: It works for Evernote. Evernote isn’t a consumer social product.
Lenny: Awesome. Okay, so it’s most helpful for if you’re the social, your friends are in it sort of product?
Marketplace History Is Disruption History
Sarah Tavel: Right. You have the chance of level three with social.
Universal Lessons Beyond Marketplaces
Lenny: Right, awesome. Okay. On this thread of retention, it’s a thing that I speak about often, everyone always talks about. The most important thing you got to get right is get retention to a good place because if you can’t retain people, nothing’s going to work anyway.
So just to spend a little more time here, is there anything else you recommend to founders to help them with increasing retention and getting to a healthy place with retention?
Finding Marketplace Opportunity Spaces
Sarah Tavel: Number one is actually measuring it. I can’t tell you how many times I suggest to a founder to track cohorts and that’s a new thing. Just being really, really clear and intellectually honest on looking at cohorts I think is number one.
Lightning Q&A Session
Lenny: Okay, maybe just describe that briefly, and then we’ll link to an article that I have about how to do that.
Sarah Tavel: Perfect. These are the moments when I should probably turn the mic over to you, to talk about-
Lenny: Nope, you’re in the hot seat.
Sarah Tavel: [inaudible 00:27:46]. A cohort, what I always like to look at is weekly cohorts for these products. You look at them in two ways. Which is one, for each vintage of cohorts, you’re looking at a group of people who signed up in a given week, and that’s one.
… like a group of people who signed up in a given week and that’s one cohort. You look at it both on an active user basis, like are those people continuing to come back to the product? And I particularly love to look at that on a weekly active user completing the core action pieces of like, are users completing the core action? How is that changing overtime for each of the cohorts? And then also, looking at activity level within those cohorts. And so, what you love to see is the kind of classic smile graph where, as the network grows and users start to use the product more and more, you start to see that, overtime, they actually become more retained in the product as opposed to kind of the classic leaky bucket where the cohort just keeps on dwindling down. And until you reach a point with your cohorts where there is a plateau, you have more work to do on figuring out the retention of your users.
The second thing is just focus. So I can’t tell you how how many times also you’ll meet a founder and they will… There was one example I saw, it was a kind of a dating app, friend making app, and he was growing it via TikTok, which is not geographically constrained at all. And so, he’s growing the user numbers, but without focusing on a specific geography, it’s gonna be really difficult to make that type of product a high retention product.
Lenny: Coming back to the framework, which layer do you find most often is the one founders maybe are under-investing in/maybe the most important to focus on if you had to pick one of these, or is it super dependent on your situation?
Sarah Tavel: What I often feel is that, a lot of times, product founders, consumer founders, see where they want to get to, they compare themselves to the full expression of a product that you see with other products, ROBLOX, Instagram, TikTok, whatever it may be, and they want to get there.
But what that ends up meaning when the when a new user signs up is that there’s too much in the beginning to to take in and understand, and you don’t then have a very focused product that gets the user to the thing that you most want them to do. And that’s actually part of the importance of understanding level one, what your core action is, is that you want to make sure that when a user comes to your product, signs up for the first time, doesn’t have necessarily a lot of contacts on what the product is itself, that they see the thing that they’re supposed to do and you get them to do it. And a lot of times, in the beginning, there are just so many other things that a product might have that you’re defusing that attention that they would otherwise have had on the on the thing that’s most important.
And so, I feel that that’s the first mistake, and it’s kind of natural that it would be the first mistake, but maybe the largest mistake that I see people make.
Lenny: Essentially, not getting the activation moment right, not focusing enough on getting people to that aha moment as people describe, and then again, that repeating again and again as a core action.
Sarah Tavel: Yes.
Lenny: To close the loop on this sort of discussion, could you just share again a few examples of core actions/activation moments, just to make this fresh again in people’s minds? And then also, just whatever you could share about helping people decide what that is. I know it’s a difficult thing to do well, but any advice for how to find that activation?
Sarah Tavel: I mean, I’ll tell you the exercise that we did at Pinterest because as I mentioned before, it wasn’t obvious to us in the beginning of Pinterest like were we a social network? Like should we optimize for the follow graph? But you have to remember, Pinterest, this was 2011, you had Twitter growing like crazy, Instagram was growing. Those were both asymmetrical follow graphs that they were creating, right? And so, it wasn’t clear at the time whether Pinterest was actually just creating a new follow graph, but that was about things instead of what Twitter was or what Instagram was. And so, it wasn’t obvious.
And what happened actually is that there was two efforts that I think of as like kind of bottoms-up and top-down that helped really clarify that, actually, pinning something was the core action, it was going to be our North Star. We called it weekly active pinners.
And the two things were, there’s always this like bottoms-up analysis that you do, which is, we looked at every action that you could do on Pinterest, so we had liking, following, clicking through, time on site, pinning, repinning. And we looked at, first of all, what percentage of users complete those actions? And if you do that action in a week, what’s your propensity to come back the following week? And we basically ranked that.
And what we saw was that if you pinned something, repinned something, which is finding something on Pinterest, I’m using those synonymously, or click through, you had an incredibly high probability that you would come back. So if someone’s pinning something, they’re coming back to Pinterest the next week with a super high, more than 90% probability at the time.
And then there’s like the top-down way of thinking about it, which is, well, what is Pinterest for? And if a user does come to Pinterest and they never add something to a board, do they really understand what Pinterest is? And yes, clicking through makes you want to save it. The click through is valuable, you want save it, so clicking through is obviously really important. But at the end of the day, if they don’t like that pin enough that they want to save it themselves to their board, then we haven’t done our job.
And so, we did this kind of top down, bottoms up analysis to make it very clear that when we launch an experiment or launch a new feature, if the probability, if the percentage of people that pin something doesn’t go up, or the number of pins for that cohort doesn’t go up, that experiment is not a a successful experiment.
Lenny: Awesome. There’s a post I’ll link to in the show notes where there’s actually a guide to doing this regression analysis on how to figure out your activation milestone.
Sarah Tavel: Amazing.
Lenny: Basically, what is most causal of retention as you’re describing. And I love this example from Pinterest. Any other just examples? Again, you shared a few at the beginning of just examples of great activation milestones/core user actions.
Sarah Tavel: I’ll tell you one other one that I thought was super interesting, which is that when I initially published this post, I had assumed wrongly that YouTube’s core action was watching a video. And then Shishir Mehrotra, who was the kind of CPO of YouTube, he reached out to me and he said, “That’s what it was in the early days, but we started to realize that it wasn’t actually our core action. And we did a lot of analysis on YouTube and what we realized was that subscribing was the core action on YouTube.”
And it makes so much sense when he said it, right? You’re a creator, you’re uploading content onto YouTube, there are a lot of other places at that time that you could have uploaded that content to, but you care about YouTube because that’s where you’re growing your audience, right? And so, the more people that subscribe to your content on YouTube, the more you have the accruing benefits and mounting loss of using YouTube.
And so, that was super important on the creator side, which, one of the funny things that will bridge to our next conversation is that all social products are really marketplaces, right? YouTube is a marketplace. You have the creators uploading content and the viewers who are watching it, supply and demand.
And so then, the subscribe button is also very interesting because then from the demand side, the viewer, why would I come back to YouTube consistently versus, again, all the other places I could spend time on if it weren’t for me having found creators for whom their content really resonates with me so much so that I subscribe to their content?
And so, I loved that example because it showed a little bit the evolution that can happen with these companies, but then also, just the beauty of like you know you’ve got something really right with the core action when it’s helping both sides of your network.
Lenny: Awesome example. And I think it’s also a good reminder people change these things. “You come up with your best bet. Okay, we tried this for six months, maybe let’s try something else. We’ve learned something new.”
Sarah Tavel: Exactly.
Lenny: I’m also going to link to this post I wrote around finding your North Star metric, which was like such a multimedia conversation with just links for all these topics to go deeper. Essentially, I figured out the North Star metric for, I don’t know, 30 companies. And I feel like the North Star metric of a company ends up often being this core user action. So like Pinterest, it sounds like those WAPs, weekly active pinners.
Sarah Tavel: Yeah. Pinners, yeah.
Lenny: And YouTube is subscribers.
Sarah Tavel: In the beginning we called it weekly active repinners and war because we felt like we were at war, so it was good.
Lenny: And then, it became peacetime maybe.
Sarah Tavel: Yes, exactly.
Lenny: Awesome. So maybe just to close the thread on this framework, can you just briefly summarize who this is most helpful for and just how they could apply it if they’re maybe not growing as fast as they want or they’re just getting started as a founder building a consumer product?
Sarah Tavel: Yeah, I think about consumer founders, product founders, product leaders in these companies that are thinking through the road map. What is the most important things that they need to prioritize, the big rocks, for the immediate short-term? And the framework then provides a lens on what to prioritize.
Lenny: And we’ll link to the whole framework for people that want to go deeper.
Sarah Tavel: Awesome.
Lenny: Okay, so let’s move on to your second framework that you called the hierarchy of marketplaces. And first of all, I want to give a shout-out to Mike Williams, who’s the founder of Everything Marketplaces, who gave me a bunch of good question suggestions to ask as we do this.
Sarah Tavel: Wonderful, now I’m nervous.
Lenny: He’s Mr. Marketplace.
Sarah Tavel: Yes.
Lenny: Okay, so let’s start with the same question, just what’s kind of the broad way to think about what this framework is and who it’s for? And then, where did it come from?
Sarah Tavel: It’s a framework or hierarchy that is for marketplace founders. It could actually be B2BC or B2C, or marketplace product leaders that are like either getting started or scaling their marketplace and helping kind of prioritize and focus on the things that most matter.
And it came out of a similar reaction, a very similar parallel to what I was experiencing, meaning, all these consumer social founders. Like they would talk about MAUs and I just felt like it didn’t get to the heart of whether they were building enduring value. And I actually started to realize that GMV was very similar. GMV, it’s a metric that it seems like… Of course, you can’t build a marketplace without growing GMV in the same way that you can’t build a social product without growing MAUs. But if you focus, if the race that you think you’re running is to grow MAUs or to grow GMV, you’re not actually going to run the right race. It can take you…
And actually, with marketplace, very interestingly, it can take you in the wrong direction. So what would happen is I would meet all these founders and everybody got fixated on this milestone of 1,000,000 of annualized GMV, it means you’re ready for your Series A. But it’s kind of self-evident that not all GMV is created equal, right?
So imagine a food delivery company 10 years ago. You could have 1,000,000 of GMV by focusing on Boston, or you could have 500,000 here, $200,000 here, like spreading it out. And I would meet so many founders who would say, ” Oh, well, I thought we had to prove out that the value proposition resonated in these other cities and so, that’s why we’re diffusing our focus.” But what they what I would always feel is like they were just making their job so much harder by doing that.
The other way you could think of it is like if you’re trying to get to 1,000,000 of GMV when you’re skimming the cream on this big ocean of a market, then to be very, very focused on a smaller market. And getting to $1,000,000 of GMV in a constrained market is a lot harder, takes longer, but it’s actually the path to building something that endures.
And so, I was having the same conversation again and again and I just felt like I needed to crystallize it or synthesize it in a way that would be easier to communicate, and that’s what led to this hierarchy.
Lenny: Awesome. Okay, cool. So you’ve touched on a number of the important elements of this hierarchy, so let’s dive in.
Sarah Tavel: Okay. There’s probably a couple core insights, but the first one that I think about with this hierarchy is that when you’re building a marketplace, you actually have to start from the goal and work backwards from there.
Now, what’s the goal? Marketplaces, I mean, you have so much incredible content on this, they’re just incredibly difficult to build. You’re basically building two companies at the same time, right? You have the product and go-to-market org for the demand side, the product and go-to-market org for the supply side. And somehow, you have to make these two line up so that they serve each other’s needs. It’s an incredibly difficult dance. And yeah, it’s one of the hardest types of companies in the software world that I think you can build.
And you do it because you think about the the full expression of these models and you think about companies like Airbnb or Amazon or eBay or Google, where once you have scale and have very dominant market share, you have a product that just is the best place without question of fulfilling this need. And they end up being very profitable cash-flowing businesses. And you see that, and that’s the business that you want to build, that’s why you’re going through all the hardship of building a marketplace, getting the marketplace off the ground to get to that place.
And there’s kind of very clear analysis. I published it in the hierarchy. I have this incredible graph that I remember seeing when I board observer for this online classified company called OLX led by Fabrice Grinda. And it kind of shows that the more dominant a marketplace is relative to the number two in its space, the more profitable that business is. And so, it’s just like a very clear like you don’t want to be… Obviously, when you’re building a marketplace, you don’t want to be in the middle of the pack, but even being number one but just barely number one doesn’t give you any of the benefits of a marketplace model, you’re fighting for each incremental point of market share. It’s not clear to the supply side or the demand side that you’re like the main place to be. And so, it only becomes really clear once you have that dominant market position where you’re just so much bigger than the number two
And the only way to get to that place, to get to that moment of real dominance where you have this winner take most dynamic is that you have to tip your market, and that’s the only scalable way to do that, and that’s what level two is.
And so, how do you maximize your chance of tipping a market? You have to focus on a really constrained opportunity, and that is level one. So that’s kind of like the broad framing, which is like a really important thing of how, when you’re building a marketplace, you actually are building towards that point of dominance. And so, it’s part of the reason why being really, really, really focused in level one is so important.
Lenny: Awesome. So you walked through this backwards. Just to summarize in case people didn’t totally catch it, basically, layer one is focus, layer two, tip the market, layer three, dominate the market.
Sarah Tavel: Exactly.
Lenny: Awesome. So let’s maybe start with layer one of just focus-
Sarah Tavel: Let’s do it.
Lenny: … which I think is the most counterintuitive step for people building a marketplace where, as you said, normally, it’s go big as fast as possible, get as much GMV as possible, just make everyone happy as quickly as you can. And your advice is, essentially, do the opposite. Make it very…
You have this like great acronym of thimble that, I imagine, you’ll talk about that I love, I always think about. So yeah.
Sarah Tavel: Yeah. And part of what’s so hard about this idea focus is I’m lucky to meet with just incredibly ambitious founders. And the hardest thing I think about building these marketplaces is that the ambition can often feel like this sun, like the heat of the sun that’s trying to warm everything up, and you’re going after this big market, warming the ocean.
And I think that, really, what the the best, ambitious founders do is they focus that ambition like a laser beam on a small market, the thimble. And what you do is like you’re getting that thimble, you’re getting the product market fit really, really right with this like small, constrained market. And if you heat that up really, really hot, then it expands from there.
And part of this is that we have to accept a couple of points of scarcity. One is that, you can’t raise hundreds of millions of dollars from the start, where we, especially today, live in a world where there is a constraint around capital. And so, you have to be able to take that capital in the beginning and make the most out of it. And the only way to do that is to be very, very focused.
And the second thing is that the constraint is the founder’s attention. And again, these things are really, really difficult to to get off the ground, and the only way that you can do it is by having myopic focus on a segment.
And the example that I always think about was a very cool thing that we all got to see, which is when the food delivery wars happened, where you had companies like DoorDash and Postmates and Uber Eats, and then, the incumbents of Grubhub, take very different strategies. I make comparisons to Postmates and and DoorDash, both successful companies, but Postmates, from the very beginning, had very big ambition and went after all the big cities. They went after, not just restaurants, but restaurants and Apple and retail, bicycle. I remember, there were so many things that they went after all at the same time.
And when you’re playing that game, you’re always being compared to whatever other substitutes there are in the market, right. And you’re it and that just when you have constraint of capital and attention you’re you’re spreading yourself thin across a lot of different vectors of kind of preference for the customer and the seller.
DoorDash on the other hand, famously and very controversially went after the suburbs in the beginning. And the beautiful thing about the suburbs is that there is very little competition because no one thought that you could do it economically. And they probably weren’t wrong in the beginning, like DoorDash lost a lot of money in the beginning fulfilling delivery in the suburbs, just because the delivery times, the driving was so long, but by going after a market that other people weren’t focused on, it let them get to a place where they were able to really make the customers on both sides of their marketplace happy enough that they retained.
And this word happy I use, I should expand on it a little bit because the realization I had as I reflected on this kind of feeling that GMV is really actually a vanity metric, it doesn’t get at the core of whether you’re building enduring value. It’s like very clear and there’s plenty of examples I could give where there are companies that had incredible scale and still were disrupted by a startup. And it’s because actually, customers don’t care how big you are, they don’t care how many transactions you’ve accumulated. What they care about is when they have a transaction with you, how happy do you make them? How much better is the experience that you provide than any other substitute that they could use? And if you do a good job, then they’re gonna keep coming back to you. And so I call it happy GMV.
And that’s actually the thing that I think you as a founder or product leader have to focus on, which is, what do I think is going to be the experience of a buyer or seller that leads them to retaining and tracking that as like the happy path and therefore, the happy GMV.
Lenny: Amazing. I love that concept, happy GMV. You also kind of extend this idea and I think you call it the minimum viable happiness is what you want to create when you’re building this marketplace, this symbol of water that you’re trying to boil into something incredible. What’s the minimum version of that that creates really happy customers?
Sarah Tavel: That’s right. Yes. And kind of the way to think of it is like, obviously, when you’re a marketplace founder you know that in order to build something endures, you’re going to have to grow. But you in the beginning, you’re you’re doing all these things that don’t scale, you’re working on your product experience, you’re taking friction out of the transaction, and you want to get to a point where there’s a certain percentage of people that retain after having done a transaction. And so, you’re kind of doing the work, doing the work, doing the work to get to that minimum threshold. And that’s when you know you get to kind of go to the next step of starting to figure out the levers to really scale what you’re doing.
Lenny: Awesome. And again, it’s easy to say, it’s difficult to do as a founder to tell them like, “You just need to get a small version of this marketplace working, versus you go big really quickly.” And so, most of the time, I think it’s actually like location, basically start in a city if it’s location-oriented. Or if it’s all online, pick like one niche to focus on, like Etsy was like, craft fair goods, right?
Sarah Tavel: Exactly. And sometimes, as we saw with Postmates, sometimes it’s both, which is, geography and category. Again, you have to assume scarcity of your capital, of your attention, of your customers attention and so getting complete clarity of what is the experience that you want to really nail, what’s that happy path you’re optimizing for, constraining that in the beginning gives you the option, the optionality to grow beyond that, but if you don’t constrain, you just won’t be able to get there fast enough.
Lenny:
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I want to talk about what it looks like when you you’ve got it working and it makes sense to start expanding, but before I do, there’s one kind of example I found in my research which is really interesting, which is Thumbtack where they, from the beginning, went national and across many categories. And the founders admit maybe that wasn’t the right idea. It took them a long time to get to something that was really working. But on the other hand, their thinking was to create enough of a flywheel for people to keep coming back. How often do you need a plumber? How often do you need a DJ? So there’s-
Sarah Tavel: I was just going to say that is the trickiness with Thumbtacks model and it persists as the trickiness with their model, which is that you don’t have a high repeat use case there and so you have to… One of the really important things with building a marketplace is cornering the buy side, like having a relationship with the buy side where they don’t even think about where they’re gonna go, they come to you. And if it’s a plumber, you use that so infrequently that every time you are going to look for a plumber, you’re gonna start at Google, right? You’re not gonna assume, “I’m gonna go to Thumbtack to find that because-
I’m not going to assume I’m going to go to Thumbtack to find that because you’ve already forgotten by that point. And so you need to have enough touch points with the consumer so that they’ll have a relationship with you and start to think of you as a place to go to. And that’s probably, that was the trickiness with Thumbtack. And by the way, when we talk through level two, that also level two will articulate some more of that trickiness.
Lenny: Awesome. By the way, I do use Thumbtack. It’s implanted in my head of that’s where to go to find plumbers and stuff.
Sarah Tavel: That’s great. I mean those founders, I adore Marco. He is an incredible, incredible founder.
Lenny: As a segue to layer two, what are signs that you’ve done a good job at focusing and things are working? You have this term that I love of creating a white hot center, so maybe speak to that, or just what tells you, it’s like, “Cool, I think we’ve got this very focused thimble. How do we know it’s time to go?”
Sarah Tavel: Yeah, I think it’s very much that you see people retaining. You just feel that where people are texting you or emailing or whatever it is, that they’ve had a great experience and you see them coming back. And you’re not going to make everybody happy. Let’s all accept that. But there’s a core of users, a persona that you are able to make really happy. That’s when you know that you’re on the right track.
Lenny: Awesome. It’s essentially the very fuzzy product market fit question.
Sarah Tavel: Yes, yeah.
Lenny: And I’ll link to a few posts I’ve written that help people get there. I guess is there anything you want to add there like this?
Sarah Tavel: The only thing I’ll add, those two things related I’ll add. I don’t like NPS for this, and I have a whole blog post on this. I like Sean Ellis’s question of how disappointed would you be if this product disappeared? And I think it’s if you have at least 40% of people respond that they’d be very disappointed, then you’re on the right track. That’s kind of the feeling that should tell you you’re on the right track.
Lenny: Awesome. Okay, let’s talk about layer two around tipping the marketplace.
Sarah Tavel: So layer two, I think, will actually illuminate again the importance of that constrained focus for layer one. You’re doing all these things that don’t scale, that you’ve written so much about, Lenny, about kick-starting, the marketplace, all those things that you can’t just keep on doing forever.
Now, layer two, level two is about figuring out how to do things that do scale. And really, you’re doing it in service of this kind of mythical moment of a tipping point. And the tipping point is this idea that you often reach some kind of saturation point in a market. You’ve reached an experience, you’ve kept on working on the product experience, you’ve taken a lot of friction out, and you keep on growing, growing, growing. And you’re doing that in service of increasing happiness.
And this is a really important thing. The growth that you’re doing, you should have a lot of clarity on your flywheel at this point, and know that you’re growing in service of accelerating your flywheel. And people talk about the flywheel as liquidity. You could think of it as happiness, which is that the more the flywheel spins, the more you’re able to make both sides of your marketplace happy.
And what you’re doing is you’re growing into a greater percentage of your market. And as you’re doing all these things again that don’t scale, then you reach this moment where things start to get a lot easier. You’ve kind of pushed the boulder up the hill and it starts to slide down. And what you notice first, I think, is you start to see it on a micro level where you might have suppliers that start to tip to you or buyers that tip. You might see your cohorts get a little bit better. You start to see some organic growth.
And let me give a story or an example of a company that I got to see where the marketplace started to tip. So we’re investors in a company called REKKI. And REKKI is a marketplace for restaurants and their suppliers. And it’s, imagine in the beginning, this kind of app that you could use. It almost looked like WhatsApp, that a chef could use instead of doing a voicemail at midnight when they’re leaving the restaurant or typing something into WhatsApp and texting it to their supplier, an email, whatever it is. They could use this REKKI app and it would make it a lot easier for them to do that. And then of course the marketplace elements is that then they’ll be able to discover other suppliers on REKKI if they need them.
Now in the beginning, REKKI had to have their own sales force and they were going to London, knocking on the doors of these restaurants, finding and cornering probably the chef in the kitchen to show them the app, to get them to change to this new app called REKKI. And it’s a very high cost of sales effort to have, as you might imagine. But then what started to happen is that every time they got a new chef onto REKKI, that order would then go to the supplier that that restaurant normally ordered from. And so instead of getting the voicemail, the supplier would start to see a nice order form that was from the restaurant and provided by REKKI, powered by REKKI.
And what would happen is that as REKKI grew more and more in London, these suppliers started to get more and more of their restaurants ordering via REKKI. And then some of the early suppliers started to be like, “Well, this is so much easier for me. I would much rather get this order form from REKKI than have to listen to an hour of voicemails from chefs with different accents and different ways of ordering their food in the morning when I come in.
And so then the suppliers would reach out to REKKI and be like, “Hey, here’s a CSV of all of our customers. Can you reach out to them and onboard them to REKKI because I’d much rather have my orders come via REKKI than the way I’m getting them.” And so you go from this moment of the hard high cost of sales, pounding the pavement, to getting a list on a silver platter of restaurants to onboard. And that’s that feeling of tipping, where all of a sudden something goes from being really freaking hard to so much easier.
Lenny: It feels a lot like how people describe finding product market fit. Things start to feel like you’re not pushing anymore and it’s just coming to you.
Sarah Tavel: Yes.
Lenny: In your experience, is this tipping often just happens as you become more successful in this thimble of a marketplace? Or is it things you have to do actively to tip to get to this place? It sounds like in REKKI it was like this feature they built of just recommending, “Hey, you should check out REKKI, and maybe other suppliers would help you have an easier time if they’re joining.” So is it usually like it just happens with scale, or is there usually something you have to change to create this tipping point?
Sarah Tavel: I don’t think Ronan predicted that that was what was going to happen. And you’re constant, that kind of customer obsession, having the relationships with the suppliers, having the relationship with the buyers, so that you have your ear to the ground. And when they start to lean in a little bit, you’re there to receive them. And so I think this is very much part of what great marketplace founders are able to do, is they’re able to start to feel that there’s something tipping in their direction and then create momentum behind it.
And that’s a lot of what this level two is all about, which is that, I think, every marketplace has to figure out what I call tipping loops. And there’s two types of tipping loops that work together symbiotically to help a marketplace scale.
The first are the growth loops. And so we just talked about an example with REKKI. There are many examples of this Hipcamp, another marketplace I’m lucky to work with. If you and I went camping on Hipcamp and I booked a tree house on Hipcamp, and you are going to join me on it, I could then as part of my checkout flow, essentially invite you to my reservation so that you could see the maps, the more information about the tree house and any of the sites around it. And so I’m the person that Hipcamp acquired, but then I pull you into my experience and that’s a great buyer to buyer growth loop.
There’s classic seller to seller loops or buyer to seller, all these directions. And then the great marketplaces see those loops and they figure out ways to accelerate them. So classic seller to seller referrals. Uber drivers would tell their friend, “Oh, you should start driving for Uber, it’s great.” But then Uber incentivize it with a referral bonus, and you started to see Uber drivers literally writing blog posts about how much they loved driving for Uber because some of them were making more money getting the referral bonus then actually driving. And so you’re trying to find these growth loops and you maximize them.
Lenny: Awesome. I’ll link to a post that has a lot of these insights from this work that I’ve done on marketplaces, but a few others that are just interesting. Basically you’re trying to figure out how do you create a engine that continues to drive supply and also drives demand. So a fun example is when Etsy was getting started, as you know, they went to craft fairs and pitched sellers, “Hey, sign up for Etsy. You could sell your stuff online.” And then all their sellers started telling all their buyers, “Hey, buy my stuff on Etsy.”
Sarah Tavel: Etsy literally gave them business cards. So Etsy gave their sellers business cards that made them feel like, “Oh, I’m a real…” Made them feel professional. And the link on it was to their Etsy store.
Lenny: I love that. One of the most magical growth engines of marketplaces is when your supply brings on the demand. So that’s a really good example. Another one is DoorDash, where basically a restaurant signed up for DoorDash and then they tell all the customers, “You want to order our food? Go to DoorDash and order it.” And so all the restaurants are telling everyone about DoorDash and then they become DoorDash users and they order from other restaurants.
Sarah Tavel: Yes, and it shows how creative DoorDash was to both sides of the market in that example.
Lenny: And then Faire is an awesome example too. It sounds similar to REKKI as you described, where Faire is basically a B2B artisanal items marketplace where boutique shops buy nice candles and blankets for their store to sell. And essentially they did what you described, where they signed on a store and they basically told them, “All your vendors can join for free and not have to pay any fees if they sign up for Faire, and it makes it easy for you to buy their stuff.” And then on the other side, a candlemaker tells all the places they sell to, “Hey, you should use Faire. It’s so easy to buy our stuff, and we can communicate through there.” And they can sign up without any fees. So basically everyone just invites all their existing partners on Faire, and then everyone’s on Faire. So yeah, there’s a lot of ways to do it.
Sarah Tavel: I love it. And so the second type of loop, and again this loop works symbiotically with the growth loop, is what I call happiness loops. And I think of them almost as the kidneys for your marketplace as you grow. The happiness loop, the idea is you have a lot of new sellers coming in, and of course you have new buyers, but you want to make sure that you are matching your buyers with the sellers that are going to give them the best experience.
And so, normally in a consumer social product, churn is heartbreaking. Once a user churns, they’re almost never going to come back. And with a consumer social product, you’re trying to get to massive scale. But when you’re building a marketplace, actually, there’s a healthy amount of churn that you want on the supplier side because there are just going to be suppliers who aren’t going to create a great experience for the buyer, and you can’t do anything about that.
And so we’ve all had the Uber driver who you give one star to. That person you don’t want on your marketplace getting matched with buyers. And so you’re trying to then make sure that, as you grow, you have a natural mechanism in your marketplace to reward the suppliers that you want to reward and to churn out the ones that you don’t. Of course your job is to do your best to set all the sellers up for success, but it’s an inevitability.
And so there’s two great examples I think of in these happiness loops, which is around search ranking, and then reputation. Search ranking is just a very obvious one, which is, you’re trying to understand what creates a happy experience for the buy side, and then reward the sellers that provide that experience.
So I think an interesting example that ended up actually changing but still is illustrative, is that UberEats in the very beginning of their journey, thought that their advantage in the market was going to be about having really fast delivery, right? Because they already had this network of drivers and so they thought that that’s where they were going to really lean in and have an edge over any competition. And so in the search ranking, they rewarded restaurants that prepared the food quickly, and so answered the Uber Eats request, and then actually got the food out as fast as possible so that Uber Eats became synonymous with the quickness by which you got the delivery. And so that restaurant that takes 40 minutes to prepare the food, they would get ranked low in the experience for Uber Eats, even if the food was really, really great.
Lenny: Okay, so we’ve been talking about tipping of the marketplace. Is there anything else there that you want to share before we move on to the third layer?
Sarah Tavel: Yeah, there’s two other things that come to mind. One, just as a reminder, and then one as a caution. So the reminder is in order to tip a market, you have to reach a saturation point in that market. You can’t tip a market before you’ve penetrated it to some saturation level. And it goes back to level one of why you want to focus on a constrained market.
Let’s take growing a food delivery product in Des Moines, Iowa versus LA or New York. When you’re growing in a small city and you’re focused on restaurants, you’re going to be able to get to this tipping point a lot faster and more efficiently than if you’re going after a very big market. And so there’s a real advantage to being able to prove out the playbook as quickly as possible and as efficiently as possible before you move on to bigger challenges. And so I think it underscores, again, why it’s so valuable in the beginning to focus on something that is constrained.
And again, Postmates focusing on San Francisco, the city. DoorDash focusing initially on the suburbs, much smaller opportunity, but one that they could really knock the cover off the ball on. They had no competition. They had a customer that was desperate for attention, and so they could make them happy. And that just sets you up for real success to go from strength to the adjacent market.
The second thing that I’d say is, and this is so important is that not all markets are susceptible to tipping, right? We’ve all experienced this, I’m sure Lenny, with the companies that you work with, the companies I work with, where there are conditions of a market that make it vulnerable to tipping. I have six in my post just to name a couple classic ones.
The first obvious one is just concentration on the supply side. In order to be able to tip a market, you need suppliers to want to lean in on your marketplace. My partner, Bill Gurley talks about how great marketplaces create the new incumbents. So you basically have suppliers who aren’t the incumbents. The incumbents aren’t going to lean in on your marketplace, they’re already fat and happy, but you want to have these hungry suppliers who lean in. But if there’s already concentration in your marketplace, in the ecosystem, the market that you’re playing in, then you’re not going to have sellers lean in, and you’re not going to be able to create a flywheel that spins where the more sellers you bring on, the better the pricing or experiences on the demand side because the sellers are happy and there’s nobody that’s hungry or fighting. And so that’s just a critical, critical point.
Lenny: Bill Gurley and I actually had a little Twitter debate once about supply versus demand and which one’s more important. And basically his pitch was like, “All that really matters in the end, to build a successful marketplace, is can you find the demand? Can you bring the demand to your marketplace?” It makes all the sense in the world. Everything in the end is, “Can you find customers?”
In the work I’ve done looking into marketplaces, what I find is the hardest thing to do, to bring people to your marketplace, is to find the supply and bring it to people, basically aggregate it. And your point here is exactly right, is that basically the value of your marketplace is to find this non-concentrated demand that’s all over the place and bring it together and make it easy to transact with. So I think that is really important, just to double down on this point, that what makes the marketplace valuable is supply that is hard to find that you make easy to find and transact with. And I feel like that’s almost the core of what makes marketplace work.
Sarah Tavel: I think you’re both right.
Lenny: Yeah, I think we’re both right. Right, right.
Sarah Tavel: Because in the beginning, the only way you get started with the marketplace, obviously, is you’re bringing the supply online, and that’s what opens up the opportunity. And the only way then for you to have a chance at tipping the market is if there’s enough fragmentation on the supply side to create a differentiated experience for the demand side to care about your marketplace. But the only way to build long-term enduring value with a marketplace is to corner the demand side. And so it’s kind of a little bit that evolution of a marketplace that ends up changing who you focus on.
And I don’t know if you’ve experienced this in my experience with the marketplaces that I work with, it’s a constant like, “I have to focus more on the demand side right now. Okay, now we got to focus more on the supply side.” And it’s just back to how difficult these businesses are to build, especially when you have limited resources, that it’s like the forever battle of building a marketplace.
Lenny: Yeah, especially if it’s a geographically oriented marketplace like a DoorDash. Sometimes you have more customers than restaurants.
Sarah Tavel: Right.
Lenny: Sometimes you have too many restaurants, not enough customers.
Sarah Tavel: Yes.
Lenny: So, it’s very city dependent. At Airbnb we had basically many attempts at a dashboard of which market is supply constrained, which is demand constrained. Along the same lines, I think it’s also something I think about with B2B marketplaces, the reason they’re challenging, in my experience, to work, there’s so few of them, is the supply is rarely fragmented. Usually there are very few suppliers, so it’s pretty easy. “I’m just going to pick one of these 10 and I don’t need you.” Is that true? Is that how you think about the challenges of B2B marketplaces?
Sarah Tavel: There’s definitely that, but I think actually the bigger challenge with B2B marketplaces is on the homogeneity of the supply. When you think about a lot of labor marketplaces, and let’s take a classic example of Mechanical Turk, right? What you need in a marketplace for that flywheel… I have a graph in my slides where you show that the more you penetrate the market, the happier you’re able to make your customer. You should have an exponential experience where the flywheel doesn’t slow down. Now you take Airbnb as an example, there isn’t a limit to how valuable it is to have more supply on Airbnb because everybody has their own special preferences. And there probably is a theoretical limit, but you just feel like there is always going to be the, there’s such heterogeneity in the supply for Airbnb, that that’s what has let Airbnb really close and escape competition.
With B2B marketplaces what sometimes happens, like a labor marketplace, is that you have this homogeneity in the supply, where it’s not clear that adding the next incremental unit of supply actually changes the experience for the demand side. And so at Mechanical Turk, whether Mechanical Turk has a hundred thousand Turkers or 5 million Turkers, it probably doesn’t really change the experience for somebody who is using Mechanical Turk. And that’s why in the early days, a Mechanical Turk, you saw a lot of other copycats or clones of Mechanical Turk doing something similar because it didn’t take that much supply for them to be able to create an experience for a segment of the market that was as good as the already scaled Mechanical Turk.
Lenny: Awesome. I’m glad we got into that. We’re getting real dirty about marketplaces. Exactly what I was hoping for. You said that you had something else you wanted to share along these lines.
Sarah Tavel: And there’s so many other examples of reasons why a marketplace won’t tip competition. Again, you’re a food delivery company and you go after the suburbs where there’s no competition. That makes your job really easy to tip the market. You go to New York City where you have an entrenched competitor of Grubhub plus Seamless Web, a different culture around delivery where the restaurants mostly have their own delivery fleets, and it’s just going to be so much harder for you to tip that market. And so, I think you have to be really context aware when you’re building a marketplace of what your competition’s going to be so that you see if there is a path for you to actually tip the market.
Lenny: And even if you’ve tipped the market, it may get untipped, like Uber comes in and starts to eat your lunch, no pun intended. It doesn’t last forever. You have to keep fighting for it.
Sarah Tavel: Well, and it’s such an important point, which is that you can never rest on your laurels when you’re building a marketplace. The history of places is one in which you have a marketplace that feels dominant and then gets disrupted by a competitor. HomeAway, VRBO being disrupted by the likes of you at Airbnb.
Lenny: I wish I could take credit for all that. Yeah, so one way I think about it is you’re talking about this idea of tipping is, a simple way to think about if tipping is happening, if you’re tipping it successfully, is percentage of your growth that’s starting to come from organic word of mouth, people just becoming like, “This is the default way I’m going to order food, travel, book a ride.”
Sarah Tavel: I think you see two things. You see one, the cohorts getting better. So people start using you more. As the supply side gets more diverse, you have more and more use cases that you start to be able to serve. And so you get the demand side leaning in more, the cohorts get better. And then to your point, you have the organic growth that happens where you don’t have to fight to get each new participant on both sides of your market. There’s something that starts to happen where the value proposition is just so strong relative to any other substitute that the market starts coming to you.
Lenny: Awesome. So essentially, cohort retention starts going up because more and more valuable, and more people are coming to you, just word of mouth or through some loops that you built.
Sarah Tavel: Exactly.
Lenny: Awesome. Anything else on this layer/level of the [inaudible 01:21:41] before?
Sarah Tavel: No.
Lenny: Okay, cool. Let’s talk about dominating the marketplace and what that looks like, and how you do that. How do you dominate a marketplace and win, Sarah Tavel?
Sarah Tavel: So yes, level three, and this is the one I feel like every founder who starts a marketplace, they’re chomping at the bit to be able to really focus now on growth. Because all along, I feel like we’ve been holding you back of just, “Focus, focus, focus.” And what you’re doing through level one and level two as you’re honing what you’re building, is that you’re basically building a playbook. You don’t yet know whether this playbook is repeatable. It’s not always the case that the dynamics of one market is the same elsewhere. I’ll take REKKI as an example. In the London food scene, there’s significant fragmentation of suppliers. In the Berlin food scene, that’s not the case. And so it’s not always the case that whatever you did in one market works in another market, but usually there’s something that rhymes. There’s a hint of what is going to work.
So what happens now is you have a market that’s tipping, and the question then is, are you ready to take your eye off the ball and start to diffuse your focus into other markets? So there’s kind of three vectors then that any marketplace can grow at this point.
The first vector is within the existing market where you already are tipping that market. You as a founder then have to make a very personal decision, that what you’re looking at is the context of your competitive situation. So if you’re tipping a market and you have no other competitor going after that market, you’re the first one to see this opportunity, then I think you have two things that you want to do at the same time to grow.
The first thing is that you want to take the existing market that you’re in and you just keep doing what you’re doing, and you may even find ways to stretch beyond that initial market that you’re going after-
… Beyond that initial market that you’re going after, within the same market. And so, what I mean by that is Uber went from black cars to UberX to UberPool. They kept on finding ways in the geographies where they were already dominant to keep on getting stronger by expanding the use cases that they serve. So you have continuing to grow and penetrate the market, find ways to answer more use cases in that market that you can do, especially if you don’t have a lot of competition. And then, the third vector of growth is you want to then try to get as many plates spinning in as many markets that you can handle as quickly as possible. And this is like the blitz scale, right? This is the land grab. And again, your equity value that you’re going to create is going to come from dominating the market.
And so you don’t want to plant a thousand flags in a thousand markets at the same time, spread yourself too thin, and not decidedly win any one market. You always want to put more wood behind fewer arrows. The more scale that you have, the more cities or categories where you have the flywheel starting to spin and you’re starting to see the tipping point happen, the stronger your company will be. Each market that you get, you have scale in, where you’ll have contribution profit. You take that contribution profit, you invest it in new markets. The more markets and contribution profit you have, the more venture capital you’ll be able to raise, which you then reinvest in growing. And so, this is really the place where you are, as aggressively as possible, while, at the same time, not losing sight of the fact that your goal is, in each market individually, to dominate that market, you’re trying to grow into as much possible market opportunity as you possibly can.
Lenny: And again, the reason this is so important is most founders that are ambitious start with this. They’re just like, “Go big immediately, blitz scale. We need to win fast before anyone catches up.” And so, again, it’s a reminder that’s the final step, once you’ve done these other two steps.
Sarah Tavel: Yes, and it’s such an important point, because don’t forget, you’re always going to be vulnerable to competition. And so, let’s say you have a million dollars, and you spread that million dollars of go-to-market costs across 10 cities, spreading yourself really thin. You have a competitor come in, and guess what? They put a million dollars into one city, they’re going to win that city, and that’s going to set them up for greater success down the road, to keep on being able to get more capital and more expense that they can put to work to grow those cities. And of course, we never have one competitor. Always have a lot of competitors. And so, focus on these steps is just, it really is such an important thing to have discipline around.
Lenny: And this is the reason that Uber went big and raised so much money, invested so much to scale so fast, versus Lyft. Same with DoorDash versus Uber. Basically, they’re both trying to dominate. Neither one, I guess, Uber, I don’t know if it’s safe to say, seems to have won in the market. DoorDash versus Uber Eats still very one and two-ish. So I think a lot of people look at these companies, they’re like, “They raise so much money, they’re losing so much money, they’re never going to work.” But they do this, because to build a durable business and to get the benefits of the idea of what the marketplace they built, they need to dominate, they need to be number one by far. And it doesn’t mean it always works. DoorDash, even though they’re bigger than Uber Eats, from what I understand, they’re not like… I don’t know, would you consider they’re dominant? Or is it still a big challenge?
Sarah Tavel: I don’t know. I don’t know. What is clear is that they’ve built an incredible company. It’s just an incredible… They’ve done an incredible job of doing what they do, and it is a crowded market still.
Lenny: So you can still build a great business, even if you don’t dominate, dominate. It’s just you won’t make as much money, nearly as much profit, basically, your cash flow.
Sarah Tavel: That’s right.
Lenny: Something that you all at Benchmark are really big on, which I think would be interesting to talk about, is the TAM not being as big a deal as people think. So a lot of times, there’s a lot of marketplaces that start very small, and there’s a fear that the market is just not going to be big enough for them to build a massive business long-term. And you all don’t worry about that as much as a lot of other investors, where the market itself isn’t a huge killer of investing.
Sarah Tavel: I would underline it even, which is that we get excited about the markets, the opportunities, that might seem small from the outside.
Lenny: I love it. Can you speak to that and help people understand [inaudible 01:29:10]?
Sarah Tavel: You remember the early days of Airbnb like, “How big could this get?”
Lenny: Yeah, I wasn’t there that early.
Sarah Tavel: Yeah, but you knew of it, and Etsy also underestimated for years and years and years. Hipcamp, that was part of what excited us is that it was this market that was actually much bigger than people would have thought from the outside. And the wonderful thing about going after these underestimated markets is that they don’t have competition in the beginning. And so, you have more of the elements of being able to operate into a market and tip the market towards you, when you don’t have competition. And so, we love these types of markets, and we always say, to the founders out there, if other people are telling you the market’s too small, we would love to get to know you.
Lenny: I think a lot of founders will love hearing this. I think it’s also important to add something you’ve shared with me is it’s important for there to be adjacent markets that are big, for you to have the potential to expand it to [inaudible 01:30:11].
Sarah Tavel: Right. And yeah, it’s such an important point. The market itself, it can’t be a cul-de-sac. You need to start somewhere that has the potential to grow beyond that, but in the beginning, it’s going to look small. Let me give you the example of Hipcamp. Hipcamp, when we invested, was literally land. It was land where people… I don’t know, Lenny, if you’re a camper. I unfortunately am…
Lenny: Yeah, I love Hipcamp by the way.
Sarah Tavel: Okay, well, amazing. Well, if you have a tent and a sleeping bag and you’re not afraid to put your thermos in a running river and clean the water, then that was the early days of Hipcamp. It was for the hardcore camper, which itself, feels like a very small market. It’s not actually that small, but it is a smaller market than other people might themselves get comfortable with. But then, what would happen is that hosts on Hipcamp, and I stayed at one of these Hipcamps, and it’s just such an incredible experience, the host started to make a little bit of money from Hipcamp. And they took that money, and they started to invest in structures on their land. So in the beginning, maybe it was a fire pit or a bathroom or shower, and then, it became a tree house or a yurt.
And so, what happened with Hipcamp is that, in the beginning, it was going after this very different market segment, but as they became successful, made their landowners money, those landowners invested that money back into their land and started to open up the market opportunity for Hipcamp, into people more like me, that are glampers, that want that experience in nature, but maybe don’t want to pitch a tent to have it. And so, that’s kind of one of those examples of an underestimated market that ends up growing beyond that. There’s warning stories here too. I always think of Etsy. So Etsy, I remember, actually, when I was at Pinterest, being driven crazy by Etsy, because Etsy was all about handmade goods. But as they were running up to going public, they started to chase GMV. And what that looked like is that they started to have a lot of mass produced goods on Etsy.
It drove me crazy at Pinterest, because there was this one seller of these scarves, that was clearly a mass produced scarves, and they were spamming Pinterest constantly with pins of those scarves. And it was just very clear that Etsy had kind of lost its way in that moment. They would start to chase GMV growth. They were going beyond what they actually stood for, and they ended up having a real reaction from the sellers that were making handmade goods and the buyers. It was this big erosion of trust, and they ended up, I don’t know if it was related, but it ended up precipitating, I think, a CEO change, to the CEO that is there now and who has obviously done an incredible job building Etsy from there.
Lenny: Yeah, we had the VP of product from Etsy on the podcast. And we talked about that actually, what that transition was like, because it was pretty dramatic. They went from very warm, fuzzy, cozy vibes to, “We need to build a business that lasts. Let’s change the way we operate.” While we’re on this topic of what gets you excited about marketplaces, this is something Mike suggested I ask you, so I love that you get excited when it’s a small market, very contrarian, what else, when founders are pitching you, let’s say with a marketplace, what else do you look for? Whatever you can share off the top of your head that you look for that gets you excited about marketplace.
Sarah Tavel: It’s a couple things. One is, and I’m thinking actually of one founder I met recently, where there’s that earned secret, where they see a market opportunity that other people are overlooking, that hasn’t been addressed. Maybe there’s a reason why it hasn’t been addressed in the past, but now is the moment, there’s something changing that’s creating a current in the market. We could talk about currents later, if we want to, but that there’s something that’s creating momentum in the market, that’s opening up an opportunity for this marketplace to exist. And for whatever reason, that founder is the person who sees it. And it’s kind of one of those things that, once you see it, you’re like, “How does it still work this way?” And it makes so much sense for somebody to come in and do something about it. And then, the second thing that always just deeply resonates, and it’s obvious at this point why this would be true, is a founder then that really has focus.
And it’s kind of back to focusing their ambition, like a laser beam, as opposed to this broad sun trying to do everything. And so, you really feel like they’re focused on the right things, and that actually leads to the third thing, which is you really feel, when a founder is either trying to fool you or fool themselves with vanity metrics, versus the true intellectual honesty and the intellectual rigor of, “What’s really working in my business? What’s not working? Where are we focused to make that the best it can be?” And man, that is always, that’s how you build long-term, enduring value, and it’s something that I think it’s consistent across all the founders I’m lucky enough to work with.
Lenny: What I love about this answer is something I often say about marketplaces is that most of your problems are not marketplace problems or questions. It’s just what every startup has to deal with. So what you shared is basically an earned secret, which will apply to any business, which maybe emerges a current in a wave that you can ride, having great focus and also focusing on the right metrics. I 100% agree. And it’s also interesting, it could be a marketplace, it cannot be, and I think people often overweight how much… “I’m building a marketplace and I need to think of everything,” from this marketplace perspective versus 95% of your challenges, questions, hurdles are going to be just whatever startup has to deal with. And then, there’s a bit of specific to marketplace.
Sarah Tavel: And I want to just double click on the current thing, because it’s very related, which is a lot of people, and this is back to maybe our contrarian take on markets, I think a lot of people think about markets almost like these bodies of water. And it’s like, “Oh, it’s this big body of water that we’re going after.” And I actually think that the most interesting markets, you have to think of them like currents, where there’s something happening in the market that’s creating this current, where you can have a plank of wood that you’ve put on the river and it’s going to pull you forward, versus a market that doesn’t really have that momentum to it, you’re going to have to build something really big and fancy to make any progress. And that’s why we care less about market size, because really, what you’re looking for when you’re looking at a market are what are the dynamics of change, what’s the current and momentum that’s going to pull the company and make the job easier for the founders to actually build something that endures?
Lenny: Essentially, “Why now?” is how a lot of people think about this, right?
Sarah Tavel: Yes, yes.
Lenny: I love just the visual of a current. There’s a startup I invested in, as an example of the opposite, that’s a crypto marketplace sort of thing. And they started it when crypto was really great, and they continued building it as crypto winter emerged. And they just realized, “Our timing, this is not the time to build a crypto company, that’s new, that’s trying to compete with who’s out there.” And so, it’s an example of the… You got to recognize when the wave is going the opposite direction and everything is pulling you away from success. The opposite of what you’re describing.
Sarah Tavel: Yes. I might have a nuance there, because I think crypto is too broad of a way to describe it. If you said it was a DeFi crypto company, then yes, definitely, with treasuries where they are, the opportunity in DeFi isn’t as material as it once was, which stablecoins, I’m a huge believer in stablecoins, and I think that’s a market where we have a real current. With inflation and so many local currencies, there’s real demand for stablecoins, the US dollar stablecoin, that comes in many different shapes and forms, that is something that I believe has a very strong current right now, that I’m actually quite excited about.
Lenny: Oh, interesting. Yeah, I should have been clear. It’s like a very specific part of crypto that’s just not happening too much, versus what it was. Okay, we’ve gone totally off track. So let me come back to our track and see what else you wanted to share around the hierarchy of marketplaces either on the top…
Sarah Tavel: That’s it.
Lenny: Okay. We did it. Amazing.
Sarah Tavel: Yes.
Lenny: I have a couple more questions sort of related, but I guess, is there anything else that you wanted to say about the hierarchy of marketplaces?
Sarah Tavel: Maybe just this kind of the coda, which is like you can never rest on your laurels, and we talked about this already, but the history of marketplaces is one of disruption. And the idea with happiness is that, and Amazon and Bezos talk about this, which is expectations, consumer expectations, are constantly going up. And so, if you ever stagnate in the experience that you give to the consumer, guess what? You’re going to get disrupted. And the examples of we talked about with Airbnb and HomeAway, DoorDash, and Grubhub, Grubhub wasn’t able to, for different reasons, they were a public company, and so, they couldn’t access capital in the same way that the private markets could. But they were too slow to change the atomic unit of their supply to have delivery that they fulfilled. And so, they got disrupted by the DoorDash, Uber Eats of the world. And so, you just can’t rest on your laurels. Expectations constantly go up. And it’s part of what’s so exciting about this market that we play in.
Lenny: I think Grubhub is a great example of that, where they were the first really successful food delivery company, and then, even with network effects, by far, the best way to order. And then, DoorDash comes around and wins, because they go bigger and spend a lot of money that Grubhub wasn’t willing to spend. Awesome. So I guess the advice there is just don’t take for granted your success, even if you have amazing network effects.
Sarah Tavel: That’s right.
Lenny: Okay. So as we were chatting about this conversation, something you mentioned is that, even if you’re not building a marketplace, these lessons are actually still useful. So say you’re building an open source product or a social network or even a SaaS startup, a lot of these sort of lessons can still apply. What advice would you have for people that have heard what you just shared, but aren’t necessarily building a marketplace? What are some of the takeaways as well?
Sarah Tavel: At Benchmark, I’m lucky that I have partners who look at very different types of companies that I look at, and we meet such a incredible breadth of founders. And what you just realize, again and again, is that these same lessons hold. With open source, it’s about solving a specific developer’s need in the beginning and solving it really freaking well, and then, expanding from there. With SaaS, I think maybe the fascinating exception, kind of similar to your Thumbtack exception, I think what Parker Conrad’s doing with Rippling and this idea of a compound startup is very different. And actually, he has a level of ambition that is both the sun and a laser at the same time. And so, that’s kind of, in a rare founder, you can have that level of execution, but again and again, what you see, and I think a lot of this, for new companies leveraging large language models to build products, is that focus on a constrained market to start is the way to win.
Lenny: I like that. Basically, it’s happy developer in the case of DevTools or happy enterprise user, just get happy people using your product and coming back to it. So I love that as a reminder. One other question is you wrote this post on finding white space in building marketplace, basically someone that wants to build a marketplace, trying to figure out, where is there an opportunity for new marketplace? Do you have any advice for people, say, founders, potential founders, that are looking for ideas and opportunities to build a marketplace for how to find one? Where do you think there’s opportunity?
Sarah Tavel: It’s kind of fun to ask the question whether LLMs change the game or open up new surface area. So in my post, I write about three ways that you can look for a new opportunity. I think it was like, number one, you always find a horizontal marketplace and you find the kind of low NPS part of that segment and you create a marketplace around that. eBay, being a horizontal marketplace, the sneakers being a low NPS part of that, and you get GOAT. The second is finding a niche that no one else is paying attention to. And the Etsy examples we gave, the Hipcamp stories, and bringing that online, taking friction away, and showing that it’s actually a bigger market than you think. And then, the third is changing the atomic unit of the supply. So that kind of like Grubhub, the atomic unit there was a restaurant that has its own delivery fleet, and then, Postmates, DoorDash, Uber Eats came in and said, “Actually, it’s any restaurant, we’ll provide the delivery fleet.”
And so, they opened up the available supply. Now, when I think about LLMs, I think there’s a real opportunity for the third one. LLMs may make it possible to bring on a supply type that maybe the long tail, that was just, it was too much effort to reach out to them, onboard them, but maybe if you automate that work, you actually create an opportunity to expand the supply in a way that none of us can anticipate right now. And then, who knows whether there’s an opportunity with LLMs to create a better experience in one of these kind of low NPS segments of a market or a niche market itself, that makes it possible to bring it online. So I haven’t seen anything yet, but I am definitely on the hunt.
Lenny: Very cool. Turned into AI corner, which I love. Okay, well, with that, we reached our very exciting lightning round. Are you ready?
Sarah Tavel: Okay, I’m ready.
Lenny: What are two or three books that you’ve recommended most to other people?
Sarah Tavel: Pachinko is one of the best fictional books I’ve read in a while. I just loved it, and so, I highly recommend that. And then, to founders, I am a sucker for The Five Temptations of a CEO and The Five Dysfunctions of a Team. It’s kind of like you imagine those books in the grocery store aisle, but they’re fast reads that are incredibly insightful and I highly recommend.
Lenny: Is there a favorite recent movie or TV show that you really enjoy?
Sarah Tavel: I don’t watch stuff, so I’m not a good candidate there.
Lenny: I highly respect that. Is there a favorite interview question that you like to ask candidates, which usually, we can transform into when you’re talking to founders and trying to decide if you want to invest?
Sarah Tavel: I always love hearing the journey people take and specifically how they’ve made decisions along the way, what drives them from each step. I think that’s always very illuminating.
Lenny: Do you have a favorite product you’ve recently discovered that you really love, whether it’s an app or physical product that you’ve used often? Anything real cool or fun?
Sarah Tavel: I’ll say we are late joiners to Tesla, my family. And man, it is one of those products that you use it for the first time, and you’re just like, “I could see why I’d want to own equity in this company,” not financial advice obviously, but it’s just an awesome experience.
Lenny: I completely agree. I’ve gotten so used to, we have a regular car and a Tesla, and the fact that you don’t need a key anymore, you just walk up and open it, because it has your phone… My wife, she left the key in our Subaru, just because she’s like, “Oh, shit, I need to take the key out.” It’s just sitting there running. Yeah, you’re so used to just the casual just walk up, open, you’re good to go. Awesome. Do you have a favorite life motto that you often repeat to yourself, share with people, either in work or life, that you find useful?
Sarah Tavel: My partner at Greylock, Reid Hoffman, has this line of every strength has a corresponding weakness, and vice versa, and there’s so much wisdom there. We see our own strengths and we see our weaknesses, but not realize that they actually go together. You can’t have one without the other. Similarly, strengths in organizations, like a decentralized organization can move really quickly, and the corresponding weakness of that is that it can feel chaotic and disorganized. On the other side, a centralized organization can feel really slow, but it is very intentional in the decision-making and the control of the experience. And so, everything has trade-offs, and realizing that, more often than not, they come together, it’s just so useful to be aware of that.
Lenny: Awesome. Final question. I believe you played rugby at some point, is that right?
Sarah Tavel: Yes.
Lenny: Okay. Is there a rugby story that would be fun to share from your time playing rugby? And if not, what should people know? What would surprise people about rugby, that they may not be aware of?
Sarah Tavel: Well, what people might be surprised of, especially if they meet me, is that I was actually a really good tackler, and I think I broke my nose a couple times and have more injuries than I would care to remember, but I definitely inflicted more injuries on other people than I received. And I think rugby is, there’s a camaraderie that comes with rugby, and the one thing I’ll confess is that we always joke that the rugby team is, it’s not a rugby team, it’s a drinking team, that has a rugby problem.
Lenny: Amazing.
Sarah Tavel: Those times are behind me.
Lenny: Oh, man. It sounds like an awesome person to have in your court when you’re a founder, the best tackler in town.
Sarah Tavel: Heck yes.
Lenny: Amazing. Sarah, I’m not surprised this went as long as it did. Thank you so much for being here. Two final questions. Where can folks find you online if they want to reach out and maybe ask follow-up questions? And how can listeners be useful to you?
Sarah Tavel: I appreciate that. I’m Sarah at Benchmark. I’m on Twitter, Sarah Tavel, and I have a Substack, SarahTavel.com. If you’re a founder, you’re working on something, don’t be shy. We’re in the business of meeting with people like you, and so, I always love to get stimulated by new ideas and people.
Lenny: Just to focus people even more there, is there stage you like, is there markets, anything people should know of what’s right for you?
Sarah Tavel: We, at Benchmark, we’re early stage. We’re an early stage firm. We aspire to be first board member. Usually, it looks like the series A, and that’s really where our sweet spot is.
Lenny: Awesome. Sarah, thank you so much for being here.
Sarah Tavel: Thank you for having me.
Lenny: Bye, everyone. Thank you so much for listening. If you found this valuable, you can subscribe to the show on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, or your favorite podcast app. Also, please consider giving us a rating or leaving a review, as that really helps other listeners find the podcast. You can find all past episodes or learn more about the show at lennyspodcast.com. See you in the next episode.
Glossary
| English | 中文 |
|---|---|
| activation | 激活 |
| adjacent market | 相邻市场 |
| aha moment | 啊哈时刻 |
| atomic unit | 基本单元 |
| B2B / B2C | B2B / B2C |
| Benchmark | Benchmark(风投机构,保留原文) |
| big rocks | 大石头(指最重要的事项) |
| Bill Gurley | Bill Gurley(人名,保留原文) |
| blitz scale | 闪电式扩张 |
| capital | 资金 |
| cohort | 同期群 |
| collaborative journals | 协作笔记本 |
| compound startup | 复合型创业公司 |
| contribution profit | 贡献利润 |
| core action | 核心行为 |
| CPO (Chief Product Officer) | 首席产品官 |
| crypto winter | 加密寒冬 |
| cul-de-sac | 死胡同 |
| currents | 浪潮(指市场中正在形成的趋势/动能) |
| DeFi | DeFi(去中心化金融,保留原文) |
| discovery surfaces | 发现类界面 |
| DoorDash | DoorDash(外卖平台,保留原文) |
| dormant user | 沉睡用户 |
| earned secret | 靠努力换来的洞察(指创始人通过亲身经历获得的市场洞见) |
| engagement | 参与度 |
| Fabrice Grinda | Fabrice Grinda(人名保留原文) |
| flywheel | 飞轮 |
| follow graph | 关注图谱 |
| fragmentation | 碎片化 |
| glamping | 豪华露营 |
| GMV (Gross Merchandise Value) | GMV(商品交易总额) |
| go-to-market | 市场推广 |
| GOAT | GOAT(运动鞋交易平台,保留原文) |
| Greylock | Greylock(风投机构,保留原文) |
| growth hacking | 增长黑客 |
| growth loops | 增长循环 |
| Grubhub | Grubhub(外卖平台,保留原文) |
| happiness loops | 幸福循环 |
| happy GMV | Happy GMV(满意 GMV,保留原文作为专有概念) |
| happy path | 幸福路径 |
| heterogeneity | 异质性 |
| hierarchy | 层级 |
| Hipcamp | Hipcamp(交易平台公司名,保留原文) |
| HomeAway | HomeAway(度假租赁平台,保留原文) |
| homogeneity | 同质性 |
| incumbents | 在位者 |
| intellectually honest | 理智诚实 |
| K-factor | K-factor(病毒传播系数,保留原文) |
| land grab | 跑马圈地 |
| leaky bucket | 漏水桶 |
| liquidity | 流动性 |
| Lyft | Lyft(网约车平台,保留原文) |
| Marco | Marco(人名,保留原文) |
| marketplace | 交易平台 |
| MAU (Monthly Active Users) | 月活跃用户数 |
| Mechanical Turk | Mechanical Turk(Amazon 众包平台,保留原文) |
| minimum viable happiness | 最低可行满意度 |
| network effect | 网络效应 |
| North Star | 北极星 |
| NPS | NPS(Net Promoter Score,净推荐值,保留原文) |
| NUX (New User Experience) | 新用户体验 |
| optionality | 可选择性 |
| organic growth | 有机增长 |
| Pachinko | 《柏青哥》(韩裔美籍作家李敏金的小说,使用公认中文译名) |
| Parker Conrad | Parker Conrad(人名,保留原文) |
| Pinterest Graph | Pinterest Graph(专有名词,保留原文) |
| plateau | 平台期 |
| playbook | 打法 |
| Postmates | Postmates(外卖平台,保留原文) |
| product market fit | 产品市场匹配 |
| re-engagement loop | 再参与循环 |
| Reid Hoffman | Reid Hoffman(人名,LinkedIn 联合创始人、Greylock 合伙人,保留原文) |
| REKKI | REKKI(交易平台公司名,保留原文) |
| retention | 留存 |
| Rippling | Rippling(公司名,保留原文) |
| Ronan | Ronan(人名,保留原文) |
| saturation point | 饱和点 |
| Seamless Web | Seamless Web(外卖平台,保留原文) |
| Sean Ellis | Sean Ellis(人名,保留原文) |
| Secret | Secret(匿名社交应用,保留原文) |
| self-perpetuating | 自我驱动 |
| Series A | A 轮 |
| smile graph | 微笑曲线 |
| stablecoin | 稳定币 |
| Subaru | Subaru(汽车品牌,保留原文) |
| Substack | Substack(内容订阅平台,保留原文) |
| TAM (Total Addressable Market) | TAM(总可达市场) |
| The Five Dysfunctions of a Team | 《团队的五种功能障碍》(Patrick Lencioni 的管理著作,使用公认中文译名) |
| The Five Temptations of a CEO | 《CEO 的五种诱惑》(Patrick Lencioni 的管理著作,使用公认中文译名) |
| thimble | 顶针(比喻极度聚焦的小市场) |
| Thumbtack | Thumbtack(服务平台,保留原文) |
| tip the market | 倾斜市场 |
| tipping loops | 倾斜循环 |
| tipping point | 临界点 |
| Turkers | Turkers(Mechanical Turk 上的工作者,保留原文) |
| Uber Eats | Uber Eats(外卖平台,保留原文) |
| UberPool | UberPool(Uber 服务类型,保留原文) |
| UberX | UberX(Uber 服务类型,保留原文) |
| user acquisition spend | 用户获取花费 |
| vanity metrics | 虚荣指标 |
| VRBO | VRBO(度假租赁平台,保留原文) |
| WAP (Weekly Active Pinners) | 周活跃 Pin 用户(weekly active pinners 的缩写) |
| weekly active pinners | 周活跃 Pin 用户 |
| white hot center | 白热中心 |
| white space | 机会空间 |
| winner take most | 赢家通吃(多数) |
| yurt | 蒙古包 |
Reformatted by reformat_english.py
参与度层级 | Sarah Tavel(Benchmark、Greylock、Pinterest)
我认为很多人把市场想象成水体,就像一大片我们要去征服的水域。但我实际上认为,最有趣的市场,你应该把它们想象成水流——市场中有某种正在发生的变化创造了这股水流,就像你把一块木板放到河面上,水流会带着它向前。而一个没有这种势能的市场,你就不得不建造非常庞大精巧的东西才能取得任何进展。这就是为什么我们不太关心市场规模,因为在审视市场时,你真正要寻找的是变化的动力学——什么是能拉动公司前进的水流和势能,让创始人的工作变得更轻松,从而真正建立起持久的东西。
嘉宾介绍
Lenny: 今天我的嘉宾是 Sarah Tavel。Sarah 是 Benchmark 的合伙人,Benchmark 是全球最顶尖的风险投资基金之一,她专注于投资消费者和交易平台(marketplace)领域的初创企业。在加入 Benchmark 之前,Sarah 是 Pinterest 的第一位产品经理。虽然我通常有一个不在播客上邀请 VC 的原则,但正如你将看到的,Sarah 的思维方式非常像一个产品和增长负责人。每次和 Sarah 聊初创企业和交易平台,我都能学到很多东西。在我们的对话中,我们还了解到她以前打过橄榄球,而且显然是她们联盟里最好的扑搂手之一。
在这次对话中,我们深入探讨了 Sarah 的两个杀手级框架。一个是参与度层级(hierarchy of engagement),这是在尝试弄清楚如何增长和规模化你的消费者初创企业时极其有用的视角。另一个是交易平台层级(hierarchy of marketplaces),这是帮助你构建交易平台初创企业的极其有用的指南。如果你正在构建消费者产品或交易平台,这期节目就是为你准备的。我们会聊得非常深入、非常硬核,正合我意。
Lenny: Sarah,非常感谢你能来,欢迎来到播客。
Sarah Tavel: 非常激动能来这里。
Lenny: 你可能知道也可能不知道,我通常有一个不在播客上邀请 VC 的原则。但你是一位非常特别的 VC,因为你曾经是产品经理。很多人不知道你是 Pinterest 的第一位产品经理。对我来说,你的思维方式仍然像一个产品经理,所以我非常高兴能破例邀请你来参加播客。
Sarah Tavel: 谢谢你为我破例。
两大框架概述
Lenny: 我想利用我们在一起的时间,深入探讨你开发并在与创始人合作中使用的两个框架,帮助他们打造成功的公司。一个聚焦于消费者业务,另一个聚焦于交易平台业务。
我们就从第一个框架开始吧。我想你把它叫做参与度层级。首先,能不能大致介绍一下这个框架?还有,它是从哪里来的,你是怎么想出这个概念的?
参与度层级的起源
Sarah Tavel: 当然。我觉得你会注意到我的一点是,我对虚荣指标(vanity metrics)有一种过敏反应,就是人们常说的那些虚荣指标。当我从 Pinterest 转型离开时,我在那里负责发现团队的产品工作,所以我负责 Pinterest 上所有的发现类界面(discovery surfaces)——主页信息流、搜索、推荐,还有其他几个团队。归根结底,这些团队的工作都是围绕参与度的,提高 Pinterest 的参与度——帮助人们在 Pinterest 上找到他们足够喜欢、想要 Pin 到自己画板上的内容。
当我开始与那些才华横溢的消费者社交产品创始人见面时,正是大家都在热衷于增长黑客(growth hacking)的时期。你会看到这些创始人纷纷前来,他们都有那些一路向右上方的图表,不管是注册量、下载量还是月活跃用户数(MAU)。我感觉不太对——他们如此执着、如此关注、在演示中如此展示的那些指标,未必是应该关注的东西。这些指标并没有触及核心问题——他们是否走在构建持久的消费者社交产品的道路上。他们从根本上忽略了参与度的关键性。
我越来越强烈地感受到这一点,就像鞋里的一粒沙子一样挥之不去。我开始经历那个你经历过很多次的过程——写作、提炼,于是就有了这个层级。当你审视社交产品时,你会发现几乎都有这样一个行为,我称之为产品的核心行为(core action),它构成了产品的基础。当用户完成这个行为时,很明显他们既理解了产品的效用,也理解了这个产品是做什么的,而且如果他们执行了这个行为,他们很可能会再次回来。
对于 Facebook,在早期最明显的行为就是加好友。对于 Pinterest,就是 Pin。如果你用过 Evernote,对于 Evernote 来说就是写笔记。当你执行了那个行为,说明你是一个参与度高的用户。当然,还有很多其他行为可以做——你可以在 Pinterest 上关注别人,可以在 Facebook 上评论。但归根结底,如果你没有做那个核心行为,你就不算是这个产品的真正用户。这就是为什么 MAU 这个数字其实没什么意义。真正要看的是完成核心行为的用户。你可以用同期群(cohort)的方式来看,可以按周、按天,或者任何合适的频率。但这就是基础,这就是第一层。
Lenny: 基本上就是,消费者业务需要定义某种”活跃用户”的口径,并搞清楚他们做了什么行为才能算作活跃用户,而不是仅仅打开了应用之类的。对于 Snapchat,可能就是发送一条 Snap;对于 WhatsApp,可能就是发送一条消息。
Sarah Tavel: 没错。顺便说一下,这个行为的选取非常重要,你要选对行为。你要确保这是一个能够扩展到足够多用户的行为。你要思考:“如果我围绕这个行为来规划产品路线图并为之优化,我们最终会做什么?“
核心行为的选取:Pinterest 的早期经验
Sarah Tavel: 给你一个更具体的例子。其实在 Pinterest 早期,我们也不确定它到底是什么。我们有各种各样在量的指标——关注、点击、点赞、Pin,还有停留时长。我们做各种实验,得到各种不同的数据,有的指标上升,有的指标下降。我们到底该优化什么?
有一点真的非常重要——你要非常清晰地知道:对我们的产品来说,这个行为才是最重要的。所有东西,我们的 NUX 都必须引导到这个行为上。如果用户没有做这个行为,那他们的产品体验中就缺了什么。获得这种清晰度,确切知道你要选择哪一个行为往前推进,是极其重要的。
激活与核心行为的关系
Lenny: 顺着这个思路再问一个问题。你怎么看这个里程碑和新用户激活(activation)里程碑之间的关系?你觉得它们通常是同一个吗?就是让用户到达那个”啊哈时刻”(aha moment)——
Sarah Tavel: 是的。
Lenny: 相比于持续性的行为?
Sarah Tavel: 对。这里面有一部分是,你怎么衡量 NUX 和激活的成功与否?对我来说,就是看你能不能把新用户引导到充分理解产品的心智模型,从而开始完成核心行为。
Lenny: 很好。
Sarah Tavel: Pinterest 曾经有一个我们试验过的 NUX,里面甚至没有教人们什么是 Pin。信息流就神奇地出现了,那是一个真实的……那个例子很好地说明了,我们必须帮助人们理解,他们来到这里是为了发现东西并保存到自己的画板上。
Lenny: 顺便说一下,以防有人不知道 NUX 是什么,就是 new user experience,新用户体验的缩写。
Sarah Tavel: 谢谢,是的。
框架的使用方式
Lenny: 好。也许还有一个基础性的问题我们可能跳过了——怎么最好地思考如何使用这个框架?本质上是不是就是你应该把精力集中在产品的哪些要素上、应该推动哪些指标?这样理解是不是最简单的方式?基本上我们谈了第一层,一共有三层。在你介绍这个框架的过程中,怎么最好地思考如何应用和使用它?
Sarah Tavel: 在某种程度上,构建和设计消费者产品时需要全局思考。但我认为非常重要的一点是,一旦产品上线、你开始优化的时候,就要开始逐层思考。这非常有聚焦作用,能帮助创始人理解:“我真正需要集中精力改善的杠杆是什么?”
Lenny: 好。等我们把三层都讲完之后,我想回过头来谈谈怎么应用它,也许举一些例子。所以现在把话筒交回给你。
第二层:留存——产品越用越好
Sarah Tavel: 完美。假设你在构建产品,开始看到有用户在完成核心行为。接下来你面临的挑战——我见过很多次——就是如何让这些用户留下来。你要留存这些用户。显然,如果他们做了一两次核心行为就失去动力了,那你要打造一个持久的产品就会处于非常困难的境地。
对我来说,检验你是否在构建一款具备留存能力的产品——在微观层面,即单个用户层面——的标准是:产品应该越用越好,而且离开它的代价越来越大。我给你举几个例子,几个我最喜欢的产品。
显然,Pinterest。我在 Pinterest 时参与开发并上线的一个功能,就是”Picked for You”(为你精选)信息流。它的理念是,每次你 Pin 一个东西到画板上,我们就利用用户给我们的这些信息,在首页信息流中生成推荐。这可能是社交产品中第一个算法信息流,因为突然之间你的首页信息流不再只是你关注的人和内容。事实上,人们在 Pinterest 上并不怎么关注其他人,所以我们需要一种方式让体验随着使用越来越好,于是我们开始在首页信息流中做推荐。
这种体验就是,你 Pin 得越多,首页信息流就越个性化。同时,你 Pin 得越多,离开 Pinterest 的代价也越大——因为突然之间,你所有的喜欢的书、想记住的文章、打算某天做的食谱、正在规划的假期旅行,都在里面。你不会放弃 Pinterest,因为 Pinterest 成了这些不同身份表达的仓库,或者你想回头查看的各种书签。这就是那个理念。非常重要的是,核心行为正是你用来让产品体验随时间越来越好的那个抓手。
Evernote,另一个例子。我不知道你是不是 Evernote 用户。
Lenny: 不是。我试过一次,太复杂了,很快就放弃了。
Sarah Tavel: 人们到现在还笑我用 Evernote。
Lenny: 哇。
Sarah Tavel: 我是终身用户。
Lenny: 哇。
Sarah Tavel: 就是那种,我把所有笔记都记在 Evernote 里,文档也往里面丢。这意味着我用得越多……现在我知道在 Evernote 里搜一下就能找到我要的文档。现在,我再也离不开 Evernote 了。它里面什么都有。我在 Evernote 里有成千上万的文档。这样的产品留存力极强。
Lenny: 除非有人做了一个很好的导出工具,那这个摩擦就不复存在了。
Sarah Tavel: 人们一直告诉我要迁移到 Notion 或者别的什么工具上去,但还没到时候。我将继续做这里的恐龙。
Lenny: 哇。我很喜欢这个例子——有人可以打破那个壁垒,通过让退出变得更容易来降低留存。
Sarah Tavel: 是的。
Lenny: 这其实是一个很有趣的增长策略。
第三层:自我驱动与网络效应
Sarah Tavel: 是的,确实如此。假设现在你有了一款产品,它在增长,越来越多的人完成了核心行为。他们完成核心行为时,产品对他们的留存力也越来越强——越用越好,离开的代价越来越大。接下来你面临的艰巨任务——这是最难克服的——就是如何让产品自我驱动(self-perpetuating)。这是我喜欢的一种思考方式:每次用户使用你的产品,不管是点击鼠标还是点击手机屏幕,我喜欢把它想象成他们向你的产品注入的动能。你在接收这股能量,而做一个好产品的任务,就是尽可能多地把这股能量转化回用户正在体验的产品中。
你能做的最大的事情就是网络效应(network effect)。我在 Pinterest 上 Pin 得越多,Pinterest 上每一个用户的体验就越好。每次我把一个 Pin 添加到画板上,我就在 Pinterest Graph 中创建了一条新的边,Pinterest 随后利用它来生成推荐,丰富对 Pinterest 上所有对象的理解。网络效应是你能做到的最强大的事情。显然,如果你拥有网络效应——所有社交产品在某种程度上都必须拥有——你就必须花时间尽可能最大化它出现的地方,精细调整它,消除摩擦,让它成为一个越转越快的飞轮(flywheel)。
增长与再参与循环
Sarah Tavel: 但还有其他循环,你需要识别出来并加以最大化。这些就是增长循环和再参与循环。这些是经典的循环,你经常谈到它们,它们存在于交易平台和社交产品中。你怎么做到让用户在使用产品的过程中,想要把它分享给其他人?他们创建的元数据可以用于 SEO。你有协作体验,能把其他人拉进来。这里有很多不同的事情可以做。此外,还有一些可以用来重新激活用户的手段。
比如,在 Pinterest 早期,如果你 Pin 了一样东西,你 Pin 的是在 Pinterest 上找到的、别人已经 Pin 过的内容。所以我们就会发一条推送通知:“嘿,Lenny,Sarah 刚把你的 Pin 添加到了她的艺术画板上。” 这时候,如果你是一个沉睡用户,已经好几周没用 Pinterest 了,那条通知可能就会把你拉回来,“嘿,我好奇 Sarah 的艺术画板上还有什么别的 Pin。” 这是一个很好的再参与循环——Pinterest 不需要在那里刻意做任何事情。是用户创造了那个行为,驱动了 Pinterest 想要实现的结果。
Evernote 的缺失
现在,尽管我很喜欢 Evernote,但正是在这一点上 Evernote 显然是掉了链子的。它没有任何可以利用的循环——当我使用这个产品时,并没有让它对你变得更好。也没有这样的循环——当我使用它时,我想要把你拉进来使用。他们曾经尝试过做协作笔记本,但没有成功。正因如此,Evernote 不得不花钱获取用户,最终触达了天花板。他们没能跨越第三级。
飞轮失灵的陷阱
我还可以举其他例子,说一些你可能想不到的、没能跨越到第三级的公司。我会想到像 Houseparty 和 Clubhouse 这样的产品。这两个产品有趣的地方在于,你可能会认为加入 Clubhouse 或 Houseparty 的用户越多,飞轮就应该转得越快。但挑战在于,它们依赖推送通知。我不知道你有没有这种体验,以 Houseparty 为例。你在 Houseparty 上关注了很多人,然后突然之间,你的推送通知就变得压倒性地多了。因为它是一个实时产品,你必须靠推送通知才能知道什么时候该加入进去,但当你关注的人越来越多、通知也越来越多的时候,你就会到达一个开始忽略它们的临界点。于是就变成了这样一种局面:即使飞轮本应该转得更快,它反而开始瓦解了。这就是第三级中真正棘手的微妙之处。
Lenny: 我想听到这里的人会想:“好吧,让用户更频繁地使用你的产品,提高留存,基本上就是让它病毒式传播”——这些他们已经知道了。但我觉得这个框架的力量在于,它只是一个透镜,一个帮你厘清什么最重要的透镜。有太多太多的事情你可以去做来提升产品的成功率、帮助它增长。我喜欢这个框架的地方就是:“这是最重要的三件事,然后这是它们的层级关系。” 它们是层层递进的。如果你想提高留存,就让人们更频繁地完成核心行为。如果你想帮助增长,就专注于让它传播、自我驱动。
Sarah Tavel: 是的,没错。这一点的重要性在于——我无法过分强调专注在创建这些公司时有多重要。这真的很难。确实没有现成的手册可以照搬。每一家成功的公司,都必须在根本意义上不同于之前的任何东西。但它们共享一些第一性原理层面的要素,你可以利用这些要素,在经历不可避免的增长曲线时真正地聚焦,想知道”我们如何最大化当前这个阶段?我们如何真正聚焦于那些最能让我们成功的事情?” 我认为正是这时候,一个这样的框架可以起到厘清思路的作用。
消费者产品为何必须自我传播
Lenny: 你说的这些背后都很有深度,你太谦虚了。其中一点是,在这个金字塔顶端——让产品自我驱动——这件事之所以如此重要,是因为一款消费者应用要成功运转,绝大多数情况下它必须能够以极低的成本传播。获客成本必须非常低,除非你找到了某种付费广告策略能在其中赚钱——而这非常罕见。所以也许可以谈谈为什么这一点对消费者产品如此关键。
Sarah Tavel: 是的。你做一款消费者产品,目标是什么?你不是要做一个小众的东西。你想做的是一个面向大众市场的产品,数亿用户、数十亿用户的那种。如果靠市场营销来做到这一点,需要巨额的资金。到目前为止我们只有一个例子,那就是 TikTok——在它搞清楚前两个层级之后,花费了超过十亿美元来实现增长。实际上,TikTok 在拥有一个具备留存能力的产品之前,并没有投入用户获取的花费,之后他们才确认要全力最大化。但其他所有社交产品都是有机增长的。它们能做到这一点,是因为找到了如何最大化这些循环。即便是 TikTok,在花掉所有资金去获取剩余用户之前,也已经达到了数百万用户的规模。
Lenny: 我不知道这个数字。TikTok 花了十亿美元在付费广告上——
Sarah Tavel: 是的。
Lenny: 才达到今天的规模?
Sarah Tavel: 是的。
Lenny: 天哪。
Sarah Tavel: 是的。
Lenny: 我知道是好几千万,但没想到是十亿。
Sarah Tavel: 是的。
Lenny: 这恰恰说明了要突围成为一个新的社交网络——或者新的社交应用——有多难。
Sarah Tavel: 确实很难。但与此同时,我们也确实看到了一些例外,我依然觉得消费者渴望新的体验。过去几年我们看到了几个增长到数千万用户的产品。不过还没有哪个真正创造出足够有黏性的体验,能从 TikTok 和 Instagram——这两个目前占据主导地位的平台——那里抢走用户时间。
病毒式增长的另一面
Lenny: 你说的这些也让我想起最近我 Newsletter 上的一篇客座文章,是关于 Saturn 这款应用的,不知道你读过没有。
Sarah Tavel: 哦,没读过。但我知道这款应用,创始人也很棒。
Lenny: 是的。那篇文章真的很有意思。他们有一个非常有趣的洞察——首先,能冲到 App Store 榜首、突破现有格局的应用极其稀少。而那些做到的,几乎总是在上面待几天就消失了,因为那是一次性的爆发。他们基本上谈到的是,很多应用都有这种病毒式的 K-factor,疯狂传播,所有人都开始用,所有人都涌入其中。但紧接着反方向的力量也同样迅速地起作用——如果有几个人连续几天没使用,你进去一看就是”哦,这里已经没什么动静了”,然后它就迅速崩塌。Clubhouse 本质上经历了这个过程,BeReal 也开始经历这个——人们停止发布内容,然后”算了,大家都不在了”。大多数应用都有这种破坏性的 K-factor,就像当初推动它传播的那个 K-factor 一样,反过来开始起作用。
Sarah Tavel: 是的。正如人们所说,当一样东西增长得非常快的时候,它也可能同样快地崩塌。
匿名性的陷阱
Lenny: 是的,很难。顺着这个思路,你有没有看到或学到什么……这个框架的核心目的就是避免那种情况。但除此之外,你还能想到什么避免那种情况的方法吗?
Sarah Tavel: 我还见过另一种容易遇到问题的情况,我觉得它尤其容易在第二层级出问题,就是匿名性。匿名性这个东西……伪匿名和匿名是完全不同的概念。伪匿名的话,Twitter 上有,Reddit 上也有。你在创建一个持续存在的身份,这个身份可以积累收益,也会产生沉没成本。我在 Twitter 上那个专门喷其他 VC 的伪匿名账号……开玩笑的。
Lenny: 这可是独家新闻。
Sarah Tavel: 我没那么有趣,做不出那种事。但对那些确实有伪匿名账号的人来说,他们能积累收益,因为可以获得关注者。这也是沉没成本——他们在一个平台上经营了自己的身份,即使那是一个伪匿名身份。而当你面对完全匿名时,问题在于你没有这种积累收益或沉没成本。
我不知道你有没有玩过 Secret,但它和 TikTok 之类的东西有些类似。这类体验的问题在于,随着时间的推移……网络效应无法发挥作用,因为匿名性为不良行为创造了条件,于是开始拖垮整个社区。而且,这也是一种你可以使用产品、删除账号,然后三个月后再回来的体验——因为匿名的特性,你的体验和之前没有任何区别。我发现匿名性这个东西,人们不断在尝试,非常优秀的创始人也不断在这堵墙上撞得头破血流,因为它确实有早期那种有趣的快速增长,但它始终是一个无法在没有持续身份的情况下长期存续的产品。
提高留存的方法
Lenny: 我想沿着”如何提高留存”这条线索继续聊。基本上,你刚才说的,也许也是你告诉创始人们的最主要的事情,就是帮助提高留存——让用户真的很难离开。在继续之前,先明确一下,这个框架主要适用于社交消费者产品,还是可以推广到所有消费者产品?
Sarah Tavel: 我认为适用于所有消费者产品。
Lenny: 好的。
Sarah Tavel: 但对社交消费者产品最有意义。
Lenny: 好的,明白了。
Sarah Tavel: Evernote 也适用。Evernote 就不是社交消费者产品。
Lenny: 明白了。所以这个框架最适合的就是那种社交型的、你的朋友也在里面的产品?
Sarah Tavel: 对。只有社交产品才有可能达到第三层级。
Lenny: 好的。回到留存这个话题,这是我经常谈论的、也是大家总在讨论的东西。你必须做对的最重要的事情就是把留存做到一个健康的水平,因为如果你留不住人,其他一切都不管用。所以想在这里多花一点时间,关于帮助创始人提高留存、让留存达到健康水平,你还有什么其他建议吗?
Sarah Tavel: 第一件事其实是测量它。我无法告诉你有多少次,我建议一位创始人去追踪同期群,而这对他来说是件新鲜事。我认为第一要务就是非常非常清楚地、理智诚实地看待同期群数据。
Lenny: 能不能简要描述一下,然后我会链接一篇我写的关于具体操作方法的文章。
Sarah Tavel: 太好了。这种时候我大概应该把话筒交给你,让你来讲——
Lenny: 不行,你坐在热椅上呢。
Sarah Tavel: 同期群的话,我一直喜欢看这类产品的周同期群。从两个维度来看。第一个维度是,对于每一组同期群,你看到的是在同一周注册的一群人,这就是一个同期群。你既要从活跃用户的角度来看——这些人是否持续回到产品中?我特别喜欢从周活跃用户完成核心行为的角度来看,就是用户是否在完成核心行为?这个数据在每个同期群中随着时间推移如何变化?同时也要看这些同期群内部的活动水平。你希望看到的是那种经典的微笑曲线——随着网络增长、用户越来越多地使用产品,你会发现随着时间的推移,他们的留存实际上越来越高,而不是那种经典的漏水桶,同期群一直在萎缩。在同期群数据达到一个平台期之前,你在用户留存方面都还有更多工作要做。
聚焦的重要性
第二件事就是聚焦。我也数不清有多少次遇到创始人……我见过一个例子,是一个约会/交友类应用,创始人通过 TikTok 来获客,而 TikTok 完全不受地理限制。所以他的用户数字在增长,但如果没有聚焦在一个特定的地理区域,让这种类型的产品成为高留存产品是非常困难的。
Lenny: 回到这个框架,你觉得创始人最常在哪个层级投入不足?或者说如果你必须选一个最重要的层级来集中精力,会是哪个?还是说完全取决于具体情况?
创始人最常见的错误
Sarah Tavel: 我经常感到的是,很多时候,产品创始人、消费者创始人,他们看到自己想达到的目标,把自己和别人产品的完整形态做比较——ROBLOX、Instagram、TikTok 等等——他们想尽快达到那个程度。但这带来的结果是,当一个新用户注册时,一开始就有太多东西需要消化和理解,产品没有一个清晰的聚焦点来引导用户去做你最希望他们做的事情。而这正是理解第一层级——你的核心行为是什么——的重要性所在:你要确保当用户来到你的产品、第一次注册、对产品本身可能还不太了解的时候,他们能看到自己应该做的事情,并且你去引导他们完成。很多时候,在早期阶段,一个产品可能已经有很多功能,但这些功能分散了用户本应放在最重要事情上的注意力。所以我觉得这是第一个错误,它自然而然地成为第一个错误,也许也是我看到的最大的错误。
Lenny: 本质上来说,就是没有做好激活时刻,没有足够聚焦于让用户达到人们所说的”啊哈时刻”,然后让这个核心行为不断重复。
Sarah Tavel: 对。
Lenny: 为了给这个讨论收个尾,你能不能再分享几个核心行为/激活时刻的例子,让大家在脑海中重新刷新一下?另外,关于帮助人们确定那是什么,你能不能分享一些建议?我知道做好这件事很难,但关于如何找到那个激活时刻,你有什么建议吗?
Pinterest 的核心行为探索
Sarah Tavel: 我可以分享一下我们在 Pinterest 做的那个练习。因为正如我之前提到的,Pinterest 早期我们并不清楚自己到底是什么——我们是一个社交网络吗?应该优化关注图谱吗?但要记住,那是 2011 年的 Pinterest,当时 Twitter 在疯狂增长,Instagram 也在增长。它们都在构建不对称的关注图谱,对吧?所以当时并不清楚 Pinterest 是不是也在创建一种新的关注图谱,只不过是基于物品而非 Twitter 或 Instagram 那样基于人的。所以这件事并不显然。
后来实际上有两个方向的努力,我把它看作是自下而上和自上而下的,它们帮助真正明确了,实际上 Pin 一个东西才是核心行为,它将成为我们的北极星。我们称之为 weekly active pinners(周活跃 Pin 用户)。
这两个方向,一是总会有那种自下而上的分析,就是我们去看了你在 Pinterest 上能做的每一个操作——点赞、关注、点击跳转、停留时长、Pin、Repin。我们首先看了完成这些操作的用户占比是多少?如果你在某个星期做了这个操作,下一周回来的倾向有多大?我们基本上做了排序。
结果我们发现,如果你 Pin 了某个东西,或者 Repin 了某个东西——也就是在 Pinterest 上发现某样东西,我把这两个说法当作同义词——或者点击跳转了,你回来的概率极高。所以如果有人 Pin 了东西,他们下一周回到 Pinterest 的概率在当时超过了 90%。
然后还有一种自上而下的思考方式,就是 Pinterest 到底是用来做什么的?如果一个用户来到 Pinterest,但从来没有往画板上添加过任何东西,他真的理解 Pinterest 是什么吗?是的,点击跳转会让你想要保存它。点击跳转是有价值的,你会想保存它,所以点击跳转显然非常重要。但归根结底,如果他们没有对这个 Pin 喜欢到想把它保存到自己的画板上,那我们就没有做好自己的工作。
所以我们做了这种自上而下、自下而上的分析,非常清楚地表明:当我们发布一个实验或新功能时,如果 Pin 过东西的用户比例没有上升,或者该同期群的 Pin 数量没有上升,那这个实验就不是成功的实验。
Lenny: 太棒了。我会在节目笔记里附上一个链接,那是一篇关于如何做这种回归分析来找到你的激活里程碑的指南。
Sarah Tavel: 太好了。
Lenny: 基本上就是你描述的,什么对留存最具有因果性。我很喜欢 Pinterest 这个例子。还有其他的例子吗?就像你开头分享的那样,好的激活里程碑/核心用户行为的例子。
YouTube 的核心行为:订阅
Sarah Tavel: 我再讲一个我觉得特别有意思的例子。我最初发布那篇文章的时候,我错误地假设 YouTube 的核心行为是观看视频。然后 Shishir Mehrotra,他当时算是 YouTube 的 CPO,他联系了我,说”在早期确实是这样,但我们开始意识到它其实不是我们的核心行为。我们在 YouTube 上做了大量分析,最终发现订阅才是 YouTube 的核心行为。”
他这么一说,就觉得太有道理了,对吧?你是创作者,你把内容上传到 YouTube,当时有很多其他平台可以上传这些内容,但你在乎 YouTube 是因为那里是你增长受众的地方。所以在 YouTube 上订阅你内容的人越多,你就越能获得累积收益,也越有无法离开 YouTube 的沉没成本。
这在创作者那一侧非常重要,由此引出一个有趣的观点,也能衔接到我们接下来要聊的话题——所有社交产品本质上都是交易平台。YouTube 就是一个交易平台。你有上传内容的创作者和观看内容的观众,供给和需求。
所以订阅按钮也非常有意思,因为从需求侧,也就是观众的角度来看,如果不是因为我找到了那些内容深深打动我的创作者,以至于我订阅了他们的内容,我为什么要持续回到 YouTube,而不是去其他所有我可以消磨时间的地方呢?
我特别喜欢这个例子,因为它一方面展示了这些公司可能经历的演变过程,另一方面也体现了,当一个核心行为能同时服务于你网络中的双边时,你就知道你真正找到了对的东西。
Lenny: 很棒的例子。我觉得这也很好地提醒大家,这些东西是可以变的。你先拿出一个最优猜测,然后”好吧,我们试了六个月,也许该试试别的了,我们学到了新的东西。”
Sarah Tavel: 完全正确。
第一框架小结
Lenny: 我还会附上我写的那篇关于找到北极星指标的文章,这次对话就像一个多媒体对话,各种话题都有深入链接。基本上,我帮大概 30 家公司找到了北极星指标。我觉得一家公司的北极星指标最终往往就是这个核心用户行为。比如 Pinterest,听起来就是那些 WAP,weekly active pinners(周活跃 Pin 用户)。
Sarah Tavel: 对,Pinners,是的。
Lenny: YouTube 就是订阅者。
Sarah Tavel: 一开始我们叫它 weekly active repinners,还有 war,因为我们觉得自己像在打仗,所以这样挺好的。
Lenny: 然后就进入和平时期了。
Sarah Tavel: 是的,没错。
Lenny: 好的。那为了给这个框架收个尾,你能不能简要总结一下它对谁最有帮助,以及如果他们增长速度不如预期,或者作为创始人刚开始做消费者产品,应该怎么应用它?
Sarah Tavel: 好的,我想到的是消费领域的创始人、产品创始人,以及这些公司里的产品负责人,他们在思考路线图时,最需要优先处理的事情是什么,短期内的大石头是什么。这个框架就提供了一个视角,帮助你判断该优先做什么。
Lenny: 我们会把整个框架的链接附上,供想深入了解的人参考。
Sarah Tavel: 太好了。
交易平台层级框架
Lenny: 好,那我们进入你的第二个框架,你称之为交易平台的层级。首先,我想感谢 Mike Williams,他是 Everything Marketplaces 的创始人,他给我们提供了很多好的问题建议。
Sarah Tavel: 太好了,现在我紧张了。
Lenny: 他是交易平台先生。
Sarah Tavel: 没错。
Lenny: 好,我们从同样的问题开始——从宏观上怎么理解这个框架,它是给谁用的?它的起源是什么?
Sarah Tavel: 这是一个面向交易平台创始人的框架或层级。实际上它可以是 B2B 或 B2C 的,也适用于交易平台的产品负责人,无论是刚起步还是在规模化阶段,帮助排序和聚焦于最重要的事情。
交易平台层级:GMV 的误区
Sarah Tavel: 这个框架的诞生出于非常相似的触动,和我之前的经历如出一辙——我遇到的所有消费社交创始人,他们开口就谈月活跃用户数,但我总觉得这根本无法触及他们是否在创造持久价值的核心问题。而后来我逐渐意识到,GMV 其实也非常类似。GMV 这个指标看起来……当然,你不能在不增长 GMV 的情况下建成一个交易平台,就像你不能在不增长月活跃用户数的情况下建成一个社交产品一样。但如果你认为你参加的竞赛是增长月活跃用户数或增长 GMV,你其实并没有跑对方向。它可以把你带向……
有趣的是,在交易平台的场景下,它甚至可能把你带向错误的方向。我遇到的所有创始人,大家都执迷于 GMV 达到 100 万美元这个里程碑。很多人开始觉得,只要年化 GMV 能达到 100 万美元,就意味着你准备好融 A 轮了。但显而易见的是,并非所有 GMV 都是等价的,对吧?
想象一家十年前的外卖配送公司。你可以专注洛杉矶做到 100 万美元 GMV,或者专注波士顿做到 100 万美元 GMV,也可以分散开来,这里 50 万,那里 20 万。我遇到太多创始人会说:“哦,我觉得我们必须证明价值主张在其他城市也能被接受,所以我们要分散发力。“但我始终觉得,这样做只是把自己的任务搞得难上加难。
换一种思路:如果你想要尽快达到 100 万美元 GMV,你实际上会被激励去追逐一个非常大的市场,对吧?在一个巨大的市场海洋里撇取最上层的奶油,要比在一个更小的市场里极度聚焦更容易达到 100 万美元 GMV。而在一个受限的市场里做到 100 万美元 GMV 要难得多,花的时间也更长,但这恰恰是建设持久事业的路径。
于是,我一遍又一遍地进行同样的对话,觉得有必要把它凝练、综合成更容易传达的形式,这就是这个层级的由来。
从目标倒推:交易平台的核心洞察
Lenny: 太好了。好,你已经提到了这个层级中的一些关键要素,我们深入展开吧。
Sarah Tavel: 好。这个层级大概有几个核心洞察,但我首先想到的是:当你建设一个交易平台时,你实际上必须从目标开始,从那里往回倒推。
目标是什么?交易平台……你的播客上已经有大量关于这个话题的精彩内容,它们确实极其难建。你基本上是在同时建设两家公司——需求侧有自己的产品团队和市场推广团队,供给侧也有自己的产品团队和市场推广团队,而你必须让这两边对齐,使它们彼此满足对方的需求。这是一支极其艰难的舞蹈。这是软件世界中我认为最难构建的公司类型之一。
你之所以去做,是因为你想象这些模式的完整形态,你想到 Airbnb、Amazon、eBay、Google 这样的公司——一旦你有了规模、有了压倒性的市场份额,你的产品毫无疑问就是满足这种需求的最佳去处。它们最终会成为利润丰厚、现金流充沛的生意。你看到了这些,这就是你想建的事业,这就是你愿意承受建设交易平台一切艰辛的原因——把交易平台做起来,走到那个位置。
而且有非常清晰的分析。我在层级文章里发表过,有一张令人印象深刻的图表——我记得是当我担任一家叫 OLX 的在线分类信息公司董事会观察员时看到的,那家公司由 Fabrice Grinda 领导。那张图表明,一个交易平台相对于同赛道第二名越占据主导地位,这门生意的利润率就越高。所以道理非常清楚——显然,当你建设交易平台时,你不想处于中游,但即使你做到第一、只是勉强第一,你也得不到交易平台模式的任何好处,你在为每一个百分点的市场份额而战,供给侧和需求侧都不清楚你是否就是主要的去处。只有当你拥有那种压倒性的市场地位,远远甩开第二名时,一切才真正明朗。
而要达到那个位置——达到那种真正主导地位的赢家通吃(多数)局面——唯一的途径就是让你的市场发生”倾斜”,这是唯一可规模化的方式,而这正是第二层级。
第一层级:极致聚焦
那么,如何最大化倾斜一个市场的概率?你必须聚焦于一个非常受限的机会,这就是第一层级。这就是大的框架——一件非常重要的事:当你建设交易平台时,你实际上是在朝着那个主导地位的目标在建设。因此,在第一层级做到极度、极度、极度聚焦,是如此重要的原因之一。
Lenny: 太好了。你是从后往前讲的。为防大家没完全跟上,我总结一下:第一层级是聚焦,第二层级是倾斜市场,第三层级是主导市场。
Sarah Tavel: 完全正确。
Lenny: 太好了。那我们从第一层级”聚焦”开始吧——
Sarah Tavel: 来吧。
Lenny: 我认为这对交易平台建设者来说是最反直觉的一步。正如你所说,通常的思路是尽可能快地做大、尽可能多地获取 GMV、尽快让所有人满意。而你的建议本质上恰恰相反——把它做得很聚焦……
你有一个很棒的”顶针”比喻,我想你会谈到,我非常喜欢,一直记着。
Sarah Tavel: 是的。“聚焦”这个理念之所以如此困难,部分原因是我有幸接触到极具雄心的创始人。建设交易平台最难的一点在于,雄心往往像太阳一样——太阳的热量试图温暖一切,你去追逐一个大市场,就像在温暖整片海洋。
我认为,真正最优秀的雄心型创始人所做的,是像激光束一样将雄心聚焦在一个小市场——一个顶针上。你拿着这个顶针,在这样一个极小的、受限的市场里把产品市场匹配做得非常非常精准。如果你把这个顶针加热到滚烫,它就会从那里膨胀扩张开来。
这背后的前提是我们必须接受几个稀缺性约束。第一,你不可能从一开始就融到数亿美元,尤其今天我们处在一个资金受限的世界里。所以你必须能在初期把有限的资金发挥到极致,而唯一的办法就是极度聚焦。
第二,创始人注意力的约束。再说一次,这些事情真的、真的很难启动,唯一能做成的方式就是对外围视而不见,死死盯住一个细分市场。
外卖大战的启示
Sarah Tavel: 我一直想到的一个绝佳案例,就是我们都有幸亲眼见证的那次外卖大战。当时 DoorDash、Postmates、Uber Eats,以及作为在位者的 Grubhub,采取了截然不同的策略。我经常把 Postmates 和 DoorDash 拿来比较——两家都是成功的公司——但 Postmates 从一开始就野心勃勃,直接进军所有大城市。他们不仅做餐厅外卖,还做 Apple 零售、各类商品的配送,甚至自行车配送。我记得他们同时追了太多东西。
当你那样下棋的时候,你永远在和市场上其他替代品做比较。而在资金和注意力都有限的情况下,你实际上在顾客和卖家的多个偏好维度上同时分散了自己的力量。
而 DoorDash 则做了一个当时非常有争议的决策——他们一开始就瞄准了郊区。郊区的美妙之处在于几乎没有竞争,因为没有人认为这在经济上可行。他们可能最初确实没判断错——DoorDash 在早期郊区配送中亏了很多钱,因为配送时间长、驾驶距离远。但正因为他们选择了一个其他人没有关注的市场,他们得以做到让自己的交易平台两端的客户都足够满意,从而留下来。
Happy GMV
我刚才用了”满意”这个词,我应该展开讲讲。因为我反思之后意识到,GMV 实际上是一个虚荣指标——它并不能触及你是否在构建持久价值的核心。这一点其实很清楚,我可以举出很多例子,有些公司拥有惊人的规模,却仍然被一家创业公司颠覆了。原因在于,顾客并不在乎你有多大,也不在乎你累积了多少交易量。他们真正在乎的是:当他们在你这里完成一次交易时,你让他们有多满意?你提供的体验比他们能用的其他替代方案好多少?如果你做得好,他们就会不断回到你这里。所以我称之为 Happy GMV。
而这才是我认为作为创始人或产品负责人应该真正聚焦的东西——即:我认为什么样的体验能让买家或卖家留存下来?把这条路径作为幸福路径(happy path)来追踪,从而得到 Happy GMV。
Lenny: 太棒了,我很喜欢这个概念——Happy GMV。你还进一步延伸了这个想法,我记得你称之为”最低可行满意度”(minimum viable happiness),即当你构建一个交易平台——把你那个顶针般的市场煮成不可思议的东西——时,你想要创造的是什么?能让客户真正满意的最低版本是什么?
Sarah Tavel: 没错。可以这样理解:显然,作为一个交易平台创始人,你知道要构建持久的东西就必须增长。但在初期,你在做大量不可扩展的事情——打磨产品体验、消除交易中的摩擦——你希望达到一个状态,即有一定比例的人在完成交易后能够留存。所以你就不断做事、做事、做事,直到达到那个最低门槛。到了那一刻,你就知道自己可以进入下一步——开始寻找真正实现规模化增长的杠杆了。
Lenny: 太好了。话说回来,这说起来容易,作为创始人很难做到——告诉他们”你只需要让这个交易平台的一个小版本先跑起来”,而不是一上来就铺得很大。所以大多数时候,我认为实际上就是地域的问题——如果是地域导向的,就在一个城市起步。如果完全在线上,就选一个细分领域来聚焦,比如 Etsy 最初就是做手工艺集市商品,对吧?
Sarah Tavel: 完全正确。有时候,就像我们在 Postmates 那个案例中看到的,可能两个维度都需要聚焦——既是地域,也是品类。再说一遍,你必须假设你的资金、你的注意力、你客户的注意力都是稀缺的。所以,你必须极其清晰地界定你想要打磨好的那个体验是什么,你优化的那条幸福路径是什么,在初期做好这种约束才能给你未来的增长提供可选择性(optionality)。如果你不做约束,你根本就来不及走到那一步。
Thumbtack 的困境
Lenny: 我想聊聊当你的模式跑通了、开始扩张时是什么样子。但在那之前,我在调研中发现了一个很有意思的案例——Thumbtack。他们从一开始就做了全国覆盖,横跨了很多品类。创始人自己也承认,这可能不是正确的做法,他们花了很长时间才找到真正有效的模式。但另一方面,他们的逻辑是要创建一个足够大的飞轮,让用户不断回来。毕竟你多久才需要一次水管工?多久才需要一次 DJ?所以——
Sarah Tavel: 我正想说的就是,这正是 Thumbtack 模式的棘手之处,而且这个棘手之处至今依然存在——就是你没有一个高频复购的使用场景。所以你必须……构建交易平台有一个非常重要的点,就是拿下买方——与买方建立一种关系,让他们根本不会去想要去哪里,他们直接就来找你。但如果是水管工,你使用的频率太低了,以至于每次你需要找水管工的时候,你都会从 Google 开始搜,对吧?你不会默认”我要去 Thumbtack 上找”——因为你早就忘了。所以你需要与消费者之间建立足够多的触点,让他们和你形成一种关系,开始把你当作一个默认去处。这大概就是 Thumbtack 的棘手之处。顺便说一下,当我们讲到第二层级的时候,也会进一步阐释这种棘手之处。
Lenny: 太好了。顺便说一下,我确实在用 Thumbtack。它已经深深植入我脑子里了——找水管工之类的就上 Thumbtack。
Sarah Tavel: 那太好了。那些创始人——我很喜欢 Marco,他是一位非常出色的创始人。
白热中心与产品市场匹配的信号
Lenny: 作为过渡到第二层的衔接,聚焦做得好、事情开始奏效的信号是什么?你有一个我很喜欢的说法——打造白热中心(white hot center),可以聊聊这个,或者说你怎么判断”好了,我觉得我们拿下了这个非常聚焦的顶针。什么时候该继续推进了?”
Sarah Tavel: 我认为最核心的信号就是你看到用户在留存。你能真切感受到——用户给你发短信、发邮件,或通过任何方式告诉你他们有了很好的体验,而且你会看到他们不断回来。你不可能让所有人都满意,这点我们必须承认。但一定有一群核心用户、一个你能够真正取悦的用户画像。当你能做到这一点时,你就知道自己走对方向了。
Lenny: 没错。本质上就是那个非常模糊的产品市场匹配问题。
Sarah Tavel: 是的,没错。
Lenny: 我会在节目备注里链接几篇我写的帮助人们达到那个状态的文章。关于这一点你还有什么想补充的吗?
Sarah Tavel: 唯一想补充的,有两件相关的事。第一,我不喜欢用 NPS 来衡量这个,我专门写过一篇博客讲这件事。我更推崇 Sean Ellis 的那个问题:如果这个产品消失了,你会多失望?如果有至少 40% 的人回答”会非常失望”,那你就走对方向了。这才是应该告诉你自己是否走在正确轨道上的那种感觉。
第二层:倾斜交易平台
Lenny: 好,我们来聊聊第二层,关于倾斜交易平台。
Sarah Tavel: 第二层,我认为实际上会再次印证第一层中那种约束性聚焦的重要性。你在做各种不可规模化的的事情——Lenny,你写过很多这方面的内容——关于启动交易平台,所有那些你不能永远持续做下去的事情。
第二层、第二层级,核心是找到可规模化的做事方式。你真正追求的,是那个近乎神话般的临界点(tipping point)时刻。临界点是这样的概念:你通常会在某个市场达到某种饱和点。你持续打磨产品体验,去掉大量摩擦,不断增长、增长、增长。而你做这一切的目的,都是为了提升满意度。
这一点非常重要。你在这个阶段所做的增长,应该对自己的飞轮有非常清晰的认知,并且明确你是在为加速飞轮而增长。人们常把飞轮等同于流动性(liquidity),你也可以把它理解为满意度——飞轮转得越快,你就越能让交易平台的双边都满意。
你做的事情本质上是在向更大比例的市场渗透。当你做完所有那些不可规模化的事情之后,你会到达这样一个时刻——事情开始变得轻松很多。就像你把巨石推上了山顶,它开始自己向下滑。你最先注意到的,我觉得是在微观层面上:你可能会看到一些供应商开始倒向你这边,或者买方开始倾斜。你可能会看到同期群数据变好一些。你开始看到一些有机增长。
让我讲一个我亲眼见过交易平台开始倾斜的公司的例子。我们投资了一家叫 REKKI 的公司。REKKI 是一个连接餐厅和供应商的交易平台。想象一下,最初它是一个你可以使用的应用,界面几乎像 WhatsApp,厨师可以用它来代替深夜离开餐厅时给供应商留语音邮件,或者在 WhatsApp 里打字发给供应商、发邮件什么的。他们可以用 REKKI 这个应用,会让整个过程轻松很多。当然,交易平台的核心在于,之后他们还能在 REKKI 上发现其他供应商,如果有需要的话。
最初,REKKI 必须组建自己的销售团队,跑到伦敦挨家挨户敲餐厅的门,在厨房里找到并堵住厨师,给他们展示这个应用,让他们换成 REKKI 这个新应用。你可以想象,这是一种销售成本极高的方式。但随后发生的事情是,每当他们让一位新厨师用上 REKKI,那份订单就会发到那家餐厅平时下单的供应商那里。于是供应商不再收到语音邮件,而是开始看到一份漂亮的订单表格,来自餐厅,由 REKKI 提供、REKKI 驱动。
随着 REKKI 在伦敦越做越大,这些供应商开始收到越来越多餐厅通过 REKKI 下的订单。一些早期供应商开始觉得:“这对我来说太方便了。我宁可收到 REKKI 的订单表格,也不想每天早上来了之后听一个小时不同口音的厨师留下的语音邮件,每个人都有不同的订货方式。”
于是供应商会主动联系 REKKI 说:“嘿,这是我们所有客户的 CSV 文件,你能帮我们联系他们、让他们也上 REKKI 吗?因为我更希望订单通过 REKKI 过来,而不是现在这种收单方式。“就这样,你从那种高成本、挨家敲门销售的艰难阶段,变成了别人把一份餐厅名单用银盘子端到你面前让你去入驻。这就是那种倾斜的感觉——某个东西从非常非常难,突然变得轻松很多。
Lenny: 这很像人们描述找到产品市场匹配时的感受。事情开始感觉你不用再使劲推了,它自己就朝你来了。
Sarah Tavel: 是的。
倾斜循环
Lenny: 根据你的经验,这种倾斜通常是在你在这个顶针般的交易平台中越做越成功时自然发生的?还是说你需要主动做些什么才能到达这个临界点?听起来 REKKI 的例子中,似乎是他们构建了某个功能,推荐说”嘿,你应该看看 REKKI,如果其他供应商也加入,你的日子会好过很多”。所以这种情况通常是在规模化过程中自然发生的,还是说一般需要你做出某些改变才能创造这个临界点?
Sarah Tavel: 我觉得 Ronan 当初也没有预料到会发生这样的事。而你一直在做的,是那种对客户的极致关注——与供应商建立关系、与买方建立关系,让你始终贴近一线。当他们开始微微倾向你这边时,你已经准备好接住他们。所以我认为这正是优秀交易平台创始人能够做到的事情:他们能够开始感觉到自己的市场中有什么东西正在朝自己倾斜,然后顺势创造出动量。
这也是第二层很大的一部分内容。我认为每个交易平台都必须找到我所说的倾斜循环(tipping loops)。有两种类型的倾斜循环,它们以共生关系协同工作,帮助交易平台实现规模化。
第一种是增长循环(growth loops)。我们刚才举了 REKKI 的例子。还有很多其他例子——Hipcamp 是另一个我有幸合作的交易平台。如果你和我在 Hipcamp 上预订了一次露营,我订了一个树屋,而你要和我一起去,我可以在结账流程中邀请你加入我的预订,这样你就能看到地图、树屋的详细信息以及周边的场地。所以我是 Hipcamp 获取的用户,然后我把你拉入了我的体验中——这就是一个很好的买方到买方的增长循环。
增长循环的更多形态
Sarah Tavel: 经典的还有卖方到卖方的循环,或者买方到卖方的循环,各种方向都有。而优秀的交易平台会看到这些循环,并想办法加速它们。比如经典的卖方到卖方推荐——Uber 司机会告诉朋友:“你应该来开 Uber,挺不错的。“然后 Uber 用推荐奖金来做激励,于是你会看到 Uber 司机真的在写博客,说自己多喜欢为 Uber 开车,因为他们中有些人拿到的推荐奖金比实际开车赚的钱还多。所以你要做的就是找到这些增长循环,然后把它们最大化。
Lenny: 太好了。我会附上一篇链接,里面有很多我在交易平台研究中积累的这类洞察,还有一些其他有趣的例子。基本上,你要思考的是如何打造一台持续驱动供给、同时也驱动需求的引擎。一个有趣的例子是 Etsy 刚起步的时候,如你所知,他们会去手工艺集市上推销卖家:“嘿,来注册 Etsy 吧,你可以把东西放到网上卖。“然后他们所有的卖家开始告诉自己的买家:“嘿,到 Etsy 上买我的东西吧。”
Sarah Tavel: Etsy 真的直接给卖家发了名片。Etsy 给他们的卖家做了名片,让卖家觉得自己像是”哦,我是一个真正的……”让他们觉得自己很专业。名片上的链接就是他们的 Etsy 店铺。
Lenny: 我太喜欢这个了。交易平台最神奇的增长引擎之一,就是你的供给方把需求方带上来。这是一个非常好的例子。另一个例子是 DoorDash——基本上,一家餐厅注册了 DoorDash,然后告诉所有顾客:“想点我们的菜?去 DoorDash 上下单吧。“于是所有餐厅都在帮 DoorDash 宣传,然后这些人变成 DoorDash 用户,又开始从其他餐厅下单。
Sarah Tavel: 没错,这个例子也说明了 DoorDash 在市场两端都非常有创造力。
Lenny: Faire 也是一个很棒的例子。听起来和你描述的 REKKI 很类似——Faire 基本上是一个 B2B 手工艺品交易平台,精品店通过它采购好看的蜡烛和毯子之类的商品放到自己店里卖。他们的做法基本就是你描述的那样:先签下一家店,然后告诉他们:“你所有的供应商都可以免费加入 Faire,不用交任何费用,而且通过 Faire 进货很方便。“然后在另一边,一个蜡烛制造商告诉所有他们供货的地方:“嘿,你应该用 Faire,买我们的东西特别方便,而且我们可以在上面沟通。“对方也可以免手续费注册。所以基本上所有人都在把自己的既有合作伙伴邀请到 Faire 上,然后所有人就都在 Faire 上了。所以说,实现增长循环的方式真的很多。
幸福循环
Sarah Tavel: 说得好。那么第二种循环——同样,这种循环与增长循环是共生关系——就是我所说的幸福循环(happiness loops)。我几乎把它们看作交易平台在成长过程中起到类似肾脏作用的一套机制。幸福循环的思路是:你会有大量新卖家涌入,当然也有新买家,但你要确保的是把买家和那些能给他们最好体验的卖家匹配在一起。
通常在社交产品中,用户流失是令人心痛的。一旦用户流失了,他们几乎不会再回来。做社交产品时,你的目标是达到海量规模。但当你搭建一个交易平台时,实际上在供给端保持一定程度的健康流失是必要的,因为总会有一些卖家无法为买家创造好的体验,而你对此无能为力。
我们都遇到过那种你只想给一星的 Uber 司机。你不想让这个人在你的交易平台上被匹配给买家。所以你要做的是,随着规模增长,在你的交易平台中建立一种自然机制——奖励那些值得奖励的供给方,淘汰那些你不想要的。当然,你的职责是尽最大努力让所有卖家都能成功,但有些流失是不可避免的。
在幸福循环方面,有两个很好的例子,一个是搜索排序,另一个是信誉体系。搜索排序是一个非常直观的例子——你要理解什么能为买方创造幸福的体验,然后奖励提供那种体验的卖家。
有一个我觉得很有意思的例子,虽然后来做法变了,但仍然很有说明性:UberEats 在发展初期认为自己在市场上的优势会是非常快的配送速度,对吧?因为他们已经有一个司机网络,所以他们觉得这会是自己相比任何竞争对手的真正优势所在。于是在搜索排序中,他们优先展示那些快速备餐的餐厅——迅速响应 UberEats 订单,然后尽快把食物做出来——这样 UberEats 就和配送速度画上了等号。而那种需要 40 分钟才能把菜做好的餐厅,即使食物非常好吃,在 UberEats 的体验排名中也会被排得很低。
倾斜交易平台的关键提醒
Lenny: 好,我们一直在聊交易平台的倾斜。在我们进入第三层之前,还有什么想分享的吗?
Sarah Tavel: 还有两件事想提。一个是提醒,一个是告诫。先说提醒:要想倾斜一个市场,你必须在该市场达到一个饱和点。你不可能在渗透到一定饱和度之前就倾斜一个市场。这也回到了第一层中为什么你要聚焦于一个受限市场的原因。
以在爱荷华州得梅因做外卖产品为例,对比在洛杉矶或纽约。当你在一个小城市专注于餐厅时,你能以快得多的速度、高得多的效率达到这个临界点,而如果你追求的是一个巨大的市场就做不到。所以,能够尽快、尽量高效地验证打法,然后再去应对更大的挑战,这是一个真正的优势。我认为这也再次强调了早期聚焦于一个受限领域是多么有价值。
再看 Postmates 聚焦于旧金山这座城市,DoorDash 最初聚焦于郊区——机会小得多,但他们能真正把这件事做到极致。他们没有竞争对手,他们的客户迫切需要被关注,所以他们能让客户满意。而这种成功为你从优势领域扩展到相邻市场打下了坚实的基础。
第二件事,而且这一点非常重要——并非所有市场都能被倾斜。我们都有过这样的经历,我相信 Lenny,和你合作的公司、和我合作的公司中都有这种情况:市场的某些条件使其容易发生倾斜。我在文章里列了六个条件,这里只举几个经典的。
供给端集中度
Sarah Tavel: 第一个显而易见的条件就是供给端的集中度。要想倾斜一个市场,你需要供应商愿意在你的交易平台上投入。我的合伙人 Bill Gurley 谈过,伟大的交易平台如何创造新的在位者。基本上,你拥有的供应商不是那些既有在位者。在位者不会在你的交易平台上投入,他们已经吃得饱饱的、舒舒服服了,你需要的是那些饥渴的、愿意主动投入的供应商。但如果在你的交易平台中、在你所处的生态系统中、在你所进入的市场中已经存在集中度,那么卖家就不会愿意投入,你也无法建立这样一个飞轮——更多的卖家加入 → 需求端获得更好的价格或体验 → 卖家满意。因为没有人感到饥渴,没有人去战斗。所以这是一个非常、非常关键的条件。
供给与需求之争
Lenny: Bill Gurley 和我曾经在 Twitter 上有过一场小小的辩论,关于供给和需求哪个更重要。他的核心观点基本就是:“要建立一个成功的交易平台,最终真正重要的只有一件事——你能不能找到需求?能不能把需求带到你的交易平台上来?“这道理完全说得通。归根结底一切都是”你能不能找到客户?”
在我研究交易平台的过程中,我发现最困难的事情——把人带到你的交易平台上来——是找到供给并将其聚合到用户面前。而你刚才说的这点完全正确:交易平台的价值就在于找到那些分散在各处的、非集中的需求,将其汇聚在一起,让交易变得简单。所以我觉得这一点非常重要,值得再次强调——交易平台的核心价值在于找到那些难以发现的供给,让用户容易发现并与之交易。我觉得这几乎就是交易平台能够运作的核心所在。
Sarah Tavel: 我觉得你们俩都对。
Lenny: 对,我觉得我们俩都对。没错没错。
Sarah Tavel: 因为在最初阶段,你启动一个交易平台的唯一方式显然是把供给端上线,这才会打开机会。而之后你想要有机会倾斜市场,前提是供给端有足够的碎片化,这样才能为需求端创造差异化的体验,让需求端在意你的交易平台。但要建立长期的、持久的价值,唯一的方式是占据需求端。所以这有点像交易平台的一种演进过程,你关注的重点会随之变化。
我不知道你是否有类似的经历,但在我合作过的交易平台中,我体会到这是一种持续的拉锯——“我现在必须更关注需求端。好,现在我们又得更关注供给端了。“这也恰恰说明这类业务有多难做,尤其是当资源有限的时候,这就像是建造交易平台过程中一场永无止境的战斗。
Lenny: 是的,尤其如果是一个地理导向型的交易平台,比如 DoorDash。有时候你的顾客比餐厅还多。
Sarah Tavel: 没错。
Lenny: 有时候又餐厅太多,顾客不够。
Sarah Tavel: 是的。
Lenny: 所以这很大程度上取决于具体城市。在 Airbnb,我们曾经多次尝试做一个仪表盘,标注哪个市场供给受限,哪个市场需求受限。沿着同样的思路,B2B 交易平台也是我一直思考的问题。根据我的经验,它们之所以难以成功——真正做成的案例那么少——原因之一就是供给端很少有碎片化。通常供应商就那么几个,所以很容易——“我就从这十家里挑一家,不需要你。“这个判断对吗?你是这样看待 B2B 交易平台面临的挑战的吗?
B2B 交易平台的同质性难题
Sarah Tavel: 这确实是一个因素,但我认为 B2B 交易平台更大的挑战其实在于供给端的同质性。想想很多劳动力交易平台,拿 Mechanical Turk 这个经典例子来说。在交易平台中,要让飞轮运转起来需要什么……我的幻灯片里有一张图,展示的是你对市场的渗透越深,就能让客户越满意。你应该获得一种指数级的体验,飞轮不会减速。再看 Airbnb 这个例子,Airbnb 上的供给越多就越有价值,这件事没有上限,因为每个人都有自己独特的偏好。理论上可能存在一个上限,但你就是觉得永远不会到头——Airbnb 的供给端异质性如此之强,正是这一点让 Airbnb 真正甩开了竞争。
而 B2B 交易平台有时候会出现的情况是——比如劳动力交易平台——供给端存在同质性,增加下一个增量供给是否真能改变需求端的体验,这一点并不清楚。以 Mechanical Turk 为例,不管它有十万还是五百万 Turkers,对于使用 Mechanical Turk 的人来说,体验大概没什么区别。这就是为什么在早期,你看到很多 Mechanical Turk 的模仿者或克隆品在做类似的事情,因为并不需要那么多供给,它们就能为某个细分市场创造出与已经规模化了的 Mechanical Turk 同样好的体验。
竞争与市场的可倾斜性
Lenny: 太好了,很高兴我们深入聊了这个。我们真的深入到了交易平台的脏活细节里,正是我期望的。你之前说还有其他想分享的。
Sarah Tavel: 关于交易平台为什么可能无法倾斜,还有很多其他原因。竞争就是其中之一。你是一家外卖公司,去那些没有竞争的郊区,这让你的市场倾斜工作变得非常容易。但如果你去纽约市,那里有 Grubhub 加上 Seamless Web 这样根深蒂固的竞争对手,还有不同的外卖文化——餐厅大多有自己的配送队伍——你在那个市场倾斜起来就会困难得多。所以我认为,在构建交易平台时,你必须对自身所处的竞争环境有非常清醒的认知,这样才能判断是否真的存在一条倾斜市场的路径。
市场可以被”反倾斜”
Lenny: 而且即使你已经倾斜了市场,它也可能被”反倾斜”,比如 Uber 杀进来开始抢你的饭碗——不是双关。这种优势不会永远持续,你必须不断为之战斗。
Sarah Tavel: 这是一个非常重要的观点,就是做交易平台你永远不能躺在功劳簿上。交易平台的历史就是这样——一个交易平台看起来已经占据主导地位,然后被竞争对手颠覆。HomeAway、VRBO 就被你们 Airbnb 这样的后来者颠覆了。
Lenny: 我要是能把所有功劳都揽到自己身上就好了。关于你说的倾斜这个概念,我想补充一种简单的思考方式来判断倾斜是否正在发生、是否成功——就是看你的增长中有多少比例来自有机增长的口碑传播,人们自然而然地认为”这就是我点外卖、订旅行、叫车的默认方式”。
第三层:主导市场
Sarah Tavel: 我觉得你会看到两件事。第一,同期群表现越来越好,人们开始更多地使用你。随着供给端越来越多样化,你能服务的场景也越来越多,需求端就会更深入地参与进来,同期群数据随之改善。然后就像你说的,有机增长开始发生——你不再需要为争夺市场两端的每一个新参与者而苦苦挣扎。当你的价值主张相对于其他替代方案强大到一定程度时,市场会自动向你走来。
Lenny: 漂亮。所以本质上,同期群留存开始上升,因为产品越来越有价值,而且越来越多的人通过口碑或者你构建的某些循环主动找上门来。
Sarah Tavel: 完全正确。
Lenny: 关于这一层还有什么要补充的吗?
Sarah Tavel: 没有了。
Lenny: 好,那我们来聊聊主导交易平台这件事——它长什么样,以及怎么做到。Sarah Tavel,如何主导一个交易平台并获胜?
Sarah Tavel: 好的,第三层。我觉得每个做交易平台的创始人都迫不及待地想真正聚焦到增长上。因为一路走来,我们一直在拉住你,让你”聚焦、聚焦、再聚焦”。而你在第一层和第二层所做的,在打磨你正在构建的产品的同时,实际上是在建立一套打法。你还不确定这套打法是否可复制——一个市场的动态不一定和另一个市场相同。以 REKKI 为例,在伦敦餐饮圈,供应商非常碎片化;但在柏林餐饮圈,情况并非如此。所以你在某个市场行之有效的东西,不一定在另一个市场也管用,但通常会有一些相似之处——会有一些线索暗示什么可能会奏效。
现在的情况是,你有一个市场正在倾斜,接下来的问题是:你是否准备好移开视线,开始把焦点扩散到其他市场?这时候任何交易平台都有三个增长向量。
第一个向量是在你已经倾斜的现有市场内继续深耕。作为创始人,你需要做出一个非常个人的决策——你所要评估的是你面临的竞争格局。如果你正在倾斜一个市场,而且没有其他竞争对手在追赶这个机会,你是第一个看到它的人,那么我认为你需要同时做两件事来推动增长。
第一件事是在你所在的现有市场中继续做你正在做的事,你甚至可以找到方法,在同一个市场内延伸到你最初瞄准的那个细分市场之外——我指的是像 Uber 从黑车到 UberX 再到 UberPool,他们在已经占据主导地位的地区不断找到新的方式,通过扩展可服务的场景来持续增强自己的地位。所以你要继续增长和渗透市场,找到在该市场中服务更多场景的方法,尤其是在竞争不激烈的情况下。然后,第三个增长向量是你要尽可能快地在你能承受的范围内让尽可能多的市场开始运转起来。这就是闪电式扩张,对吧?这就是跑马圈地。同样,你所创造的股权价值将来自于对市场的主导。
你不想同时在 1000 个市场插 1000 面旗帜,把自己摊得太薄,结果哪个市场都没有明确拿下。你永远应该把更多的资源集中在更少的箭上。你拥有的规模越大——在越多的城市或品类中飞轮开始转动、你开始看到临界点出现——你的公司就越强。你拿下的每一个市场、拥有规模的每一个市场,都会产生贡献利润。你拿这个贡献利润投入到新市场中。你拥有的市场越多、贡献利润越多,你能融到的风险投资就越多,然后再投入到增长中。所以,这一阶段你要尽可能激进地扩张,同时始终不要忘记你的目标是——在每个市场中都要 individually 地主导那个市场——你在努力拓展尽可能大的市场机会。
Lenny: 再强调一下,这件事之所以如此重要,是因为大多数雄心勃勃的创始人一开始就想做这一步。他们就是想”立刻铺开,闪电式扩张,趁别人还没追上来赶紧赢”。所以这再次提醒我们,这是最后一步,是在你完成了前两步之后才做的。
Sarah Tavel: 对,这一点非常重要。别忘了,你永远面临竞争威胁。假设你有 100 万美元,你把这 100 万美元的市场推广费用分散到 10 个城市,把自己摊得很薄。这时候一个竞争对手进来了,猜怎么着?他们把 100 万美元全部投入一个城市,他们会赢下那个城市,而这会为他们后续的成功奠定基础——让他们能融到更多资金,投入更多资源来扩张更多城市。当然,我们从来不只有一个竞争对手,总是有很多。所以围绕这些步骤保持纪律性,真的是极其重要的。
Lenny: 这也是为什么 Uber 大举扩张、融了那么多钱、投入那么多来快速规模化,而相比之下 Lyft 没有。DoorDash 对 Uber 也是同样的逻辑。基本上双方都在试图主导市场。不过 Uber……我不确定能不能说它赢了。DoorDash 对 Uber Eats 至今仍然是第一和第二的格局。我觉得很多人看这些公司会说,“融了这么多钱,亏了这么多钱,这生意永远不会成”。但它们之所以这么做,是因为要建立一个持久的业务、获得他们所构建的交易平台带来的种种好处,就必须主导市场,必须远远地做第一。当然这不意味着总能成功。DoorDash 虽然比 Uber Eats 大,但据我所知,他们也不是那种……我不知道,你会认为他们已经主导市场了吗?还是说这仍然是一个很大的挑战?
Sarah Tavel: 我不确定。但很清楚的是,他们建立了一家了不起的公司。他们确实做得非常出色,不过那个市场依然很拥挤。
Lenny: 所以即使你没有完全主导、主导、再主导,你仍然可以建立一家很棒的公司。只是你赚的钱不会那么多,利润远不如主导市场的情况,基本上就是现金流上的差距。
Sarah Tavel: 没错。
TAM 不如人们想象的那么重要
Lenny: 你们 Benchmark 非常强调的一点,我觉得值得聊聊,就是 TAM 并没有人们想象的那么重要。很多时候,很多交易平台起步时非常小,人们会担心这个市场不够大,不足以支撑一个长期的巨大业务。而你们并不像很多其他投资人那样为此担忧——市场本身并不是投资决策的核心杀手。
Sarah Tavel: 我甚至想更加强调这一点——恰恰是那些从外面看起来可能很小的市场、很小的机会,反而让我们感到兴奋。
Lenny: 我太喜欢这个观点了。你能展开讲讲,帮助大家更好地理解吗?
Sarah Tavel: 你还记得 Airbnb 早期的时候吗,那时候人们都在问,“这东西能做多大?”
Lenny: 是的,不过我没那么早期就关注到。
Sarah Tavel: 嗯,但你肯定听说过。Etsy 也被低估了很多很多年。Hipcamp 也是,这正是让我们兴奋的部分——这个市场实际上比人们从外面看到的要大得多。而进入这些被低估的市场有一个美妙之处:一开始没有竞争。所以,你更容易在没有竞争的情况下,把市场操作起来并让市场向你倾斜。因此,我们非常喜欢这类市场。我们总是对创始人们说,如果有人告诉你市场太小了,我们非常愿意认识你。
Lenny: 我觉得很多创始人会很喜欢听到这番话。我觉得还需要补充一点你之前跟我分享过的——重要的是要有足够大的相邻市场,这样你才有扩展的潜力。
Sarah Tavel: 对,这一点非常重要。市场本身不能是一条死胡同。你需要从一个有增长潜力的地方起步,但在一开始,它看起来会很小。让我用 Hipcamp 来举例。我们投资 Hipcamp 的时候,它做的就是土地——人们在自己土地上……我不知道 Lenny,你是不是个露营爱好者。可惜我是……
Lenny: 哈哈,顺便说一下,我很喜欢 Hipcamp。
Sarah Tavel: 好吧,太棒了。如果你有一顶帐篷和一个睡袋,还不怕把保温壶放进奔流的河里去取水清洗——那就是 Hipcamp 早期的样子。它面向的是硬核露营者,这本身感觉是一个很小的市场。实际上并没有那么小,但相比其他市场,确实是一些人不太敢下注的规模。但接下来发生的事情是,Hipcamp 上的房东——我自己也在 Hipcamp 上住过一次,真的是非常棒的体验——房东们开始从 Hipcamp 上赚到了一点钱。他们拿着这笔钱,开始在自己的土地上投资建设施。一开始,可能是一个篝火坑,或者一个浴室、淋浴间,然后变成了树屋或者蒙古包。
所以 Hipcamp 发生的变化是,最初它针对的是一个非常细分的市场,但随着他们取得成功,让土地所有者赚到了钱,这些土地所有者又把赚到的钱再投资到自己的土地上,从而为 Hipcamp 打开了更大的市场机会——面向更多像我这样的人,那些想要豪华露营(glamping)体验的人,想亲近自然,但可能不想自己搭帐篷。这就是一个被低估市场最终实现超越的典型案例。当然,这里也有反面教训。我总是会想到 Etsy。我记得,实际上当我在 Pinterest 工作的时候,Etsy 让我抓狂。因为 Etsy 一直都是做手工商品的。但在他们准备上市的过程中,开始追逐 GMV 增长。具体表现就是,Etsy 上开始出现大量大规模生产的商品。
当时在 Pinterest 上让我抓狂的是,有一个卖家卖那种围巾,明显是批量生产的围巾,他们在 Pinterest 上不断用这些围巾的 Pin 进行垃圾营销。很明显,Etsy 在那个时刻已经偏离了自己的初衷。他们开始追逐 GMV 增长,超越了自己真正代表的价值观,最终引发了那些做手工商品的卖家和买家的强烈反弹。信任被严重侵蚀,最终——我不知道是否直接相关——但我想这加速了 CEO 的更换,换成了现在的那位 CEO,她显然在之后把 Etsy 建设得非常好。
Lenny: 是的,我们之前请过 Etsy 的产品副总裁上过播客,我们确实聊到了那段转型期,因为那是非常戏剧性的变化。他们从非常温暖、柔和、舒适的氛围,转向了”我们需要建立一个能持续发展的业务,让我们改变运营方式”。说到什么让你对交易平台感到兴奋这个话题——这是 Mike 建议我问你的——我很喜欢你会在市场很小的时候感到兴奋,非常反共识。除此之外,当创始人向你推介一个交易平台时,你还会看重什么?随口能分享的,什么让你对交易平台感到兴奋?
Sarah Tavel: 有几个方面。第一——我其实在想最近遇到的一位创始人——就是那种”靠努力换来的洞察”(earned secret),他们看到了一个别人忽略的、尚未被解决的市场机会。也许过去有原因导致它没有被解决,但现在时机到了,市场中有某种正在改变的东西正在形成一股浪潮。我们可以稍后再聊浪潮,但关键是市场中存在某种动能,正在打开一个让这个交易平台得以存在的机会。而且出于某种原因,正是这位创始人看到了它。这就像那种事情——一旦你看到了,你会想,“为什么现在还是这样运作的?“然后你会觉得显然应该有人来做点什么。第二件总是让我深有共鸣的事情——而且到了现在,为什么这很重要已经很显然了——就是创始人是否真正有专注力。
就是把野心像激光束一样聚焦,而不是像散射的阳光一样什么都想做。你真的能感受到他们是否聚焦在了正确的事情上。而这其实引出了第三点:你真的能感受到,一个创始人是在用虚荣指标来糊弄你或糊弄自己,还是有着真正的理智诚实和智力严谨——“我的业务中什么真正有效?什么没有效?我们把精力集中在哪里来把它做到最好?“这才是建立长期持久价值的方式,而且我觉得这是我所有有幸合作的创始人身上的共同特质。
Lenny: 我喜欢你这个回答的地方在于——我经常说的一个关于交易平台的观点是:你的大部分问题其实不是交易平台特有的问题,而是每个创业公司都要面对的问题。所以你分享的这些——靠努力换来的洞察,这适用于任何业务,也许正好乘上了一股浪潮;拥有出色的专注力;以及聚焦于正确的指标——我百分之百同意。还有一个有趣的地方:这可以是交易平台,也可以不是。我觉得人们经常过度看重”我在做一个交易平台,所以我需要从交易平台的视角来思考所有事情”,而实际上 95% 的挑战、问题、障碍,是任何创业公司都要面对的。只有很小一部分是交易平台特有的。
浪潮与市场动能
Sarah Tavel: 我想进一步展开聊聊浪潮这个概念,因为它和刚才的话题非常相关。很多人——这也回到我们之前关于市场的那个反直觉观点——我觉得很多人把市场想象成某种水体,“哦,那是我们要去追逐的一大片水域。“但我其实认为,最有趣的市场,你必须把它们想象成浪潮——市场中有某种正在发生的变化正在形成一股浪潮,就像你把一块木板放到河面上,浪潮会带着你往前走;而如果一个市场没有那种动能,你就得造出某个巨大而精巧的东西才能取得一点进展。这就是为什么我们不太看重市场规模——因为当你审视一个市场时,你真正要寻找的是变化的动力学,是什么浪潮和动能能够带动这家公司,让创始人的工作变得更轻松,从而真正建立起持久的东西。
Lenny: 本质上就是很多人常说的”为什么是现在?“对吧?
Sarah Tavel: 对,对。
Lenny: 我特别喜欢浪潮这个意象。有一个我投资过的创业公司,正好是一个相反的例子——它是一个加密货币相关的交易平台。他们在加密货币行情很好的时候开始做,但随着加密寒冬的到来,他们还在继续搭建。最终他们意识到,“我们的时机不对,现在不是创办一家新的加密货币公司、去和现有玩家竞争的时候。“这是一个很好的例子——你得识别出浪潮何时是在朝反方向流动,一切都在把你推离成功。正好和你描述的相反。
Sarah Tavel: 对。不过我可能有一个细微的补充,因为我觉得”加密货币”这个说法太宽泛了。如果你说的是一家 DeFi 加密货币公司,那确实——在当前国债利率水平下,DeFi 的机会已经不像从前那么大了。但稳定币,我是稳定币的坚定信徒,我认为那是一个真正有浪潮的市场。在通货膨胀和许多本地货币贬值的背景下,对稳定币、美元稳定币有真实的需求——它可以有很多不同的形态和形式——我认为这是一个有着非常强劲浪潮的市场,实际上我对此相当兴奋。
Lenny: 哦,有意思。对,我刚才应该说得更清楚。它只是加密货币中某个非常具体的领域,现在确实不太行了,不像以前那样。好吧,我们完全跑题了。让我回到正轨,看看你还有什么想分享的关于交易平台层级的内容……
Sarah Tavel: 就这些了。
Lenny: 好的。我们聊完了。太棒了。
Sarah Tavel: 是的。
Lenny: 我还有几个相关的问题,不过——关于交易平台层级,你还有什么想补充的吗?
交易平台的历史就是被颠覆的历史
Sarah Tavel: 也许就一个尾声——你永远不能躺在功劳簿上。我们之前已经聊过这一点,但交易平台的历史就是一部被颠覆的历史。关于幸福这个概念,Amazon 和 Bezos 也谈到过——消费者的期望值是在不断上升的。所以,如果你在给消费者提供的体验上停滞不前,猜猜会怎样?你会被颠覆。我们之前提到的 Airbnb 和 HomeAway、DoorDash 和 Grubhub 的例子——Grubhub 未能做出改变,原因是多方面的,它是一家上市公司,所以无法像私有市场的公司那样获取资金;但他们太慢了,没有把供给的基本单元转变为由自己来履约配送。所以他们被 DoorDash、Uber Eats 这些公司颠覆了。你真的不能躺在功劳簿上。期望值在不断上升。而这正是我们所从事的这个市场令人兴奋的一部分。
Lenny: 我觉得 Grubhub 是一个很好的例子。他们是第一个真正成功的外卖公司,后来即使有了网络效应,也依然是最好的点餐方式。然后 DoorDash 出现并赢了,因为他们铺得更大,花了大量 Grubhub 不愿意花的钱。很好。所以我想这边的建议就是:即使你有惊人的网络效应,也不要把成功视为理所当然。
Sarah Tavel: 没错。
超越交易平台的通用启示
Lenny: 好。在我们之前讨论这次对话的时候,你提到过一点:即使你不是在做一个交易平台,这些经验教训其实依然有用。比如你在做一个开源产品、社交网络,甚至一个 SaaS 创业公司,很多这类经验同样适用。对于那些听了你刚才的分享、但并不一定在做交易平台的人,你有什么建议?有哪些核心的收获?
Sarah Tavel: 在 Benchmark,我很幸运拥有一些与我关注完全不同类型公司的合伙人,我们接触到令人难以置信的广泛创始人群体。你会一次又一次地意识到,这些道理是通用的。在开源领域,关键是在一开始就解决某个具体开发者的需求,而且解决得极其出色,然后从那里扩展。在 SaaS 方面,我觉得可能有一个有趣的例外——有点类似你之前说的 Thumbtack 那个例外——我认为 Parker Conrad 在用 Rippling 做的事情,以及他提出的”复合型创业公司”(compound startup)的理念,是非常不同的。实际上,他有一种同时兼具阳光和激光的野心。所以这是一种罕见的创始人,能够有那种执行力水平。但一次又一次,你所看到的——我认为对于很多利用大语言模型来构建产品的新公司来说尤其如此——赢的方式是在一开始聚焦于一个受限的市场。
Lenny: 我喜欢这个观点。基本上就是,在 DevTools 的情况下是”幸福的开发者”,在企业软件的情况下是”幸福的企业用户”——就是要让人们乐于使用你的产品并不断回访。我很喜欢这个提醒。
寻找交易平台的机会空间
还有一个问题。你写过一篇关于在交易平台中寻找机会空间的文章,基本上是针对想做一个交易平台、试图找到哪里有新机会的人。对于那些正在寻找想法和机会来创建交易平台的人,你有什么建议吗?你觉得哪里有机会?
Sarah Tavel: 问一下 LLM 是否改变了游戏规则或打开了新的可能性空间,这个问题其实挺有趣的。在我的文章中,我写了三种寻找新机会的方法。第一种:你总是可以找到一个横向交易平台,然后找到其中 NPS 较低的那部分,围绕它创建一个新的交易平台。比如 eBay 作为一个横向交易平台,运动鞋是其中 NPS 较低的部分,于是就有了 GOAT。第二种是找到一个没有人关注的小众市场。比如我们之前提到的 Etsy、Hipcamp 的例子——把这些东西搬到线上,消除摩擦,展示它实际上比你想象的市场更大。第三种是改变供给的基本单元。比如 Grubhub 的基本单元是拥有自己配送车队的餐厅,然后 Postmates、DoorDash、Uber Eats 出来说,“不,应该是任何餐厅,我们来提供配送车队。”
于是,他们打开了可用的供给。现在,当我思考 LLM 时,我认为第三种方法存在真正的机会。LLM 可能使得引入一种新的供给类型成为可能——也许是长尾供给,过去要触达它们、完成入驻实在太费力了,但如果能把这些工作自动化,你实际上就创造了一个以我们目前无法预见的方式扩展供给的机会。此外,谁又知道 LLM 是否能在某个 NPS 较低的市场细分或小众市场中创造更好的体验,从而使其有可能被搬到线上。所以,我到目前为止还没有看到具体的案例,但我绝对在持续寻找。
闪电问答环节
Lenny: 非常酷。没想到拐进了 AI 话题,我很喜欢。好了,接下来进入我们非常精彩的闪电问答环节。准备好了吗?
Sarah Tavel: 好的,准备好了。
Lenny: 有哪两三本书是你最常推荐给别人的?
Sarah Tavel: 《柏青哥》是我最近读过的最好的小说之一,我非常喜欢,所以强烈推荐。另外,对于创始人,我对《CEO 的五种诱惑》和《团队的五种功能障碍》这两本书完全没有抵抗力。它们就像是你在超市过道上会看到的那种书,但读起来很快,而且洞察力极强,我强烈推荐。
Lenny: 有没有最近特别喜欢的电影或电视剧?
Sarah Tavel: 我不太看东西,所以这方面不是个好候选人。
Lenny: 这点我非常尊重。有没有一个你最喜欢的面试问题,喜欢用来问候选人的——当然,我们也可以把它转化为你在和创始人交谈、决定是否要投资时会问的问题?
Sarah Tavel: 我总是很喜欢听人们走过的旅程,尤其是他们一路上如何做出决策,是什么驱动他们从一步走到下一步。我觉得这总是非常有启发性。
Lenny: 有没有最近发现的、你特别喜欢的产品?可以是 app 或实物,你经常用的。有什么特别酷或好玩的?
Sarah Tavel: 我想说的是,我们家是较晚才开始用 Tesla 的。天哪,它就是那种你第一次使用就会感叹的产品,你会觉得”我能理解为什么有人想持有这家公司的股票”——当然这不是投资建议——但体验真的很棒。
Lenny: 我完全同意。我们已经太习惯了,我们有一辆普通车和一辆 Tesla,你不再需要钥匙这件事,直接走过去就能开门,因为它识别你的手机……我妻子把钥匙落在我们的 Subaru 里了,因为她就是那种”哦糟糕,我还要拿钥匙”的反应。车就那么停在那儿发动着。是的,你已经太习惯那种走过去、开门、直接出发的体验了。很棒。你有没有一个最喜欢的座右铭,经常对自己说或分享给别人,不管是在工作中还是生活中,觉得特别有用的?
Sarah Tavel: 我在 Greylock 的合伙人 Reid Hoffman 有一句话:每一个优势都有一个对应的劣势,反之亦然。这里面蕴含着很深的智慧。我们能看到自己的优势和劣势,却没有意识到它们实际上是相伴而生的。你不可能只要一个而不要另一个。组织也是如此——一个去中心化的组织可以行动非常迅速,对应的劣势是它可能让人觉得混乱和无序。反过来,一个中心化的组织可能感觉很慢,但在决策制定和体验控制上非常有章法。所以,一切都有权衡,而且要意识到,大多数情况下它们是一体两面的,认识到这一点非常有用。
Lenny: 太棒了。最后一个问题。我相信你曾经打过橄榄球,对吗?
Sarah Tavel: 是的。
Lenny: 好的。你打橄榄球的那段时间有没有什么有趣的故事可以分享?如果没有,你觉得人们对橄榄球有什么可能不了解的、会让他们感到意外的?
Sarah Tavel: 可能让人意外的,尤其是见过我的人,是我其实非常擅长擒抱。我想我断过几次鼻梁,身上的伤病比我想记住的多得多,但我在别人身上造成的伤病肯定比我受的更多。我觉得橄榄球有一种独特的战友情谊。有一件事我要承认——我们总是开玩笑说,橄榄球队不是一个橄榄球队,而是一个有橄榄球问题的喝酒队。
Lenny: 太精彩了。
Sarah Tavel: 那些日子已经过去了。
Lenny: 哈哈。听起来如果你是创始人,身边有这么一个人会很棒——镇上最擅长擒抱的人。
Sarah Tavel: 那当然。
Lenny: 太棒了。Sarah,我一点也不意外这次访谈会聊这么长。非常感谢你来。最后两个问题。大家如果想联系你、问后续问题,可以在哪里找到你?另外,听众怎样能帮到你?
Sarah Tavel: 感谢你。我的邮箱是 Benchmark 的 sarah,我在 Twitter 上是 Sarah Tavel,还有一个 Substack,SarahTavel.com。如果你是创始人,正在做某个项目,不要害羞。我们的工作就是和像你这样的人交流,所以我总是很乐意被新的想法和人所激发。
Lenny: 为了让大家更有针对性地联系你,你有没有偏好的阶段、市场或其他什么信息,让大家知道什么样的项目适合你?
Sarah Tavel: 我们 Benchmark 是做早期阶段的。我们是一家早期投资机构,我们的目标是成为公司的第一位董事会成员。通常这意味着 A 轮,这确实是我们的核心领域。
Lenny: 太棒了。Sarah,非常感谢你来。
Sarah Tavel: 谢谢你的邀请。
Lenny: 大家再见。非常感谢收听。如果你觉得这期节目有价值,可以在 Apple Podcasts、Spotify 或你喜欢的播客应用上订阅。也请考虑给我们评分或写评论,这真的能帮助其他听众发现这个播客。你可以在 lennyspodcast.com 找到所有往期节目或了解更多关于这个节目的信息。下期再见。
术语表
| 原文 | 中文 |
|---|---|
| activation | 激活 |
| adjacent market | 相邻市场 |
| aha moment | 啊哈时刻 |
| atomic unit | 基本单元 |
| B2B / B2C | B2B / B2C |
| Benchmark | Benchmark(风投机构,保留原文) |
| big rocks | 大石头(指最重要的事项) |
| Bill Gurley | Bill Gurley(人名,保留原文) |
| blitz scale | 闪电式扩张 |
| capital | 资金 |
| cohort | 同期群 |
| collaborative journals | 协作笔记本 |
| compound startup | 复合型创业公司 |
| contribution profit | 贡献利润 |
| core action | 核心行为 |
| CPO (Chief Product Officer) | 首席产品官 |
| crypto winter | 加密寒冬 |
| cul-de-sac | 死胡同 |
| currents | 浪潮(指市场中正在形成的趋势/动能) |
| DeFi | DeFi(去中心化金融,保留原文) |
| discovery surfaces | 发现类界面 |
| DoorDash | DoorDash(外卖平台,保留原文) |
| dormant user | 沉睡用户 |
| earned secret | 靠努力换来的洞察(指创始人通过亲身经历获得的市场洞见) |
| engagement | 参与度 |
| Fabrice Grinda | Fabrice Grinda(人名保留原文) |
| flywheel | 飞轮 |
| follow graph | 关注图谱 |
| fragmentation | 碎片化 |
| glamping | 豪华露营 |
| GMV (Gross Merchandise Value) | GMV(商品交易总额) |
| go-to-market | 市场推广 |
| GOAT | GOAT(运动鞋交易平台,保留原文) |
| Greylock | Greylock(风投机构,保留原文) |
| growth hacking | 增长黑客 |
| growth loops | 增长循环 |
| Grubhub | Grubhub(外卖平台,保留原文) |
| happiness loops | 幸福循环 |
| happy GMV | Happy GMV(满意 GMV,保留原文作为专有概念) |
| happy path | 幸福路径 |
| heterogeneity | 异质性 |
| hierarchy | 层级 |
| Hipcamp | Hipcamp(交易平台公司名,保留原文) |
| HomeAway | HomeAway(度假租赁平台,保留原文) |
| homogeneity | 同质性 |
| incumbents | 在位者 |
| intellectually honest | 理智诚实 |
| K-factor | K-factor(病毒传播系数,保留原文) |
| land grab | 跑马圈地 |
| leaky bucket | 漏水桶 |
| liquidity | 流动性 |
| Lyft | Lyft(网约车平台,保留原文) |
| Marco | Marco(人名,保留原文) |
| marketplace | 交易平台 |
| MAU (Monthly Active Users) | 月活跃用户数 |
| Mechanical Turk | Mechanical Turk(Amazon 众包平台,保留原文) |
| minimum viable happiness | 最低可行满意度 |
| network effect | 网络效应 |
| North Star | 北极星 |
| NPS | NPS(Net Promoter Score,净推荐值,保留原文) |
| NUX (New User Experience) | 新用户体验 |
| optionality | 可选择性 |
| organic growth | 有机增长 |
| Pachinko | 《柏青哥》(韩裔美籍作家李敏金的小说,使用公认中文译名) |
| Parker Conrad | Parker Conrad(人名,保留原文) |
| Pinterest Graph | Pinterest Graph(专有名词,保留原文) |
| plateau | 平台期 |
| playbook | 打法 |
| Postmates | Postmates(外卖平台,保留原文) |
| product market fit | 产品市场匹配 |
| re-engagement loop | 再参与循环 |
| Reid Hoffman | Reid Hoffman(人名,LinkedIn 联合创始人、Greylock 合伙人,保留原文) |
| REKKI | REKKI(交易平台公司名,保留原文) |
| retention | 留存 |
| Rippling | Rippling(公司名,保留原文) |
| Ronan | Ronan(人名,保留原文) |
| saturation point | 饱和点 |
| Seamless Web | Seamless Web(外卖平台,保留原文) |
| Sean Ellis | Sean Ellis(人名,保留原文) |
| Secret | Secret(匿名社交应用,保留原文) |
| self-perpetuating | 自我驱动 |
| Series A | A 轮 |
| smile graph | 微笑曲线 |
| stablecoin | 稳定币 |
| Subaru | Subaru(汽车品牌,保留原文) |
| Substack | Substack(内容订阅平台,保留原文) |
| TAM (Total Addressable Market) | TAM(总可达市场) |
| The Five Dysfunctions of a Team | 《团队的五种功能障碍》(Patrick Lencioni 的管理著作,使用公认中文译名) |
| The Five Temptations of a CEO | 《CEO 的五种诱惑》(Patrick Lencioni 的管理著作,使用公认中文译名) |
| thimble | 顶针(比喻极度聚焦的小市场) |
| Thumbtack | Thumbtack(服务平台,保留原文) |
| tip the market | 倾斜市场 |
| tipping loops | 倾斜循环 |
| tipping point | 临界点 |
| Turkers | Turkers(Mechanical Turk 上的工作者,保留原文) |
| Uber Eats | Uber Eats(外卖平台,保留原文) |
| UberPool | UberPool(Uber 服务类型,保留原文) |
| UberX | UberX(Uber 服务类型,保留原文) |
| user acquisition spend | 用户获取花费 |
| vanity metrics | 虚荣指标 |
| VRBO | VRBO(度假租赁平台,保留原文) |
| WAP (Weekly Active Pinners) | 周活跃 Pin 用户(weekly active pinners 的缩写) |
| weekly active pinners | 周活跃 Pin 用户 |
| white hot center | 白热中心 |
| white space | 机会空间 |
| winner take most | 赢家通吃(多数) |
| yurt | 蒙古包 |
此文档由 AI 分片翻译(translate_long_document)