从服务 600+ 家 YC 创业公司中学到的经验 | Gustaf Alströmer(Y Combinator, Airbnb)
Lessons from working with 600+ YC startups | Gustaf Alströmer (Y Combinator, Airbnb)
Gustaf Alströmer (00:00:00): If I drill down what makes companies fail, it’s quite simple. It’s just like they don’t talk to users, which means they don’t find product market fit. And if they don’t find product market fit, nothing else really matters. What mistakes do people make is like it is all about that. It’s all about talking to customers and learning that you’re building something that’s actually useful. YC Slack headline is make things people want, and it’s still true and it’s always going to be true.
What Makes Airbnb Unique
Lenny: Welcome to Lenny’s Podcast where I interview world-class product leaders and growth experts to learn from their hard one experiences building and growing today’s most successful products. Today my guest is Gustaf Alstromer. Gustaf is a group partner at Y Combinator where he’s been for almost six years. Prior to that, Gustaf was at Airbnb for over four years where he started the original Airbnb growth team and where I was very lucky to get to work alongside him for a number of years. Gustaf is also at the heart of YC’s increased focus on climate tech, and in my opinion is one of a handful of people who’ve had an incredible impact on the increasing amount of investment and people flowing into climate tech.
We chat in depth about what’s happening in climate tech, why things have shifted so much recently, what’s new and exciting, and how to think about the space if you’re hoping to make the jump. We also get deep into Gustaf’s experience working with over 600 startups over his time at YC. We talk about what are the most common mistakes that early stage startups and founders make, what advice YC partners give founders most often, the most common attributes of successful founders, the importance of having a technical co-founder and why that’s the case, so much more. I guarantee you will leave this episode smarter and more inspired and I can’t wait for you to hear it. With that, I bring you Gustaf Alstromer after a short word from our wonderful sponsors.
Gustaf, welcome to the podcast.
Gustaf Alströmer (00:04:17): Thank you, Lenny. Honestly, it’s so great to see you. I’m excited to be talking to you.
I’ve been looking forward to this conversation for a while ever since we booked this. We worked together at Airbnb for many years. I was really lucky to get to work with you before you moved on to bigger and better things at YC. Speaking of Airbnb, you once tweeted about how special an experience that was for you, and I think even more interestingly, how many of the people that have left Airbnb can’t find another place that’s as special that just like that bar has been set too high. And so my first question is just like, what do you think it was that made Airbnb so special? Why was it such an important experience for you and other people? And even more importantly, just what is it that you take from that experience that you bring to startups that you work with now?
Gustaf Alströmer (00:05:02): Yeah, it’s funny. I think this year in a couple of months it’ll be 10 years ago since you and me started Airbnb.
Wow.
Gustaf Alströmer (00:05:08): It was 2012. The reason I treated that was I asked everyone that I’d met after Airbnb, because I had this experience of like, this was the highlight of my career up until then, at least being in the team like that and I asked everyone, “Have you found anything better?” Besides maybe one or two people, I haven’t heard anybody say that they found something better. And they all missed that dearly. I thought a lot about why that was the case, but I would say Airbnb did not feel like a normal job. It felt like more like a group of friends trying to just do something together and we were friends. At least in the beginning it did not feel like this was a job. It was sort of like an ongoing project and an assembly of amazing people. I think in the end we managed to build two things, like a really successful company, thanks to Joe and Nate and Brian just for starting this. Without them there would be nothing to build.
I think people don’t like to use the word family, but I feel like that way because when I go and meet with Airbnb alumnis from that team. We have a very special bond that reminds me of close social connections more than anything else. It does not remind me of coworkers. I asked myself why this was the case. The best answer I have is probably we brought in a special type of people. We had very diverse backgrounds. A lot of us was former founders. Not many of us were career people from the technology industry of the early days, not many of us.
I think that bar that we set, the first, I believe when I joined there was probably five or seven PMs and there was 30 engineers or something and you joined a little bit before me, those people set the bar or set the standard of what we were looking for afterwards. I think it took a long time to change that narrative. I mean, eventually you have to hire people that only had big corporation careers, but I don’t remember we did that for a long time. When I actually read my goodbye note recently, my words there still means a lot to me and it means sort of like you’re trying to reflect on exactly these things on like, building a great company that became successful and being part of this sort of family of really close friends.
So it sounds like if you had to boil down what Airbnb did, it sounds like hiring was the main piece that impacted the way it turned out just like the founders being very specific about the type of people they were hiring.
Gustaf Alströmer (00:07:32): Absolutely.
Why Hiring Is Key
Lenny: Is there anything that’s like, I don’t know, a take away there of just what you recommend to founders, like hiring. People know, be very careful who you hire. The first, I don’t know, 10 people will impact the culture long term. But I don’t know. Is there anything just abstracting away there of just what to look for in that first batch of hires?
Gustaf Alströmer (00:07:50): It’s a tricky one because I would like to say that all the things that we did were the cost of the outcome of this, but that’s not really how the world works. Some of the things we did work, some of the things that we did did not work. It’s hard for us to actually disentangle what those things are, but I think we can talk about the things that we did. First of all, we made sure we hired people that were really excited to be there, right? They wanted to build Airbnb and they were really excited to work on Airbnb. That was the most important thing. Of course people had other offers, but I think you can figure out from those offers are you excited to be here or not. So that was probably the first thing.
The second thing I think is trying to understand the true motivations of the people that were there, like lower, “Why are you here?” We did something we call culture interviews that I think the founders have written about or there’s probably content online about this. We did a lot of culture interviews early on to try to figure out we got the people that were there that mapped our core values and were really excited to work on Airbnb. I think finally, I don’t know how this happened, we did pick people from diverse backgrounds. Most startups don’t have most of the PMs being former founders, but I believe that was the case for the first 10 or 12 or 15 PMs at Airbnb. A lot of us were former founders. I think that that made a big difference for how you make decisions and how you get started on things.
I think I actually see this a lot in the Airbnb founders. They really care about the time at YC and they tried to recreate YC inside Airbnb a couple of times with demo day and with so new products completely isolated from the rest, starting with doing things that don’t scale and talking to customers. So I think that that experience had made a big impact on them, but it’s hard to say just these two things go and apply these things. It’s actually kind of hard to say, “Well that will work at it as Airbnb.” I think that’s a really tricky question to answer.
The last thing I would say is Airbnb had an incredible business model, an incredible business from early on and it was hard to fail. What I mean by that is it’s hard to fail with a company. You can fail with individual things inside the company, but a company was still going to succeed. I think we all felt that. A lot of companies don’t have the ability to take risks like Airbnb did early on because they don’t have something that’s so obviously great.
That’s a really interesting point on the last piece that you may have the most amazing culture and hire incredibly well, but if the company doesn’t work out, it’s not going to be looked back as like, “Wow, that was an amazing experience, but we failed.”
Gustaf Alströmer (00:10:18): Yeah.
Yeah, that’s interesting. So you mentioned YC and this kind of is a good segue to where I want to focus most of our time. You mentioned that you’ve worked with over 600 companies at this point, which is absurd. It feels like it’s you get some statistical significance on takeaways at this point of what works and doesn’t work. So I have just a bunch of questions about your experience working at YC and with all these companies. The first is I think about this quote that Elad Gill tweeted once and he wrote, I think, a post about it. Elad Gill is a legendary angel investor. He said that starting a company is an act of desperation. You’re either desperate to change the trajectory of your career or you’re desperate to make a bunch of money, you’re desperate to achieve some kind of mission or build a specific product that you’re just like, “I need this to exist.” I’m curious if you agree with that sentiment and then I have a follow-up question around that.
Gustaf Alströmer (00:11:20): Yeah, actually I haven’t heard it before, but you know me, I’m an optimistic person. I think it probably reflects on my view of this question, but I would say desperation sounds like a negative place that you’re starting at. I actually think that most people to start companies start from a positive place. But the motivations, I agree with what he said, can be very diverse for successful founders, right?
So we actually asked this in one of the early Group Office Hours sessions. We asked them, “Why are you doing this?” And we don’t want to hear an answer like, “I found this niche of the market.’ That’s not the why. The why is like, “Why will you come in and work late after four years when you have no money left and everything’s going to shit?”, right? Then the niche market is not the answer. There’s something deeper than that. We’ve learned that it varies a lot for people’s motivations to start companies. Some of them just want to solve some technical problem that they feel are passionate about solving. Some of them want to prove themselves in front of others or prove themselves towards themselves. Some have grand really important motivations to change the world and they will say things like, “I want to give everyone water or I want to solve climate change or I want to democratize publishing.” You can imagine any number of large ideas. Some people just want to start a big company and just want to be successful.
It doesn’t matter, in my experience, what your motivation is. I don’t think either of these motivations. It sounds like some of them will be better than others. In my experience, it’s not the case. The motivation will change over time to just running this thing, right? Like once something becomes big, it’s hard to think every day about exactly why you got started because the motivation is just like it can be fun and work on boring things because it’s fun to build something big. Everything doesn’t have to be shiny and big and grandiose because there are many ideas that are “boring,” but just the idea of running the company becomes the motivation eventually.
That is really interesting that one of the main things you look for, it sounds like when you’re interviewing, is how strong and durable is that drive to build this company. Is that what you’re saying?
Gustaf Alströmer (00:13:26): It’s actually kind of hard for screen for motivation, I would say, in interviews because the purpose of this kind of Office Hour question is to highlight why someone is there and highlight the diversity of reasons people are there and sometimes even highlight from one founder to another co-founder why they are doing this. They might have never talked about this. Actually, surprisingly, often founders have not talked about why they’re doing this. And just knowing why someone is here really helps with conflict resolution for example, really helps with understanding why someone is there on a certain day or something like that. So it’s not something we screen for as much as I think we try to help founders discover this among themself and really know this about themself. I’ve just accepted that the motivations to start companies is widely diverse.
Do you ever discourage founders from starting a company when you see that maybe it won’t be a durable kind of lasting motivation or whatever other reasons just knowing how hard starting a company ends up being?
Gustaf Alströmer (00:14:23): It’s a good question. I would say sometimes if someone doesn’t have a motivation or don’t know why they’re doing this, they’re doing this because they read that it would be a natural career step. So a good reason to not start a company is if you think of starting a company as a career step. Well, it is not. Because if it’s successful, it’ll be your entire career. It’ll be 10 years most likely. And if it’s not successful, then it’s not something that people generally aspire to start. So non-successful startups. So I think people will start companies because this is sort of something they want to put on their resume. They have not understood what startups are or why you should do them.
Sometimes you can screen and kind of figure this out, but sometimes people don’t even know why they’re starting a company when they get started and it kind of gets figured out along the way. And that’s okay. I don’t want to discourage people who don’t know exactly why they’re starting this company just to start a company. They might figure out along the way and find the true motivation after doing this for a little bit or finding that it’s really fun.
I think I discourage people to start startups if they have so many other things that are important than their life that are more important than the startup. So if there are financial constraints or family constraints or relationship constraints and they are going to trump this, then yeah, you should think a second time perhaps because startups are hard. They’re much harder than a normal job. Equally hard if they’re successful or failure, right? There’s no middle way, we’re like, “Oh, my company is doing great so I can chill.” That doesn’t work that way either. So I don’t really discourage or encourage people, I just want them to have all the information.
Working With 600 YC Startups
Lenny: You mentioned YC Office Hours and I had a question around this. I’m working on this piece where I’m interviewing a bunch of B2B founders of companies that are doing super well and I asked them a few questions like, “How’d you come up with the idea? How’d you find your first few customers?” it’s shocking how many of them bring up a conversation in YC Office Hours as the most pivotal point that set them on the trajectory that they’re on now. I’m curious what happens in these Office Hours? What are the most common pieces of advice that you give or maybe most surprising pieces of advice that you give in these Office Hours so that people can get maybe a glimpse into these conversations you have?
Gustaf Alströmer (00:16:43): So at YC we have two type of Office Hours, two of the common ones. We have regular Office Hours, which is usually a one-on-one or basically the founders talking to me, or me plus another partner. They happen every week or every other week throughout the entire program. And they happen years after the program on the regular basis. Then we have Group Office Hours, which is you and six or seven other startups talking to us. They have [inaudible 00:17:07] a little bit different purpose. So the goal of the regular Office Hour, I always ask the question, “What’s holding you back from moving faster? We don’t want to hear updates, we don’t want to hear strategy questions. We want to understand what’s slowing you down or what’s holding you back from moving even faster. You generally have a specific goal.”
And I think that question of what’s slowing you down or were holding you back crystallizes the priorities. There are only so many things you can do as a startup and there are only so many things that matters at that stage. And by asking that question, we can start digging into, “Okay, what’s the goal? What are the things that drives towards that goal? What are the things that’s slowing you down towards that goal?” Usually, the founders don’t know what’s slowing it down, so the conversation and us probing questions actually leads to us or them discovering what it is just slowing them down.
In the Group Office Hour, it’s a little bit different. The Group Office Hour holds a couple of different purposes. One of them is if I think back on Paul and Jessica’s motivation to start YC, this is a surprise to them, but starting a company is incredibly lonely. You can’t really lean on your employees and say, “Hey, I’m feeling really shitty as a founder today. Everything is going to shit.” Employees isn’t going to take that well. So you lean on perhaps your investors, but they’re not really available. But what you can lean on is other founders because they’re all in the same situation. It’s sort of like when you ask a founder the question, “How are things going?”, it’s so emotional for them to answer that question because it’s never going well, right? It’s never like, “Oh, everything is going fantastic.” They might say that, but everybody knows all founders, when they look each other’s eyes, then no, that’s not the answer.
So founders have infinite number of problems that they’re thinking about all the time, which is why they’re allergic to the question, “How are things going?” But when YC started, we put all the founders in a group together in a room and they started learning that all founders, all companies are broken in some way, right? They’re all having these massive problems and they’re all feeling that anxiety when they hear the question, “How are things going?” And just hearing other founders explain their problems, perhaps solving their problems, is a really good way for yourself to both feel motivated to do it yourself and see how problems get solved when other companies are having similar problems. Nowadays because of the scale at YC, we group companies together that have the same problems or the same area that they’re operating in.
The second thing that Group Office Hours do well is accountability, right? We ask you, “What were your goals? What were your goals for the last two weeks? Did you hit them?” And then that gives founders accountability because founders are competitive. They don’t want to look bad. They don’t want to come back after two weeks and say “Nothing worked,” or at least like, “We didn’t learn anything.” They want to learn something and make progress whether it’s positive or negative.
Group Office Hours to me is the most magical moment because it really creates this very intense three or four month period. Founders often come back to us afterwards and say, “Hey, we want to do that again. We don’t have this really intense, really productive period. We don’t have a program exactly. We have other programs, but we don’t have anything exactly that mimics that experience.” But we do encourage founders to continue with Group Office Hours after YC. Many of them do and many of them, ad hoc, continue to meet for years in this group setting where they ask the same kind of questions to each other, to hold themselves accountable, to learn from each other, and to just have someone else to lean on. I think this was unknown and somehow the world didn’t know before that starting company is super lonely and you have all these anxiety. By just talking to other people who have the same problems, it’s just one of the best thing you can do.
There’s so many things that come up when you talk about this. One is I had a startup at one point and we worked in the coworking space. We joined the coworking space because we’re like, “Oh, we’ll meet other founders. It’ll be social, we won’t be alone.” But it turns out everyone’s just heads down, headphones on, “I don’t have time for anything. I just need to work.” It’s like a microcosm of that experience that even if you’re surrounded by founders, no one has time to do anything. They’re just working.
Gustaf Alströmer (00:21:09): You got to schedule it and force it and put the laptops on the floor and the phones on the floor and you just sit there with pen and paper. That’s how you have to do it. We tried to mimic that as much as we could over Zoom. But honestly the best experience of this was in person, in a ring, in mountain view with no computers and everyone just paying attention to everyone. That was the best experience. Yeah, that’s what I remember is one of the most meaningful parts of YC. I didn’t have it myself when I did YC, but now everyone has it.
Founder Motivation: Filter or Discover?
Lenny: The other thing that’s made me think about is someone tweeted once, “Don’t ever ask a founder how they’re doing or how it’s going. It just creates all this anxiety because nothing’s ever going great.”
Gustaf Alströmer (00:21:44): Don’t do it. Everybody looks at each other’s eyes and they know that they’re allergic to that question.
That’s hilarious. So just to summarize the questions you said you asked, the one is in the individual Office Hours, is what’s holding you back. And then in the group setting, what was the question again that you asked?
Gustaf Alströmer (00:22:01): What are your goals for next two weeks and what were your goals for the last two weeks and did you hit the goals? And if you didn’t hit them, what came in the way of hitting the goals? It’s very simple. That can uncover lots of problems that other founders are having exactly in the same way. Just by talking about the things that held you back or the things that allowed you to hit your goals, uncover something material for the other seven companies doing that in the ring.
If you kind of zoomed out a little bit and thought about the startups you’ve worked with, what would you say are the most common mistakes that early stage startups make broadly?
Gustaf Alströmer (00:22:36): There’s so many. I mean, this is how I initially learned about startups, by searching for that on Google and landing on Paul Graham’s articles because he kept-
Wow.
Gustaf Alströmer (00:22:45): I think I’ve written many articles about this topic because it is so common. So this topic can go on forever. But if I take the most recent experience I’ve had in YC, I would say startups fail, one, because they don’t talk to customers. And if you don’t talk to customers or users, you don’t actually know what’s important. If you don’t know what’s important, it doesn’t matter what you build, it doesn’t matter kind of what ideas you have in your head if you don’t actually know what it is that you need to build and you don’t validate with customers. That’s where a lot of the failure stems from. A lot of early YC for us or early part of the program is us pushing and probing founders to be like, “Tell us about the conversations you’ve had with the customers. What did you learn? Can you show us the organizations?” Or like all these questions, like, “What are the software they’re using? What are they paying for? What problems do they have? How are they describing the intensity of that problem?” So that’s what we spent a lot of time early at YC.
After that, I would say one of the commons mistakes in… I’m not talking about generally startups here, I’m talking inside YC. The second most common thing I see in YC is people are just afraid to talk to customers. They’re just not trying hard enough to get in front of customers. I think this comes from, technical people tend to think that software is just sort of solution to everything. But really what you should need to do is to talk to someone over Zoom or over phone or in person, even better. People are just afraid of doing that and they’re afraid of being rejected. These are common, people that want to build good products are just really afraid of people saying no.
The problem is, which anyone who hasn’t done sales before that joined YC, they realize this, is that if you take the average customer group in the world, 90% are not early adopters. It doesn’t matter if you have something new and cool, they’re just not interested. They are not incentivized to take risks in their job to try something new. They’re just incentivized to not take risks and just continue what they’re doing. Those 10 percents are the early adopters. They’re The ones that you actually want to reach. But that means you have to reach 10 to find one. And then you convince that one person to get on the phone or a video call with you. And that takes work and it takes a lot of work. I think people don’t really think of this. This is common knowledge, basic stuff for salespeople, but founders should never done sales before just get surprised by the percentages and the sort of what it means to do this.
If I think of more generally outside of YC, so these are two kind of things I experience within YC, but I think generally outside of YC, I would say the two most common problems the same one is not talking to customers, the other one is not being technical and not knowing what it takes to build successful technology company. It means having technical founders and it means being able to build the first prototype. This is something we screen for when we interview people in YC and we aren’t accepting a whole lot of team that don’t know how to build or get their first prototype built themselves because we know it is a super common value pattern.
I can go on and on and on and on for this one, but honestly if I drill down what makes companies fail, it’s quite simple. It’s just like they don’t talk to users, which means they don’t find product market fit. And if they don’t find product market fit, nothing else really matters. What mistakes do people make is it is all about that. It’s all about talking to customers and learning that you’re building something that’s actually useful. YC Slack headline is make things people want, and it’s still true and it’s always going to be true.
This is really interesting and good advice. It’s interesting that… Like, “Talk to customers,” people hear that all the time. They’re like, “Of course we’re going to talk to customers. We’re going to do that of course.” And your experience is they know this but they just don’t do it probably because they’re afraid. Maybe also because they think they already know what they need to build and it’s like, “Yeah, we’re good.”
Gustaf Alströmer (00:26:41): And you have all these validators, right? So the people are validating that even if you don’t talk to customers, why has he accepted you? This investor invested in you. This investor said you were great, like blah blah blah. All these different validations that you confuse with product market fit, right? We have to remind everyone on the first day in YC, “None of you have product market fit because you probably don’t,” right? Almost nobody has. Because people confuse this external validation with the thing that matters the most, which is talking to customers and learning what matters. It’s just like a thing that just keeps coming back. Some get really good at it. And that is the source of successful startups, is when you really get good at this.
It reminds me coming back to Airbnb, one of the most important moments in Airbnb history was Paul Graham telling the founders of Airbnb, “Where are your customers?” And they’re like, “Oh, they’re in New York” and he’s like, “Why are you talking to me and not in New York right now talking to them?” And they talk about that all the time.
Gustaf Alströmer (00:27:35): Yeah, it’s absolutely true. I think he wrote the article Do Things That Don’t Scale as a learning… The learning there was the Airbnb founders doing the trips to New York and learning about how to build Airbnb, which is a very counterintuitive idea, which is when you have to spend the most amount of time with your customers. I think Airbnb is sort of one of the best stories inside YC of doing this well.
Reasons to Start a Company
Lenny: This also reminds me, I’ve been talking to a bunch of founders recently. I asked them, “How many customers have you talked to help figure out this idea?” So just the other day it was 150 financial CROs that they talked to before they actually started raising this round. Another company, actually two Airbnb guys that started, they actually ran ads I think on LinkedIn to find specific people to talk to and that specific role. And they talked to probably at least 100, maybe 200. So there’s a strong correlation there.
Gustaf Alströmer (00:28:26): Yeah, I think that’s the volumes that people don’t expect. They think they might have to talk to five, but I think you have to talk to 25 to 50. That means you have to reach out to a lot more to be able to get to people that are potentially early adopters. Those ones you talk to are also the ones that become your customers. So you are already doing most of the sales by just doing this work anyway.
Do you have maybe one tactical tip you could share of just either getting over your fear of talking to customers or just holding yourself accountable to actually doing it?
Gustaf Alströmer (00:28:55): Yeah, I tell this story, I actually told this story yesterday. So remember when you sign up first service that’s a cool service and you hear about in TechCrunch or something like that and then you realize you already signed up a year ago, right? And then from the founder’s perspective, you sign up to something you never used it. So the founders who build those services, their inclination to think is that “Everybody hates me because they sign up and they never use me.” They never use the service. The fear of that is that basically the fear of rejection. So if I put my thing out there and most people won’t use it and they will tell all their friends how shitty this thing is, you should never even sign up for it, that’s the fear people have, but the truth is that people sign up for it and be like, “Oh, I’m busy. I got something else to do.” And they actually don’t remember or care.
So whenever you sign for something that you signed up a year ago, think of yourself that that is the common customer experience, which is that you just sign up for a lot of stuff you don’t even remember you. You never have this, “I hate this thing’ reaction. You always have this like, “I’m indifferent to this thing. I don’t actually care to even complete the sign up flow or try it out,” right? I think that’s the thing that people need to remember, is that the worst thing that can happen to startup is not that people hate what you’re doing, it’s that they’re completely indifferent to what you’re doing. It’s not the worst thing, but the most common thing that happens is people just is indifferent. But it doesn’t give you a second chance. Let’s say, it always gives you a second chance and you really need to internalize that people have busy lives and if people don’t actually use what you’re building, that’s fine. You can reach out to them a year from now or six months from now or two weeks from now and they probably will if you make some improvements.
I think people just have this fear that, “If I get a lot of rejection, that means everything is bad.” But the rejection should be put in context to the early adopter idea and that most people who don’t care are not early adopters, who don’t want to dig into new things. And that the more narrow of a solution you have to a specific problem, the fewer people actually want to dig in. But that’s where you have to start because you cannot build the whole thing right up front and make everybody loves you. That doesn’t really work that way.
Even Airbnb was like air mattresses or staying in someone’s homes when they’re home. That was not the complete solution of Airbnb. But there were early adopters who dug in and be like, “Yep, I like that. I like those two things. I want to have people stay in my living room in my mattress.” But that’s not what Airbnb is about today, and a lot of those things were unknown at the time. But I think people are just afraid of rejection and you just need to overcome that fear and just learn that there’s nothing that’s really that bad that can happen when people don’t use the service or sign up and don’t care. It’s not really that bad.
It reminds me of a quote that I always love for Mark Andreessen, that everyone’s time is already allocated. They don’t have space for your product right now. They already have plans for their day.
Gustaf Alströmer (00:31:42): Totally.
And it takes a lot to convince someone to pay attention to anything. I guess that just comes back to why it’s so important that your product is solving a real pain and not just a nice little toy that is better than what’s out there, but not so much better that you’re like, “I need this right now.” So maybe just along those lines, do you have any thoughts on just the importance of that pain and just how critical that is?
Gustaf Alströmer (00:32:15): I actually recorded… I’m happy of these videos, but I’ve recorded two videos on YouTube as part of YC Startup School last fall. You can go watch them on YouTube right now. One of them is how to talk to users and the other one is how you sell or how you use sales. The one about talking to users, I think there’s a difference in asking someone, “Do you have a problem with X, Y, Z? Is this podcasting setup working for you?” And people say, “Yeah, it’s kind of working.” But if you are a podcasting setup experts and you watch people use some other thing that’s really shitty, they might also think that it’s pretty good. But you have to watch them do it. And the best way for you to figure out what is the intensity of the problem is not to ask them but to watch them or to watch them solve the thing that they do.
You know how a lot of non-technical people don’t know how to automate things? So they will do the same thing in Excel like a million times by just tapping because that’s the only thing that they know and they’re not technical enough to write some kind of script to do it, and you just have to watch those people to just feel the pain. You can’t actually ask them how difficult is it to do X, y, z because they won’t even know that it’s that difficult to them. So the best thing I’ve learned about how to discover the pain is to watch people, have them screen share, have them walk you through their daily workflow about the area where you’re doing some discovery. That is the best thing.
I’ll give you another example. So there’s a bunch of waste companies that are doing EV charging for electric cars and they’re like, “What are the problems in EV charging?” And I was like, “Just rent an EV and go and charge at all the non Tesla chargers and see what they say, see what you experience.” And the truth is that it’s just like garbage. A lot of EV charting systems are just so shitty and the apps are terrible. You just have to just use them yourself to know how bad it is.
Inside YC Office Hours
Lenny: It’s cool how often it just comes back to, “Just go do the thing. Do things that don’t scale.” Classic YC advice. I want to come back to something you mentioned that I want to pull a thread on as the technical co-founder, being technical early on, just to cover that. So I know YC looks to… Having a technical founder is an important variable in you’re deciding to accept a company. Say someone doesn’t have a technical co-founder, do you have any advice for what they could do, like what often can work?
Gustaf Alströmer (00:34:41): Yeah, I think the first thing is to understand the value of technical co-founder. So some people who are in this situation where they have an idea of something they want to build and they don’t have anyone to help build them in building it, I had a friend Paul who gave this incredible quote, he said, “I have an idea for a song, I just need a musician to help me make it,” right? That’s kind of similar to how it is with engineering. If you view output of engineering as like, “I just have an idea for a song, I just need someone to actually make it for me” and then you’re not valuing software engineering or mechanical engineering or any engineering skill set deep enough, right?
The truth is that the engineering part is the really hard part. The first thing I would say is you need to learn how to value the engineering piece. Let me give you an example of how you don’t do that. You applied to YC and you have 90% for yourself and 10% for the engineer. You’re basically saying that like, “Oh, the engineering part of this company is only worth 1/10th of me. I’m the non-technical person.” So that to me is a signal that you’re not really valuing engineering.
Okay, so how do you go out about and find someone? Well, the truth is that there are a lot of technical co-founders. The technical people, they also want to find business co-founders. They don’t want to do other part. They don’t want to do sales and they actually don’t really care that much about fundraising. They just want to solve the problem. And that’s fine. We built something called co-founder matching where those funders can meet, but if you don’t participate in that, you can just start by asking the best technical people that you know. “Are you interested in starting a company with me?” Same thing with rejection. Many of them will just say, “No, I have a great job, I’m really happy.” But some of them will have thought about starting a company for a while and was hoping that someone would come and ask them to do that. So you have to remove your fears and go and ask the best people.
The reason you want to have a technical co-founder and not a hired engineer or not a hired contracting team is because so many of the decisions you’re going to make are technical and so many of the iterations you’re going to make relies on engineering. And if you don’t understand that, you won’t actually make the right decisions anyway. It’s not like service. You have an idea for a product, you build a product and you’re done. There’s infinite number of iterations in that process.
And then finally, I would say a lot of people learn how to code themselves, right? So there are a lot of places online that you can learn the skillset that takes to build a prototype. You might not be the best engineers. So there are many successful startup founders who are not the best engineers because they stop coding when they hire three or four engineers, that’s fine. But you need to be sufficiently good that you understand the value of engineering and that you understand that the best way to solve most of the problem is with software. There are a lot of founders who just, for whatever reason, study something else that doesn’t have to be a conscious or very precise reason that you had when you were 18 or 19 and then you’re 25, you’re like, “Oh, I wish I know how to code” and then just learn to code and they learn how to code. It’s not that more difficult than that.
Have you ever seen a startup work out if they had a contracting firm, like engineering firm build a product? Does that ever work or were you just like, “No, do not ever do this”?
Gustaf Alströmer (00:37:53): Basically, I can’t recall any specific ones where people have a contracting firm but I’ve recalled founders where let’s say you had two non-technical founders, but they valued engineering and they had an ability to build a team of great people that were not co-founders and they gave them equity and they become successful. There are many examples of that I would say, but I don’t remember any specific examples where you had a contracting team building the whole thing. I think the reason for that is it takes more than just sort of riding a spec to build a product. You can’t actually spec yourself to a great product. You have to just be part of the iterations yourself. That’s why I think someone being the engineer, having the idea of what iteration looks like and just doing it is how you do things.
I think that the cases where I’ve seen non-technical founders make this work is that they have really good engineering teams who feel like they’re founding team. It might not be co-founders per YC-7 definition of having 10%, but they feel like they’re the bonding team.
This reminds me of a story of just the recent podcast interview I did with the CPO of Calendly. She talked about how when Calendly started, they actually had a Ukrainian dev team built the first product. Not only did they help them build the first product, they actually ended up driving all the growth initially because they saw Calendly and started using it within their firm.
Gustaf Alströmer (00:39:14): Wow.
And then everyone that they knew started using it and spread within Ukraine and they actually continue to work with that firm. They’re still the [inaudible 00:39:20] team for Calendly or some part of it.
Gustaf Alströmer (00:39:22): Wow.
Yeah
Gustaf Alströmer (00:39:24): Wow, that’s cool.
There’s a success story.
Gustaf Alströmer (00:39:26): I mean, I would say it’s certainly the case that in some countries people have other jobs while they start the startups, so like the engineers. In Ukraine for example or in Eastern Europe, it’s very common that if they start their own startup, they actually have a full-time job as a contractor while they’re starting the startup because that’s how you pay the bill because often you can’t raise money. And that’s fine too.
Amazing. That’s some hustle.
I want to zoom out a little bit and ask another big question and see what answer you have for this. If you just think about the most successful startups in YC or even just the companies you worked with, if you had to pick just one or two attributes of what’s most common across successful companies, what would that be?
Gustaf Alströmer (00:41:04): I would say the most common reason that I’ve seen founders succeed or companies succeed, it comes down to the founders and characteristics of those individuals. The most important characteristics of those individuals are they’re really determined to win and they don’t give up when things are hard and they have an internal motivation that’s just really infectious to people around them, which is how they end up building really good teams around them. People are actually going to want to go and work for them. I have numerous examples of people like this where the CEO or one of the founders are just really inspirational people.
The second thing I would say is they are technical. So that’s kind of like they’re technical enough. If I would grade companies on a scale of technical to less technical, more technical founders are more likely to succeed, I would say. And then I would say they figure out how to talk to users and move fast early on so they don’t wait for permission from their investors or from YC or from someone else to make progress. They’re like, every day or every week there’s continuous progress. They’re not doing this for someone else, they’re doing this for the customers. They’re not doing this for the investors, that’s for sure. The investors are sort of in the way more or less. And they’re just naturally focusing on the customers.
Finally, what I would say is the skill that’s really attributed to great founders is excellent communication skills. So the ability to communicate really complicated ideas clearly, to enjoy the communication part, right? Enjoying communication is often kind of correlated with enjoying doing fundraising, which is an important part of some companies’ success. Not all of them, but for some of them. I would say communication or storytelling is part of the same arc, right? And those are part of the same thing that actually motivates people around you. If you can communicate why you’re building, what you’re building and why it’s important to the world, tell a story about that, that can motivate people around you to just want to follow you. I think it’s rare that I’ve seen founders succeed where the founder isn’t in some way an inspirational person or someone that is a good communicator. Most of the time, you at least have respect or you somewhere know that they’re going to succeed, right? And that is what inspires you to be around them or be on their team.
The Loneliness of Founders
Lenny: That is a really cool list. So just to summarize, one, they have the strong will to win, and with that they’re inspirational. They kind of pull people along and get people really excited. Two is they’re more likely to succeed if they’re technical and can build a thing. Three, they figure out how to talk to customers, don’t wait, just start doing it. And they’re just obsessed with that versus what investors want them to do and they don’t want to talk to the investors to make time for the customers. And then excellent communication skills, which comes back to the first. They’re able to story tell and get people excited. Is that right?
Gustaf Alströmer (00:44:06): Yeah, I would say those are the attributes of successful things. To be a super successful company, there’s something else that have to happen. Those things are not things you can put on a list because they are the outliers, right? If you look at startups on a typical YC batch, there’d be a couple billion companies. Those are the outliers. They’ll almost certainly have all the things that we’ve talked about. Many other companies in the batch will have that too, but then what makes someone a true outlier is something that is unknown. That’s why so many investors said no to Airbnb when they were not trying to raise money because that was an outlier idea. It was an idea that was not logical and did not make sense to most people. Those kind of ideas, the ones that end up succeeding often don’t make sense to people. There’s some reason that no one has done this before because they’re just not natural next step of the world.
That’s a great segue to a question I’ve been meaning to ask, which is, how good are you at predicting in a batch which startups are going to be the monster hits? So maybe like you and then just generally YC, how good are you all at knowing what’s going to work out, is going to be the next Airbnb or Dropbox?
Gustaf Alströmer (00:45:14): I think the truth is that we’re not very good at knowing what’s going to succeed. Certainly we cannot figure out who’s going to be the really successful company in the batch. That’s not possible. What we’re good at is knowing what failure looks like. What we sometimes like to tell founders at the beginning of the batch is like, “If you fail, please do it in some new exciting way. Not one that we’ve seen 100 times.” Because we have seen people fail for a large number of reasons. The best way for us to sort of not predict, but the best way for us to make more companies succeed is to tell them how they might fail, right? Be very direct and honest with them and say, “You doing these three things, these things are likely going to lead that you won’t succeed.” And if we do our job well, most people get that feedback and they’re on the track for succeeding.
Now, which of those companies end up becoming the best? There are so many things that are uncorrelated to being the best, and it’s the things that people don’t like. I’m in a hot industry, I was writing up on TechCrunch like, this investor started talking to me. You’d be surprised how many of the things I just mentioned are uncorrelated to outlier success, right? That’s why it’s so hard to actually do this. I think people really want these questions to be answered. People really want to believe that you can pick really great companies at the seed stage, but everything I’ve learned from the plus 600 companies that I’ve worked with is that it’s just not that easy and it’s maybe not even possible and certainly not possible when you talk about finding the outlier companies. I don’t think it’s that easy. And if it was easy, then we would accept a lot fewer companies. We just accept those ones, but it’s just not that easy.
Do you have a sense of which ones are likely to work out better than others? Or is it just like, “We have 150 really unclear, but one of these, hopefully.”
Gustaf Alströmer (00:47:09): One good indicator is if each new Office Hour there is really exciting new stuff, right? We’re not talking about the same thing we talked about two weeks ago or four weeks ago. They’ve already done that stuff, right? Like, “Oh, I was trying to sell to these three customers. Well, they already bought it. I’m not actually talking to seven others.” And now we are talking about a different price and different product because they’re like, they want more of what we’re doing. If I’m experiencing that, and that’s like a consistent trend, then when people draw this revenue graph of this 10% weekly growth rate kind of situation, those are the companies that we attribute that to. It’s like if you’re able to make that progress on that short amount of timescale, you are on track to do something well.
Now, a lot of other things have to go well for you to ultimately be able to succeed, but progress on this weekly or biweekly timescale is a really good indicator of someone who’ll succeed. To me, much better indicator than I am in this market or I’m talking to this investor or something like that. But those are much worse indicators of someone succeeding than I’m making progress and it’s pretty fast clip.
Common Early Startup Mistakes
Lenny: Interesting. And so what I’m hearing is at the beginning of a batch, we’re just in a bet on a bunch of companies that have a lot of potential founders, technical maybe, they have the strong will to win and all these things. Through the batch, you’re looking at the companies that are exceeding your expectations week to week in terms of progress that they’re making.
Gustaf Alströmer (00:48:34): I mean, sometimes it could be different reasons that people are not making progress. But if you are making continuous progress, and I think Paul and Jessica said this, this was true early days in YC, if you are hitting your goals and you’re making progress continuously, if that continues, that’s a really strong correlation to some success. But again, going back to the question, can we predict who’s going to be the best ones? No. And that’s why we really focus on trying to meet people not to fail. Especially good teams can’t fail. If you have a really talented team who’s really technical in how to build a product but they make some other basic mistakes, like not talking to customers or something like that or trying to build everything all at once, I feel like it’s our responsibility to make sure they don’t make the basics mistakes that we’ve seen many times. We need to help them at least make some spectacular mistake that we haven’t seen before. Then that’s a high potential team. If someone’s on a good track for a decent idea but they’re still early, that’s a really good potential.
I have kind of a fun question that I wanted to try, which is kind of connected to this idea around attributes of successful founders and companies. So I had this founder friend named Flow, and he was asking me recently, “If you had to think about the most successful founders, which attributes do they have?” And he kind of gave me this list and it’s kind of like two ends of a spectrum. So I thought it’d be fun to just go through this list and see, in your experience, which end of the spectrum, if any, are associated and correlated with the most successful founders. Does that sound good?
Gustaf Alströmer (00:50:01): Sure. Sure. Let’s do it.
Okay. So the first is speed versus quality. Is there end of the spectrum where you find that most successful founders are either speed-focused or quality-focused?
Gustaf Alströmer (00:50:10): Sometimes founders ask us this question, “What should I focus on? Growth or retention?” And the answer is, they’re asking us for permission to not do one or the other. The truth is, to succeed, you have to do both. I would argue that speed versus quality, there’s different level of speed and different level of quality at different stage of the company. But the truth is that you always have to move fast and you have to understand what the meaning of quality is, right?
So I think I actually don’t see that as a spectrum, but I would say if you move fast with talking to customers, you’ll build something that have potential having quality because you know a lot about the problem. I think when people think about quality, they often think about, “What is my personal definition of quality?” I have a bar of quality, but quality to me of a good product idea, a good startup idea, has more to do with the customer think is valuable. And if you move fast by talking to customers and having customer learnings and know the problems, then you will actually come up with something that’s high quality. So they’re not at a spectrum to me.
All right. Let’s try another one. Confidence versus humility as a founder?
Gustaf Alströmer (00:51:16): I don’t think that they’re on a spectrum. I think that learning to predict confidence as a founder is critical going back to this communication piece of motivating people around you, right? I wouldn’t want to join a company where the founder’s completely not confident in their own idea, right? Because that is going to shine through. An investor isn’t going to want to invest in someone who’s completely not confident in that idea. So learning to first build your own confidence for what you’re working on and then predicting that confidence to the people around you I think is critical. A lot of people will have doubt around you. And if you’re not predicting that confidence, it’s not clear that anybody else will if you’re the founder. You’re the one who’s have to do it.
I think that you can predict that confidence while having a strong sense of humility towards the people around you. But I think when it comes to startups, learning to have that confidence is an important piece of the early days, right? And especially if you’re building something that’s very difficult, that takes a lot of work and a lot of money, protecting the confidence that you will succeed is critical for everybody that’s doubting you. And those doubting you is a lot of people around you, right? And you just need to have an unnatural amount of confidence to prove them wrong. I think, again, this is not on the spectrum with humility. In fact, the most successful founders are often the most… You cannot inspire people around you if you don’t have a strong sense of humility. People don’t actually want to spend time with you, which means they don’t want to work for you or invest in you. Again, you need both, but they serve different purposes when you get started.
Tough gig this founder life. You got to got to be everything. Let’s see if there’s a big difference in this next one. Execution and tactics versus focusing on strategy and kind of higher level stuff. How deep do founders go that you find that are most successful?
Gustaf Alströmer (00:53:02): So this one actually I have a strong opinion about. I think that the reason that we talk about strategy a lot is because it goes back to business school. The origin of business school was to teach people to join the corporate world. And in the corporate world, strategy matters, right? So when you join a big company, you’re employee number 2,010 or something, then you probably might have a business school job where thinking about corporate strategy is an important thing. When you are a small startup, strategy does not matter because there’s not that much a strategy as about. Maybe later on you might be fruitful to think about strategy, but strategy kind of assumes that you can do multiple things at the same time, which small startups cannot. They can just do one thing at the same time. So execution is the thing that matters for companies.
Whenever someone wants to have a strategy conversation, it assumes that they don’t understand their priorities. The priorities is always a list from top to bottom where there’s one thing that’s more important than the others. You can’t really have a strategy session about the other things because there’s only one thing to work on. So to me, a clear answer here is the good founders are execution-oriented and they just continually have one priority of what they’re trying to go for. And then they’re just hitting that priority all the time and then new priorities will come up and you don’t really have time to have a discussion about company strategy. Company strategy also assumes that you have product market fit because you already have something that’s working. If you don’t have that, then getting to people wanting your product, that is your strategy. You don’t have any other strategy.
Awesome. Okay. We found one that’s quite different one on the spectrum or the other. How about autocratic and kind of like, I don’t know, I think of Steve Jobs-like versus kind of consensus, collaborative driven, if this is a spectrum at all. And then where do you find founders might fit that are most successful?
Gustaf Alströmer (00:54:53): I don’t know if I have an answer to that question because I think when you work at early stage, you might look different than when you work at late stage. I don’t spend a lot of time with founders that have thousands of employees and hearing how they are in the… When I talk to those founders, I talk to them one-one-one and I only hear from their perspective. So I don’t actually know how they’re peering in a large corporate setting. But when you’re a small company, you’re three people or five people or 10 people, you cannot be an autocratic decision maker. The founding team have a founding team decision making dynamic that could look different. Sometimes it’s like everybody decides together on everything and sometimes you say, “I have my area of expertise and you have yours. We split it up, the decision making.” Either of those things are fine. I think you just have to have a process so you don’t rehash every decision after you made them a million times.
I would say the thing that matters the most at that point is to be willing to adhere to the process that you and your founding team have come up with. Your individual nature could be different in a different role in a different company. But for a startup to work out, you have to have a specific process on how you make decisions. Those are on a very short sprints, like weekly or biweekly. And everyone needs to feel good about decisions after the fact. At least they feel good about the process. I don’t think that you can just decide… You can’t also be fully collaborative, everyone gets decided about everything. So small startups agree on how they decide together. So after that, everyone just follow the process. That’s usually how things work out.
Fear of Talking to Customers
Lenny: Okay, I got one more. Cares more about the product or cares more about the distribution and growth strategy?
Gustaf Alströmer (00:56:33): Well, there’s a lot of assumptions built into that, I would say, because caring about the product to me is caring about the customers. Sometimes if I would say something like, “Oh, great founders care about the product,” a lot of founders misinterpret that as in my personal perception of the product or my ideas of what the product is. And that’s wrong. The right perception there is the expectations or the use of the product from the customers. So if you are meaning focus on the product or cares about the product in that sense that your customers care about, then absolutely, I think that’s a really, really critical, important thing to have early on, like talking to users, doing things you don’t scale. Once you get big, if you don’t figure out a scalable distribution strategy, you won’t succeed. And those are different for different companies, but they’re not doing anything that don’t scale.
Doing things that don’t scale is not a scalable strategy. Eventually, something specific will be the things that work for you. If you’re lucky, people will talk about your product and you’ll have organic growth. But in many cases, that sales, that is some kind of consumer distribution strategy. You can’t start with that. I’ve seen a lot, and this is when I had to reset my thinking coming from a growth team joining YC, is you can’t start a startup ethic with a growth team mindset because that is just scalable things all the time. And really what you need to go back to is doing things that don’t scale and unscale your way of thinking about customers. But it’s really useful to have the growth mindset once something is working, right? Once you have thousands of people signing up everything every day, well how do you get to 2,000? Well, that’s probably something that looks more like this thing that the growth team would do or distribution team would do.
I would say everyone has different experiences of this based on their prior experience, right? So if you work for a company that was infinitely successful, then you won’t care so much about this. If you work for Google, you’ll never even think about this because distribution is just the website. But if you work for a really small shitty product, then you think a lot about distribution because that’s natural to you on how you succeed. So I think at the end of the day, talking to customers matters the most. That is what it means to care about a product to me. And then distribution is something that you will definitely invest a lot in once something is working.
Awesome. All right. I have probably a hundred other questions I want to ask along these lines, but I want to make sure we get to another topic which I know is near and dear to your heart, which is climate tech. So my understanding is you’re instrumental in pushing YC to focus on climate tech as a focus area. I believe you led the charge on their initial request for startups I think is the term where you all put out like, “Here’s who we want to fund.” I think you’ve mentioned you funded a couple dozen climate tech companies and the last few batches, is that all generally correct?
Gustaf Alströmer (00:59:24): First, request for startup was actually Sam Altman and a few other folks that was kind of that one who drove that. The second one that we wrote into our actual request for startup, I wrote that one, was carbon removal specifically focused on. And then naturally the people that apply with climate tech ideas get in my reading queue of applications and I read them and I interview them. Not all of them, but many of them. I think today we funded over 130 plus companies that are focused on climate tech in some way or another.
Wow.
Gustaf Alströmer (00:59:54): The trend line is that really ambitious people who want to start companies in this area. Some of them want to start the companies because the climate tech is the number one problem, but they don’t view this as a nonprofit. Now I want to really make this as a distinction. People somehow think that starting a climate tech company is doing good for the world, but it probably doesn’t have a lot more than that. The truth is that the world have decided. Because climate is one of the biggest problems that we’re facing, if not the biggest, we’ve decided that we are going to stop doing the things that we’re doing and we’re going to change our entire energy system and change all the things that we do that emits carbon. And we have just decided, governments have decided this. The question is how it’s going to happen, but this decision has been made.
In that transition, we’re talking about trillions of dollars of money moving from things that cause climate change to things that don’t. The scale of this transition is not something we’ve seen recently. Like software is not that big in comparison. It actually is much smaller than this transition. So I think if you look at something like Tesla, which now has, I don’t know, 700 billion market cap, that’s just one company that currently provides a couple percent of all the cars in the United States, new cars sold. And that is already one of the biggest companies in the world and has now the biggest, richest person in the world. We’ve only seen the beginning of this. The economical motivation be behind the decisions that people are making are just as strong as I want to fix climate change because this is just a really good business. This change have attracted a large set of software founders that you and me know that listen to this podcast that said, “My skills is relevant here. There are a lot of things that I can do. And if not, I can learn those things.”
But most importantly, the skills of working for startups is really, really critical to join this transition. A lot of them have started companies or joining companies. I still get an email every week from some accomplished software engineer who asked me “Which software companies should I work for to fix climate change?” And I’ve gotten those emails for two or three years now. This thing just attracts really, really ambitious people. It’s not stopping. It’s accelerating. I feel lucky to work with so many of these great founders because they are uniquely interesting people.
Common Problems Beyond YC
Lenny: I’ve noticed exactly the same thing of just how many smart, driven, amazing people are like, “I just want to move to a climate tech company. That’s all I’m looking for now.” Just to give you credit, I feel like you are ahead of the curve on the shift that’s started to happen and pushed YC to focus on this really early. I always think like, “Man, I know Gustaf and I feel like Gustaf has made such a massive impact on the investment and focus in startups on climate.” And so I just want to give you huge props for doing that and being so at the forefront of a lot of this.
Gustaf Alströmer (01:02:50): Thank you. I mean, sometimes I’d say that it matters to someone who has the credibility of YC to start accepting these companies. It does matter. I remember when I spoke to Diego from Pachama in 2018 when he was starting Pachama, we were whiteboarding in YC. He was a YC alumni starting a different company. The word climate tech did not exist. People were unsure if investors would fund companies like these. Pachama’s raised $60 million to have, I don’t know, lots of big customers, lots of employees and it’s clearly doing really well. But I think at the time of 2018 it was kind of unknown. One of the reasons it was unknown is we had this previous bubble, clean tech bubble, in 2008, 2009, 2010 that didn’t work out because of a number of specific reasons and investors were just afraid of funding things because they had some scar tissue or scars from this previous thing that happened.
Now that turned out upside down. The number of new investors that are investing in climate tech is as big of a trend as any other trend we’ve seen in the last decade or two decades. There’s just an enormous focus on the investing side. Most recently, me and another guy, David Rusenko, wrote this request for startup, a new updated, very detailed list of… I hope we can post it in the show notes, a very detailed list of ideas or areas where we think it might be worth looking If you want to start a company.
Now, we don’t know what good ideas look like. We don’t know. But we can tell you where all the areas of opportunity exist. We should go and look for good ideas. We wrote this because in response to all these people that come to us and say, “I want to work on climate tech. I don’t have a good idea because I don’t have any specific experience in this stuff.” And then we’re just like, “Don’t work on these three things but go and work on any of these 25 directions.” It already has generate a good response. I think it’ll generate more response. But I think it’s important for YC to tell the world that we look and fund these things. And that’s always been the reasons we had requests for startups, is to let people know that these are things that we actually want to fund.
I actually moderated a panel a couple weeks ago. This organization called the Climate Draft put together PMs that are in climate tech. A lot of the questions were just like, “What kind of background do I need to move into climate tech startup to start a climate tech company?” It’s interesting, every single one again and again just said like, “Your actual regular PM skills is all we need.” There’s a lot of people already at the company that are experts in the science and that’s okay if you have no experience. They just need the business experience, how to operate, how to execute, standard stuff that PMs learn. And so would you agree with that that you don’t need to have this deep background in science and climate to move into the space?
Gustaf Alströmer (01:05:41): Yeah, I would say if you were working on a software company and even some of the hardware companies, that’s probably generally true. Absolutely. It’s much more valuable to have that background than to have this specific domain expertise background. Those are complimentary. But as a PM, having the solid PM background is the more valuable piece I would say. Being a competitive PM, coming from a really good culture of product management, knowing what good looks like, that’s invaluable to some of these companies because in the past they weren’t able to hire these people. So I agree with that 100%.
In terms of founders, I’ve seen everything, right? I’ve seen people having some domain expertise starting a company and really succeeding. I’ve seen people who had no domain expertise and learned everything they need to know. Maybe they partnered up with someone who had a domain expertise and then succeeded. I’ve seen all of it and I actually think that you can succeed in either of these categories. You don’t need the deep expertise. It depends really on all the area you’re in. But someone like Pachama, Diego and Tomas did not have expertise in forests besides the personal experience. They just had a willingness to solve the problem and it really worked out for them.
You mentioned you have this list of areas you’re excited about. I know we’ll share in the show notes, but is there any you want to highlight, just like here’s areas you’re most excited about and want to fund and/or are there companies you want to mention that are super interesting and super cool in the space that people should know about?
Gustaf Alströmer (01:07:04): We wrote the list and we are highlighting companies in each of the categories. I don’t know if I want to highlight any specific categories, but I can talk about some of the things that we’ve funded in the past that has real legs. So here’s how I generally think about climate tech. So we have to decarbonize all the things we do that emits emissions. That means we have to change a bunch of things in the world, change transportation, change energy, change homes, all of these things, or change how we heat homes for example.
And then there is carbon removal. Carbon removal is sort of like, well even if we do all of this stuff really well, it’s probably not going to be enough. And because there’s an opportunity and there’s some evidence to suggests that we can actually remove carbon from atmosphere in some way or another, a lot of companies are also working on this at the same time. I would say we need to do both and they’re not in conflict. We probably are going to need to do both. Well, we certainly need to do the first one.
On the decarbonization side, there’s infinite number of categories of our society where we met a lot of carbon, right? So I’ll give you an example. Shipping is a really big deal. A lot of carbon emissions come from freight ships around the world. That’s not obvious solution how you would solve that because the kind of oil that they run on is really cheap and it’s a very low margin business and they don’t have a whole lot of incentives to change besides what is coming down regulatory. So it’s not a national solution where someone to be a cool, someone will build a test off ships and it just work out. But the two companies to be funded in that area, one of them is Seabound who is building carbon capture and removal for ships.
The other one is Fleetzero who build electrical ships. Electrification is on and again and again and again and again and whenever it’s being applied, turn out to be a more efficient way of doing whatever thing that you were previous doing with the combustion industry. It is almost no maintenance. It’s cheaper to build. The batteries are more expensive, it’s cleaner and it fits the carbon coal you have. There’s just a bunch of benefits there, but there has limitations. Usually the limitations on electrification has to do with batteries. It’s like how far can you go? Now that category is what I call the… Which is a very important kind of critical one, which is the carbon accounting and sort of the recommendation systems that help big company account for the carbon that they have and they are giving some recommendations of what you do.
So I’ll give you three examples. We funded Unravel Carbon, which is carbon counting software in Singapore, focusing on Asia, probably the leading one there. There’s company called Carbon Chain, which is focused specifically on supply chain and shipping and raw materials, stuff like that out of UK. And then there’s ANAI here in the Bay area. Who knows how this market is going to play out, but this market has carbon accounting customer demand right now, right? So all the large companies of the world have other either promised the government, promised their shareholders or promised the public, or maybe even the employees, they go into decarbonize. They don’t always have an idea how to do it. These software platforms is like the plug and play “This is how you do it.”
And then I’ll give you two examples of things you can go into if you don’t have any specific domain expertise and just a good software engineer. There’s a company called Enode. They are basically building Plaid for EV chargers and Plaid for home energy system. So if we imagine that the future of all homes or future of all charging of EVs is going to be a bunch of energy appliances that are run by small computers, they’re all wifi connected, you can connect to them and do things, tell them to turn on, turn off, turn on when it’s cheap, turn off when it’s whatever, all these different things that are valuable for the energy grid. Then you need a software platform to connect with all of them. And that’s what Enode has been building.
Another related company is called Static. Static is the Airbnb for EV charging in India. The reason that you need something like that is you don’t have Tesla charging. You don’t really have public charting in general. People don’t have outlets in their garage and they don’t have garages. So you need to build a new bottom up EV charging system or platform, and that’s what Static has been doing. They’re actually building out public charging infrastructure as well, but they have their own app. So if you use a Static app, they’ll direct you to all the Static chargers. I believe that they’re the biggest or the fastest growing EV charging network in India, which is the second-biggest country, if not the biggest country in the world right now.
So the potential of these ideas, even that they’re doing well now is just infinite, such an enormous market. If you succeed in one of these things, I don’t think we are going to have as many gas stations as we have today and different networks. We’re not going to have the same in EV charging. It’s going to be a lot more consolidated around the use experience of the end user and the app they open to do this stuff. So I’m pretty convinced that there’s real big opportunities for software entrepreneurs to figure this out. There’s some companies in the current batch that are focused on this too.
The final one I would mention is Heart Aerospace. We have a Heart Aerospace and the Right Electric and a few others focused on aviation. Aviation is another big difficult to decarbonize. Heart and Right are focusing on battery electric planes. So they’re basically making commercial airplanes that fly on batteries and flying electric motors and it’s incredible to see.
External Validation vs. Product-Market Fit
Lenny: What a killer list. We’re definitely going to include links to all these companies in the show notes. Something I was thinking about is, so one narrative violation you mentioned is that there’s actually money to be made in climate tech. It’s not impact-oriented market anymore. It might be worth chatting about why that happened, but the question I want to get to is also things are going well. A lot of progress is being made. People see climate change and it’s like we’re dead, it’s game over. But it feels like battery prices are coming down, solar’s coming down, wind powers ramping up, all these startups are investing. So it’d be fun to just hear what’s going well and maybe what is there to be optimistic about, but then also, “Okay, yeah, things are going well, but there’s still things that are not going so great and where we need to double down.”
Gustaf Alströmer (01:13:10): Two specific things that went well in the last say 12 or 24 months. First one was politics. So in the United States we got the IRA, which is like it’s called the Inflation Reduction Act. It makes sense because shift into greener energy is going to actually reduce inflation because it reduces energy costs. But it’s really a climate bill, right? It really is a bill that is focusing on onshoring, a lot of supply chain for the green economy and incentivizing a lot of this change that we just talked about. Whether it’s carbon removal or home energy or home heating, whatever it might be, this bill addresses all of it and is massive. So that’s one really good news. Politics didn’t have a lot of good news in the US for a long time on this. Maybe not ever actually.
The second good news, and it’s such a good news that Europe is now trying to conquer. They’re not trying to counter the IRA with their bill because they’re seeing some of the battery companies saying, “Well, I’ll actually going to build the next factor in US, not Europe anymore. I changed my mind.”
Oh, wow.
Gustaf Alströmer (01:14:05): So Europe now has to counter with their incentives as well. The second good news is corporations are now customers. So maybe three or four years ago you went to a Fortune 100 company and you’re like, “Hey, do you want to buy my XYZ decarbonation solution?” What it’s like? The software platform or EVs or whatever it might be. They’re like, “Well, talk to this person on this floor. Maybe they can help you.” And this person was not really empowered to make decisions. That has changed. Now they’re like, “Actually, we promised our shareholders to reduce emissions by 2% every year and we also promised the government and we promised whatever publicly to do that. So we got to do that.” They’re like, “Where do we start? What’s the first 2% that we got to decarbonize? Maybe that starts with energy. Oh, we’ll change our energy providers.” But they are now showing up as customers, not just with LOIs but paying actual for contracts, right? Doing investments in these companies because they’ve all see the future and they don’t want to be behind.
There’s financials motivations for this. They want to get access to capital that has some strings attached to some of these things, but they don’t want to fall behind. And then they don’t want to be the Toyota to Tesla, where Toyota said, “We are not going to do battery electric.” It’s just like they’re still saying that sometimes and everybody else is like, “Tesla is the one we got to copy because that’s the one that’s winning.” All these corporations are really afraid of being the Toyota. They’re really afraid of being the last one who’s not changing and then the world will move past them and then they’re going to die. So I think the motivation here is intrinsically survival and it’s really about sort of adopting this because this is where the world is going.
I think these are the two best news. The thing that I think what… We also wrote about this in the request for startups. This is not a thing where you can convince everybody to just agree with you. And even if you did, people wouldn’t know what to do. So you have to view this as an economical opportunity and say… We can’t convince everybody that this is going to be the thing that’s going to happen. It doesn’t actually matter if you convince everybody. What matters is that sufficient amount of corporations are convinced that they change their habits. And then you can sell the things you’re building to them.
As sort of founder, just focus on your customers and focus on B2B. That’s what most people I recommend to do here because that’s where most of the change is going to happen. That’s why I’m really optimistic about these startups and these founders. What they’re doing is, in my opinion, more impactful than someone running a campaign trying to convince some other people that this is a big problem. Even when people know that climate change is problem, they don’t know exactly what to do about it. But the startup founders, they know.
Overcoming Customer Conversation Fear
Lenny: You touched on this, but it feels like one of the biggest shifts is capitalism is kicked in and is now leaning into climate tech startups and that’s-
Gustaf Alströmer (01:16:46): Yes. Absolutely. Absolutely.
… making a big dent. Well, with that, we’ve reached the final part of our chat, which is the very exciting lightning round. I’ve got six questions for you. Are you ready?
Gustaf Alströmer (01:16:58): Yeah.
What are two or three books that you recommend most to other people?
Gustaf Alströmer (01:17:04): The first one I recommend, I think I have it here. Yeah, this one. It’s called The 100% Solution. It’s written by Solomon Goldstein-Rose. It’s for people who think climate change is a problem but don’t know what to do about it, or they’re just kind of in despair or think they’re like, “Ah, everyone are going to die,” right? There are some books written where the outcome of the book is like, “We’re all going to die,” but the truth is that we’re not all going to die. This book is trying to cover the 100% of all the solutions in detail, kind of much more detailed version of the request of Sharp that we wrote. It gets you freely optimistic. And I give that to anybody who’s cared about climate change because it really lays out this from a very optimistic way of looking at the world. And that’s why I recommend that book more than almost anything else. That’s probably my number one book.
Amazing. I love that if just a one book, here’s the book you got to read. I like that approach. What’s a favorite recent movie or TV show that you’ve really enjoyed?
Gustaf Alströmer (01:18:10): Oh, I watched so much. I don’t know. I love Emily in Paris on Netflix. I think I have TV serves different purpose for me these days. It’s just like entertainment.
Yeah, I get that.
Gustaf Alströmer (01:18:24): But what else movie do I watch? We watch the Everything All at Once. I thought that was a really good movie. That was-
Yeah, it might win Best Picture.
Gustaf Alströmer (01:18:32): Yeah.
We have a drinking game here. People say White Lotus, we drink. And so you did not, that’s probably for the best. Favorite interview question that you like to ask YC founders when you’re interviewing them?
Gustaf Alströmer (01:18:43): What have you done since you applied to YC on your product? What are specific things that you’ve accomplished since you applied? Because that usually is a month or two month months ago.
That’s awesome. It connects so much with what you said earlier.
Gustaf Alströmer (01:18:55): I hope the answer is like, “Here are all the things that we did.”
Versus we just prepared for this interview.
Gustaf Alströmer (01:19:01): Exactly. Exactly.
Most out there wild startup you have funded?
Gustaf Alströmer (01:19:07): I think I would say when I stepped onto the hangar floor of Heart Aerospace. I can send you a photo. Literally, I am looking at an airplane that’s being made and I’m like there’s no SaaS company’s office you can walk into and you just open your mouth and you’re like, “What the hell is this?” There are a few of those companies that are space companies or airspace companies or something like that where it’s just a different feeling that you fund them and you can touch it. I have a lot of appreciation for things like that now because they’re much harder to do, but when you succeed, they’re much more tangible and you can be like, “I have a tiny little piece in this space rocket or this airplane that we funded or this satellite above us.” I really think that that’s in some way a strong legacy compared to some other things that exist and just replace other softwares. And all these are better businesses, but there are strong legacies.
What’s a pro tip for applying to YC?
Gustaf Alströmer (01:20:09): Pro tip. Number one thing is go to YouTube and type in like… I think there’s a video that we’ve recorded which is about how you succeed with your application [inaudible 01:20:18]. It’s an hour long video that gives you all the pro tips on how to do it. We told people in advance, “Once you’ve watched that video, then see if you know anybody who’ve done YC and then reach out to them and maybe ask them if YC is right for you, but also ask them what’s important for you to, as you kind of approaching applying to YC, writing the application, during the interview, what were the things that matter?” Those are probably the two things I would do.
Final question, what’s one pro tip for visiting Sweden?
Gustaf Alströmer (01:20:49): First of all, you should visit in the summer. It’s a really good time to be there. It’s a very different country in the winter. Try to go outside the cities into the nature and then prepare yourself for Swedes not all being Americans. They’re a little bit more colder and have a little bit more distance to you and they don’t randomly talk to you like I’ve learned to do here in America. I think you just have to go along with a little bit different of a vibe than you have here in the US. Most people actually love it. Most people who have just been, they love it, but most of them go in the summer.
This reminds me, I wanted to close it, but there’s a tweet once about how in Sweden when you go to someone’s house, they don’t feed you. It’s not expected that you will have food. You have to bring your own food. Is that true? And what’s that about?
Gustaf Alströmer (01:21:35): It’s absolutely true. I actually gave an unconference talk about this topic. The unconference talk was all of the strange things to Swedish people do and why. If i would summarize it, yes, we do that. I actually experienced that. I went to a friend’s house and they had dinner and I waited in my friend’s room while they had dinner. That was just normal. And why did that happen? I think there’s a strong sense of individual responsibility in Sweden, which kind of reaches over to unfriendliness, [inaudible 01:22:10] from an American or foreign lens because this is so crazy. But in Sweden it’s just like, “Well, you take care of your kids. I’ll take care of my kids.” And it’s not really a question.
I think that a lot of the motivations of why Swedes are strange, one of them is we don’t want to be indebted to someone else. So we never want to feel like… Which is why you wouldn’t… For example, if you go to a bar in Sweden, you don’t buy a round, you buy your own beer because maybe you have to figure out the money at the end of the day, things like that. I think it’s just actually quite individualistic society, but it’s individualistic with heart I would say. There’s a warmth to it, but it will definitely be appeared strange to people who don’t really understand this. They think people are cold and they’re just like they don’t understand that there’s actually a heart behind this stuff.
Discovering Real Pain Points
Lenny: That sounds really smart, to be honest, the system. I would be into it, but I can see how people are very confused. Gustaf, I can’t thank you enough for doing this. This was incredible. I know that people listening to this are going to leave informed, inspired, motivated, hopefully motivated to move faster and make more progress. Two final questions. Where can folks find you online if they want to learn more or ask you may be follow up questions? And two, how can listeners be useful to you?
Gustaf Alströmer (01:23:27): I tweet sometimes on twitter.com/gustaf. The most useful things that I put out is probably on the YC’s YouTube channel. So I record a couple videos on growth, on sales, on how to talk to customers. I actually send them to people all day long because the Start School videos that we made are a lot of preparation went into it and it answers most of the questions that people have. So watch those first, I would say. But yeah, sometimes I tweet other stuff that people can follow. That’s fine. How can people be useful to me? I love hearing feedback from founders, what they’re working on. I want to hear kind of questions they have about their companies. But I want to also really emphasize that to apply to YC, you don’t need to know any of us. You don’t need to reach out to us. It doesn’t make any specific difference.
The principles in YC is that you should be able to become an insider in YC in Silicon Valley without knowing anybody. That’s kind of what the application process is about. So feel free to reach out to us if you have questions, but don’t feel like that’s required to be a good YC applicant. It’s actually the opposite in that we read and treat all the applications equally. Thank you so much for listening to this podcast. I mean, it made me happy you made all the way to the end.
Yeah, extra credit for listening to the end. I also just want to say while you’re saying that, it feels like YC is such a good force for the world. It just enables so much innovation and progress. And if technology is what drives the world forward, IC is so at the center of a lot of that. So just huge props to what YC is doing and what you’re doing, Gustaf.
Gustaf Alströmer (01:25:02): We feel a lot of responsibility towards that. That’s for sure.
All right, I’ll let you go. Again, Gustaf, thank you for doing this.
Gustaf Alströmer (01:25:09): Thank you so much.
Thank you so much for listening. If you found this valuable, you can subscribe to the show on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, or your favorite podcast app. Also, please consider giving us a rating or leaving a review as that really helps other listeners find the podcast. You can find all past episodes or learn more about the show at lennyspodcast.com. See you in the next episode.
Glossary
| English | 中文 |
|---|---|
| alumni | 前同事/校友 |
| angel investor | 天使投资人 |
| batch | 批次 |
| carbon removal | 碳移除 |
| climate tech | 气候科技 |
| co-founder matching | co-founder matching |
| contracting firm | 外包公司 |
| early adopters | 早期采用者 |
| Elad Gill | Elad Gill |
| external validation | 外部验证 |
| Flow | Flow(创始人朋友的名字) |
| Group Office Hours | Group Office Hours |
| group partner | 合伙人 |
| Heart Aerospace | Heart Aerospace(瑞典电动飞机制造商) |
| Jessica | Jessica(指 Jessica Livingston,YC 联合创始人) |
| make things people want | 做出人们想要的东西 |
| niche market | 利基市场 |
| Office Hour | Office Hour |
| organic growth | 有机增长 |
| outlier | 异常值 |
| Paul | Paul(指 Paul Graham,YC 联合创始人) |
| PM (product manager) | 产品经理 |
| product market fit | 产品市场匹配 |
| Request for Startups | Request for Startups(YC 发布的一种征集特定领域创业项目的号召) |
| scalable | 可规模化的 |
| seed stage | 种子阶段 |
| Solomon Goldstein-Rose | Solomon Goldstein-Rose(美国气候政策作者) |
| spec | 规格说明 |
| Startup School | Startup School(YC 的创业课程,保持原文) |
| Steve Jobs | Steve Jobs |
| technical co-founder | 技术联合创始人 |
| The 100% Solution | The 100% Solution(书名,保持原文) |
| unconference talk | 非正式会议演讲 |
| weekly growth rate | 周增长率 |
Reformatted by reformat_english.py
从服务 600+ 家 YC 创业公司中学到的经验 | Gustaf Alströmer(Y Combinator, Airbnb)
访谈实录
Gustaf Alströmer: 如果我深究公司失败的原因,其实很简单。就是他们不跟用户交流,这意味着他们找不到产品市场匹配(product market fit)。如果找不到产品市场匹配,其他一切都不重要了。人们犯的错误,归根结底都是关于这件事——跟客户交流,了解你正在构建的东西是否真的有用。YC Slack 的标语是”做出人们想要的东西”(make things people want),这句话至今仍然成立,也将永远成立。
Lenny: 欢迎来到 Lenny’s Podcast,在这里我采访世界级的产品领导者和增长专家,从他们打造和增长当今最成功产品的宝贵经验中学习。今天的嘉宾是 Gustaf Alströmer。Gustaf 是 Y Combinator 的合伙人,在那里已经工作了将近六年。在此之前,Gustaf 在 Airbnb 工作了四年多,他创建了最初的 Airbnb 增长团队,我也非常幸运地能与他共事多年。Gustaf 也是 YC 日益重视气候科技(climate tech)的核心推动者之一,在我看来,在越来越多的投资和人才涌入气候科技这一趋势中,他是产生深远影响的少数人之一。
我们深入讨论了气候科技领域正在发生什么、为什么最近变化如此之大、有什么新东西令人兴奋,以及如果你希望进入这个领域该如何思考。我们还深入探讨了 Gustaf 在 YC 期间与超过 600 家创业公司合作的经验。我们聊到了早期创业公司和创始人最常犯的错误是什么、YC 合伙人最常给创始人的建议是什么、成功创始人最常见的特质是什么、拥有技术联合创始人(technical co-founder)的重要性及其原因,还有很多其他话题。我保证你听完这期节目会变得更聪明、更有启发。我迫不及待想让你听到这些内容了。话不多说,在短暂的赞助商广告之后,为你请出 Gustaf Alströmer。
(广告部分已跳过)
Lenny: Gustaf,欢迎来到播客。
Gustaf Alströmer: 谢谢你,Lenny。说真的,很高兴见到你。很期待和你的对话。
Airbnb 的特殊之处
Lenny: 自从我们预约了这次访谈,我就一直期待着这次对话。我们在 Airbnb 共事了很多年。我真的很幸运能在你去 YC 追求更大的事业之前和你一起工作。说到 Airbnb,你曾经发过一条推文,谈到那段经历对你来说有多特别,更有意思的是,很多离开 Airbnb 的人再也找不到像那样特别的地方了,那个标杆被设得太高了。所以我的第一个问题是,你觉得是什么让 Airbnb 如此特别?为什么它对你和其他人来说都是一段如此重要的经历?更重要的是,你从那段经历中学到了什么,并带到现在你合作的创业公司中?
Gustaf Alströmer: 是啊,说来好笑。今年再过几个月,距离你和我在 Airbnb 共事就整整十年了。
Lenny: 哇。
Gustaf Alströmer: 那是 2012 年。我发那条推文的原因是,我在离开 Airbnb 之后遇到的每个人那里都问了这个问题,因为我有这样一种体验——至少到那时为止,在那样一个团队中工作是我职业生涯的高光时刻。我问每个人:“你有没有找到更好的?“除了可能一两个人之外,我没听到任何人说他们找到了更好的。他们都深深怀念那段时光。我思考了很久为什么会是这样,但我觉得 Airbnb 不像一份正常的工作。它更像是一群朋友试图一起做点什么,而且我们确实是朋友。至少在刚开始的时候,这感觉不像是一份工作。它更像一个持续推进的项目,一群了不起的人聚在一起。我认为最终我们成功构建了两样东西——一家真正成功的公司,这要感谢 Joe、Nate 和 Brian 创办了它。没有他们,就没有什么可构建的。
我觉得人们不太喜欢用”家人”这个词,但我的感受就是那样,因为当我去见那个团队的前 Airbnb 同事时,我们之间有一种非常特殊的纽带,那种感觉更像是亲密的社交关系,而不是同事关系。我问自己为什么会这样。我能给出的最好的答案大概是我们招进了一种特别类型的人。我们的背景非常多元,很多人是曾经的创业者。在早期,我们当中没有多少人是科技行业出身的那种职业经理人,确实不多。
我认为我们设定了很高的标准。我刚加入的时候,大概只有五到七个产品经理,三十个左右的工程师,你比我早一点加入。那些人树立了后来我们招人的标准和标杆。我觉得这种叙事花了很长时间才被改变。我的意思是,最终你不得不录用那些只有大公司职业经历的人,但我记得我们在很长很长一段时间里都没有这么做。当我最近重新读我的告别信时,那里面的文字至今对我仍然意义深远。它就像是在反思这些事情——建立一家成功的伟大公司,成为这样一个由亲密朋友组成的”家族”的一部分。
招聘是关键
Lenny: 所以听起来,如果要你概括 Airbnb 做对了什么,招聘似乎是最核心的部分——创始人在招聘时对人才类型非常明确、非常讲究。
Gustaf Alströmer: 毫无疑问。
Lenny: 关于招聘这块,你有什么建议可以给创始人的吗?大家都知道招人要谨慎,前10个人会长期影响公司文化。但抛开这些泛泛之谈,对于第一批招聘应该看重什么,你有什么总结性的建议吗?
Gustaf Alströmer: 这个问题不太好回答,因为我很想说我们所做的一切都是促成最终结果的原因,但现实并非如此。我们做的有些事情确实有效,有些则没有。我们很难真正厘清哪些是有效的、哪些不是。不过我们可以谈谈我们做了什么。首先,我们确保招来的人是真的非常兴奋能来到这里的——他们想打造 Airbnb,对在 Airbnb 工作充满热情。这是最重要的。当然,候选人也会有其他公司的 offer,但我认为你可以从这些 offer 的比较中看出他们到底是不是真心想来。这大概是第一点。
第二点,我认为是要真正理解在那里的人的内在动机,就是那种更深层的”你为什么在这里?“我们做了一个叫”文化面试”的做法,创始人应该写过相关内容,网上可能也能找到。我们在早期做了大量文化面试,试图确保招到的人与我们的核心价值观一致,并且真的对在 Airbnb 工作充满热情。最后一点,我不太清楚这是怎么发生的,但我们确实选择了背景多元的人。大多数初创公司的大多数产品经理不会是前创始人,但 Airbnb 的前10到12、15位产品经理中,很多确实如此。我们很多人都是前创始人。我认为这对你们如何做决策、如何启动工作产生了很大的影响。
实际上我在 Airbnb 的创始人身上经常看到这一点。他们非常重视在 YC 的那段时光,并且尝试在 Airbnb 内部多次复刻 YC 的做法——比如举办 demo day,以及让新产品完全独立于其他团队,从做那些不可扩展的事情开始,然后与客户对话。所以我认为那段经历对他们影响很大。但很难说就是这两件事,去照做就行了。实际上很难说”这在 Airbnb 行得通,所以对你也行得通”。我觉得这是一个非常棘手的问题。
最后我想说的是,Airbnb 从早期就有一个非常了不起的商业模式、一个非常了不起的生意,很难失败。我的意思是,公司层面很难失败。公司内部的具体项目可以失败,但公司本身还是会成功。我觉得我们所有人都感受到了这一点。很多公司无法像 Airbnb 早期那样承担风险,因为他们没有那种显而易见的优秀基础。
Lenny: 最后这点非常有意思——你可以拥有最出色的文化、招到最优秀的人才,但如果公司本身没有成功,人们回顾时不会说”哇,那是一段了不起的经历,只是我们失败了”。
Gustaf Alströmer: 是的。
在 YC 与 600 家公司合作的经验
Lenny: 这很有意思。你提到了 YC,这恰好引出我想重点聊的话题。你提到你目前已经和超过 600 家公司合作过,这个数字太惊人了。感觉你现在已经可以得出一些统计学上显著的结论,知道什么有效、什么无效。所以我准备了很多关于你在 YC 工作以及与这些公司合作经历的问题。第一个问题是,我想起 Elad Gill 曾经发过的一条推文,他也就此写过一篇文章。Elad Gill 是一位传奇的天使投资人(angel investor)。他说,创办公司是一种绝望之举——你要么急于改变自己的职业轨迹,要么急于赚一大笔钱,要么急于实现某种使命,或者打造某个你迫切需要它存在的产品。我很好奇你是否认同这种说法,然后我还有一个后续问题。
Gustaf Alströmer: 说实话我之前没听过这句话。不过你知道我这个人比较乐观,我想这可能会影响我对这个问题的看法。但我觉得”绝望”听起来像是从一个负面的起点出发的。我实际上认为大多数人创办公司是从一个积极的起点出发的。不过关于动机,我同意他说的,成功的创始人的动机确实可以非常多元。
我们在一次早期的 Group Office Hours 中确实问过这个问题。我们问他们:“你为什么要做这件事?“我们不想听到”我发现了一个利基市场(niche market)“这样的答案。那不是”为什么”。真正的”为什么”是——当你做了四年、钱花光了、一切都在崩塌的时候,你为什么还会来上班、还会加班到很晚?利基市场不是那个时候的答案。答案必须更深。我们发现人们创办公司的动机差异很大。有些人就是想解决某个他们充满热情去攻克的技术问题。有些人想在别人面前或向自己证明自己。有些人有非常宏大的、重要的改变世界的动机,他们会说”我想让每个人都有水喝”或者”我想解决气候变化”或者”我想让出版民主化”。你可以想象出任何数量的大想法。还有些人就是想创办一家大公司,想获得成功。
根据我的经验,你的动机是什么并不重要。这些动机之间听起来好像有些比其他的更好,但在我看来并非如此。动机会随着时间的推移而变化,最终变成”经营这件事”本身。一旦公司变大了,你很难每天都在想最初是为什么开始的,因为动力就变成了——这件事可能很有趣,即使做的是无聊的事情,因为建立一个大东西本身就是有趣的。不是每件事都必须光鲜亮丽、宏大壮观,因为有很多”无聊的”想法,但经营公司这件事本身最终就成了动力。
创始人的动机:筛选还是发现?
Lenny: 这很有意思。听起来你在面试时最看重的要点之一,就是这种打造公司的驱动力的强度和持久性。是这个意思吗?
Gustaf Alströmer: 其实在面试中筛选动机是相当困难的。这种 Office Hour 问题的目的是揭示每个人为什么在这里,揭示人们在这里的原因的多样性,有时甚至揭示一个创始人和他的联合创始人之间各自为什么做这件事。他们可能从来没谈过这个。令人惊讶的是,创始人之间往往确实没有讨论过彼此为什么要做这件事。而知道一个人为什么在这里,对解决冲突非常有帮助,对理解某个人某天为什么会出现也很有帮助。所以这不是我们筛选的内容,更多是我们帮助创始人之间发现这一点,真正了解自己。我已经接受了创办公司的动机是极其多样的这个事实。
Lenny: 当你看到某个创始人的动机可能不够持久,或者基于其他原因——毕竟你知道创办公司最终会有多难——你会劝阻他们不要创办公司吗?
创办公司的理由
Gustaf Alströmer: 好问题。我想说,有时候如果一个人没有动机,或者不知道自己为什么要做这件事,只是因为他读到这应该是职业生涯中自然而然的一步所以才去做。那么,一个不该创办公司的好理由就是把它当作职业发展的一步。它不是。因为如果成功了,它将是你整个职业生涯,很可能长达十年。如果没成功,那也不是人们一般渴望去经历的事情——不成功的创业公司。所以我认为有些人创办公司只是想把它写进简历,那他们就没有理解创业公司是什么,也不理解为什么要做这件事。
有时候你可以筛选出来、搞清楚这一点,但有时候人们在起步时甚至不知道自己为什么要创办公司,然后在过程中慢慢搞清楚。这也是可以的。我不想劝阻那些只是为了创业而不太清楚为什么而创业的人。他们可能在过程中逐渐找到真正的动机,或者发现这件事真的很有趣。
我认为,如果一个人生活中有太多比创业更重要的事情——比如财务压力、家庭压力或关系压力,而这些都会压过创业这件事——那我会劝他三思,因为创业很难,比普通工作难得多。而且无论成功还是失败都一样难,对吧?没有中间状态说”哦,我的公司发展得不错,我可以放松一下了。“这也不成立。所以我不太劝人也不太鼓励人,我只是希望他们掌握所有信息。
YC Office Hours 里发生了什么
Lenny: 你提到了 YC Office Hours,我正好有个相关的问题。我最近在做一篇内容,采访了一批发展非常好的 B2B 公司创始人,问了他们几个问题,比如”你的想法是怎么来的?""最初几个客户是怎么找到的?“令人震惊的是,其中很多人提到 YC Office Hours 里的一次对话是他们走上当前轨道最关键的转折点。我很好奇这些 Office Hours 里到底发生了什么?你给出的最常见的建议是什么?或者说最令人意外的建议是什么?好让大家能窥见这些对话的一角。
Gustaf Alströmer: 在 YC,我们有两种常见的 Office Hours。一种是常规 Office Hours,通常是一对一,基本上就是创始人和我,或者我加上另一位合伙人对谈。在整个项目期间每周或每两周一次。项目结束后也会持续定期进行。另一种是 Group Office Hours,是你和其他六七家创业公司一起和我们交流。两者的目的稍有不同。常规 Office Hour 的目标,我总会问一个问题:“什么在拖慢你的速度?我们不想听进展汇报,不想听战略问题。我们想了解什么在拖慢你,什么在阻碍你走得更快的步伐。你通常应该有一个具体的目标。”
我觉得这个”什么在拖慢你”的问题能把优先级理清楚。创业公司能做的事情有限,在那个阶段真正重要的事情也有限。通过问这个问题,我们可以开始深挖:“好的,目标是什么?哪些事情在推动你朝那个目标前进?哪些事情在拖慢你朝那个目标前进?“通常创始人自己并不知道什么在拖慢他们,所以通过对话和我们追问,实际上会帮助我们或他们自己发现到底是什么在拖慢他们。
Group Office Hour 则有些不同,它有几个不同的目的。其中一个,回想 Paul 和 Jessica 创办 YC 的初衷——这一点对他们来说也是意外——创办公司是非常孤独的。你不能靠在员工身上说”嘿,我今天作为创始人感觉很糟糕,一切都完蛋了”。员工不会很好地接受这些。你可能转向投资人倾诉,但他们也不总是有空。但你可以依靠的是其他创始人,因为他们都处于同样的境地。就像你问一个创始人”进展怎么样?“,对他们来说回答这个问题情绪波动很大,因为从来都不会一帆风顺,对吧?从来不会有人说”哦,一切都棒极了。“他们嘴上可能这么说,但所有创始人都心知肚明,当他们四目相对的时候,那不是真正的答案。
创始人脑子里有无穷无尽的问题在同时思考,所以他们对”进展怎么样?“这个问题近乎过敏。但 YC 开始的时候,我们把所有创始人放在一个组里、一个房间里,他们开始了解到所有创始人、所有公司都各有各的问题,对吧?他们都在面对那些巨大的难题,听到”进展怎么样?“这个问题时都同样感到焦虑。仅仅是听其他创始人讲述自己的问题,也许还能帮忙解决问题,这对你自己来说也是一种很好的方式——既能获得动力,又能看到其他公司遇到类似问题时是怎么解决的。现在由于 YC 的规模,我们会把在相同领域或面临相同问题的公司分到同一组。
Group Office Hours 做得好的第二件事是问责制,对吧?我们会问你:“你的目标是什么?过去两周的目标是什么?你达到了吗?“这就给了创始人一种问责感,因为创始人是有竞争心的。他们不想丢脸。他们不想两周后回来说”什么都没成功”,或者至少是”我们什么也没学到。“他们想学到东西、取得进展,不管是正向还是负向的。
对我来说,Group Office Hours 是最神奇的时刻,因为它真正创造了这段极其高强度的三四个月时间。创始人经常之后回来对我们说”嘿,我们想再来一次。我们没有这样高强度、高产的时期了。我们有其他项目,但没有完全复刻那种体验的。“但我们确实鼓励创始人在 YC 之后继续 Group Office Hours。很多人这样做了,很多人自发地以这种小组形式持续聚会多年,彼此问同样的问题,互相问责、互相学习、互相依靠。我觉得这一点以前不为人知,某种程度上整个世界之前都不知道——创办公司是极其孤独的,你有各种各样的焦虑。仅仅是和面临同样问题的人交谈,就是你能做的最好的事情之一。
创业者之间的孤独
Lenny: 你说到这里让我想到很多事情。其中一个是我曾经也创过业,我们在一个共享办公空间工作。我们加入共享办公空间是因为想”哦,我们会遇到其他创始人,会很有社交感,不会孤单。“但结果发现每个人都埋头苦干,戴着耳机,“我什么时间都没有,我只需要工作。“这就是那个体验的一个缩影——即使你身边都是创始人,也没有人有时间做任何事,他们只是在工作。
Gustaf Alströmer: 你得刻意安排,强制执行,把笔记本电脑和手机都放在地上,就拿着笔和纸坐在那里。就得这样才行。我们尽量在 Zoom 上模拟这种体验,但说实话,最好的体验还是线下——在 Mountain View 围坐一圈,没有电脑,每个人都在认真听彼此说话。那是最棒的体验。对,那也是我记忆中 YC 最有意义的部分之一。我自己做 YC 的时候还没有这个,但现在每个人都有了。
Lenny: 这让我想到另一件事——有人曾经在推特上说过,“永远不要问创始人’你怎么样’或者’进展如何’。这只会制造各种焦虑,因为从来没有什么事情是一切顺利的。”
Gustaf Alströmer: 千万别问。大家看着彼此的眼神,就知道这个问题让所有人都不舒服。
Lenny: 太真实了。那我来总结一下你提到的那些问题——在个别 Office Hours 里你问的是”什么在阻碍你”。那在 Group Office Hours 的场景下,你再重复一下你问的问题是什么?
Gustaf Alströmer: 你接下来两周的目标是什么,过去两周的目标是什么,你达标了吗?如果没有达标,是什么阻碍了你达标?非常简单。但它能揭示很多问题,而其他创始人恰好也在经历同样的问题。仅仅通过谈论那些阻碍你的事情,或者那些帮你达成目标的事情,就能为围坐一圈的其他七家公司发现一些实质性的东西。
早期创业最常见的错误
Lenny: 如果稍微退后一步,回顾一下你合作过的那些创业公司,你会说早期创业公司最常犯的错误有哪些?
Gustaf Alströmer: 太多了。我最早了解创业,其实就是通过在 Google 上搜索这个问题,然后看到 Paul Graham 的文章,因为他一直在写——
Lenny: 哇。
Gustaf Alströmer: 我自己也写过很多关于这个话题的文章,因为实在是太常见了。这个话题可以一直讲下去。但如果拿我最近在 YC 的经历来说,我认为创业公司失败,第一,是因为他们不跟客户交谈。如果你不跟客户或用户交谈,你其实不知道什么才是重要的。如果你不知道什么重要,那你建什么都无所谓,你脑子里有什么想法也无所谓——如果你不知道自己到底需要建什么,也没有跟客户验证过。很多失败就根源于此。在 YC 早期——或者说项目的前半段——我们花大量时间推动和追问创始人:“跟我们讲讲你跟客户的对话。你学到了什么?能不能给我们看看那些机构?“或者各种问题:“他们在用什么软件?在为什么付费?有什么问题?他们怎么描述那个问题的严重程度?“这就是我们在 YC 早期花大量时间做的事情。
不敢跟客户交谈
在那之后,我想说最常见的错误之一……我说的不是一般意义上的创业公司,我说的是 YC 内部。我在 YC 里看到的第二大常见问题是,人们就是害怕跟客户交谈。他们就是不够努力去接触客户。我觉得这是因为,技术背景的人往往认为软件就是一切的解决方案。但你真正需要做的是跟人交谈——不管是通过 Zoom、电话,还是面对面更好。人们就是害怕这样做,害怕被拒绝。这很常见,那些想做好的产品的人就是非常害怕别人说”不”。
问题在于——任何加入 YC 之前没做过销售的人,进来后都会意识到这一点——如果你看世界上平均的客户群体,90% 不是早期采用者(early adopters)。不管你有什么又新又酷的东西,他们就是不感兴趣。他们在工作中没有被激励去冒险尝试新东西,他们被激励的是不冒险、继续做手上的事。那 10% 才是早期采用者,才是你真正要触达的人。但这就意味着你得接触十个人才能找到一个。然后你还得说服那一个人跟你通电话或视频通话。这需要付出努力,而且需要付出很多努力。我觉得很多人没有想到这一点。这对销售人员来说是常识、基础的东西,但从未做过销售的创始人会对这些比例和实际操作中的含义感到惊讶。
YC 之外更普遍的问题
如果我从更广泛的角度想——刚才这两点是我在 YC 内部经历到的——但在 YC 之外更普遍地看,我认为最常见的两个问题,一个是跟上面一样的不跟客户交谈,另一个是没有技术能力、不知道建立一家成功的科技公司需要什么。这意味着要有技术创始人,意味着要能做出第一个原型。我们在 YC 面试时会对此进行筛选,我们不会接收大量不知道如何自己做出第一个原型的团队,因为我们知道这是一个非常常见的失败模式。
我可以一直说下去,但说实话,如果我深挖公司失败的根本原因,其实很简单——就是不跟用户交谈,这就意味着找不到产品市场匹配。如果找不到产品市场匹配,其他一切都不重要。人们犯的错误归根到底都是围绕这一点——就是跟客户交谈,确认你在做的东西真的有用。YC Slack 的签名是”做出人们想要的东西”,这一点至今仍然成立,而且永远成立。
外部验证 ≠ 产品市场匹配
Lenny: 这真的很有意思,也是很好的建议。有趣的是……”跟客户交谈”,大家一直都听到这句话。他们会说,“我们当然会跟客户交谈,那还用说。“但你的经验是,他们知道这一点,但就是不去做,大概是因为害怕。也可能是因为他们觉得自己已经知道需要做什么了,觉得”嗯,我们没问题”。
Gustaf Alströmer: 而且你有各种验证信号,对吧?人们会用这些东西来验证自己——即使不跟客户交谈,“YC 为什么录取了我?这个投资人投了我。那个投资人说我很棒,“blah blah blah。所有这些不同的验证,你会跟产品市场匹配搞混。我们不得不在 YC 第一天就提醒所有人:“你们都还没有产品市场匹配,因为你们大概率就没有。“几乎没有人有。因为人们把这些外部验证跟真正最重要的东西搞混了——那就是跟客户交谈,了解什么才是重要的。这就是一个不断重复出现的问题。有些人最终做得很好。而真正擅长这件事,正是成功创业公司的根源。
Lenny: 这让我想起了 Airbnb。回到 Airbnb,Airbnb 历史上最重要的时刻之一就是 Paul Graham 问 Airbnb 的创始人:“你们的客户在哪?“他们说:“哦,他们在纽约。“他说:“那你为什么还在跟我说话,为什么不现在就去纽约跟他们谈?“他们后来一直提到这件事。
Gustaf Alströmer: 没错,确实如此。我觉得他写那篇 “Do Things That Don’t Scale” 就是基于这个经验……那个经验就是 Airbnb 创始人一次次跑去纽约,从中学会了如何打造 Airbnb。这是一个非常反直觉的想法——你越需要花最多时间跟客户待在一起的时候,恰恰就是你最该这么做的时候。我觉得 Airbnb 是 YC 内部把这件事做得最好的案例之一。
Lenny: 这让我想起我最近跟不少创始人聊过。我问他们:“你们为了验证这个想法,跟多少客户谈过?“就在前几天,有个人说他们在开始这轮融资之前,跟 150 个财务 CRO 谈过。还有一家公司,其实是两个 Airbnb 出来的人,他们在 LinkedIn 上投广告,专门去找特定角色的人来聊,聊了至少 100 个,可能 200 个。所以这里有一个很强的相关性。
Gustaf Alströmer: 对,我觉得大家低估了需要的量级。他们以为聊五个人就够了,但我认为你需要聊 25 到 50 个。这意味着你得联系更多的人,才能找到那些可能是早期采用者的人。而你聊的这些人,后来也会成为你的客户。所以你做这些工作本身,其实已经在做大部分的销售了。
如何克服与客户交谈的恐惧
Lenny: 你有没有什么具体的技巧可以分享?要么是克服跟客户交谈的恐惧,要么是怎么逼自己真正去做这件事?
Gustaf Alströmer: 有,我经常讲这个故事,昨天刚讲过。你想想看,你注册了一个看起来很酷的服务,在 TechCrunch 上看到的那种,然后你发现自己一年前就注册过了,对吧?从创始人的角度看,有人注册了你的东西但从来不用。做了那些服务的创始人,他们的本能想法是”所有人都讨厌我,因为他们注册了却从来不用”。从来不用这个服务。这种恐惧本质上就是被拒绝的恐惧。如果我把自己做的东西拿出来,大多数人不会用,还会告诉所有朋友这东西有多烂,你根本就不该注册——这是人们心中的恐惧。但事实是,人们注册了之后就想,“哦,我很忙,有别的事要做。“他们其实根本不记得,也不在乎。
所以每当你发现自己注册了一个一年前就注册过的服务时,想想你自己就是典型客户体验的代表——你注册了一堆东西,连自己都不记得了。你从来没有过”我讨厌这东西”的反应。你的反应永远是”我对这东西无所谓。我甚至懒得完成注册流程或者试一下”,对吧?我觉得大家需要记住这一点:对创业公司来说最糟糕的事不是人们讨厌你做的东西,而是人们对你做的东西完全无动于衷。这不是最糟糕的事,但确实是最常见的情况——人们就是无动于衷。但这并不意味着你没有第二次机会。应该说,你总是有第二次机会的。你真的需要内化一点:人们生活很忙,如果人们没有真正使用你正在构建的东西,那没关系。你可以一年后再联系他们,或者六个月后,或者两周后,如果你做了一些改进,他们可能就会用了。
我觉得大家就是有这种恐惧:“如果我遭到很多拒绝,那就意味着一切都很糟。“但你要把拒绝放到早期采用者的框架里去理解——大多数不在乎的人不是早期采用者,他们不想去挖掘新东西。你对特定问题的解决方案越窄,真正愿意深入尝试的人就越少。但你必须从这里开始,因为你不可能一开始就构建出完整的东西,让所有人都喜欢你。事情不是这样运作的。
就连 Airbnb 起初也只是气垫床,或者住在别人家里时跟主人待在一起。那并不是 Airbnb 的完整解决方案。但有早期采用者深入尝试后说:“对,我喜欢这个。我喜欢这两样东西。我想让人住在我客厅的床垫上。“但这不是今天的 Airbnb,很多当时的事情都是未知的。我觉得人们就是害怕被拒绝,你需要克服这种恐惧,认识到当人们不用你的服务或注册了不在乎时,其实并没有什么真正糟糕的事情发生。真的没那么糟。
Lenny: 这让我想起 Marc Andreessen 说的一句话,我一直很喜欢——每个人的时间都已经被分配好了。他们现在没有空间容纳你的产品。他们一天的日程都已经排满了。
Gustaf Alströmer: 完全同意。
发现真正的痛点
Lenny: 要让一个人注意到任何东西,都需要付出很多努力。我想这也回到了为什么你的产品必须解决真正的痛点——而不只是一个比现有东西好一点但不足以让人觉得”我现在就需要这个”的小玩具。沿着这个方向,你对痛点的重要性有什么想法?它到底有多关键?
Gustaf Alströmer: 其实我录过……我对这些视频还挺满意的,去年秋天作为 YC Startup School 的一部分,我在 YouTube 上录了两期视频。你现在就可以去 YouTube 上看。一期是关于如何跟用户交谈,另一期是关于如何销售、如何做销售。关于跟用户交谈那期,我觉得有一点很重要:你问别人”你对 X、Y、Z 有没有问题?这个播客设置对你来说好不好用?“人家说”还行吧”。但如果你是播客设置方面的专家,你去看别人用一些很烂的东西,他们可能也觉得挺好。但你必须看他们怎么做。你要判断问题的强烈程度,最好的方式不是问他们,而是看他们——看他们如何解决自己在做的事情。
你知道很多非技术人员不会自动化操作吧?所以他们会在 Excel 里把同一件事做一百万遍,就是一直点点点,因为他们只知道这个方法,又不够技术化去写什么脚本。你得亲眼看着这些人操作,才能真正感受到那种痛。你不能直接问他们”做 X、Y、Z 有多难”,因为他们甚至不知道那对他们来说有多难。所以我学到的关于发现痛点的最好方法,就是观察人们——让他们屏幕共享,让他们带你走一遍他们在你正在探索的领域的日常工作流程。这是最好的方法。
我再举个例子。有一堆做电动汽车充电的公司,他们问”电动汽车充电有什么问题?“我就说”去租一辆电动车,到所有非 Tesla 的充电桩去充一下,看看他们怎么说,看看你自己体验到了什么。“事实就是,体验非常糟糕。很多电动汽车充电系统真的很烂,App 也很差。你必须自己亲自用一下,才知道有多差。
技术联合创始人的价值
Lenny: 有意思的是,这类问题经常绕回到”直接去做就好。做那些没法规模化的事。“经典的 YC 建议。我想回到你之前提到的一点,想深入聊聊——技术联合创始人,在早期具备技术能力,把这个话题聊透。我知道 YC 在决定是否录取一家公司时,拥有技术创始人是一个重要的考量因素。如果有人没有技术联合创始人,你有什么建议吗?通常什么方法比较管用?
Gustaf Alströmer: 首先我觉得要理解技术联合创始人的价值。有些人有了一个想做的想法,但没有人帮他们把它做出来。我有个朋友 Paul 说过一句特别好的话,他说:“我有一首歌的灵感,我只需要找个音乐家帮我做出来。“这跟工程的情况其实挺像的。如果你把工程产出看作是”我有个歌的想法,只需要有人帮我把它做出来”,那你就没有充分重视软件工程、机械工程或任何工程技能的价值。
事实上,工程部分才是真正困难的部分。我想说的第一件事就是,你需要学会正确看待工程的价值。我举个例子说明怎样是错误的看法。你申请了 YC,然后你给自己留了 90% 的股份,给工程师 10%。你这基本上就是在说,“这个公司的工程部分只值我的十分之一。我是非技术人员。“对我来说,这就是一个信号,说明你并没有真正重视工程。
好,那怎么去找人呢?实际情况是,技术联合创始人其实很多。技术人员也想找到商业联合创始人。他们不想做另一部分的事情,他们不想做销售,也不是特别关心融资。他们只想解决问题。这完全没问题。我们做了一个叫 co-founder matching 的平台,让这些创始人可以互相认识。但如果你不参加那个,你可以先去问你所认识的最好的技术人员:“你有兴趣跟我一起创业吗?“跟面对拒绝一样,他们中很多人会直接说,“不了,我有一份很好的工作,我挺开心的。“但其中有些人其实一直在想创业的事,只是希望有人来邀请他们一起做。所以你必须克服恐惧,去问最优秀的人。
你之所以需要技术联合创始人,而不是雇佣工程师或外包团队,是因为你要做的决策中有很多是技术性的,你要进行的迭代中大量依赖工程能力。如果你不理解这一点,你根本做不出正确的决策。这不是做一个服务那么简单——你有了一个产品的想法,做完就完了。这个过程里有无数次的迭代。
最后,很多人选择自己学编程。网上有很多地方可以学到制作原型所需的技能。你可能不会成为最好的工程师。很多成功的创业创始人并不是最好的工程师,因为他们在招到三四个工程师之后就不再写代码了,这没问题。但你需要达到足够的水平,能够理解工程的价值,理解解决大多数问题的最好方式是用软件。有很多创始人,不管什么原因,学了别的东西——这不一定是你十八九岁时做过什么清醒或精确的选择——然后到了二十五岁,你想”唉,我要是会写代码就好了”,然后就去学了。就这么回事,没那么难。
Lenny: 你有没有见过哪个创业公司靠外包公司——比如工程外包公司——来开发产品,最后做成的?有没有这种情况,还是你会直接说”绝对不要这么做”?
Gustaf Alströmer: 基本上,我想不起哪个具体案例是靠外包公司做成的。但我确实见过这样的创始人:比如有两个非技术创始人,但他们很重视工程,也有能力组建一支优秀的非创始人工程师团队,给了他们股权,最后做成了。这种例子很多。但我不记得有哪个具体案例是靠外包团队把整个产品做出来的。我觉得原因在于,做出一个产品不仅仅是写个规格说明那么简单。你没法光靠写规格就做出一个优秀的产品。你必须亲自参与迭代过程。所以我觉得,有一个工程师,他知道迭代应该是什么样子,然后直接动手去做,这才是做事的方法。
我见过的那些非技术创始人做成的案例,都是他们有非常优秀的工程团队,而这个团队觉得自己就是创始团队。他们可能不一定是 YC 定义的那种拥有 10% 股份的联合创始人,但他们觉得自己就是核心团队。
Calendly 的案例
Lenny: 这让我想到一个故事——我最近采访了 Calendly 的 CPO,她谈到 Calendly 起步的时候,其实是一个乌克兰开发团队帮忙做了第一个产品。他们不仅帮着做了第一个产品,实际上后来还推动了最初的所有增长,因为他们看到了 Calendly,然后在自己的公司里开始使用它。
然后他们认识的所有人也开始用,在乌克兰传播开来。他们后来继续跟那家公司合作,他们现在仍然是 Calendly 的开发团队,至少是其中的一部分。
Gustaf Alströmer: 厉害。
Lenny: 嗯,这是一个成功案例。
Gustaf Alströmer: 我想说的是,在某些国家,人们一边做着其他工作一边创业,这在工程师中确实很常见。比如在乌克兰或东欧,他们开始自己的创业项目时,通常会同时有一份全职的承包商工作,因为这样才能支付账单——因为往往没法融资。这也没问题。
Lenny: 厉害。这种拼劲真让人佩服。
成功创业公司的共同特质
Lenny: 我想把视角拉远一点,问一个更大的问题,看看你怎么回答。如果你回想 YC 最成功的那些创业公司,甚至就是你自己合作过的那些公司,如果只能挑一两个在最成功的公司中最常见的特质,你会选什么?
Gustaf Alströmer: 我认为创始人或公司成功最常见的原因,归根结底在于创始人及其个人特质。这些最重要的个人特质是:他们有极强的求胜心,在困难面前绝不放弃;他们有一种内在的驱动力,这种驱动力极具感染力,能感染身边的人——正因如此,他们才能组建起真正优秀的团队。人们真心愿意去为他们工作。我见过许多这样的人,他们的 CEO 或某位联合创始人就是极具感召力的人。
第二点,他们是技术型的。也就是说,他们有足够的技术能力。如果我按技术能力从强到弱给公司打分,技术能力更强的创始人成功的概率更大。然后我想说,他们在早期就想出了如何与用户对话并快速行动,不会等投资者、YC 或其他人许可才去推进。每一天或每一周都有持续的进展。他们不是为别人做这件事,而是为客户做的。他们当然也不是为投资者做的,投资者某种程度上反而更像是挡在路上的。他们天然地就把注意力放在客户身上。
最后,我认为伟大创始人必备的一项技能是出色的沟通能力。也就是能够清晰地表达非常复杂的思想,并且享受沟通这件事。享受沟通通常与享受融资相关,而融资对某些公司的成功至关重要——不是所有公司,但对一部分来说确实如此。我认为沟通能力或者说讲故事的能力属于同一个脉络,它们实际上是激励身边人的同一种能力。如果你能清晰地说出你在做什么、为什么做、为什么这对世界很重要,并把这个故事讲好,就能激励身边的人追随你。我很少见到创始人在不具备某种感召力或良好沟通能力的情况下取得成功。大多数时候,你至少会对他们心生敬意,或者在内心某处相信他们会成功,正是这种感觉激励你愿意待在他们身边、加入他们的团队。
Lenny: 这份清单真的很棒。我来总结一下:第一,他们有强烈的求胜心,因此极具感召力,能把人凝聚过来,让大家真正兴奋起来。第二,如果他们是技术型的、能亲手做出产品,成功的概率更高。第三,他们想出了如何与客户对话,不等不靠,直接开始做。他们对此近乎痴迷,而不是关注投资者想让他们做的事,他们甚至不愿花时间跟投资者交谈,而要把时间留给客户。第四,出色的沟通能力,这又回到了第一点——他们擅长讲故事,能让人兴奋起来。对吗?
超级成功的公司需要更多
Gustaf Alströmer: 对,我认为这些就是成功公司所具备的特质。但要成为超级成功的公司,还需要一些别的东西。那些东西不是你能列在清单上的,因为它们就是那些异常值。如果你看一个典型的 YC 批次,会有那么几家估值达到十亿的公司,它们就是异常值。它们几乎肯定具备我们刚才讨论过的所有特质,批次中很多其他公司也具备这些特质,但让某家公司成为真正异常值的东西,是不可预知的。这就是为什么当初 Airbnb 不融资的时候,有那么多投资者拒绝了他们——因为那是一个异常值级别的想法,一个对大多数人来说不合逻辑、说不通的想法。这类最终成功的想法往往一开始在人们看来都不太合理。之所以之前没人做过,是有原因的——因为它们不是这个世界顺理成章的下一步。
能否预测下一个巨头
Lenny: 这个话题正好引出一个我一直想问的问题:在一个批次中,你预测哪些创业公司会成为巨头的准确度有多高?也许先说你个人,然后再说 YC 整体——你们判断什么会成功、谁是下一个 Airbnb 或 Dropbox 的能力有多强?
Gustaf Alströmer: 我觉得说实话,我们并不太擅长预测什么会成功。我们确实无法判断批次里哪家公司会成为真正成功的公司。这不可能做到。我们擅长的是知道失败长什么样。我们有时会在批次开始时对创始人说:“如果你要失败,请用某种我们没见过的新鲜方式失败,别用那种我们已经看过一百次的方式。“因为我们见过人们因为各种各样的原因失败。我们能做的——与其说是预测,不如说是让更多公司成功的方法——是告诉他们可能怎样失败。非常直接、坦诚地告诉他们:“你做的这三件事,很可能导致你无法成功。“如果我们做好了这件事,大多数人收到反馈后就会走上成功之路。
至于哪些公司最终会成为最好的,有太多因素与成为最好毫无关联,偏偏就是那些人们追捧的东西——我身处一个热门行业、我被 TechCrunch 报道了、有投资者主动来找我了。你会惊讶于我刚才提到的这些东西与异常值级别的成功之间的相关性有多低。这正是做这件事如此困难的原因。我觉得人们真的很希望这些问题有答案,真的很希望能相信在种子阶段就能挑出伟大的公司,但在我合作过的六百多家公司中所学到的一切告诉我,这件事没那么简单,甚至可能根本做不到——尤其是在寻找异常值公司的时候。我认为这没那么容易。如果容易的话,我们就会少录取很多公司,只录取那些就行了,但这真的没那么容易。
Lenny: 你有没有一种感觉,能判断哪些公司成功的可能性更大?还是说就像,“我们有 150 家公司,都不太确定,但希望其中有一家能行”?
Gustaf Alströmer: 一个好的指标是,如果每次新的 Office Hour 都有令人兴奋的新进展。我们不是在讨论两周前或四周前讨论过的那些东西,那些他们已经做完了。比如,“我之前在尝试把产品卖给这三个客户”,“嗯,他们已经买了,我现在其实在跟另外七个客户谈”。然后我们讨论的是不同的定价、不同的产品,因为客户想要我们做的更多。如果我持续看到这种趋势,当人们画出那条 10% 周增长率的收入曲线时,我们就会把它归功于这些公司。如果你能在这么短的时间尺度上取得这样的进展,你就走在了做大事的轨道上。
当然,最终要取得成功还有很多其他因素需要顺利推进,但在每周或每两周这个时间尺度上的进展,是判断某人能否成功的一个非常好的指标。对我来说,这远比”我身处这个热门市场”或”我在跟这个投资者谈”之类的指标好得多。那些指标比不上”我正在取得进展,而且速度相当快”。
判断团队潜力的关键信号
Lenny: 有意思。所以我听到的是,在一个批次开始的时候,我们其实是在押注一批公司,这些公司有很有潜力的创始人,可能是技术背景的,有很强的求胜意志等等。而在整个批次进行过程中,你关注的是那些在进展上每周都超出你预期的公司。
Gustaf Alströmer: 我的意思是,有时候人们没有取得进展可能有不同的原因。但如果你在持续取得进展——我想 Paul 和 Jessica 也说过这一点,这在 YC 早期就是如此——如果你在不断达成目标、持续取得进展,且这种势头保持下去,那跟某种程度的成功有很强的相关性。但话说回来,回到之前的问题,我们能不能预测谁会是最优秀的那几个?不能。正因如此,我们真正专注于的是帮助那些人不要失败。尤其是优秀的团队不能失败。如果你有一个非常有才华的团队,在技术层面很擅长构建产品,但他们犯了其他一些基本错误,比如不跟客户沟通,或者试图一次性把所有东西都做出来——我觉得我们有责任确保他们不犯那些我们已经见过很多次的基本错误。我们至少得帮他们犯一些我们没见过的、壮观的错误。那就是一个高潜力的团队。如果某人有一个不错的想法,正走在正确的轨道上,但还处于早期阶段,那也是非常有潜力的。
成功创始人的特质光谱
Lenny: 我有一个挺有趣的问题想试试,跟刚才聊的成功创始人和公司的特质这个话题有点关系。我有一个叫 Flow 的创始人朋友,他最近问我:“如果你要想想最成功的创始人,他们有哪些特质?“然后他给了我这样一个列表,就像是光谱的两端。所以我想逐个过一下这个列表,看看根据你的经验,光谱的哪一端——如果有的话——跟最成功的创始人相关联。听起来怎么样?
Gustaf Alströmer: 好啊,来吧。
Lenny: 好。第一个是速度与质量。在这个光谱上,你发现最成功的创始人更偏向速度还是更偏向质量?
Gustaf Alströmer: 有时候创始人会问我们这样的问题:“我应该关注什么?增长还是留存?“而真相是,他们其实是在向我们请求许可,让自己可以不做其中某一个。事实是,要成功,两者都必须做。我认为速度与质量这个问题——在公司不同阶段有不同水平的速度和不同水平的质量——但事实是你总是需要快速行动,同时也要理解质量的含义是什么,对吧?
所以我其实不认为这是一个光谱。但我想说的是,如果你通过跟客户对话来快速行动,你就会构建出有潜力具备质量的东西,因为你对问题了解很多。我觉得当人们想到质量时,往往想的是”我个人对质量的定义是什么”——我有一个质量标准——但对我来说,一个好的产品想法、一个好的创业想法的质量,更多取决于客户认为什么是有价值的。如果你通过跟客户对话、获取客户反馈、了解问题来快速行动,那你实际上就会做出高质量的东西。所以对我来说,它们不是光谱的两端。
自信与谦逊
Lenny: 好,再试一个。作为创始人,自信与谦逊?
Gustaf Alströmer: 我不认为它们在一个光谱上。我认为学会作为创始人展现自信是至关重要的,回到之前说的沟通能力——激励你周围的人,对吧?我不会想加入一家创始人对自己想法完全没信心的公司,对吧?因为那会显露出来。投资者也不会想投资一个对自己想法完全没有信心的人。所以学会首先建立对自己所做事情的信心,然后把这种信心传递给你周围的人,我认为至关重要。你周围会有很多人有疑虑。如果你不传递那种信心,不清楚还有谁会这么做——如果你是创始人的话。你必须亲自来做这件事。
我认为你可以在展现信心的同时,对周围的人保持强烈的谦逊感。但我觉得在创业这件事上,学会拥有那种自信是早期阶段很重要的一部分,对吧?尤其是当你在构建一件非常困难、需要大量工作和大量资金的事情时,维护”你会成功”这种信心,对所有怀疑你的人来说都是至关重要的。而怀疑你的人,在你周围会有很多,对吧?你只需要有一种不自然的自信程度来证明他们是错的。我觉得,同样地,这跟谦逊不在一个光谱上。事实上,最成功的创始人往往是最……如果你没有强烈的谦逊感,你就无法激励周围的人。人们其实不想跟你待在一起,这意味着他们不想为你工作或投资你。同样地,两者你都需要,但在起步阶段它们服务于不同的目的。
Lenny: 创始人这活儿真不好干。你得什么都是。看看下一个会不会有比较大的分歧。执行与战术,还是关注战略和更高层面的东西。你觉得最成功的创始人在这一点上深入到什么程度?
执行优于战略
Gustaf Alströmer: 这个我确实有很强的观点。我觉得我们之所以经常谈论战略,是因为它源于商学院。商学院的初衷是培养人们进入企业界。在企业界,战略很重要,对吧?所以当你加入一家大公司,你是第 2010 号员工之类的,那你可能有一份商学院出身的工作,思考企业战略是一件重要的事。但当你是一家小型创业公司时,战略并不重要,因为根本没有什么战略可言。也许到了后期,思考战略可能会有成效,但战略的前提是你能同时做多件事,而小型创业公司做不到。他们一次只能做一件事。所以执行才是对公司来说真正重要的东西。
每当有人想进行战略讨论时,那说明他们不理解自己的优先级。优先级始终是一个从上到下的列表,其中有一件事比其他所有事都重要。你不太可能对其他事情进行战略讨论,因为只有一件事要做。所以对我来说,这里有一个明确的答案:好的创始人是执行导向的,他们始终只有一个优先事项去追求。然后他们不断攻克那个优先事项,新的优先事项会随之出现,你根本没有时间讨论公司战略。公司战略的前提也是你已经有了产品市场匹配,因为你已经有了在运转的东西。如果你还没有,那么让人们想要你的产品,那就是你的战略。你没有别的战略。
Lenny: 很好。好的,我们找到了一个光谱两端差距相当大的。那独裁式的——有点像,我不知道,我会想到 Steve Jobs 那种——跟共识驱动、协作式的相比呢,如果这算一个光谱的话。你觉得最成功的创始人会落在哪一端?
独裁式与协作式决策
Gustaf Alströmer: 我不知道我是否有答案,因为我觉得在早期阶段工作时,你的样子可能跟后期阶段不一样。我并没有花很多时间跟那些有几千名员工的创始人待在一起,听他们在大公司环境里是怎样运作的。当我和那些创始人交谈时,我都是一对一地聊,只听到他们自己的视角。所以我其实并不了解他们在大型企业环境中是怎样与同事协作的。但当你是一家小公司,只有三个人、五个人或十个人时,你不可能做一个独裁式的决策者。创始团队有一种创始团队式的决策动态,形式可以不同。有时候是所有事情大家一起决定,有时候你说”这是我的专业领域,那是你的,我们把决策分开”。这两种方式都可以。我觉得你只需要有一个流程,这样就不用在做出决定之后反反复复地重新讨论。
我觉得在那个时候,最重要的是愿意遵守你和创始团队共同制定的流程。你个人的天性在不同的角色、不同的公司里可能不一样。但要让一家创业公司运转下去,你必须有一个具体的决策流程。这些决策周期很短,以周或双周为单位。每个人在事后都需要对决策感到满意,至少要对流程感到满意。我不觉得你可以直接拍板……你也不能完全协作式地让每个人都参与每一个决策。小型创业公司需要就”如何一起做决策”达成共识,之后就遵循这个流程。事情通常就是这样运作的。
Lenny: 好的,我还有一个。更在乎产品,还是更在乎分发和增长策略?
Gustaf Alströmer: 这里面其实包含了很多预设,我觉得,因为对我来说,在乎产品就意味着在乎客户。有时候如果我说”优秀的创始人应该在乎产品”,很多创始人会误解为这是我对产品的个人感受,或者我对产品应该是什么样的想法。这是错的。正确的理解应该是客户对产品的期望和使用方式。所以如果你的意思是在乎产品是指在乎客户所关心的那些方面,那我绝对认为这是非常非常关键的,是早期必须具备的东西——比如跟用户交流、做不可规模化的事情。一旦你做大了,如果没有找到可规模化的分发策略,你不会成功。不同公司的策略不同,但他们不是在一开始就做可规模化的事情。
做不可规模化的事情本身不是一个可规模化的策略。最终,某个具体的做法会成为适合你的方式。如果幸运的话,人们会讨论你的产品,你会获得有机增长。但在很多情况下,需要的是销售,或者是某种面向消费者的分发策略。你不能从一开始就这样做。我见过很多——这也是我从增长团队加入 YC 时必须重新调整思维方式的原因——你不能用增长团队的思维来启动一家创业公司,因为那全是可规模化的东西。你真正需要回到的是做不可规模化的事情,用不可规模化的方式去思考客户。但一旦有什么东西开始运转了,拥有增长思维确实非常有用,对吧?一旦你每天有几千人注册,那怎么做到两千人?那可能就更像是增长团队或分发团队会做的事情。
我觉得每个人的经验不同,取决于他们之前的经历,对吧?如果你在一家非常成功的公司工作过,那你不会太在意这些。如果你在 Google 工作,你甚至不会想到这些,因为分发就是网站本身。但如果你在一个很烂的小产品工作过,那你会很认真地思考分发问题,因为那是你成功的自然方式。所以我觉得归根结底,跟客户交流是最重要的。对我来说,这就是在乎产品的真正含义。而分发是你一旦有什么东西开始运转之后,一定会大量投入的事情。
气候科技
Lenny: 太好了。好吧,这类问题我大概还有一百个想问的,但我想确保我们聊到另一个话题,我知道这个话题对你来说非常重要,那就是气候科技。我的理解是,你在推动 YC 将气候科技作为重点方向方面发挥了重要作用。我相信你主导了他们最初的 Request for Startups——好像是这个说法,就是你们发布的那种”我们想资助这样的公司”的号召。我记得你提到过在过去几个批次中资助了几十家气候科技公司,这些大致正确吗?
Gustaf Alströmer: 首先,Request for Startups 其实是 Sam Altman 和其他几个人推动的。我们写进正式 Request for Startups 的第二版,那一版是我写的,专注于碳移除领域。然后自然而然地,那些带着气候科技想法来申请的人就会进入我的申请阅读队列,我来读他们的申请、面试他们。不是全部,但很多都是。我觉得到目前为止,我们已经资助了超过 130 家以上以某种方式专注于气候科技的公司。
Lenny: 哇。
Gustaf Alströmer: 趋势是,真正有抱负的人想在这个领域创办公司。有些人想创办公司是因为气候科技是头号问题,但他们并不把这看作非营利组织。我想在这里做一个明确的区分。人们 somehow 觉得创办一家气候科技公司就是在为世界做好事,但可能也就仅此而已了。事实是,世界已经做出了决定。因为气候是我们面临的最大问题之一,如果不是最大的话,我们已经决定要停止目前正在做的事情,要改变整个能源体系,改变所有会排放碳的行为。我们已经做出了这个决定,各国政府也已经决定了。问题只是它将如何发生,但这个决定已经做出了。
在这场转型中,我们谈论的是数万亿美元的资金从导致气候变化的事物转移到不会导致气候变化的事物上。这场转型的规模是我们近期从未见过的。相比之下,软件行业都没有那么大,实际上比这场转型要小得多。我觉得如果你看看 Tesla,它现在大概有六七千亿美元的市值,而这只是一家目前在美国新车销量中占几个百分点的公司。这已经是世界上最大的公司之一了,也造就了世界上最富有的人。我们才刚刚看到这场转型的开始。人们做出这些决定背后的经济动因,和”我想解决气候变化”一样强烈——因为这确实是一门好生意。这种变化吸引了大量你我都知道的软件领域创始人,他们听着这档播客,说”我的技能在这里是有用的,有很多我能做的事情。即便不能,我也可以去学。“
气候科技的人才吸引力
但最重要的是,初创公司的工作技能对于参与这场转型至关重要。很多人已经创办或加入了相关公司。我每周仍会收到一些优秀的软件工程师发来的邮件,问我”我应该去哪些软件公司工作才能应对气候变化?“这样的邮件我已经收到两三年了。这个领域就是能吸引到非常有抱负的人。而且势头没有停止,还在加速。我觉得很幸运能和这么多优秀的创始人合作,因为他们都是独一无二、非常有趣的人。
Lenny: 我注意到了完全一样的现象——那么多聪明、有干劲、出色的人都在说,“我只想去一家气候科技公司,这就是我现在唯一的追求。“另外,我想给你应有的认可——我觉得你在这场转变开始之前就走在前面了,很早就推动 YC 关注这个领域。我经常想,“我认识 Gustaf,我觉得 Gustaf 在推动投资和创业公司聚焦气候方面产生了如此巨大的影响。“所以我想对你所做的、对你在很多事情上走在最前沿给予高度肯定。
Gustaf Alströmer: 谢谢。我想说,有时候,像 YC 这样有信誉的机构开始接纳这些公司,这件事本身就有意义。我记得 2018 年我和 Pachama 的 Diego 交谈时,他当时正在创办 Pachama,我们在 YC 一起在白板上讨论。他是 YC 的校友,之前创办过另一家公司。那时候”气候科技”这个词还不存在。人们不确定投资人是否会为这类公司提供资金。Pachama 已经融资 6000 万美元,有很多大客户,很多员工,显然发展得非常好。但在 2018 年的时候,这些还是未知数。之所以是未知数,其中一个原因是之前有过一个泡沫——2008、2009、2010 年的清洁技术泡沫,因为一些具体原因没有成功,投资人因此心有余悸,害怕投资这类项目。
现在情况完全逆转了。新进入气候科技投资领域的投资人数量之多,是我们在过去十年甚至二十年里见过的任何趋势都无法比拟的。投资端的关注度极其巨大。最近,我和另一个人 David Rusenko 写了一份 Request for Startups,一份新的、更新的、非常详细的列表——我希望可以附在节目说明里——列出了我们认为值得关注的方向和领域,如果你想创办公司的话。
说实话,我们并不知道好的想法长什么样。我们不知道。但我们可以告诉你哪些领域存在机会,你应该去哪里寻找好想法。我们写这份列表,是因为很多人来找我们说,“我想做气候科技,但我没有好的想法,因为我在这个领域没有特定经验。“然后我们就说,“别做这三件事,但可以去尝试这 25 个方向中的任何一个。“这已经获得了很好的反响,我相信后续还会有更多。但我觉得 YC 向世界宣告”我们关注并资助这些领域”这件事很重要。这也是我们发布 Request for Startups 的一贯原因——让人们知道这些是我们真正想要资助的方向。
转行气候科技需要专业背景吗?
Lenny: 几周前我实际上主持了一个panel。一个叫 Climate Draft 的组织召集了在气候科技领域的产品经理。很多人的问题就是,“我需要什么样的背景才能进入气候科技创业公司,创办一家气候科技公司?“有趣的是,每一位嘉宾都反复说,“你现有的产品经理技能就是我们需要的。“公司里已经有很多科学方面的专家了,你没有经验也没关系。他们需要的是商业经验,知道如何运营、如何执行——产品经理学到的那些标准技能。你同意这个看法吗?进入这个领域不需要有深厚的科学和气候背景?
Gustaf Alströmer: 是的,如果你是在做软件公司,甚至一些硬件公司,这大概普遍成立。绝对如此。有产品经理背景比有特定领域专业背景要有价值得多。这两者是互补的。但作为一名产品经理,扎实的产品经理背景是更有价值的部分。做一个有竞争力的产品经理,来自一个非常好的产品管理文化,知道好的标准是什么样的——对这些公司来说是无价的,因为过去他们招不到这样的人。我百分之百同意。
就创始人而言,我见过各种情况。我见过有领域专业知识的人创办公司并取得了成功。也见过没有领域专业知识、但学到了所需一切的人。也许他们和一个有领域专业知识的合伙人搭档,然后成功了。各种情况我都见过,我认为你在这两类中的任何一类都能成功。你不需要深厚的专业知识。这取决于你所处的具体领域。但像 Pachama 的 Diego 和 Tomas,除了个人体验之外,他们并没有森林方面的专业知识。他们只是有解决问题的意愿,而结果确实很好。
气候科技的投资方向
Lenny: 你提到你有一份你感兴趣的方向列表。我知道我们会在节目说明里分享,但有没有你想特别强调的?比如”这是我最兴奋、最想投资的领域”,或者有没有你想提到的、在这个领域里超级有趣、超级酷、大家应该知道的公司?
Gustaf Alströmer: 我们写了那份列表,并在每个类别下都标注了相关公司。我不知道是否要特别强调某个具体类别,但我可以谈谈我们过去资助过的一些真正有发展潜力的项目。以下是我对气候科技的一般性思考方式。我们必须对所有排放温室气体的行为进行脱碳。这意味着我们必须改变世界上很多东西——改变交通方式、改变能源、改变住宅,所有这些,比如改变我们供暖的方式。
然后是碳移除。碳移除有点像是——即使我们把上述所有事情都做得很好,可能还是不够。因为有这样的机会,而且有一些证据表明我们确实可以通过某种方式从大气中移除碳,所以很多公司也在同时开展这方面的工作。我认为我们需要两者兼顾,它们并不矛盾。我们很可能需要两者都做。嗯,前者是肯定要做的。
在脱碳方面,我们社会中排放大量碳的领域不胜枚举,对吧?举个例子,航运是一个很大的问题。全球货运船舶产生了大量碳排放。如何解决这个问题并没有显而易见的方案,因为它们使用的燃料油非常便宜,而且这是一个利润率很低的行业,除了即将出台的监管要求之外,它们没有什么改变的动机。这不是一个靠某个国家出台方案、有人建几艘测试船就能解决的问题。但在那个领域,已经有两家获得投资的公司,其中一家是 Seabound,他们在为船舶做碳捕获和移除。
另一家是 Fleetzero,他们在制造电动船舶。电气化一次又一次地被证明——每当它被应用,都发现它是比之前用燃烧方式做事更高效的方案。几乎不需要维护,建造成本更低。电池更贵一些,但它更清洁,也符合你的碳目标。好处非常多,但也有局限性。电气化的局限性通常与电池有关——比如你能跑多远?
现在有个类别,我称之为——这是一个非常关键的方向——就是碳核算以及帮助大公司核算自身碳排放并给出行动建议的推荐系统。我举三个例子。我们投资了 Unravel Carbon,这是新加坡的碳核算软件公司,专注于亚洲市场,大概也是该领域领先的。还有一家叫 Carbon Chain,专门聚焦供应链、航运和原材料等,总部在英国。另外还有湾区的 ANAI。这个市场最终会如何发展谁也说不准,但目前这个市场确实存在碳核算的客户需求。世界上所有大企业要么对政府承诺过,要么对股东承诺过,要么对公众或甚至对员工承诺过要实现脱碳。但他们往往并不清楚该怎么做。这些软件平台就像是即插即用的——“这样做就行了。“
不需要特定领域专长的机会
然后我再举两个例子,适合那些没有特定领域专长、只是优秀软件工程师的人去做。有一家公司叫 Enode,他们基本上在为电动汽车充电桩和住宅能源系统打造类似 Plaid 的服务。如果我们设想未来所有住宅、所有电动汽车充电都将由一系列能源设备组成,这些设备由小型计算机控制,全部通过 Wi-Fi 连接——你可以连接它们并执行各种操作:让它们开启、关闭,在电价便宜时开启,在某个条件下关闭,所有这些对电网来说都很有价值。那么你就需要一个软件平台来连接所有这些设备。这就是 Enode 一直在做的事情。
另一家相关的公司叫 Static。Static 是印度电动汽车充电领域的 Airbnb。之所以需要这样的东西,是因为印度没有 Tesla 充电网络,总体上也缺乏公共充电设施,人们车库里没有插座,甚至没有车库。所以你需要从零开始建设一套全新的电动汽车充电系统或平台,这正是 Static 在做的。他们也在建设公共充电基础设施,但有自己的应用。如果你使用 Static 的应用,它会引导你找到所有 Static 充电桩。我相信他们是印度最大或增长最快的电动汽车充电网络,而印度是目前世界第二大、甚至可能是第一大人口国家。
这些创意的潜力——即便它们目前表现得已经不错——简直就是无限的,市场巨大。如果你在其中某一领域取得成功,我认为我们不会再有今天这么多加油站和各自为政的网络。电动汽车充电领域不会是同样的模式,它会围绕终端用户体验和他们打开的应用更加整合。所以我非常确信,软件创业者在这里有真正的巨大机会。当前批次也有一些公司专注于这个方向。
航空脱碳
最后我想提一下 Heart Aerospace。我们有 Heart Aerospace、Right Electric 以及其他几家专注于航空的公司。航空是另一个难以脱碳的大领域。Heart 和 Right 专注于电池电动飞机。他们基本上在制造靠电池飞行、使用电动机的商业飞机,看到这些真的令人惊叹。
Lenny: 这份清单太厉害了。我们一定会在节目笔记里附上所有这些公司的链接。我在想的是——你提到的一个叙事反转是,气候科技领域实际上是可以赚钱的,它不再仅仅是一个以影响力为导向的市场了。为什么会发生这种转变也许值得聊聊,但我想进一步问的是:情况在好转,很多进展正在取得,但人们看到气候变化时总觉得”我们完了,全完了”。可实际上电池价格在下降,太阳能成本在下降,风电在扩大规模,所有这些创业公司都在投入。所以很想听听哪些方面在好转、有什么值得乐观的,但同时也想了解——“好吧,确实在好转,但仍然有些方面不太理想,我们需要加倍努力的地方在哪里。“
好消息
Gustaf Alströmer: 过去大概 12 到 24 个月里,有两个具体的利好。第一个是政治层面。美国通过了 IRA,即《通胀削减法案》。这个名字说得通,因为转向更绿色的能源确实能通过降低能源成本来减少通胀。但它本质上是一项气候法案,专注于将绿色经济的供应链大量回流到美国本土,并激励我们刚才讨论的许多变革。无论是碳移除还是住宅能源、住宅供暖,无论什么领域,这项法案都覆盖了,而且规模巨大。这是美国长期以来在气候议题上难得的好消息,也许可以说是史无前例的。
第二个好消息——好到欧洲现在都在设法应对。他们正在试图用自己的法案来回应 IRA,因为他们看到一些电池公司说:“我实际上打算把下一个工厂建在美国,不再建在欧洲了。我改主意了。”
Lenny: 哦,哇。
Gustaf Alströmer: 所以欧洲现在也不得不出台自己的激励措施来应对。第二个好消息是,企业现在成为了客户。大概三四年前,你去找一家财富 100 强公司说:“嘿,你们想买我的某某脱碳方案吗?“不管是软件平台还是电动汽车什么的。他们的反应是:“嗯,去找这层楼的某个人聊聊吧,也许他能帮你。“而那个人并没有真正的决策权。这种情况已经改变了。现在他们会说:“实际上,我们向股东承诺了每年减排 2%,我们也向政府承诺了,还向公众承诺了。所以我们得做到。“他们会问:“从哪里开始?我们先得脱碳的头 2% 是什么?也许从能源开始。哦,那就换能源供应商。“他们现在作为客户出现了,不只是带着意向书,而是实际付款签合同,对这些公司进行投资,因为他们都看到了未来,不想落后。
Gustaf Alströmer:
这背后也有财务上的动机。他们想获得那些与这些领域挂钩的、带有一定附加条件的资本,而且他们不想落后。他们也不想成为 Tesla 面前的 Toyota——Toyota 曾经宣称”我们不会做纯电动车”,到现在有时还在这么说,而其他所有人都在说”Tesla 才是必须效仿的对象,因为那是赢家”。这些大公司真的很怕成为 Toyota。他们真的很怕成为最后一个不改变的,然后世界把他们抛在后面,他们就会消亡。所以我认为这里的动机本质上是生存,关键是要顺势而为,因为世界正朝这个方向发展。
我认为这就是两个最好的消息。我们在 Request for Startups 中也写到了这一点。这不是你能说服所有人都认同的事情,而且即使你说服了,人们也不知道该怎么做。所以你必须把这视为一个经济机遇。我们无法说服所有人这将会发生,但其实说服所有人并不重要。重要的是有足够多的企业被说服,从而改变他们的行为方式,然后你就可以把你正在做的东西卖给他们。作为创始人,专注你的客户,专注 B2B。这是我对大多数人在这个领域的建议,因为大部分变化将发生在这里。这也是为什么我对这些创业公司和创始人非常乐观。他们正在做的事,在我看来,比发起运动试图说服别人这是一个大问题更有影响力。即使人们知道气候变化是问题,他们也不知道具体该怎么做。但创业创始人知道。
Lenny: 你刚才提到了这一点,但感觉最大的转变之一是资本主义已经发力了,现在正在大力推动气候科技创业公司——
Gustaf Alströmer: 是的,完全正确。
Lenny: ——这正在产生重大影响。好了,我们进入聊天的最后一部分,也是非常激动人心的快问快答环节。我有六个问题。准备好了吗?
Gustaf Alströmer: 好。
快问快答
Lenny: 你最常推荐给别人的两三本书是什么?
Gustaf Alströmer: 我推荐的第一本,我想我手边就有。对,这本。叫 The 100% Solution,作者是 Solomon Goldstein-Rose。这本书是给那些认为气候变化是个问题但不知道该怎么办的人看的,或者那些感到绝望、觉得”啊,所有人都要死了”的人。有些书写到最后结论就是”我们都要死了”,但事实是我们不会都死。这本书试图详细涵盖百分之百的所有解决方案,某种程度上是我们写的 Request for Startups 的更详细版本。它会让你感到由衷的乐观。我会把这本书推荐给任何关心气候变化的人,因为它真的以一种非常乐观的视角来呈现这一切。这也是为什么我推荐这本书胜过几乎所有其他的。这大概是我排名第一的推荐。
Lenny: 太好了。我喜欢这种”如果只读一本书,就读这本”的推荐方式。你最近最喜欢的电影或电视剧是什么?
Gustaf Alströmer: 哦,我看了太多了。不知道。我很喜欢 Netflix 上的《艾米丽在巴黎》。我觉得现在电视对我来说有不同的用途,就是纯粹的娱乐。
Lenny: 是,我理解。
Gustaf Alströmer: 但我还看了什么电影来着?我们看了《瞬息全宇宙》。我觉得那是一部非常好的电影。
Lenny: 是啊,它可能会拿最佳影片。
Gustaf Alströmer: 对。
Lenny: 我们这儿有个饮酒游戏,有人说《白莲花度假村》我们就喝一杯。所以你没提,这大概是好事。你面试 YC 创始人时最喜欢问的问题是什么?
Gustaf Alströmer: “你申请 YC 之后在产品上做了什么?你申请以来具体完成了哪些事情?“因为那通常是一两个月之前的事了。
Lenny: 太棒了。这跟你之前说的完全吻合。
Gustaf Alströmer: 我希望回答是”这些就是我们做的所有事情”。
Lenny: 而不是”我们只是在准备这次面试”。
Gustaf Alströmer: 没错,没错。
Lenny: 你投资过的最疯狂的创业公司是什么?
Gustaf Alströmer: 我想说是当我踏上 Heart Aerospace 的机库车间的那一刻。我可以给你发张照片。真的就是,我在看着一架正在制造的飞机,当时的反应是——没有任何一家 SaaS 公司的办公室能让你走进去就张大嘴巴说”这到底是什么?“有一些这样的公司,太空公司或航空航天公司之类的,那种感觉完全不同——你投资了它们,然后你能触摸到实体。我现在对这类事情非常欣赏,因为它们做起来难得多,但当你成功时,它们更加具象可触。你可以说”这枚火箭、这架飞机、我们头顶那颗卫星,里面有我的一小份”。我真的认为在某种程度上,与那些只是替代其他软件的东西相比,这是一种强有力的遗产。当然那些都是更好的生意,但这些才留下了强大的遗产。
Lenny: 申请 YC 有什么建议?
Gustaf Alströmer: 建议是这样的。第一件事是去 YouTube 上搜索,我们录制过一个关于如何成功申请的视频,一个小时长,里面有所有的申请技巧。我们事先告诉人们:“看完那个视频之后,看看你认不认识做过 YC 的人,然后联系他们,问问 YC 是否适合你,同时也问问他们在申请 YC、写申请材料、面试过程中,哪些事情是重要的。“这大概就是我会做的两件事。
Lenny: 最后一个问题,去瑞典旅游有什么建议?
Gustaf Alströmer: 首先,你应该在夏天去。那是一段非常好的时间。冬天的瑞典完全是另一番景象。试着走出城市,到大自然中去。然后做好心理准备,瑞典人不都像美国人那样。他们稍微冷淡一些,跟你保持更多的距离,不会像我在美国学会的那样随机跟你搭话。我觉得你就是要适应一种跟美国不太一样的氛围。大多数去过的人其实都很喜欢,但他们大多是在夏天去的。
Lenny: 这倒让我想起来,我本来想结束了,但之前有条推文说,在瑞典你去别人家做客,他们不会给你饭吃。大家不觉得你会留下吃饭,你得自己带食物。这是真的吗?这是怎么回事?
Gustaf Alströmer: 完全是真的。我其实还就这个话题做过一场非正式会议演讲。那场演讲讲的就是瑞典人做的各种奇怪的事以及原因。如果要我总结的话,是的,我们确实这样。我自己就经历过。我去一个朋友家,他们在吃晚饭,我就待在朋友房间里等他们吃完。这在当时就是很正常的事。为什么会这样?我觉得瑞典有一种很强的个人责任感,这种观念在美国人或外国人的视角下近乎不友好——因为这实在太疯狂了。但在瑞典,就是”你照顾好你的孩子,我照顾好我的孩子”,这根本不是什么需要讨论的问题。
我觉得瑞典人之所以显得奇怪,其中一个动机是我们不想欠别人的人情。所以我们永远不想有那种感觉……比如你在瑞典去酒吧,你不会请一圈人喝酒,你只买自己的啤酒,因为到头来你还得算清楚钱之类的事情。我觉得这其实是一个相当个人主义的社会,但我想说这是一种带着温度的个人主义。它有温暖的一面,但对不了解这一点的人来说,肯定会觉得很奇怪。他们觉得瑞典人冷漠,其实他们不明白这些行为背后是有温度的。
Lenny: 说实话,这套做法听起来挺聪明的。我能接受,但我能理解为什么大家会很困惑。Gustaf,真的太感谢你来做这期节目了,太精彩了。我知道听众们听完之后一定会收获很多信息、受到启发、获得动力——希望是被激励去更快地行动、取得更多的进展。最后两个问题:如果大家想了解更多或者问你后续问题,在网上哪里可以找到你?第二,听众怎样能帮到你?
Gustaf Alströmer: 我偶尔会在 twitter.com/gustaf 上发推。我发布的最有用的内容大概在 YC 的 YouTube 频道上。我录了几段关于增长、关于销售、关于如何跟客户交谈的视频。我其实一整天都在把这些视频发给人们,因为我们做的 Startup School 视频投入了大量准备工作,能回答人们大多数的问题。所以我建议先看那些。不过,有时候我也会发些其他内容,大家可以关注。这都行。大家怎么帮到我?我喜欢听到创始人的反馈,了解他们在做什么。我想听听他们对自己公司有哪些疑问。但我也要特别强调,申请 YC 不需要认识我们中的任何人。你不需要联系我们。这并不会带来什么特别的区别。
YC 的理念是,你应该能够在不认识任何人的情况下成为 YC 和硅谷的圈内人。这正是申请流程要保证的。所以如果你有问题,欢迎联系我们,但不要觉得这是成为优秀 YC 申请者的必要条件。事实恰恰相反——我们会平等地阅读和处理每一份申请。非常感谢大家收听这期播客。我是说,你能听到最后,我真的很开心。
Lenny: 对,听到最后的同学加分。我也想趁你说这些的时候补充一句——YC 感觉真的是世界上的一股好的力量。它推动了如此多的创新和进步。如果科技是推动世界前进的动力,那么 YC 在其中占据了核心的位置。所以对 YC 所做的一切,以及你所做的一切,Gustaf,致以巨大的敬意。
Gustaf Alströmer: 我们对这份责任感受很深。这一点是肯定的。
Lenny: 好,就不耽误你了。再次感谢,Gustaf。
Gustaf Alströmer: 非常感谢。
Lenny: 非常感谢大家的收听。如果你觉得这期节目有价值,可以在 Apple Podcasts、Spotify 或你喜欢的播客应用上订阅。也请考虑给我们评分或留下评论,这真的能帮助更多听众发现这个播客。你可以在 lennyspodcast.com 找到所有往期节目或了解更多关于这个节目的信息。下期再见。
术语表
| 原文 | 中文 |
|---|---|
| alumni | 前同事/校友 |
| angel investor | 天使投资人 |
| batch | 批次 |
| carbon removal | 碳移除 |
| climate tech | 气候科技 |
| co-founder matching | co-founder matching |
| contracting firm | 外包公司 |
| early adopters | 早期采用者 |
| Elad Gill | Elad Gill |
| external validation | 外部验证 |
| Flow | Flow(创始人朋友的名字) |
| Group Office Hours | Group Office Hours |
| group partner | 合伙人 |
| Heart Aerospace | Heart Aerospace(瑞典电动飞机制造商) |
| Jessica | Jessica(指 Jessica Livingston,YC 联合创始人) |
| make things people want | 做出人们想要的东西 |
| niche market | 利基市场 |
| Office Hour | Office Hour |
| organic growth | 有机增长 |
| outlier | 异常值 |
| Paul | Paul(指 Paul Graham,YC 联合创始人) |
| PM (product manager) | 产品经理 |
| product market fit | 产品市场匹配 |
| Request for Startups | Request for Startups(YC 发布的一种征集特定领域创业项目的号召) |
| scalable | 可规模化的 |
| seed stage | 种子阶段 |
| Solomon Goldstein-Rose | Solomon Goldstein-Rose(美国气候政策作者) |
| spec | 规格说明 |
| Startup School | Startup School(YC 的创业课程,保持原文) |
| Steve Jobs | Steve Jobs |
| technical co-founder | 技术联合创始人 |
| The 100% Solution | The 100% Solution(书名,保持原文) |
| unconference talk | 非正式会议演讲 |
| weekly growth rate | 周增长率 |
此文档由 AI 分片翻译(translate_long_document)