Gibson Biddle 谈 DHM 产品战略框架、GEM 路线图优先级框架、5 个 Netflix 战略迷你案例、打造个人董事会,以及更多内容
Gibson Biddle on his DHM product strategy framework, GEM roadmap prioritization framework, 5 Netflix strategy mini case studies, building a personal board of directors, and much more
Lenny: Gibson Biddle, whose name is really fun to say, by the way, has directly taught and worked with more PMs than only a handful of other people in the world. Before going full time on teaching, he was VP of product at Netflix and at Chegg, and has written what is almost surely the most popular Medium post on product strategy.
In our chat, we learned about Gibson’s very popular product strategy and prioritization framework, and we go through a bunch of real life case studies from his time in Netflix to see how they apply in the real world. I love how Gibson comes up with such clear and memorable frameworks, which help demystify the vagueness that surround strategy and prioritization. We’re really lucky to have Gibson share these with us, and I hope you enjoy it.
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Gibson, I am so excited to be doing this. We’ve collaborated on some writing. We’ve done a couple of fireside chats together, but we’ve never really dug deep into anything, and so I’m really excited for this opportunity to chat. So, welcome.
Gibson Biddle: Great, Lenny. Thanks for having me. It’s fun to virtually be in the same place at the same time. Someday we’ll do that in person.
Lenny: Oh man, I can’t wait. For folks that aren’t that familiar with you, could you just share a very brief overview of your journey through product?
Gibson Biddle: It’s hard, because I’m older than dirt, to be very brief, but I’ll give my best shot. The intro was, I discovered I loved teaching early. I ran a sailing school, took a year off from college. That was my first startup. And then, the three chapters of my life. The first one was in marketing, so I actually started in the mail room at an ad agency, and then went into account services and created a service that helped name new companies and products, like if you’re in the Bay Area, the Versatel, or the Versateller, it’s a Bank of America name.
Lenny: I’ve always been so curious about that industry, but that’s a discussion for another time.
Gibson Biddle: Oh yeah, well, we can come around to that. But at the end of the day, it’s all about packaging and positioning and branding. And so, I was curious about that. I got good at it. And then, I lived in Silicon Valley, and I wanted to go into tech, and so I decided to go back to business school, and I went back to Tuck, which is at Dartmouth. It’s the only ski… it’s the only business school that has its own ski area, which is why I went there. It’s in Hanover, New Hampshire.
Lenny: Okay, that feels like a product market fit for Gibson.
Gibson Biddle: Exactly. And then, after the school, this is the tech journey, I joined Electronic Arts. Punk kid in the right place at the right time. I joined in marketing, and then I switched over to product. It was a great place to learn product. They called it Producer College. I learned a ton, and my first startup was actually a joint venture between Electronic Arts and Disney. We created what’s called EA Kits at the beginning, and that became Creative Wonders, and we sold that company to Mr. Wonderful from Shark Tank. He was the CEO of the Learning Company that made Reader Rabbit software and Oregon Trails. That dates me, because most of the listeners have probably played Oregon Trails as a kid.
Lenny: Dying of dysentery. That’s what I remember.
Gibson Biddle: Yeah, yeah. And so, the product roles I grew up into, I call it a muckety muck, but a VP of product or a chief product officer. Joined Netflix in 2005. I left out some failed startups. That’s important. It’s important to let folks know I had some failed startups, but you can gloss over in the brief version. Netflix 2005, and then 2010 I went back to my heart, which is teaching. Chegg was a textbook rental and homework help company. It continues to exist. We took that public sort of 2014.
And then, last five years I stopped direct deposit, and I’m really back to the coda in my career. I’m back to teaching, which I really love to do. So I do talks, workshops all over the world. I do more writing, which really saves my voice, and then experiment with different ways to really try to be helpful to product leaders around the world.
Lenny: Awesome. We’re going to be spending time digging into some of that stuff. Did you describe this point in your career as stopping direct deposit?
Gibson Biddle: I did.
Lenny: That’s amazing. Wow. I’ve never heard it that way.
Gibson Biddle: At least you understood that.
Lenny: I totally get that. Amazing. So, a question I ask folks in your line of work especially is, how many PMs would you say you’ve helped train, free workshops and advising and online courses, and anything else you’ve done?
Gibson Biddle: I thought it was going to be a, how many PMs does it take to screw in a light bulb? I thought it was going to be a joke. Yeah, yeah. Okay, my SWAG. SWAG is a stupid wild-ass guess, important idea. So, my guess is, in real life I’ve worked with product leaders where I was in the building with them. It would be like 500 to 1000. When I would manage an organization, there might be 200 or 300 people in it. So, that’s in real life.
Gibson Biddle: The next one would be via talks, workshops, newsletter. That’s probably, I kind of can SWAG my way into that. Probably 50 to 100,000 a year. The reason I sort of know, I’m a feedback freak, so there’s a Survey Monkey at the end of everything I do. So for instance, every morning I wake up, it’s always feedback for the same talk. I did a Branding for Builders talk for Product School and there’ll be like 10 surveys. I’ve got like 6,000 surveys for that. They’re all watching and recording. My guess is, that means like 60,000 people have watched that one video, for instance.
Anyways, and then lifetime, it’s probably getting into 500,000 to a million. So, that’s my SWAG. I could be 2X wrong on either side.
Lenny: Okay, a million, potentially.
Gibson Biddle: Well, your number’s bigger. You could just go off of, what, 115,000 subscribers your newsletter?
Lenny: Yeah.
Gibson Biddle: You’re getting to a billion, Lenny. You’re going to get to the next level. 500 million to a billion.
Lenny: I feel like the level that you’ve helped PMs is at a deeper level for most of the folks, especially the courses you’ve done and things like that. So, it’s a little hard to compare. But anyway, that’s really impressive, and I feel like when I ask people this question, I feel like this is going to be a high bar to meet.
So, I’m excited to dig into a lot of the stuff that you’ve learned along this journey. Maybe the area you spend most of your time on is helping PMs build their product strategy, muscle through your workshops, and you have these legendary Medium posts about product strategy. So, I’d love to spend the majority of our time talking through just helping people build this muscle. And maybe just start, you have this really simple model for describing what product strategy should be for companies: to delight customers in hard to copy margin enhancing ways. So, there’s kind of these three parts, customers, hard to copy, margin enhancing. I’d love to just kind of hear your take on each of these three parts, how you came up with this, and then maybe a story or two of how you relied on this and used this at Netflix.
Gibson Biddle: Sure. You got the model right. And I mean, the short answer is, I definitely learned it from Reed Hastings when I started at Netflix. Actually, he did a reference check to a friend of mine, checking up on me, and the only question he asked my pal, whose name is John Daz, was, “Hey, John, is Gib ready? Can Gib delight customers?” That was the only question he asked in the reference check.
Luckily, I built really delightful kids software. Back then, people were talking about satisfying customers, listening carefully, understanding them, et cetera. And the delight, it just said, no, no, no. The job is to delight customers. Like Peter Thiel, his book, From Zero to One. The job of an entrepreneur at the beginning is just to find out something that’s 10X better. Delight is trying to work in that magnitude.
The hard to copy part, definitely I learned that. I had a product leader who worked for me, his name was HB Mock. He was focused on the non-member page. That’s where people sign up for. They put in their email, their credit card, they would get a free trial. He’d looked like crap, like everything at startups sucks at the beginning, but he put a happy family on the couch on this screen, and that’s where you put in your email. And that got a lot more people engaged. And so, it delighted customers, but it was helping to build the business, because more folks were setting up for a free trial.
I’m like, that’s great HB, but I’ll bet my paycheck that within a week, Blockbuster’s going to put a happy family on their couch, too. And this is the problem of doing things that are easy to copy. So in the long term, if you can delight customers and create hard to copy advantage, things are just a lot better.
And so the last phrase, margin enhancement, that’s just a fancy phrase for making money. Margin technically would mean profit. I just gave you example with that non-member page, with the happy family on the couch. It delights folks, it helps build a better business, but in that case, Blockbuster was able to copy it.
So, that’s the model. The hardest part in that model is, how do you balance delight versus margin? So if Netflix said, hey, everybody, you’re paying 5 bucks a month, you’d be just like, this is fricking awesome. You’d be really delighted. But Netflix would not, the business wouldn’t work.
So, one of the first places we sort of experiment on how to evaluate trade offs between delight and margin, in the old days, Netflix was a DVD by mail company, and if you ask customers what they wanted, then they all said the same thing. I want my new release DVDs faster, right? Back then, most customers would have to wait a week or two or four weeks. Back then, a movie came out in the theater, two months later it came out on DVD. We just couldn’t afford to buy for that initial demand. So, the way it worked was, some people got it the next day in the mail, and some people had to wait two months.
And so, the A/B test we set up, we said, okay, everybody says they want this, in focus groups and qualitative and surveys. Well, let’s A/B test and see what we really learn. So, the AB test was called the Perfect New Release Test. Imagine we’re at about a million customers circa 2005. 10,000 peeps are in a test cell. They get their new release DVD the next day in the mail. Awesome, right? And the control gets it whenever. Let’s say, average maybe two weeks later.
And so, the way we measure delight in this A/B test is, will you improve retention for the folks that are getting their DVD the next day in the mail? That’s how we measured, it was retention. When Netflix started, it was like 10% canceled every month. 2005, it was about four and a half percent canceled every month. Today it’s about 2% cancel every month. So, I’ll just put it back to you. Do you think, when we looked at the AB test results… By the way, you can’t get this wrong, Lenny, so just relax.
Lenny: Excellent.
Gibson Biddle: Do you think the Perfect New Release Experience improved retention?
Lenny: My guess is, because you’re telling this story, it’s going to be a surprise, and I would guess that it did not.
Gibson Biddle: Okay, so your guess is we won’t see an improvement in retention. And I’m guessing people listening to us right now, there’s going to be some folks that, oh, shit, yes, that’s what everybody’s asking for. Of course we should deliver it to them, right? Well, in this case, both right, right? We saw a very small change in retention. That was the surprise. And so, it went from something like 4.5% canceled in the control. It was 4.45. Very small change. We can measure it.
And so, now you get in the math of delight versus margin. If you push this out to all million customers, you would essentially save 5,000 customers. And so, what’s the value in saving 5,000 customers? The way we valued it, we said, well we’ve got 5,000 customers. The lifetime value of a customer then was a hundred bucks. And then we multiplied it by two, which is our word of mouth factor. So our theory was, if you loved it, Lenny, you’d tell your friends about it, you’d rave about it, and you’d bring in one other customer for free into Netflix. And so, we used this 2X word of mouth factor. And so if you do that math, it was worth about a million bucks to us as a company.
Gibson Biddle: So now you get into, okay, what’s the cost of that additional inventory? And the answer was 5 million more, so it doesn’t seem to make sense.
Okay, so easy question. I don’t overthink this one, Lenny. Would you roll this out to all customers?
Lenny: I would not.
Gibson Biddle: You would not. Okay. Can you help build an argument for somebody who would choose to roll it out?
Lenny: Oh, no. Give me the hint. I’ll take it.
Gibson Biddle: The hint was, there was an assumption in my formula. I said 5,000 customers times $100 bucks lifetime value, times a 2X word of mouth. So the argument for why somebody might do it, they disagree with the 2X word of mouth, and what the algorithm is.
Lenny: Yeah, I see where this is going. Basically, the experience is so much better that word of mouth increases. It’s so delightful.
Gibson Biddle: Yeah. Amazon would use a 10X, right? And so, sort of a wash there. You’d probably lean forward and do it. We actually worked hard to try to isolate what that word of mouth factor was. It was really frustrating. And then, the reality was, Barry McCarthy was the CFO. He was apoplectic about the idea of using a 2X, because it means you’ll invest more in building a better product. If you let the product team use 10x, Barry’s like, “We don’t have the money. We don’t have the money to spend $5 million on DVDs.”
Anyways, this is where we sort of refined our thinking about the model of delighting customers in hard to copy, margin enhancing ways. Pop quiz, I know the answer, Lenny, but want everybody else thinking about it. What makes Netflix hard to copy?
Lenny: The licensing deals and content that they’re creating.
Gibson Biddle: Original content, yeah. Keep going.
Lenny: Their brand that they’ve built over time.
Gibson Biddle: You trust them with their credit card every month for $20 bucks, right?
Lenny: Oh, absolutely. I think I’ve been a customer for five years.
Gibson Biddle: Yeah, yeah. What else makes them hard to copy?
Lenny: I imagine, their tech that used to be the ranking algorithm recommendation engine.
Gibson Biddle: Yeah, so there’s unique technology. Personalization is a great example. You just brought that up. There’s only one other idea that I think is… Well, there’s probably be two others for Netflix. So keep going, dig deep.
Lenny: Maybe, I don’t know if this is an answer you’re thinking, but just the talent they’ve built up over time is probably something.
Gibson Biddle: That’s really interesting. People go to culture, and then I sort of specify, what makes the Netflix product hard to copy? So, I won’t allow that one.
Lenny: Oh, man.
Gibson Biddle: Okay, keep going.
Lenny: What makes Netflix hard to copy?
Gibson Biddle: I’ll give you one clue.
Lenny: Okay.
Gibson Biddle: What made Facebook wicked hard to copy?
Lenny: Their network effects and growth loops.
Gibson Biddle: Yeah, yeah. We actually tried to experiment with friends and social, getting movie ideas from your friends. The idea is, your friends were on the network, you wouldn’t want to leave. And you’d also get great movie ideas. By the way, that was a failed hypothesis.
Lenny: Right, I was just going to say, I remember that did not work out. I don’t see it anywhere.
Gibson Biddle: Yeah. It did not work out. Yeah, I guess we could make an argument today, every screen in the world is magically prewired so you can watch Netflix anytime, anywhere. There’s sort of a kind of flywheel or network effect at work. But anyways, that’s great. So, that’s just a model. But I have found that model to be helpful in my thinking a bunch of times.
Lenny: There’s a couple things I wanted to follow up on there, because there’s a lot there. One is this idea of testing the ideal almost, and kind of working backwards from that. That’s something I always find found really helpful. Is that something that you espouse and find to be really powerful?
Gibson Biddle: Honestly, I think of these product strategies as these high level theories, these hypotheses about how you will delight customers in hard to copy, margin enhancing ways. I just gave a failed hypothesis, the social one. You actually brought up a winning hypothesis. Personalization delights customers, because it makes it easier to find movies you’ll love. It’s hard to copy. Netflix sort of knows the movie tastes of a billion people worldwide. That’s 222 members times about five profiles per. And then the margin, this is an interesting one.
When Netflix is making an investment in a TV show or movie, they kind of can guess how many people will watch it. So, they guessed that 100 million people would watch Stranger Things, so they were willing to invest 100 million. I call that right sizing the investment, but that’s how personalization helps Netflix to build margin, or to build a better business.
Anyways, back to your original question. I mainly was just trying to find these high level theories and hypotheses that I hoped would delight in hard to copy, margin enhancing ways. The reality was, we’d have 10 ideas and probably six of them would fail, but a lot of value in the three or the four that worked.
When we went to TV based systems, we actually couldn’t A/B test at first, so we were going back to qual and they were looking over people’s shoulders, and focus groups, et cetera. But eventually, Netflix could A/B test what’s a good experience on a TV based system. They have server based systems now where they can create different experiences for different folks. So I guess my short answer was, so hard to find these product strategies that worked. There was no notion of building a perfect experience of all these things together, so we just took it one theory at a time.
Lenny: Got it. And then, on that concept of delight, I always wanted to ask you this question. I’ve never had a chance. For B2B, do you find this is also something companies should really prioritize and do? Because not a lot of B2B products are delightful, and a lot of them are still really successful. How do you think about that kind of framework in B2B?
Gibson Biddle: Okay, first, I think that most all of the frameworks I use work for both consumer and B2B. Personally, I’ve spent my whole career on consumer. The thing about consumer is, you’re sort of trying to catch lightning in a bottle, right? Where enterprise, you can actually walk into it a little bit more thoughtfully. You can always find your first customers, et cetera.
Anyways, I was thinking about what’s different. For instance, one of the hard to copy advantages of B2B is switching costs, right? I didn’t bring that up in the context of Netflix. It’s wicked hard to cancel. It’s wicked easy to cancel Netflix and restart Disney+, whatever you want to do.
Gibson Biddle: I was thinking about, I used to complain that the user interface for B2B software was horrible, and it’s like, you’ve got to do better than this. And of course, at Netflix we proved that a simple, easy experience actually improves retention. So I would advocate, this is important, and they would explain to me all the basics. Hey, Gib. Actually, one of the basics surprised me. The people that are using our software are using it 10, 12, 14 hours a day. That’s very different from a Netflix experience. And in fact, they want and need to engage in the complexity. There’s stuff that they’re trying to do that is really complex.
You can just think about our use of spreadsheets to build a cash flow statement. I’m highlighting some differences, but the model I think is still there. If you’re starting a punk B2B SaaS company, I think at the end of the day, you’re trying to find something that’s 10X better than what’s currently out there today, and then over time, your hard to copy advantage. It will be different from Netflix. It’ll be different for every startup. But if you can delight your customers in these hard to copy ways, that also builds a business.
I mean, the reason you do that, you want to feel like you don’t have to compete with peeps, really. You don’t like it when you’re always on guard about what your competitors should do. You sort of want to get to this place where you don’t really care, and your sort of true North is okay, how can we best serve our customer? And that’s what I really love about that particular model.
Lenny, I would be very careful about anything I say about enterprise and B2B, because I’ve spent zero hours in this, okay? Now, you said half of my audience is in B2B and enterprise, and you hear a lot about the consumerization of enterprise software, and I think that’s good. I think that’s helpful and important.
Lenny: Awesome. That’s a really helpful caveat for folks listening, that if you’re building a B2B business, maybe don’t follow all this advice to the letter. But I imagine there’s still a lot you can pull out.
Gibson Biddle: Well, honestly, it’s so idiosyncratic. It’s going to be different for each company, or each startup, or different stage. And that’s why the tools, the models, the frameworks I use, they have to work generally, but then people have to apply their own good judgment.
Lenny: Sweet. Okay. What I’d love to do is get a little more concrete using this model, and go through a few examples of how you may have thought through problems you were tackling at Netflix through this lens, to kind of see how it actually works in practice. Does that sound good?
Gibson Biddle: That sounds like we’re going to do some rapid fire mini cases.
Lenny: That’s exactly right.
Gibson Biddle: And I’m going to put you in the hot seat, Lenny. You’re the proxy for the listeners today.
Lenny: All right. Just make sure they’re easy questions.
Gibson Biddle: No matter what you say, I’ll make you look smart.
Lenny: I like this. I just want that applied to all of life. Okay, so the first mini case study is something that I’ve seen a lot of people build, kind of hack together, is this idea of watching Netflix together with friends. I think one app is called Netflix Party. So the question there is, should Netflix launch a Netflix Party feature? Basically letting people watch Netflix together but in different places?
Gibson Biddle: Yeah, yeah. It’s kind of a real case. A bunch of engineers at Patreon, six or seven of them, they actually enabled, if you’re using Netflix, they let you connect with your friends on Netflix, watch the same TV show or movie at the same time, and chat with each other while you’re watching it, trash talk each other or use emojis, what have you. They called it Netflix party. The Netflix lawyers noticed it, and so they renamed it Teleparty. It exists. You can use it across multiple games, across Disney and Netflix, whatever you want.
Okay, so the hypothesis is, Netflix should launch this idea for real, not just download the silver light, download the…
Lenny: Chrome extension?
Gibson Biddle: Chrome extension. There you go.
Lenny: Yeah, yeah, yeah. I think I’ve tried it, actually. It’s pretty cool.
Gibson Biddle: Yeah. It’s complicated, right? I mean, you and I are both freaks, so we can figure it out. So the idea is that we’ll delight customers, because this sounds like fun, especially during COVID. We can have this connected experience when we’re also disconnected. Hard to copy advantage. We’re kind of building a network effect. You and I will be connected and watching on Netflix. We don’t want to quit because we don’t want to leave each other behind. And then, the margin. For Netflix, it’s largely about will it improve retention? Netflix today, 2% are canceling. Netflix has just ticked away at it point by point. It’s just, it’s these kinds of things that create a little bit more value, that improve retention.
The way I think about this is, the way that addition of this feature would actually improve retention is if some reasonable number of customers actually used it. And so, what I look out for is, I don’t like two percenters. So if you find an idea that only works for 2% of your customers, now you’re creating complexity, one more thing to choose. What happens when I hit this button?
And frankly, some complexity that everybody else building the product forgets, right? This happened to me a lot. We’d have, in the old days, there was a profiles feature. When we launched streaming, we forgot about the profiles feature for DVD. Like, oh, crap. So, as a rule, I never used rules as thumbs, but these two percenters, I would kill them. If I launched something and it was only 2% we’d, we called it scraping the barnacles, just get rid of it.
So, I think the key question here is, what percent of Netflix members would use Netflix Party if you launched to all? You want to guess at that, Lenny?
Lenny: Let’s say 5%.
Gibson Biddle: 5%. Okay. I think that’s good guess. I’m going to give you some historical context. We actually did Xbox Party back in 2008, 2009. My guess with the Xbox team was it would be a two percenter. I think it barely squeaked to 5%. And then, because it was only at 5%, we killed it. So I think that’s a great guess. If you had said 10 or 15%, then I would’ve been scratching my head. Could that actually have a shot at improving retention?
Anyways, Netflix hasn’t launched this. They could, of course, test it, but I think the history, the failed hypothesis of social, kind of leans against it, and I just gave you two examples. The friends network getting, giving ideas of friends and Netflix, and the second, the Xbox Party. Those are two failed instances of social. Netflix will keep experimenting with this, but in this case they chose not to. So, not enough delight despite the fact that it could build hard to copy advantage. And if you don’t have enough delight, enough usage, there’s no shot at improving margin.
Okay. You were awesome, Lenny. I told you, you sounded exceedingly smart. Okay, what do you got? What’s the next one?
Lenny: Nailed it. Just real quick, I really like the reminder of just focusing on reach and making… As good as the idea might be, just always coming back to what is the reach of this thing? Even if conversion increases like 50%, if like 10 people see it, it doesn’t really matter.
Gibson Biddle: Yeah.
Lenny: That’s such a good reminder.
Gibson Biddle: Cool.
Lenny: Okay, next one is, something that you’ve shared is that during COVID, Netflix auto-canceled, apparently, something like half a percent of its members because they were inactive. And so, the question there would be, why do they do that, and how would Netflix have thought about that?
Gibson Biddle: Yeah. Probably seen Netflix’s stock history. But the beginning of COVID, they thought they were going to have 8 million new members, Q1 2020. They picked up 16 million. So, that was awesome. It was about that time that my perception as the product manager at Netflix was looking at the data focused on non-member experience, I think his name is Eddie Woo. And he was looking at the data, and he noticed half percent of the members weren’t actually enjoying the service, like for a year. They clearly had entered their credit card, their email a year ago, and then just forgot that they had the service.
And so, when he thought about it, he said, you know, I feel like it’s the right thing to actually auto cancel people who aren’t using the service they’re paying. Of course, he was doing it a time where there was great growth, okay? So, let’s use the delight and hard to copy margin enhancing model. Is this a delightful thing to do?
Lenny: Absolutely. I feel really good.
Gibson Biddle: That’s my question. Okay.
Lenny: Yeah, if a company’s like, hey, okay, here, take your money back. You’re not using this thing.
Gibson Biddle: Exactly. And what’s the hard to copy advantage that you’d be building by engaging in this best practice?
Lenny: I imagine there’s kind of a brand halo, just you feel good about Netflix being really good to you.
Gibson Biddle: Totally. So if I told you, and this is the case, Netflix chose to auto cancel these folks like, huh, that’s a really cool thing to do. And then the margin, the bad news, you’re going to lose a hundred million bucks. So, there is delight, there is hard to copy advantage, and you’re going to lose a hundred million bucks. Does that delight and hard to copy advantage outweigh the negative of losing a hundred million?
I’m just going to ask you two more questions. Is this a high stakes decision or a low stakes decision? Eddie’s decision to auto cancel these folks and lose a hundred million bucks. High stakes or low stakes? You’re the product manager, Lenny.
Lenny: It all depends on how much a hundred million is worth to the business. I imagine Netflix is such a large scale where it’s not a huge deal, and it’s a one off that’s not recurring, and so you could give it a shot.
Gibson Biddle: Okay, so you’ve skipped ahead. You’re looking too smart. On magnitude, it’s a hundred million against a company that’s doing 30 billion in revenue. And then, the second thing you brought up is, it’s reversible, which is, he could do it now, but he doesn’t have to continue this practice forever. And so, my joke there, I got married 30 years ago. I was anxious about getting married. My friend said, “Gib, if it doesn’t work out you can always get divorced.” So they’re saying it’s reversible. Now I’ve been married 30 years, so it’s worked out.
But my point here is, as product managers, we feel like every decision we make is high stakes. It’s good occasionally to think about, hey, what’s the magnitude? And then, is it reversible? Amazon calls those, this was a two-way door decision. It’s reversible. The one way door, those are the bigger deal. And I think frankly, most people would argue that getting married is a one way door, but hey, half of folks don’t.
Lenny: Yeah, very hard to reverse. Reversible but expensive.
Gibson Biddle: Okay, what else you got?
Lenny: Okay, so you touched on Netflix’s recent troubles with growth. And so, something that’s always come up is this idea of why don’t they offer a really cheap plan, or a free plan that’s advertise supported. And so, I imagine you’ve thought about that a lot, and Netflix has thought about that a lot. How does that work with your framework?
Gibson Biddle: Well, let’s fast forward two years. Netflix earnings Q1 2022 were bad. For the first time in 10 years, they actually lost customers, and they’d like to get the growth going again. Okay, that’s a different context, right? Today.
Lenny:
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Gibson Biddle: So your question is, should Netflix have a lower-priced, advertising-supported plan?
Lenny: Okay, great.
Gibson Biddle: Okay, let’s do it. We’ll DHM it. Would an ad-supported plan that’s lower price be delightful for customers, Lenny?
Lenny: I don’t know if delightful is the right word, but if I didn’t have a lot of cash, it would feel really nice to be able to use Netflix.
Gibson Biddle: Okay, so the possible delight is, it might only cost you five bucks, or who knows, it might be free, I don’t know. But for a set of customers who are ad tolerant, that might be a reasonable trade off, right? You don’t have to pay 15 or $20 bucks. You could pay maybe five, or two? I don’t really know what the right price is.
Okay, so the next one is, would Netflix be building hard to copy advantage if they did this?
Lenny: I guess the hards of copy pieces, if there’s a network effect, they just accelerate that further, and that gives them some advantage. I don’t know.
Gibson Biddle: Maybe. So if they pick up a new set of people, a new set of profiles, it’s a technical term, as you get big, is you build economies of scale. So if they are able to grow, Netflix, they’ll spend about 8 billion. I just love saying poor Amazon. Because Netflix can amortize it across 220 million members. So, more growth, more customers, and hopefully a different segment of customers that they haven’t gotten yet, so it’s not just cannibalistic, could build more hard copy advantage.
My argument, I’m just going to skip ahead, if you cross fingers, I mean, you are picking up a new customer profile, new customer type, so you’re going to have incremental revenues, which is really what Netflix is looking for. For me, I just want to tell you why Netflix hasn’t done advertising yet. We actually did do it, 5, 6, 7, 8… 2005 through 2008. We put big-ass ad banners on every page on the site, even for the members. We did a retention test, and it actually did not hurt retention. A big surprise. And that was the first year that we generated an operating income of $20 million bucks. It was like the first profitable year.
We also did this at our business. We were selling used discs, previously viewed discs. That’s how we first made money, and Reed Hastings, the CEO, came to me in 2008 and said, “Gib, I need you to kill advertising and previously viewed, because I think we can deliver a profit in our core business.” And he wanted to keep things simple, create this simple experience that’s part of a subscription.
Gibson Biddle: You have had this. We had a lot of pride and ownership. He didn’t involve me in the decision, all of these things, right? He’s just sort of sticking a gun to my head. He only asked me two questions. He said, “Gib, who’s going to be the best in the world at advertising?” And I said, “Google.” And then his second question is, “Who needs to be the best in the world of personalization?” I said, “We do.” And his argument was to kill previously viewed and advertising to create a simple experience for the customers, and so that we could stay manically focused on personalization.
Now fast forward, so on the earnings call, for him, the debate is really between simplicity, which he’s a huge fan of. But during the earnings call he said, “Actually, there’s something I believe in even more, and that’s customer choice.” And he was saying, you know what? I think for this new set of customers, giving them the choice to have a 5 bucks. I’m just plugging that in. In this case, customer choice may be more important than delight. And in this case, rather, customer choice may be more important than the complexity of advertising, or maybe the stinky experience.
Whew. There’s something important. What he said is, today it’s relatively straightforward to execute an advertising-based business doing this. There’s a zillion partners who could do it, so we could continue to focus on the core of what we do, which is personalization. Which I thought was a really thoughtful response. So my guess is, they will do advertising, but he was very contrite. Stock had half of its value. He felt he had disappointed shareholders. So I think he was looking for ways to earn back that trust.
Lenny: Yeah. The market sometimes forces you to do something you didn’t expect. I really like the Socratic Method that Reed uses in the story you shared, where he kind of asks you these questions that help you get to the same conclusion he got to.
Gibson Biddle: Honestly, I reflected on that for five years. Why didn’t he engage me in the decision? And then I just realized… I mean, by the way, this being a CEO is a really hard job. But I realized I had so much pride and ownership, he just knew that I wouldn’t want to kill it, that it would be hard for me to be objective. And he felt strongly that he believed he knew the right answer and said, hey, I just need you to do this. And he was right. So, it took me five years to process that, but there’s a lot of things you do to support the CEO, because that job is really hard.
Lenny: We’re going to talk a bit about the role of a CPO and what you learned on that journey, but one final mini case study. Should Netflix charge for customers to share their accounts with other people, outside of their home, especially?
Gibson Biddle: Yeah, this one’s got a lot of history. Okay, so I sort of told you a bit of the story, which is Netflix’s growth has been excellent until now, and the reason they had that challenging earnings call is, it was just really hard to forecast. They had the influx of customers at the beginning of COVID, I call them fence sitters, that just happened to join en masse. And then, are they going to leave when COVID lifts? Are they going to leave when the theaters open up again? They shut down, for 700,000 Russian members, they shut off the service. You can imagine that in Eastern and central Europe, churn was a little higher than expected. Just nasty.
One of the things that this cloud of COVID forecasting did, obscured how the large extent to which sharing happens. And so, what they said was, in the US and Canada, there’s a hundred million customers total. They think there’s about 30 million folks that are sharing their email password outside the home.
So, how did Netflix get here? Netflix generally, they’ve got three prices, 15 and 20 one. And so, if you looked at their, I call it the price and plan page, it looks like a gas pump. Do you want to the left one, the middle one, or the right hand one? One of the incentives that they provided for folks to choose the $20 a month was the number of multiple streams. They had gone all the way to four streams at the same time. So in my household, four people could be watching the same time.
And of course people shared outside the house, right? And by the way, I don’t think Netflix was clear that you couldn’t. So now, if you look at the price and plan page today, they’re not sort of pitching for multiple streams as the reason you should go to $20 bucks. They’re pitching other things. There’s better resolution. That’s the key one. Better sound quality. You’re going to have HDR sound and video. And then, they did clarify in the fine print that you can use one, two, or four streams for members in your household.
And that was a new clarification, because it used to be kind of with a family. Kelsey and Brit are my daughters. They’re in the house, of course they can use it. They go off to college, they’re still my daughters, they’re part of the family. Of course they can use it. Kelsey gets married. Okay, so this is the first time they clarified it.
So now, I come all the way back to your question. As a potential growth opportunity, they’d obviously like to clarify how this should work, and they started testing in three different countries. Peru is one, and I think in the Caribbean. These smaller countries, I’m sure they’re focused with new members to figure this out first. And so, they have two different things. You could let a person outside your household, you could actually pay a little extra for them as the primary, as the sponsor, if you will. And the other is a function where a person who’s sharing your account in a different household can bump up to their own membership.
So, this is just complicated. Can I make the DHM model work with this? Well it explains why they did it. They were giving multiple streams because it was a really delightful experience. And Netflix says it in the rules. They were very permissive. I don’t really think they worried about this. Was it building hard to copy advantage? Absolutely. More taste profiles, right? And you wouldn’t leave because you didn’t want to cancel the service to your daughter’s and using out on the east coast. And was it building margin? Actually, it was driving people up to the $20 price point, and it was improving churn. You’re getting more value out of service, okay?
So now, what do they do? For me, this is just testing and math. Like, honestly, let’s try it, Lenny. Well, think about those 30 million folks. If you get an email saying, hey, we’ve noticed you’re enjoying the service on somebody else’s nickel, would you like to upgrade to your own plan? What percent of those folks are going to say yes, right? I mean, do you have a guess on that? I don’t have a guess and I don’t have an answer. But this is the game, right?
Lenny: I find with emails, open rates and all these things, it ends up always being really tiny. So I guess, again, probably 5%, maybe 3%.
Gibson Biddle: Okay. I think that’s a fine guess. I’ll just give you a different perspective. This is kind of like a free trial, right? they’ve been using a free trial. And the free trial conversion at the end of a month was 90% at Netflix, right? 90% enjoyed their first month so much that they continued with the service.
Gibson Biddle: So, I mean, I agree with you, it might be five or 10%. I was just giving you that 90% to get you to imagine, huh, maybe it could be 10%, right? Maybe it could be 20%. This is just speculation. I think they’re experimenting in these smaller countries. As we do this, if it were 10%, they’d pick up an additional 3 million in a quarter. I think that’s going to help them when their growth is at a standstill.
The other question would be, would the primary account quit when you tell them their daughters on the east coast can no longer use the service, right?
Lenny: Right.
Gibson Biddle: I think where I’m going on this is, I don’t know if we can give any real insight. The team at Netflix, this is what they live for, and the team at Netflix is testing and experimenting. They’ve probably put in an assumption like yours, 5% will convert, and now they’re seeing if they’re right or wrong, and they’re figuring it in on these smaller countries, and a year or two from now, they will have worked it all out and we’ll see the answer in North America. But I think it’s going to take them a year or two to figure this out, because it’s really hard. But they’re keenly motivated, because they’re trying to get the growth going again.
Lenny: I was trying to watch Super Pumped on Showtime recently, and Showtime wasn’t working, and I have to call my dad, because I’m leaching off their cable login account. And turned out that they moved and they changed their cable plan, and I’m probably the reason they’re keeping a lot of it.
Gibson Biddle: Well, so, Lenny, I was thinking about it. I’m open. I don’t know the answer on this one, but just you and me comparing notes, what do you think? This is the kind of behavior that I love all product leaders to engage in. I call it building your personal board of directors. You’re on mine, because I’ve been learning a lot about newsletters from you, right? Super helpful.
But when I would have questions like these, I would reach out to my pals, like, okay, what’s the right level of investment on a mobile app versus desktop? That was a moving target for years. And I would just text my pals, and they would just give me the data. That’s amazing insight, just by having peers in the business that you talk to, which this is the behavior that I want everybody out there engaged in. I call it building your personal board of directors.
Lenny: I’d love to hear a little bit more on that, actually. How do people do that? Is it pick a few people on a topic and have them as your standing board?
Gibson Biddle: I didn’t even know I was doing this. This concept began for me, I was probably 30-ish. 30, yep. I got promoted to VP and I asked my CEO, “How do I learn how to do the job well?” And he said, “I don’t know. Reach out and build your community of peers.” Like, oh, that was good advice. It really was.
So, at any moment in time… You actually had one of my board members on a podcast, Melissa Perri. She’s on my board, right?
Lenny: Amazing.
Gibson Biddle: Yeah, you voted for her. So, short answer is, it’s really easy to build your community of peers. Just keep up your former colleagues. Keep up on LinkedIn. The harder part is building the mentors. And the first rule of thumb is, don’t ask a person to be your mentor. That’s really awkward. First, identify them. Say, this is a person I think that could be helpful to me. And then, find ways to be helpful. Everybody needs help. Everybody, everybody, everybody.
So, to help you understand the kind of help I need, my greatest fear is aging ungracefully, right? So I’m trying to understand what’s going on. Okay, I asked you earlier, should I be on Discord, right? Like, oh, crap, do I have to be on Discord? But in many cases, somebody can help me to understand Discord. That’s super helpful to me. And that’s how those sort of mentor relationships eventually end up, and between the peers and the mentors, the mentors can help you to see around corners.
Actually, my favorite story of somebody who did approach me, they were in data, they wanted to be in product. They kept asking me, “Hey, do you have any startups I can work with on the weekends?” That’s a good idea. I didn’t have any answers. I got sort of frustrated with them. I said, “Just build me a website, a baby website.” He said, “I can’t build a website.” So I gave him my credit card and said, “Get on Squarespace.” If you go to GibsonBiddle.com, that’s my baby website that John Lou built for me. That was incredibly helpful to me. Someday I should get a real one, but I’ve decided it’s not that important.
Lenny: I also have a baby website on Squarespace.
Gibson Biddle: Exactly.
Lenny: We’re in good company.
Gibson Biddle: Anyways, that’s the concept of a personal board of directors. It’s really important and helpful career advice in the long term.
Lenny: Awesome. I’m glad we chatted about that. That wasn’t something we planned to chat About. Something else I wanted to dive into, beyond strategy, is prioritization. You have a really great model for our prioritization called the JAM model, that I share often with folks. I’d love to just kind of hear your overview of this model, and when it makes sense, and just roughly how to use it.
Gibson Biddle: Yeah, well, it’s a lot easier because it spells something, right? As opposed to saying… I’ll just give you a good case. I joined Chegg 2010. We were inventing a concept of renting textbooks to students instead of buying them, saving them a lot of money. And my first week was challenging, because on one end of the hall, the CEO, Dan, was saying, “Grow, baby. Grow. The most important thing we can do as a startup is grow.” And at the other end of the hall, I had my CFO partner, Greg, saying, “Slow, slow, slow. We actually don’t know if we have a business model that works.” And I could tell he was sort of, the company’s got like 40 people, sort of driving folks crazy.
So, as the product leader, what the heck should I do? And the answer was, I got them in a room and I said, “Listen, I just need you to force rank these three factors for me: growth, engagement, and monetization. And I need the two of you to agree.” So, you could say growth is most important. When we say growth, it’s basically year over year customer growth. Do you want it to be 50% or 10%?
Whatever the answer is, engagement is how I think about product quality. A more engaging product is a better product. So if you think investing in building a better product is super important, then you go with engagement, and the proxy metric that I use for that at Netflix was retention. And then, the third is monetization. You have these customers, you have this product, and how much effort do you put into turning that into a business?
So, Dan said, “Well, that’s easy. Growth, engagement, and monetization.” And Greg said, “Yeah, that’s easy. Monetization, engagement and growth.” He did the flip, right? I’m like, “I’m going to come back in two hours. You guys got to fight this out.” Which is sort of what happened.
So, they agreed on growth first, engagement second, monetization third. And then, a couple months later, it started to happen again. Greg started to say, “No, no, no.” And so, it was that point that Greg actually left the company. Which was, these are the kinds of fundamental misalignments that can wreck startups. I’m not saying that one or the other was right or wrong, but as leaders in the organization, we’ve got to get some of the basic stories straight, including how do we fundamentally prioritize growth versus engagement versus monetization?
Gibson Biddle: This is really the number one source of misalignment that I discover among startups. And startups, you’re always flipping back and forth between growth and engagement. Grow faster, build a better product. Grow fact forth, and then later, you get a little later to monetization. But this model, I find it super helpful to get leaders across an organization fundamentally more aligned.
Lenny: So, if you’re a PM, or maybe a founder, thinking about using this model, would the first step be get your leaders above you to kind of align with you on, of these three things, here’s how we stack rank it?
Gibson Biddle: Personally, I’d start with a SWAG. I would take a shot, a stupid, wild-ass guess of what I think is right, so at least I started with a point of view before I shared it with my team. And frankly, the next most important thing that happens is, if you’re trying to create a metric focused organization that appreciates data and learning through numbers, deciding, I mean, the hardest one is, what is your engagement metric? How do you measure product quality?
At Netflix, it’s monthly retention, but that’s a hard conversation. The growth story’s pretty, like, it’s usually some percentage year over year of customer growth. I mean, but it’s always different, but the only variation on what you said was, have a point of view yourself, and then get everybody’s feedback.
That’s frankly, when I would join a new company, I would give myself two weeks to develop the product strategy for that company, which is a little outrageous, but I would just do it fast. I would develop the SWAG, but then I’d go to one person. “Hey, this is my best thinking, what do you think?” And of course, they had been there for four years. They were much smarter than I, and they would refine my thinking.
I’d do that one by one, and then maybe six weeks later, I could share a product strategy across the company. But this is the value of a SWAG, which is a stupid, wild-ass guess. And don’t be afraid to start at that level.
Lenny: I really like that strategy, versus going in a little hole, spending months just thinking about the perfect answer, and only then presenting. I find this works better.
Gibson Biddle: We’re hiring a consulting company to do it. Go shoot me, okay?
Lenny: I like that you’re hiding your mouth as you say that.
Gibson Biddle: Yeah. Only Lenny can see. Yeah, but this is a podcast, Gib. Nobody can see you.
Lenny: Yeah. I will reveal. Okay, so on that topic actually, I’d love to transition and talk about our last topic, which is around career, or product manager. So, you’re the CPO at two very successful companies, or maybe you’re called the VP of product, but roughly a head of product. You have these two muckety mucks, right? Chief Muckety Muck. And in theory, this is kind of the end state of a PM career if you stay along the path. A lot of PMs go on different paths, but in theory, this is kind of where your career is heading. What would you say it takes to become a CPO someday? What kind of skills do you think you need to build that are maybe not obvious to someone that’s not in that role yet?
Gibson Biddle: Yeah, let’s take a little step by step. Individual contributor, and then to manager. When you’re just starting, you’re just trying to learn the job. And I’d say, at a high level, you’re just trying to optimize for learning in your entire career. But for individuals, building products is hard, and there’s a number of technical skills that are required. So yes, some technical, but a lot of creative skills. There’s some consumer science, that’s the A/B testing. There’s the management. How do you get people working together to actually build stuff? These are technical design skills, right? These are the technical skills.
So, early in your career, you’re just trying to learn the job. And by the way, the job is hard. And second, it’s different from every company to company in different stage. So you, Lenny and I, we’re just trying to be helpful in a leveraged way. But the key thing is, the job’s a little different in everything. So, just try to become expert in your area, expert in whatever your one thing is that you’re building.
And then, the next step to become a manager is, there’s a lot of, communication is sort of the heart, and that’s why I try to… Product strategy is a great way to communicate what’s important and what’s not, try to demystify it. If you’re early in your career, ask if you could be on interview teams, even if you’re not hiring, because then you’re starting to practice something that’s really important as you want to grow your career later, which is it’s really hiring and recruiting people.
When I was in the thick of that, I spent one to two days a week hiring and recruiting. It’s really the most important thing. And then, some amazing opportunity would come along at the company and they’d say, you know what? Maybe somebody on Gib’s team should do it, right? Because they knew I could replace people. There’s always somebody new to pop in. So, I really was expert in hiring and recruiting later in your career.
If you want to be a muckety muck, my theory is the skills of a leader are the same, whether you’re head of product, or the chief financial officer, or head of data. When I’m interviewing any of those kinds of candidates, I am looking for leadership skills. Can they do inspired communication of a vision? I do look for product strategy skills. That helps you to frame what that vision is. I do look for management skills. Have they built and managed teams?
I look for people who are proactive, results oriented. For me, leaders lead. You can’t be a follower. So, I look for really proactive, results oriented folks. And this is pretty nuanced, but later in career, I look for folks who understand how important culture is, because culture helps people to understand the skills and behaviors that are wanted of everyone within the building, and they let you provide leadership in a highly leveraged way, instead of using evil processes and meetings and rules. I look for people who appreciate culture as a tool to help lead organizations.
And then, of course, they had to grow up as a builder. They had to learn all those damn technical skills for product manager. If I abstract outside of all that, honestly, the thing that I probably did best, I think maybe I did three things best. To know me, I was an English major. I’m non-technical, and I didn’t care. First I was in marketing, and then I went into product, which I just loved.
I think I did a good job with sort of optimizing for learning. Actually, one of my hacks was, I started doing talks. I used to call it Topic This and That, on Friday mornings, about something I had just learned. That was the easiest way for me to learn something. So, optimized for learning.
We talked about building a personal board of directors, and that has been incredibly helpful for me, and that probably gets to the third thing. I was a pretty good picker, and the reason I was a good picker of companies is, I would lean on my personal board of directors. Some of them were CFOs. I’m like, “Hey, Barry, I’m thinking about joining this startup, Chegg.” Hey, as a CFO, as a VC, would you invest in it, right? It’s the same question I have to ask, should I invest my time?
Gibson Biddle: So, I had people like that who helped me to isolate, was Electronic Arts a good company to join in 1991? Yes. Was Netflix a good company join in 2005? Yes. Was Chegg a good company to join in 2010? Yes. So, I was fundamentally a good picker, and I would really give a lot of credit to that personal board of directors that I had for that.
Lenny: What about just day to day as a PM, what have you found to be really good habits, and kind of like a routine that PMs follow, that you’ve seen to kind of contribute to the success of an ICPM, especially?
Gibson Biddle: My short answer is, begin your day with intent, okay? What are the three to five things I’m hoping to do today? Second, minimize meetings, okay? Minimize meetings. That sucks the life out of everybody, including you.
Spend a lot of time with your customers. It could be focus groups, it could be usability, it could be looking at survey data, it could be digging the dirt to understand their behavior to the data, and it could be designing and executing A/B test results. Those are all ways of becoming the voice of your customer, and that’s a big part of your job as a product leader.
Find a balance between doing and thinking. Most of us do, do, do. Occasionally stop and ask yourself, okay, what’s important here? What should I really be doing right now, as opposed to the things that I enjoy doing? Self-managing yourself. The only reason people need managers is that we need someone to force us to do the things that are important that we don’t enjoy doing. So, I’m always self-managing myself. Gib, you have to do an invoice. Crap, I’ve got to bill people. That’s no fun, right?
Lenny: That inside voice, inside Gib.
Gibson Biddle: Yeah, that invoice voice. Yeah, our in-voice. Gib, you should write a damn book.
Lenny: Or not.
Gibson Biddle: We’re ignoring that inside voice. Yeah, you and me both. And then, I don’t know, for me, exercise is awesome for me. It keeps me happy. And don’t watch too much TV, and I watch too much TV. So, there you go. And don’t do what I do. Do what I say.
Lenny: Right. Yeah. I also probably watch too much TV. Funny coming from someone that helped build Netflix, but I totally get it. So, too good. It’s too good.
Gibson Biddle: Well, my wife’s trying to cure cancer. She’s like, “Oh, congratulations, Gib. You helped invent binge watching, you idiot. What good are you doing for humanity?”
Lenny: Oh, man. Brings us delight, and that’s valuable.
Gibson Biddle: Yeah, yeah. Thank you very much.
Lenny: Final question. You’ve had this illustrious career. What’s one piece of advice that you’d give a PM in the beginning stages of their career, and then maybe as a bonus, I want maybe mid stage. What comes to mind?
Gibson Biddle: Yeah, I think I did the early stuff. Pick the right company. At some point, understand that you are responsible for your career, not your workplace. And that’s one of the reasons I encourage people to start building that personal board of directors, so you can compare notes. The other thing I say is, don’t listen to your parents, because they’re a generation ahead. They really don’t know what the future looks like. I mean, I know I would give bad advice to my daughter, and so don’t listen to your parents.
And then later, ever since I stopped direct deposit, I think of myself as just purely career hacking. So in your career, it’s just a lot like building a product. You have theories and hypotheses, you find ways to experiment with them, and then you were successful or you failed. So one of my hypothesis, whenever it was, six years ago, was I would enjoy teaching. I actually tried it. I taught at Stanford, entrepreneurship for graduate level engineers, and I really liked it, but I didn’t love it, largely because I was required to be in Palo Alto every fall. I couldn’t travel as much as I like to, right?
Okay, so on one hand, okay, don’t teach in the classroom, and my next vector was, what if I teach outside the classroom? That’s what I really love to do. I do talks, workshops, all around the world in the last two years, virtually. I just love doing that, and I have a ton of flexibility. So, that’s just a little example of me treating my career like, what’s my hypothesis? Finding where to experiment with, and then, based on the results, do the next thing. And I’ve really been doing that my entire career,
So, if you embrace this idea of experimentation, you’re like a product, you need to have hypothesis, you need to try see what works. The next thing you need to do in building a product or building your career is be bold. So, don’t wimp out. At some point, when I’m working with different companies, they all kind of get attracted to the small, incremental wins, and they sort of forgot what made them a successful startup in the beginning, which is taking on fundamental risk. And so, I just nicely encourage people to be bold, to go a little bit out of your comfort zone, because that’s where you learn more, and that comes back to this idea of optimizing for learning.
Anyways, and how do you encourage people to be bold? How do you encourage them to try new things? And the simple thing is, just start. Try it tomorrow. For me, the baby step was when I, on talks, I would just ask my friends if I could drop by and do a talk. I just did it. I didn’t overthink it. I didn’t spend 97 years setting up my display and getting the right clicker. I just gave a really bad talk. But that’s how I started, and then I sort of optimized from there.
Lenny: What a perfect way to end our chat. Really inspiring and helpful advice that I’m going to try to re-listen to and use myself. Just to close, where can folks find you, reach out to you, and then also just, how can listeners be useful to you?
Gibson Biddle: That’s a great question. Thank you. The first, I would say that Lenny has been a mentor for me in “Ask Gib” Product Newsletter. So, I reached out to him via a Twitter and asked him lots of stupid early questions, so he was incredibly helpful. So, probably the most important thing is to know that I write a newsletter every two weeks. That’s the cadence I’m on now. Lenny knew me at the beginning when I was doing dailies. He’s like, “Dude, don’t burn out.” It’s called Ask Gib. I’ve answered like 63 questions so far. I really have enjoyed it.
Second thing would be my baby website GibsonBiddle.com. I have the advantage of being the only Gibson Biddle on the internet. I’m sure you’re the only Lenny, but nobody can spell your last name, right?
Yeah, and then the third, how can people be useful? I’m a feedback freak, so you’ll notice at the end of every talk I do, every essay, whether you find me on Medium, or Ask Gib, wherever, there’s a link to give me feedback. And it’s always the same question: On a scale of zero to 10, where zero sucks, 10 is excellent, how likely would you be to recommend this to a friend?
That has been incredibly helpful to me, and that’s how I’ve learned to slowly get better at everything I do. The insight I get each day from folks is amazing. And I’ll ask one follow up: but what’d you like, and what could be better? And it’s just been incredibly helpful. So, don’t ignore that link at the end. Don’t treat it like United Airlines asking how is your flight? This is important, damn it! And your feedback is incredibly helpful to me, so thank you.
Lenny: I’m going to go answer some of your surveys now. Thank you so much for doing this. I learned a ton, and I really appreciate your time.
Gibson Biddle: That was great fun, Lenny, and thanks a ton for your help with my Ask Gib newsletter, as well.
Lenny: Forever and Ever.
Gibson Biddle: Okay, cool. I’ll hold you to that.
Lenny: That was awesome. Thank you for listening. If you enjoyed the chat, don’t forget to subscribe to the podcast. You could also learn more at LennysPodcast.com. I’ll see you in the next episode.
Glossary
| English | 中文 |
|---|---|
| Barry McCarthy | 保留原文(Netflix 前任 CFO) |
| Blockbuster | 百视达(前美国连锁影视租赁公司) |
| Bob Baxley | 保留原文(产品设计领域的从业者,无公认中文译名) |
| BoJack Horseman | 《马男波杰克》(Netflix 原创动画剧集) |
| builder | 建设者 |
| cannibalistic | 互相蚕食的 |
| Chegg | 保留原文 |
| Coda | 保留原文 |
| Creative Wonders | 保留原文 |
| Dan | 保留原文(Chegg 前任 CEO Dan Rosensweig) |
| DHM | 保留原文(Delight, Hard to copy, Margin-enhancing,愉悦、难以复制、利润提升模型) |
| economies of scale | 规模经济 |
| Eddie Woo | 保留原文(Netflix 产品经理) |
| Electronic Arts | Electronic Arts(EA) |
| engagement | 参与度 |
| fence sitters | 骑墙派(指观望中、犹豫是否加入的用户) |
| Flat File | 保留原文 |
| flywheel | 飞轮 |
| focus group | 焦点小组 |
| force rank | 强制排序 |
| From Zero to One | 《从0到一》(Peter Thiel 著作) |
| Gibson Biddle | 保留原文 |
| Greg | 保留原文(Chegg 前任 CFO) |
| growth loops | 增长飞轮 |
| HB Mock | 保留原文 |
| hot seat | 热座(指被当众提问、承受压力的位置) |
| JAM model | JAM 模型(增长 Jumpstart/增长、参与度、变现优先排序模型) |
| John Daz | 保留原文 |
| John Lou | 保留原文 |
| Learning Company | 保留原文 |
| Lenny | 保留原文 |
| lifetime value | 生命周期价值 |
| Melissa Perri | 保留原文(产品管理领域专家) |
| mentor | 导师 |
| monetization | 变现 |
| Mr. Wonderful | 保留原文 |
| muckety muck | 大人物(俚语,指高职位的人) |
| network effects | 网络效应 |
| non-member page | 非会员页面 |
| one way door | 单向门 |
| operating income | 营业利润 |
| Oregon Trails | 保留原文 |
| Patreon | 保留原文(创作者订阅平台) |
| personal board of directors | 个人董事会 |
| Peter Thiel | 彼得·蒂尔(知名企业家、投资人) |
| PostHog | 保留原文(产品分析平台) |
| previously viewed discs | 二手碟片 |
| price and plan page | 价格与套餐页面 |
| Product School | 保留原文 |
| product-market fit | 产品市场契合 |
| profiles | 用户画像(Netflix 的多用户分身功能) |
| proxy metric | 代理指标 |
| punk | 保留原文(此处为口语化用法,形容初创、草根的) |
| qual | 定性研究(qualitative research 的简称) |
| Reader Rabbit | 保留原文 |
| Reed Hastings | 里德·哈斯廷斯(Netflix 联合创始人兼 CEO) |
| retention | 留存率 |
| right sizing the investment | 合理匹配投资规模 |
| scraping the barnacles | 刮藤壶(比喻砍掉使用率极低的功能) |
| Shark Tank | 《创智赢家》 |
| Showtime | 保留原文 |
| sponsor | 赞助方(此处指账号的主付费人) |
| stopping direct deposit | 停止直接入账(指不再拿固定工资/不再做全职受薪雇员) |
| Stranger Things | 《怪奇物语》(Netflix 原创剧集) |
| Super Pumped | 保留原文(Showtime 出品的电视剧) |
| Survey Monkey | 保留原文 |
| SWAG | 保留原文(stupid wild-ass guess,蠢大胆瞎猜) |
| switching costs | 转换成本 |
| Teleparty | 保留原文(原 Netflix Party 的更名) |
| Topic This and That | 保留原文(Gibson Biddle 在周五早上做的内部学习分享活动名称) |
| Tuck | 保留原文 |
| two percenter | 百分之二选手(比喻只有极少数用户使用的功能) |
| two-way door decision | 双向门决策 |
| word of mouth factor | 口碑系数 |
| Xbox Party | 保留原文 |
Reformatted by reformat_english.py
Gibson Biddle 谈 DHM 产品战略框架、GEM 路线图优先级框架、5 个 Netflix 战略迷你案例、打造个人董事会,以及更多内容
文字记录
Lenny (00:04): Gibson Biddle,顺便说一下,这个名字念起来真的很有趣。全世界直接教过、合作过的产品经理比他多的人屈指可数。在全职投入教学之前,他先后担任过 Netflix 和 Chegg 的产品副总裁,还写了一篇几乎可以肯定是 Medium 上最受欢迎的产品战略文章。
Lenny (00:21): 在我们的对话中,我们了解了 Gibson 非常受欢迎的产品战略与优先级排序框架,并通过他在 Netflix 期间的大量真实案例来看看这些框架在现实中如何应用。我很喜欢 Gibson 能想出如此清晰、令人印象深刻的框架,帮助消除围绕战略和优先级排序的模糊性。我们真的很幸运能请 Gibson 来分享这些,希望你喜欢。
赞助商:Flat File
Lenny (00:45): 本期节目由 Flat File 赞助。回想一下你上次导入电子表格的情形。第一次就成功了吗?多半没有。你大概遇到了什么奇怪的错误,不得不尝试一堆操作,比如删掉列标题上方的空白标题行,或者去搜索如何用 UTF-8 编码保存。UTF 到底是什么?谁在乎?你只是想把文件送到它该去的地方,好干正事。
Lenny (01:07): 你的客户在最重要的时刻——注册你的产品之后——也会遇到同样的问题。Flat File 登场。Flat File 是一个数据引导(data onboarding)平台,旨在消除将客户数据导入你的产品时的剧痛,让他们能看到你承诺的效果。Flat File 通过了 SOC 类型一和类型二认证,符合 GDPR,甚至符合 HIPAA,确保你的客户无论身处世界何处,都能在整个流程中安全、合规地共享数据。不用再来回邮件发送文件。不用再看那些根本不管用的帮助文档。第一天就有干净的数据,在最关键的时刻。请访问 FlatFile.com/Lenny,几分钟内即可开始导入数百万行客户数据。
赞助商:Coda
Lenny (01:50): 本期节目由 Coda 赞助。Coda 是一个一体化文档,将文档、电子表格和应用的最佳功能集于一处。我其实每天都在用 Coda。它是我的大本营,用来组织我的 Newsletter 写作。我在那里规划内容日历、收集研究资料、撰写每篇文章的初稿。它也是我为付费 Newsletter 订阅者管理私人知识库的地方,同时也是我管理这档播客工作流的工具。
Lenny (02:15): 这些年来,我看到 Coda 从一个提升团队效率的工具,进化为同时也能将科技行业最佳实践落地的平台,Coda 文档库中拥有极其丰富的模板和指南合集,包括本播客许多嘉宾的资源,包括 Shreyas、Gokul,以及 Coda 的 CEO Shishir。一些最顶尖的团队,如 Pinterest、Spotify、Square 和 Uber,都在使用 Coda 高效运转,并公开了他们的模板供所有人使用。
Lenny (02:43): 如果你还在大量文档和电子表格之间来回跳转,让生活好起来,开始使用 Coda 吧。你可以享受专门面向创业公司的限时优惠。前往 Coda.io/Lenny 注册,即可在首次账单上获得一千美元的额度。那就是 C-O-D-A.io/Lenny,注册后在你的账户上获得一千美元额度。
Gibson Biddle 的产品之路
Lenny (03:14): Gibson,我真的非常兴奋能做这期节目。我们之前合作写过一些文章,一起做过几次炉边谈话,但从来没有真正深入地聊过什么,所以我非常珍惜这次机会。欢迎你。
Gibson Biddle (03:27): 太好了,Lenny。谢谢你的邀请。能在同一时间虚拟地待在同一个地方,很有趣。总有一天我们会面对面地做这件事。
Lenny (03:35): 天哪,我等不及了。对于不太熟悉你的听众,能不能简要介绍一下你的产品从业经历?
Gibson Biddle (03:43): 这很难,因为我老得掉渣了,很难简短,但我会尽力。前面介绍提到过,我很早就发现自己热爱教学。我办过一所帆船学校,大学休学了一年。那是我的第一次创业。然后,我的人生有三个篇章。第一个是在营销领域,我实际上是从一家广告公司的收发室起步的,然后转入客户服务,还创建了一项为新建公司和产品命名的服务,比如你在湾区的话,Versatel,或者 Versateller,那是美国银行(Bank of America)的名字。
Lenny (04:10): 我一直对这个行业很好奇,不过这个话题改天再聊。
Gibson Biddle (04:14): 哦对,我们可以回头再聊。但归根结底,它讲的都是包装、定位和品牌。所以,我对这些产生了好奇,也变得擅长。后来,我住在硅谷,想进入科技行业,所以我决定回商学院深造,我去了 Tuck,在达特茅斯(Dartmouth)。它是唯一一所有自己滑雪场的商学院——这就是我去那儿的原因。学校在汉诺威,新罕布什尔州。
Lenny (04:35): 好吧,这对 Gibson 来说感觉就是产品市场契合(product-market fit)。
Gibson Biddle (04:37): 没错。然后,毕业之后,科技之旅开始了,我加入了 Electronic Arts。懵懂小子,在对的时间出现在了对的地方。我以营销身份加入,然后转到了产品端。那是学习产品管理的好地方。他们称之为”制作人学院”(Producer College)。我学到了大量东西,我的第一次创业实际上是 Electronic Arts 和 Disney 的一家合资企业。我们最初创建的叫 EA Kits,后来变成了 Creative Wonders,我们把那家公司卖给了《创智赢家》(Shark Tank)里的 Mr. Wonderful。他当时是 Learning Company 的 CEO,那家公司做了 Reader Rabbit 软件和 Oregon Trails。这暴露我的年龄了,因为大多数听众小时候大概都玩过 Oregon Trails。
Lenny (05:13): 死于痢疾。这就是我的记忆。
Gibson Biddle (05:15): 对,对。所以,后来我逐步成长为产品领域的高管——我称之为”大人物”,就是产品副总裁或首席产品官(chief product officer)。2005 年加入 Netflix。中间我省略了一些失败的创业经历。这很重要。重要的是让大家知道我也有过失败的创业,不过在简短版本里可以略过。2005 年 Netflix,然后 2010 年我回到了自己的初心——教学。Chegg 是一家课本租赁和作业辅导公司,现在还在运营。我们大约在 2014 年将其上市。
Gibson Biddle (05:44): 然后,过去五年我停止了直接入账(stopping direct deposit),重新回到了我职业生涯的初心。我回到了教学,这是我真正热爱的事情。所以我在世界各地做演讲、工作坊。我写更多的文章,这样能保护嗓子,同时尝试各种方式真正去帮助全球的产品领导者。
“停止直接入账”
Lenny (06:02): 太棒了。我们接下来会深入聊聊其中一些内容。你刚才用”停止直接入账”来描述你职业生涯的这个阶段?
Gibson Biddle (06:08): 是的。
Lenny (06:09): 太妙了。哇。我从没听过这种说法。
Gibson Biddle (06:14): 至少你听懂了。
Lenny (06:15): 我完全理解。太厉害了。那么,我想问一下你这类工作中的同行——通过免费工作坊、咨询、在线课程以及其他你所做的一切,你觉得你大概帮助培训过多少产品经理?
Gibson Biddle (06:28): 我还以为这是个”换一个灯泡需要多少个产品经理”的笑话呢。我以为是笑话。对,好。我的 SWAG——SWAG 是 stupid wild-ass guess(蠢大胆瞎猜)的缩写,很关键的概念——所以,我的猜测是,在现实生活中,我与产品领导者有过面对面合作、同处一栋楼的,大概 500 到 1000 人。当我管理一个组织时,里面可能有 200 或 300 人。所以,这是面对面的数字。
Gibson Biddle (06:53): 下一个渠道是通过演讲、工作坊、newsletter。这个大概——我可以用 SWAG 的方式估算一下——大概每年 5 万到 10 万人。我之所以大概知道,是因为我是一个反馈狂,所以我做的每件事最后都会放一个 Survey Monkey 问卷。比如说,每天早上我醒来,收到的反馈都是同一场演讲的。我为 Product School 做了一场 Branding for Builders 演讲,大概会有 10 份问卷。我已经收到了大约 6000 份关于那场演讲的问卷。他们都是在看录像的。我猜这意味着大概有 6 万人看过那一个视频。
Gibson Biddle (07:26): 总之,算上整个生命周期,大概到了 50 万到 100 万的量级。这就是我的 SWAG。两边误差可能都有两倍。
Lenny (07:34): 好的,有可能到一百万。
Gibson Biddle (07:36): 嗯,你的数字更大。你可以直接推算——你的 newsletter 有多少来着,11 万 5 千订阅者?
Lenny (07:43): 对。
Gibson Biddle (07:44): 你都快到十亿了,Lenny。你要进入下一个层级了。五亿到十亿。
Lenny (07:49): 我觉得你对产品经理的帮助对大多数人来说层次更深,尤其是你做的那些课程之类的。所以,不太好直接比较。但不管怎样,真的非常厉害,我觉得我问别人这个问题的时候,这会是一个很高的标杆。
产品战略模型
Lenny (08:04): 所以我很期待深入聊聊你在这段旅程中学到的很多东西。也许你花时间最多的领域就是帮助产品经理通过工作坊来锻炼他们的产品战略能力,而且你关于产品战略的那些 Medium 文章堪称传奇。所以我想把大部分时间用来聊聊如何帮助大家培养这种能力。也许可以先从这一点开始——你有一个非常简洁的模型来描述公司的产品战略应该是什么:以难以复制、提升利润率的方式让客户愉悦(to delight customers in hard to copy, margin enhancing ways)。这里面有三个部分:客户、难以复制、提升利润率。我想听听你对这三个部分各自的看法,你是怎么想出这个模型的,然后也许可以讲一两个你在 Netflix 依赖并运用这个模型的故事。
Gibson Biddle (08:42): 好的。你把模型说对了。简短的回答是,这确实是我加入 Netflix 时从 Reed Hastings 那里学到的。实际上,他在录用我之前向我的一个朋友做了背景调查,他问我那位朋友——我朋友叫 John Daz——唯一的问题就是:“嘿,John,Gib 准备好了吗?Gib 能让客户愉悦吗?“这是他在背景调查中问的唯一问题。
Gibson Biddle (09:05): 幸运的是,我之前做的儿童软件确实非常令人愉悦。那时候,大家还在谈论让客户满意、仔细倾听、理解客户等等。而”愉悦”这个词说的是——不不不,工作目标是让客户愉悦。就像 Peter Thiel 在他的书《从0到1》里说的那样,创业者最初的任务就是找到比现有方案好 10 倍的东西。“愉悦”就是要在那个量级上做文章。
Gibson Biddle (09:28): “难以复制”这一部分,确实也是我学到的。我有一个在我手下工作的产品负责人,叫 HB Mock。他负责非会员页面,就是人们注册的地方——输入邮箱、信用卡,然后获得免费试用。那个页面一开始看起来很糟糕,就像所有创业公司刚开始时一样什么都很难看,但他在这个页面上放了一个坐在沙发上其乐融融的家庭画面,就是你输入邮箱的地方。这让更多人参与进来了。所以它让客户愉悦了,同时也在帮助建设业务,因为有更多人注册了免费试用。
Gibson Biddle (09:58): 我说,HB,这很好,但我敢拿我的工资打赌,不出一周 Blockbuster 也会在他们的沙发上放一个幸福家庭。这就是做容易复制的事情的问题所在。所以从长期来看,如果你能让客户愉悦,同时创造难以复制的优势,情况就会好得多。
Gibson Biddle (10:17): 最后一个短语,margin enhancement,提升利润率,其实就是赚钱的一种高级说法。margin 严格来说就是利润。我刚才给你举了那个非会员页面的例子,沙发上幸福家庭的画面。它让人们愉悦,帮助建设更好的业务,但在那个案例中,Blockbuster 可以轻易抄袭。
Gibson Biddle (10:37): 这就是那个模型。这个模型中最难的部分是,你如何平衡愉悦与利润率?如果 Netflix 说,各位,你们现在每天付 20 美元,但明天开始每个月只要 5 美元就能得到完全一样的服务,你一定会觉得,这也太棒了。你会非常愉悦。但 Netflix 的生意就撑不下去了。
愉悦与利润率的博弈:完美新发行体验测试
Gibson Biddle (10:56): 所以,我们最早探索如何权衡愉悦与利润率的地方之一——在早期,Netflix 是一家邮寄 DVD 的公司——如果你问客户想要什么,他们说的都一样:我想更快拿到新发行的 DVD,对吧?那时候,大多数客户要等上一两周甚至四周。那时候,一部电影先在影院上映,两个月后才出 DVD。我们根本买不起足够多的碟片来满足最初的需求。所以实际情况是,有些人第二天就能在邮件中收到,有些人则要等上两个月。
Gibson Biddle (11:31): 所以我们设置了 A/B 测试。我们说,好吧,大家都说想要这个——不管是焦点小组、定性研究还是问卷调查都是如此。那我们来做个 A/B 测试看看能发现什么。这个 A/B 测试叫做”完美新发行体验测试”(Perfect New Release Test)。想象一下,我们大约是在 2005 年,有大约一百万客户。其中一万人被分到测试组,他们第二天就能在邮件中收到新发行的 DVD。很棒吧?对照组则按正常时间拿到。平均来说可能是两周之后。
Gibson Biddle (12:01): 那么,在这个 A/B 测试中我们衡量愉悦的方式是:对于第二天就能收到 DVD 的人,留存率是否会提高?这就是我们的衡量方式——留存率。Netflix 刚起步的时候,每个月大约有 10% 的客户流失。2005 年,每月大约 4.5%。今天大约是每月 2%。所以,我把问题抛回给你。当我们看 A/B 测试结果的时候……顺便说一句,Lenny,这个你答什么都没关系,放轻松。
Lenny (12:35): 太好了。
Gibson Biddle (12:35): 你觉得”完美新发行体验”提升了留存率吗?
Lenny (12:40): 我的猜测是——因为你在讲这个故事,所以肯定有反转——我猜没有。
Gibson Biddle (12:45): 好的,你的猜测是我们看不到留存率的提升。我猜现在听我们说话的人里,肯定有一些在想,靠,当然了,这不就是大家都在要求的吗?我们当然应该提供给他们,对吧?但在这个案例中,两边都对。我们看到了留存率的变化非常小。这就是令人意外的地方。对照组的流失率从大约 4.5% 变成了 4.45%。变化非常小,但我们能量化出来。
Gibson Biddle (13:13): 于是你就进入了愉悦与利润率的算账环节。如果把这个推广到全部一百万客户,你基本上能挽回 5000 个客户。那么,挽回 5000 个客户的价值是多少?我们的估值方式是这样的:我们有 5000 个客户,当时一个客户的生命周期价值(lifetime value)是 100 美元,然后我们再乘以 2,这是我们的口碑系数(word of mouth factor)。我们的理论是,如果你很喜欢,Lenny,你会告诉你的朋友,你会大加赞赏,然后会免费再为 Netflix 带来一个新客户。所以我们用了 2 倍的口碑系数。这样算下来,对公司来说大概值一百万美元。
Gibson Biddle (13:52): 那么现在你就要算,这部分额外库存的成本是多少?答案是 500 万美元。一方面,你通过留存更多客户带来了 100 万美元的价值,但另一方面你多花了 500 万美元,所以看起来不划算。
Gibson Biddle (14:06): 好,简单的问题。我不会把这个问题想得太复杂,Lenny。你会把这个推广到全部客户吗?
Lenny (14:10): 我不会。
Gibson Biddle (14:11): 你不会。好的。你能帮那些选择推广的人构造一个论据吗?
Lenny (14:17): 哦,不行。给我个提示吧,我接。
Gibson Biddle (14:18): 提示是,我的公式里有一个假设。我说是 5000 个客户乘以 100 美元生命周期价值(lifetime value),再乘以 2 倍的口碑系数(word of mouth factor)。所以那些可能选择推广的人的理由是,他们不同意 2 倍口碑系数这个假设,以及不同意背后的算法。
Lenny (14:33): 对,我明白你的意思了。基本上就是说,体验好太多了,所以口碑会大幅增长。太令人愉悦了。
Gibson Biddle (14:38): 没错。Amazon 会用 10 倍,对吧?所以基本上一抵消,你可能就会倾向于推进。我们其实花了很多力气试图分离出口碑系数到底是多少。过程非常令人沮丧。然后现实是,Barry McCarthy 是 CFO。他对使用 2 倍系数这个想法暴跳如雷,因为这意味着你会在打造更好的产品上投入更多钱。如果你让产品团队用 10 倍系数,Barry 就会说,“我们没有那么多钱。我们没有 500 万美元去花在 DVD 上。“
Netflix 难以复制的原因
Gibson Biddle (15:03): 总之,这就是我们逐步完善那个模型的过程——以难以复制、提升利润率的方式来愉悦客户。突击小测验,我知道答案,Lenny,但我想让其他人也想想。是什么让 Netflix 难以复制?
Lenny (15:18): 他们的授权协议和自己创建的内容。
Gibson Biddle (15:22): 原创内容,对。继续。
Lenny (15:24): 他们长期建立起来的品牌。
Gibson Biddle (15:26): 你每个月放心地把信用卡交给他们付 20 美元,对吧?
Lenny (15:28): 哦,绝对的。我想我已经当了五年的客户了。
Gibson Biddle (15:31): 对,对。还有什么让他们难以复制?
Lenny (15:34): 我想,应该是他们的技术,以前那个排名算法推荐引擎。
Gibson Biddle (15:37): 对,独特的核心技术。个性化就是一个很好的例子。你刚提到了。我认为还有一个想法……嗯,对 Netflix 来说可能还有两个。继续想,再挖深一点。
Lenny (15:48): 也许,我不知道这是不是你想的答案,但他们长期积累的人才应该也算一个。
Gibson Biddle (15:53): 这很有意思。人们经常会说到文化,然后我会进一步明确:是什么让 Netflix 的产品难以复制?所以这个不算。
Lenny (16:01): 哎,天哪。
Gibson Biddle (16:02): 好吧,继续。
Lenny (16:03): 什么让 Netflix 难以复制?
Gibson Biddle (16:05): 我给你一个线索。
Lenny (16:06): 好。
Gibson Biddle (16:06): 什么让 Facebook 极难复制?
Lenny (16:08): 他们的网络效应(network effects)和增长飞轮(growth loops)。
Gibson Biddle (16:12): 对,对。我们其实尝试过做朋友和社交的实验,从朋友那里获取电影推荐。想法是,你的朋友们都在这个网络上,你就不想离开了。而且你还能得到很棒的电影推荐。顺便说一句,那是一个失败的假设。
Lenny (16:25): 对,我正想说,我记得那个没有成功。我现在已经看不到任何痕迹了。
Gibson Biddle (16:28): 对。确实没有成功。嗯,我想今天可以这样论证:世界上每一块屏幕都神奇地预先接好了网,所以你可以随时随地看 Netflix。这其实有点像一种飞轮(flywheel)或网络效应(network effect)在起作用。但不管怎样,很好。所以,这就是那个模型。我发现这个模型在我的思考中多次帮到了我。
产品策略与高层假设
Lenny (16:44): 有几件事我想追问一下,因为这里面内容很多。一个是这个测试理想状态、然后反向推导的思路。我一直觉得这个方法非常有帮助。这是你推崇并且认为很有效的方法吗?
Gibson Biddle (16:58): 说实话,我把这些产品策略看作高层理论,看作关于如何以难以复制、提升利润率的方式来愉悦客户的假设。我刚给了一个失败假设的例子——那个社交的。你其实提到了一个成功的假设。个性化让客户愉悦,因为它让你更容易找到你会喜欢的电影。它难以复制。Netflix 大致掌握了全世界十亿人的电影品味。那是 2.22 亿会员乘以每人大约 5 个用户画像。然后利润率方面,这就很有意思了。
Gibson Biddle (17:27): 当 Netflix 投资一部电视剧或电影时,他们大致能猜到有多少人会看。所以他们猜到会有 1 亿人看《怪奇物语》(Stranger Things),于是愿意投资 5 亿美元。他们猜到会有 2000 万人看《马男波杰克》(BoJack Horseman)——我是个怪人——所以他们愿意投入 1 亿美元。我称之为合理匹配投资规模(right sizing the investment),这就是个性化如何帮助 Netflix 提升利润率、或者说构建更好的业务的方式。
Gibson Biddle (17:54): 总之,回到你最初的问题。我主要就是在寻找这些高层理论和假设,希望它们能以难以复制、提升利润率的方式带来愉悦。现实是,我们会有 10 个想法,大概 6 个会失败,但那三四个奏效的创造了巨大的价值。
Gibson Biddle (18:10): 当我们转向电视端系统时,一开始其实没法做 A/B 测试,所以只能回过头做定性研究(qual),在人们身后观察他们的操作、做焦点小组(focus group)等等。但最终,Netflix 可以在电视端系统上 A/B 测试什么是好的体验了。他们现在有基于服务器的系统,可以为不同的用户创建不同的体验。所以我想简短的回答是,找到奏效的产品策略太难了。并不存在把所有这些东西组合成一个完美体验的概念,所以我们就是一次一个假设地去试。
B2B 与愉悦框架
Lenny (18:40): 明白了。然后,关于”愉悦”这个概念,我一直想问你这个问题,一直没机会问。对于 B2B,你觉得这也是企业应该真正优先考虑和做的事情吗?因为很多 B2B 产品并不令人愉悦,但其中很多仍然非常成功。你怎么看待这个框架在 B2B 中的应用?
Gibson Biddle (18:55): 好的,首先,我认为我使用的大部分框架对消费端和 B2B 都适用。就我个人而言,我整个职业生涯都在做消费端。做消费端的话,你基本上是在试图把闪电装进瓶子里,懂吧?而企业端,你可以更从容地、有计划地进入。你总能找到第一批客户,等等。
Gibson Biddle (19:15): 总之,我在想有什么不同。比如,B2B 的一个难以复制的优势是转换成本(switching costs),对吧?我在 Netflix 的语境下没提这个。取消订阅太难了——不对,取消 Netflix 太简单了,换成重新订阅 Disney+ 也轻而易举,想换就换。
Gibson Biddle (19:29): 我在想,我以前总抱怨 B2B 软件的用户界面太糟糕了,就觉得你们得做得更好吧。当然,在 Netflix 我们证明了简洁易用的体验确实能提升留存率。所以我总是大力倡导这一点——这很重要。然后他们就会给我解释一些基本常识。嘿,Gib。其实有一条基本常识让我挺意外的——使用我们软件的人,每天要用 10、12、14 个小时。这和 Netflix 的体验完全不同。而且事实上,他们就需要、也渴望那种复杂性。他们想做的事情本身就是高度复杂的。
Gibson Biddle (20:07): 你想想我们用电子表格来搭建现金流报表就知道了。我在这里强调的是一些差异,但我认为那个模型依然适用。如果你正在创办一家 punk B2B SaaS 公司,我认为归根结底,你要找到比现有方案好 10 倍的东西,然后随着时间推移建立起你难以复制的优势。这种优势会和 Netflix 的不同,也会和每一家创业公司的不同。但如果你能以这些难以复制的方式让客户感到惊喜,那同样能建立一门生意。
Gibson Biddle (20:36): 我是说,你之所以要这么做,是因为你想达到一种不必与同行竞争的境界,真的。你不想一直提防竞争对手的动向。你更想达到一种不太在乎那些的状态,你真正的北极星就是:我们怎样才能最好地服务客户?这也是我特别喜欢这个模型的地方。
Gibson Biddle (20:53): Lenny,我对企业端和 B2B 说的一切都要打很大折扣,因为我在这方面花的工时为零,好吗?不过你刚才说我一半的听众在 B2B 和企业端,而且现在经常听到”企业软件消费化”的说法,我觉得这是好事,有帮助,也重要。
Lenny (21:13): 太好了。这条免责声明对听众来说非常有用——如果你在做 B2B 业务,也许不要把这些建议照单全收。但我想其中仍然有很多值得借鉴的地方。
Gibson Biddle (21:21): 嗯,说实话,这非常因情况而异。每家公司、每家创业公司、每个阶段都不一样。这就是为什么我使用的那些工具、模型、框架必须具有普适性,但人们还要运用自己的判断力去应用。
案例实战:迷你案例分析
Lenny (21:33): 好。接下来我想借助这个模型更具体一些,通过几个例子来看看你在 Netflix 时是如何透过这个框架思考所面对的问题的,看看它在实际中怎么运作。可以吗?
Gibson Biddle (21:48): 听起来我们要做一轮快问快答的迷你案例分析。
Lenny (21:50): 完全正确。
Gibson Biddle (21:51): 而且我要把你推到热座上,Lenny。今天你就是听众的代言人。
Lenny (21:55): 好吧。确保问题简单就行。
Gibson Biddle (21:58): 不管你说什么,我都会让你显得很聪明。
Lenny (22:01): 我喜欢这个。真希望这句话能应用到生活的方方面面。好,第一个迷你案例是我看到很多人在搭、在拼凑的一个东西——和朋友一起看 Netflix 的想法。好像有个应用叫 Netflix Party。那么问题是,Netflix 应不应该推出一个 Netflix Party 功能?就是让身处不同地方的人可以一起看 Netflix?
案例一:Netflix Party
Gibson Biddle (22:22): 对对,这其实是个真实案例。Patreon 的一群工程师,六七个人,他们做了一个东西——如果你在用 Netflix,他们让你和朋友连接起来,同时看同一部电视剧或电影,一边看一边聊天,互相吐槽、发表情包什么的。他们管它叫 Netflix Party。后来 Netflix 的律师注意到了,于是他们改名叫 Teleparty。这东西现在还在,你可以在多个平台上用,Disney、Netflix 随你选。
Gibson Biddle (22:52): 好,那么假设是:Netflix 应该正式推出这个功能,不只是下载那个 silver light……下载那个……
Lenny (23:01): Chrome 扩展?
Gibson Biddle (23:02): Chrome 扩展。对。
Lenny (23:03): 对对对,我好像还真试过。挺酷的。
Gibson Biddle (23:06): 是的。但它有门槛,对吧?你和我都是极客,所以能搞定。这个想法的逻辑是:我们会让客户感到惊喜,因为这听起来很有趣,尤其在疫情期间。我们在物理隔离的同时还能拥有这种连接的体验。难以复制的优势——我们相当于在构建一种网络效应。你和我连接在一起,在 Netflix 上一起看,我们不想退出,因为不想抛下对方。然后是利润率。对 Netflix 来说,核心问题是这能否提升留存率。Netflix 目前的月退订率是 2%,Netflix 一直在一点一点地啃,把退订率一点一点降下来。正是这类能多创造一点价值的东西,在改善留存率。
Gibson Biddle (23:45): 我对这件事的看法是,这个功能要想真正改善留存率,前提是得有一定数量的客户真正使用它。所以我特别警惕的是——我不喜欢”百分之二选手”。如果你发现一个想法只对 2% 的客户有效,那你其实是在制造复杂性——又多了一个要选择的东西,“我按这个按钮会怎样?”
Gibson Biddle (24:10): 而且说实话,这种复杂性其他做产品的人也会忘掉,对吧?这种事在我身上发生过很多次。以前有一个”用户画像”功能。我们推出流媒体的时候,把 DVD 那边的用户画像功能给忘了。哦,糟糕。所以,作为一条原则——我一般不用规则性经验法则——但这些”百分之二选手”,我会砍掉。如果我上线了一个功能,只有 2% 的使用率,我们会叫它”刮藤壶”——直接把它刮掉。
Gibson Biddle (24:34): 所以我认为这里的关键问题是:如果 Netflix Party 向所有用户推出,百分之多少的会员会使用它?你来猜猜看,Lenny?
Lenny (24:44): 就算 5% 吧。
Gibson Biddle (24:46): 5%。好的。我觉得这个猜测很好。我来给你一些历史背景。我们其实在 2008、2009 年做过 Xbox Party。我当时和 Xbox 团队的猜测是它会是个”百分之二选手”。我觉得它勉强爬到了 5%。然后,因为只有 5%,我们就把它砍了。所以你的猜测非常好。如果你说 10% 或 15%,那我就会挠头了——这真的有可能提升留存率吗?
Gibson Biddle (25:14): 总之,Netflix 没有推出这个功能。当然,他们可以测试一下,但我认为社交方向的历史——那些失败的假设——基本上是不支持它的,我刚才就给了你两个例子:好友网络在 Netflix 上推荐好友的想法,以及第二个 Xbox Party。这是社交方面的两个失败案例。Netflix 会继续在这方面实验,但在这个案例中他们选择了不做。所以结论是:惊喜度不够,尽管它可能构建难以复制的优势。但如果没有足够的惊喜度、足够的使用量,就不可能改善利润率。
Gibson Biddle (25:45): 好了。你表现得很棒,Lenny。我说过你会显得非常聪明。好,你还有什么?下一个是什么?
回到触达量的重要性
Lenny (25:51): 完美。快速插一句,我真的很喜欢你关于聚焦触达量的提醒——不管一个想法看起来多好,始终回到一个问题:这个东西的触达量有多大?即使转化率提升了 50%,如果只有 10 个人看到它,那也不重要。
Gibson Biddle (26:05): 是的。
Lenny (26:05): 这个提醒太好了。
Gibson Biddle (26:06): 嗯。
Lenny (26:06): 好,下一个问题是——你之前分享过,在疫情期间,Netflix 自动取消了大约半个百分点会员的订阅,因为他们处于不活跃状态。那么问题是,他们为什么这么做?Netflix 是怎么思考这件事的?
Gibson Biddle (26:20): 是的。你可能看过 Netflix 的股价历史。疫情初期,他们预计 2020 年第一季度会新增 800 万会员,结果涨了 1600 万。太棒了。大概就是那个时候,我作为 Netflix 产品经理的感知是——当时有一个负责非会员体验数据分析的人,好像叫 Eddie Woo。他在看数据的时候,发现有半个百分点(0.5%)的会员实际上已经一年没有享受过这项服务了。他们显然是一年前输入了信用卡和邮箱,然后就忘了自己还有这个订阅。
Gibson Biddle (26:51): 所以他想了想说,我觉得对于那些付了钱却没有使用服务的人,主动帮他们取消订阅,是一件正确的事。当然,他做这个决定的时候正值高速增长期,对吧?那我们来用愉悦、难以复制和利润提升模型(DHM)来分析一下。这件事能带来愉悦感吗?
Lenny (27:10): 绝对是。我会感觉很好。
Gibson Biddle (27:11): 这就是我的问题。好的。
Lenny (27:11): 对,如果一家公司跟你说,“嘿,拿着,把钱退给你吧。你都没在用这东西。”
Gibson Biddle (27:15): 没错。那么,通过践行这种最佳做法,你能建立什么样的难以复制的优势呢?
Lenny (27:22): 我想应该有一种品牌光环效应吧,就是你会觉得 Netflix 对你真好,心里很舒服。
自动取消的决策判断
Gibson Biddle (27:27): 完全正确。那如果我告诉你——事实上也是如此——Netflix 选择了自动取消这些用户的订阅,你会觉得,嗯,这挺酷的。然后看利润方面——坏消息是,你会损失一亿美元。所以,这里有愉悦感,有难以复制的优势,同时你会损失一亿美元。那这个愉悦感和难以复制的优势,能否抵消损失一亿美元的负面影响?
Gibson Biddle (27:50): 我再问你两个问题。这是一个高风险决策还是低风险决策?Eddie 决定自动取消这些用户、损失一亿美元——高风险还是低风险?你就是产品经理,Lenny,你来判断。
Lenny (28:04): 这取决于一亿美元对这家公司意味着什么。我想 Netflix 已经到了如此大的规模,一亿美元不算什么大事,而且这是一次性的,不会反复发生,所以可以试试看。
Gibson Biddle (28:13): 好的,你跳到前面去了。你太聪明了。从规模上看,一亿美元相对于一家年收入 300 亿美元的公司来说。然后,你提到的第二点是,它是可逆的——他现在可以做这件事,但不意味着必须永远延续这个做法。我这里有个笑话,我 30 年前结婚的时候,对结婚很焦虑。我朋友说,“Gib,如果不合适,你随时可以离婚嘛。“所以他说的就是可逆的。不过我已经结婚 30 年了,所以结果还不错。
Gibson Biddle (28:39): 但我想说的是,作为产品经理,我们总觉得自己的每一个决策都是高风险的。偶尔想一想,这个决策的影响规模有多大?它是可逆的吗?这很有帮助。Amazon 把这种叫做双向门决策——它是可逆的。单向门的那些才是更重要的决策。坦白说,大多数人会认为结婚是单向门,但嘿,一半的人不这么认为。
Lenny (29:01): 是的,非常难逆转。可逆,但代价很高。
含广告的低价方案
Gibson Biddle (29:04): 好,你还有什么问题?
Lenny (29:05): 好,你提到了 Netflix 最近在增长方面遇到的困难。所以一直有人提出的问题是,为什么他们不提供一个非常便宜的方案,或者一个带广告的免费方案。我想你肯定想过很多,Netflix 也想过很多。这在你的框架里怎么分析?
Gibson Biddle (29:21): 让我们快进两年。Netflix 2022 年第一季度的财报很差。十年来第一次,他们实际上流失了用户,他们想重新推动增长。好,这是一个不同的背景,对吧?今天的背景。
Lenny (29:37): 本集节目由 PostHog 赞助播出。PostHog 提供一套产品分析工具,包括漏斗分析、热力图、会话录制和实验功能,全部集成在一个易于使用的平台中。PostHog 是开源的,所以你可以托管在自己的基础设施上,这意味着你可以控制谁有权限访问你的数据,也让合规变得轻而易举,因为你不需要把用户信息发送给第三方。
Lenny (30:00): PostHog 的应用系统可以与你的数据仓库无缝协作,支持数据的导入和导出,让你能把数据汇聚到一个地方,轻松理解用户在各种触点上的行为。如果你想了解更多,可以访问 PostHog.com/Lenny 查看详情。
Gibson Biddle (30:18): 所以你的问题是,Netflix 是否应该推出一个更低价格、带广告的方案?
Lenny (30:25): 好的,很好。
Gibson Biddle (30:25): 好,我们来分析一下。用 DHM 框架。一个带广告的低价方案对用户来说是愉悦的吗,Lenny?
Lenny (30:33): 我不知道”愉悦”是不是准确的词,但如果我手头不宽裕,能用上 Netflix 感觉还是挺不错的。
Gibson Biddle (30:39): 好,所以潜在的愉悦感在于——可能只要花五美元,甚至可能是免费的,谁知道呢。但对于一部分能接受广告的用户来说,这可能是一个合理的权衡,对吧?你不必付 10 美元、15 美元或 20 美元。你可能只需要付五美元,或者两美元?我也不知道合适的定价是多少。
Gibson Biddle (30:56): 好,下一个问题是,如果 Netflix 这样做,能否建立难以复制的优势?
Lenny (31:00): 我想难以复制的部分在于,如果存在网络效应的话,这样做可以进一步加速网络效应,从而带来某种优势。我不太确定。
Gibson Biddle (31:06): 也许吧。如果他们获得了一批新用户、一批新的用户画像——“用户画像”是技术术语——随着规模增长,你会建立规模经济。所以如果 Netflix 能够继续增长,他们今年会在内容上投入大约 180 亿美元,而”可怜的”Amazon 只会投入 80 亿美元。我就是喜欢说”可怜的 Amazon”。因为 Netflix 可以把成本分摊到 2.2 亿会员身上。所以,更多增长、更多用户,而且最好是他们之前还没有触及的全新用户群体——这样就不只是内部互相蚕食——可以建立更多难以复制的优势。
Gibson Biddle (31:39): 我的论点是——我就直接跳到结论了——如果你运气好的话,你确实是在获取一种新的用户画像、新的用户类型,所以你会获得增量收入,而这正是 Netflix 真正想要的。不过我只想告诉你,为什么 Netflix 此前一直没有做广告。实际上我们做过——5、6、7、8……2005 年到 2008 年。我们在网站每个页面上都放了巨大的广告横幅,连会员页面都有。我们做了一个留存率测试,结果发现它实际上并没有损害留存率。这很出乎意料。而那也是我们第一次实现 2000 万美元营业利润的一年。大概是第一个盈利的年份。
Gibson Biddle (32:14): 我们当时还做了其他副业——出售二手碟片,也就是”已观看过的碟片”。我们最早就是靠这个赚钱的。2008 年,CEO 里德·哈斯廷斯来找我,说:“Gib,我需要你把广告和二手碟片业务都砍掉,因为我认为我们核心业务可以实现盈利了。“他想保持简洁,创造一个简洁的体验,作为订阅服务的一部分。
Gibson Biddle (32:34): 你是经历过的。我们当时有很大的自豪感和主人翁意识。他没有让我参与这个决策,所有这些,对吧?他基本上就是拿枪顶着我的脑袋。他只问了我两个问题。他说:“Gib,谁会是世界上做广告最厉害的?“我说:“Google。“然后他的第二个问题是:“谁必须成为世界上做个性化最厉害的?“我说:“我们。“他的论点是砍掉二手碟片和广告,为客户创造一个简洁的体验,这样我们就能对个性化保持疯狂的专注。
广告业务的权衡与股东信任
Gibson Biddle (33:02): 现在快进一下,在财报电话会议上,对他来说,这场辩论其实是在简洁性——他极度推崇的东西——之间的权衡。但在财报电话会议上他说:“实际上,有一样东西我比简洁更看重,那就是客户选择权。“他的意思是,你知道吗?我认为对于这批新用户来说,给他们一个带广告的每月 5 美元套餐的选择——5 美元是我自己加进去的,他没说这个数——在这种情况下,客户选择权可能比愉悦更重要。换句话说,客户选择权可能比广告带来的复杂性更重要,或者可能比那糟糕的体验更重要。
Gibson Biddle (33:39): 呼。有一点很重要。他说的是,如今执行一个基于广告的业务其实相对简单。有无数的合作伙伴可以做这件事,所以我们可以继续专注于我们的核心——个性化。我认为这是一个非常深思熟虑的回答。所以我的猜测是,他们会做广告,但他当时非常诚恳。股价已经腰斩。他觉得自己让股东失望了。所以我认为他在寻找恢复那份信任的方式。
Lenny (34:05): 是的。市场有时候会逼你做一些你没预料到的事情。我很喜欢你分享的那个故事里 Reed 使用的苏格拉底式方法,他向你提出那些问题,帮助你得出和他一样的结论。
Gibson Biddle (34:16): 说实话,我反思了这件事整整五年。为什么他不让我参与决策?然后我意识到……顺便说一句,当 CEO 是一份非常艰难的工作。但我意识到我有太强的自豪感和主人翁意识,他只是知道我不会愿意砍掉它,我很难保持客观。而他坚信自己知道正确答案,于是说,嘿,我只需要你去执行这件事。他是对的。所以我花了五年才消化这件事,但作为支持 CEO 的工作有很多,因为那份工作真的很艰难。
账号共享的迷局
Lenny (34:47): 我们接下来会聊聊 CPO 这个角色的职责以及你在这段旅程中学到的东西,但最后一个迷你案例研究。Netflix 是否应该向与其他人——尤其是家庭之外的人——共享账号的用户收费?
Gibson Biddle (34:59): 好的,这个话题有很多历史。我之前已经讲了一部分故事,就是 Netflix 的增长一直以来都很出色,直到最近,而他们那次艰难的财报电话会议的原因是,预测实在太难了。他们在 COVID 初期涌入了一批新用户,我管他们叫”骑墙派”,就是恰好在那个时间点集体加入的人。然后,COVID 结束后他们会离开吗?电影院重新开放后他们会离开吗?他们还关停了服务,切断了 70 万俄罗斯会员。你可以想象在东欧和中欧,流失率比预期高了一些。真是糟糕。
Gibson Biddle (35:38): COVID 预测这团迷雾所掩盖的一件事,就是共享行为到底有多大规模。所以他们说,在美国和加拿大,总共有 1 亿用户。他们认为大约有 3000 万人正在家庭之外共享他们的邮箱和密码。
Gibson Biddle (35:57): 那么,Netflix 是怎么走到这一步的?Netflix 通常有三个价格档,10 美元、15 美元和 20 美元,他们一直在想办法让人们有理由选择 20 美元的那档。所以如果你看他们的——我管它叫价格与套餐页面——看起来就像一个加油泵。你要左边的、中间的、还是右边的?他们为促使人们选择每月 20 美元档而提供的激励之一,就是同时播放流的数量。他们一度开到了四个同时流。所以在我家,四个人可以同时观看。
Gibson Biddle (36:27): 当然人们在家庭之外也会共享,对吧?顺便说一句,我认为 Netflix 之前并没有明确说你不可以这样做。所以现在,如果你看今天的价格与套餐页面,他们已经不再把多个流作为你应该选 20 美元档的理由了。他们推的是其他东西。更高的分辨率,这是关键。更好的音质。你会有 HDR 音频和视频。然后,他们确实在细则中明确了,你可以为家庭内的成员使用一个、两个或四个流。
Gibson Biddle (37:00): 这是一个新的澄清,因为以前大概是按”家庭”来的。Kelsey 和 Brit 是我的女儿们。她们在家里,当然可以用。她们去上大学了,她们还是我的女儿,是家庭的一部分。当然可以用。Kelsey 结婚了。好吧,这是他们第一次做出澄清。
Gibson Biddle (37:14): 所以现在,我回到你的问题上来。作为一个潜在的增长机会,他们显然想澄清这套规则应该怎么运作,于是他们开始在三个不同的国家进行测试。秘鲁是其中一个,好像还有一个在加勒比地区。这些较小的国家,我确信他们聚焦于获取新会员来先搞清楚这件事。他们有两种不同的方案。你可以让家庭外的人,作为主账号持有者、也就是赞助方,实际上为他们多付一点费用。另一种功能是,一个在不同家庭中共享你账号的人可以升级为自己的会员。
用 DHM 模型分析共享策略
Gibson Biddle (37:48): 所以,这确实很复杂。我能不能用 DHM 模型来解释这件事?它可以解释他们为什么这么做。他们提供多个流是因为那是一个很令人愉悦的体验。而且 Netflix 在规则里也说了,他们非常宽松。我认为他们当时并不真的担心这个问题。这是否在构建难以复制的优势?绝对是。更多的口味用户画像,对吧?而且你不会离开,因为你不想取消你女儿在东海岸使用的服务。这是否在提升利润率?实际上,它确实在把人们推向 20 美元的价格点,而且在改善流失率。你从服务中获得了更多价值,对吧?
Gibson Biddle (38:21): 那么现在,他们该怎么办?对我来说,这就是测试和算术。说实话,试一试就知道了,Lenny。想想那 3000 万人。如果你收到一封邮件说,嘿,我们注意到你一直在用别人的钱享受服务,你想升级为自己的套餐吗?那些人里会有多少比例说愿意,对吧?我是说,你有猜的吗?我既没有猜测也没有答案。但这就是游戏,对吧?
Lenny (38:47): 我发现涉及邮件的时候,打开率之类的指标,最终总是很小的比例。所以我猜,大概又是 5% 吧,也许 3%。
Gibson Biddle (38:54): 好的。我觉得这是一个不错的猜测。我给你一个不同的视角。这其实有点像免费试用,对吧?他们一直在使用免费试用。Netflix 免费试用到期后的转化率是 90%,对吧?90% 的人在第一个月享受得不得了,于是继续使用了服务。
Gibson Biddle (39:13): 所以,我的意思是,我同意你的看法,可能是 5% 或 10%。我刚才给你那个 90% 的数据,只是想让你想象一下,嗯,也许可能是 10%,对吧?也许可能是 20%。这只是猜测。我觉得他们正在那些较小的国家做实验。我们这么做的话,如果是 10%,他们一个季度就能多拿 300 万用户。我认为这会在他们的增长停滞时帮到他们。
Gibson Biddle (39:36): 另一个问题是,当你告诉主账号持有者他们在东海岸的女儿不能再使用服务时,他们会退出吗,对吧?
Lenny (39:45): 对。
Gibson Biddle (39:46): 我想我表达的意思是,我不知道我们能不能给出什么真正的洞察。Netflix 的团队,这就是他们的看家本领,Netflix 的团队就是做测试和实验的。他们可能已经预设了一个像你那样的假设,5% 会转化,然后现在他们在看自己是对还是错,他们在那些较小的国家里验证这件事,一两年之后,他们会把一切搞清楚,我们会在北美看到答案。但我觉得这需要一两年时间来弄明白,因为这真的很难。但他们的动机非常强烈,因为他们正在努力让增长重新启动。
Lenny (40:17): 我最近想在 Showtime 上看《Super Pumped》,结果 Showtime 用不了,我还得给我爸打电话,因为我在蹭他们的有线电视账号登录。结果发现他们搬家了,换了有线电视套餐,而我可能就是他们保留很多频道的原因。
个人董事会
Gibson Biddle (40:32): 嗯,所以,Lenny,我也在想这个问题。我持开放态度。这件事我不知道答案,但就你和我交流心得的话,你怎么看?这正是我希望所有产品负责人都参与的那种行为。我称之为建立你的个人董事会。你就在我的董事会里,因为我从你那里学到了很多关于 newsletter 的东西,对吧?非常有帮助。
Gibson Biddle (40:51): 但当我遇到这类问题时,我会去找我的朋友们,比如,移动应用和桌面端之间的合理投资水平应该是多少?这个目标多年来一直在变。我就给朋友们发短信,他们直接给我数据。仅仅通过与行业里的同行交流,就能获得惊人的洞察,我希望所有听众都参与这种行为。我称之为建立你的个人董事会。
Lenny (41:14): 我还真想多听听这个。大家是怎么做的?是在某个话题上挑几个人,让他们做你的常设董事会吗?
Gibson Biddle (41:21): 我当初甚至不知道自己在做这件事。这个概念对我来说起源于,我大概 30 岁左右。30 岁,没错。我被提升为 VP,然后我问我的 CEO,“我怎么才能学会做好这份工作?“他说,“我不知道。去建立你的同行社区吧。“哦,这个建议不错。确实不错。
Gibson Biddle (41:39): 所以,在任何时候……你实际上请过我的一位董事会成员上过播客,Melissa Perri。她就在我的董事会上,对吧?
Lenny (41:46): 太棒了。
Gibson Biddle (41:46): 对,是你投的票。所以,简单来说,建立同行社区其实很容易。保持与前同事的联系就好。在 LinkedIn 上保持联络。更难的部分是建立导师关系。第一条经验法则是,不要直接请一个人做你的导师。那样真的很尴尬。首先,识别他们。认定这是一个可能对我有帮助的人。然后,找到方式去帮助他们。每个人都需要帮助。每个人,每个人,每个人。
Gibson Biddle (42:13): 所以,为了帮你理解我需要什么样的帮助,我最大的恐惧是老得不体面,对吧?所以我在努力了解当前的态势。好吧,我之前问过你,我应该上 Discord 吗,对吧?就像,哎,该死,我非得上 Discord 吗?但在很多情况下,有人可以帮我理解 Discord。这对我超级有帮助。导师关系最终就是这样建立起来的,而在同行和导师之间,导师可以帮你看清拐角之后的东西。
Gibson Biddle (42:43): 实际上,我最喜欢的一个故事是有个人来找我,他在做数据方面的工作,想转做产品。他一直问我,“嘿,你有没有什么初创公司让我周末去帮忙?“这个想法不错。我没有什么答案。后来我有点烦了,我说,“你就帮我建个网站吧,一个婴儿级别的网站。“他说,“我不会建网站。“所以我把信用卡给了他,说,“上 Squarespace 去。“如果你访问 GibsonBiddle.com,那就是 John Lou 帮我做的婴儿网站。那对我来说帮助极大。总有一天我应该弄个正经的,但我已经觉得没那么重要了。
Lenny (43:13): 我的婴儿网站也在 Squarespace 上。
Gibson Biddle (43:15): 没错。
Lenny (43:16): 我们都是一路人。
Gibson Biddle (43:17): 总之,这就是个人董事会的概念。从长远来看,这是非常重要、非常有帮助的职业建议。
JAM 模型
Lenny (43:23): 太好了。很高兴我们聊了这个。这不在我们计划讨论的范围内。除了战略之外,我还想深入聊聊的另一个话题是优先级排序。你有一个非常棒的优先级排序模型,叫做 JAM 模型,我经常跟人分享。我很想听听你对这个模型的概述,它什么时候适用,以及大致怎么用。
Gibson Biddle (43:39): 好的,嗯,它很简单,因为它拼成一个词嘛,对吧?比起说……我给你讲个好案例。我是 2010 年加入 Chegg 的。我们在发明一个概念:向学生出租教科书而不是出售,帮他们省很多钱。我第一周就很有挑战性,因为走廊这头,CEO Dan 在说,“增长,宝贝。增长。我们作为初创公司最重要的事就是增长。“走廊那头,我的 CFO 搭档 Greg 在说,“慢一点,慢一点,慢一点。我们实际上还不知道自己有没有一个可行的商业模式。“我能感觉到他有点——公司当时大概 40 个人——有点把大家搞得焦头烂额。
Gibson Biddle (44:15): 所以,作为产品负责人,我到底该怎么办?答案是,我把他们拉到一个房间里说,“听着,我只需要你们帮我把这三个因素排个优先序:增长、参与度和变现。而且我需要你们两个达成一致。“所以,你可以说增长最重要。当我们说增长时,基本上就是同比客户增长。你想要 50% 还是 10%?
Gibson Biddle (44:40): 无论答案是什么,参与度是我衡量产品质量的方式。一个更有参与度的产品就是更好的产品。所以如果你认为投资于打造更好的产品超级重要,那你就选参与度,我在 Netflix 用来衡量它的代理指标就是留存率。然后,第三个是变现。你已经有了这些客户,有了这个产品,你要投入多少精力把它变成一门生意?
Gibson Biddle (45:04): 所以,Dan 说,“嗯,这很简单。增长、参与度、变现。“Greg 说,“对,这很简单。变现、参与度、增长。“他完全反过来,对吧?我说,“我两小时后回来。你们俩得把这事儿争出个结果。“基本上就是这样。
Gibson Biddle (45:19): 所以,他们最终同意增长第一,参与度第二,变现第三。然后,几个月后,同样的事又开始发生了。Greg 开始说,“不,不,不。“于是,就在那个时候 Greg 实际上离开了公司。这就是那种能让初创公司完蛋的根本性分歧。我不是说谁对谁错,但作为组织中的领导者,我们必须把一些基本的故事理清楚,包括我们如何从根本上排列增长、参与度和变现的优先级。
Gibson Biddle (45:56): 这确实是我在初创公司中发现的最主要的不一致根源。初创公司总是在增长和参与度之间来回摇摆——增长快一点,产品做好一点,增长快一点,做好一点,然后到后来才会考虑变现。但我发现这个模型超级有用,能让组织中的领导者在根本层面上更加对齐。
Lenny (46:17): 那么,如果你是一位 PM,或者可能是创始人,想要使用这个模型,第一步是不是先让你上面的领导跟你对齐一下,这三件事的排序是什么?
Gibson Biddle (46:27): 我个人会从一个 SWAG 开始。我会先拍一个——一个 stupid wild-ass guess——猜一个我认为对的答案,这样至少我在跟团队分享之前,自己已经有一个观点了。坦白说,接下来最重要的事情是,如果你要创建一个以指标为导向、重视数据和通过数字来学习的组织,最难定的就是——你的参与度指标是什么?你怎么衡量产品质量?
Gibson Biddle (46:52): 在 Netflix,就是月度留存率,但这是一个很难的对话。增长的故事比较简单,通常是同比客户增长的某个百分比。当然每个公司都不一样,但对你说的唯一补充就是:先有自己的观点,然后收集所有人的反馈。
快速形成观点,迭代完善
Gibson Biddle (47:07): 坦白说,每当我加入一家新公司,我会给自己两周时间来制定这家公司的产品战略,这有点夸张,但我就是做得很快。我会先拿出一个 SWAG,然后去找一个人:“嘿,这是我能想到的最好的思路,你觉得呢?“当然,人家已经在那儿待了四年,比我聪明得多,他们会完善我的想法。
Gibson Biddle (47:25): 我一个接一个地聊,大概六周之后,我就可以在全公司范围内分享产品战略了。但这就是 SWAG 的价值所在——一个 stupid wild-ass guess。不要害怕从这个水平开始。
Lenny (47:36): 我真的很喜欢这个策略,比躲在小黑屋里花几个月想一个完美答案然后再拿出来好多了。我发现这样做效果更好。
Gibson Biddle (47:44): “我们雇一家咨询公司来做吧。“让我开枪自杀算了,好吗?
Lenny (47:47): 我喜欢你说这话的时候还捂着嘴。
Gibson Biddle (47:50): 嗯,只有 Lenny 看得见。嗯,但这是播客啊 Gib,没人看得见你。
Lenny (47:54): 嗯,我来揭个秘。好吧,说到这个话题,我想转换一下,聊聊我们最后一个话题,就是关于职业发展,或者说产品经理的职业路径。你曾是两家非常成功的公司的 CPO,或者可能叫 VP of Product,但大致都是产品负责人。你做了两个大人物,对吧?首席大人物。理论上,如果一个 PM 沿着这条路走下去,这就是职业生涯的终点状态。很多 PM 会走不同的路,但理论上,这就是你的职业方向。你觉得要成为一名 CPO 需要什么?有哪些技能是没在那个位置上的人可能意识不到需要培养的?
PM 的职业成长路径
Gibson Biddle (48:28): 好,我们一步一步来说。从个人贡献者,到管理者。刚起步的时候,你只是在学做这份工作。我觉得总的来说,你的整个职业生涯都应该以学习为导向来优化。但对于个人来说,做产品很难,需要很多技术能力。所以,是的,有一些技术层面的,但也有很多创意能力。还有消费者科学,就是 A/B 测试。还有管理——你怎么让大家协作把东西做出来?这些都是技术性的设计技能,对吧?这些就是硬技能。
Gibson Biddle (48:59): 所以,职业生涯早期,你就是尽力学会做这份工作。顺便说一句,这份工作很难。其次,每家公司、每个阶段都不一样。所以你、我、Lenny,我们都只是在想办法用一种有杠杆效应的方式去提供帮助。但关键点是,这份工作在每个地方都有点不一样。所以,先试着成为你所在领域的专家,成为你在做的那个”一件事”上的专家。
Gibson Biddle (49:19): 然后,下一步成为管理者,沟通能力是核心。这也是为什么我试图……产品战略是一种很好的沟通方式,能说清楚什么重要、什么不重要,试着让它不那么神秘。如果你处于职业生涯早期,问问能不能参与面试团队,即使你们不是在招人,因为这样你就开始练习一件对你日后发展职业生涯非常重要的事情,那就是——招聘和招募人才。
Gibson Biddle (49:45): 我最忙的时候,每周花一到两天在招聘和招募上。这真的是最重要的事情。然后,公司里会冒出一些非常棒的机会,他们会说,你知道吗?也许 Gib 团队里的人可以做这件事,对吧?因为他们知道我能找到人替代。总有新人可以顶上来。所以,在职业生涯后期,我确实成了招聘和招募方面的专家。
高管需要的能力
Gibson Biddle (50:07): 如果你想成为大人物,我的理论是:领导者的技能是一样的,不管你是产品负责人、首席财务官,还是数据负责人。我在面试任何这类候选人的时候,看的是领导力。他们能不能做激励人心的愿景沟通?我确实会看产品战略能力,这有助于你构建愿景的框架。我也会看管理能力——他们有没有搭建和管理过团队?
Gibson Biddle (50:38): 我寻找主动性强、结果导向的人。对我来说,领导者就是要带头。你不能做一个跟随者。所以我找的是非常主动、结果导向的人。还有一点比较微妙,到了职业生涯后期,我会看一个人是否理解文化有多重要,因为文化帮助人们理解组织里每个人需要具备的技能和行为,而且它让你能以高杠杆的方式提供领导力,而不是靠那些恶心的流程、会议和规则。我寻找的是那些把文化当作领导组织工具来欣赏的人。
Gibson Biddle (51:18): 当然,他们必须是作为 builder 成长起来的。他们必须学会产品经理那些该死的技术能力。如果我把所有这些抽象出来,说实话,我可能做得最好的事情,我想大概有三件我做得最好。了解一下我:我是英语专业的,非技术背景,我根本不在乎。一开始我在市场部门,后来转到了产品,我就是特别喜欢产品。
Gibson Biddle (51:37): 我觉得我在以学习为导向来优化这件事上做得不错。实际上我的一个小窍门是,我开始做分享——我以前管它叫”Topic This and That”,在周五早上,讲一个我刚学到的东西。那是我学东西最简单的方式。所以,以学习为导向。
Gibson Biddle (51:50): 我们聊过建立个人董事会,这对我来说帮助极大,这也可能引出第三件事。我是一个不错的”挑选者”,之所以我在挑选公司方面做得不错,是因为我会依赖我的个人董事会。他们中有些人是 CFO。我会说,“嘿,Barry,我在考虑加入这家初创公司 Chegg。“嘿,作为一个 CFO、作为一个 VC,你会投资它吗,对吧?这跟我要问自己的是同一个问题——我该不该投入我的时间?
Gibson Biddle (52:16): 所以,我有这样的人帮我判断——1991 年加入 Electronic Arts 是个好选择吗?是的。2005 年加入 Netflix 是个好选择吗?是的。2010 年加入 Chegg 是个好选择吗?是的。所以我本质上是一个不错的”挑选者”,而这很大程度上要归功于我拥有的那个个人董事会。
Lenny (52:36): 那作为产品经理的日常工作呢?你发现哪些习惯和日常节奏特别好,尤其是那些你觉得能促成一位优秀产品经理成功的?
Gibson Biddle (52:49): 简短的回答是:带着意图开始你的一天,好吗?我今天希望完成的三到五件事是什么?第二,尽量减少会议,好吗?尽量减少会议。会议把所有人的精力都吸干了,包括你自己的。
Gibson Biddle (53:03): 多花时间跟你的客户在一起。可以是焦点小组,可以是可用性测试,可以看调查数据,可以深挖数据来理解他们的行为,也可以设计和执行 A/B 测试。这些都是让你成为客户之声的途径,而这也是你作为产品领导者工作中很大的一部分。
Gibson Biddle (53:24): 在做和想之间找到平衡。我们大多数人都是做、做、做。偶尔停下来问问自己,好吧,这里什么才是重要的?我现在真正应该做的是什么,而不是我喜欢做什么?自我管理。人们需要管理者的唯一原因,就是我们需要有人逼我们去做那些重要但我们不喜欢做的事。所以我一直在自我管理。Gib,你得开发票了。天哪,我得给人开账单了。一点都不好玩,对吧?
Lenny (53:56): 那个内心的声音,Gib 内心的声音。
Gibson Biddle (53:57): 对,那个发票的声音。对,我们的”in-voice”(声音/发票谐音)。Gib,你应该写本该死的书。
Lenny (54:02): 还是算了。
Gibson Biddle (54:02): 我们无视那个内心的声音。对,你我都一样。然后,我不知道,对我来说锻炼很有用。它让我保持快乐。还有别看太多电视,虽然我自己电视看得太多。就是这样。别学我做的,照我说的做。
Lenny (54:17): 对。嗯,我可能也看了太多电视。这话从一个帮忙打造了 Netflix 的人嘴里说出来挺有意思的,但我完全理解。因为确实太好看了。太好了。
Gibson Biddle (54:25): 嗯,我妻子在努力治愈癌症。她的反应就像,“哦,恭喜你,Gib。你帮忙发明了刷剧,你这个白痴。你对人类有什么贡献?”
Lenny (54:34): 天哪。但你给我们带来了愉悦,这也是有价值的。
Gibson Biddle (54:37): 对,对。非常感谢。
Lenny (54:39): 最后一个问题。你有着如此辉煌的职业生涯。对于刚刚起步阶段的产品经理,你会给一条什么建议?然后作为加赠,再来一条给中期阶段的。你想到什么?
职业建议:早期与中期
Gibson Biddle (54:50): 嗯,早期的那些建议我说过了。选对公司。到某个阶段,你要明白你的职业是你自己负责的,不是你的工作单位的。这也是我鼓励大家开始组建个人董事会的原因之一,这样你可以相互交流信息。另一件事我想说的是,别听你父母的,因为他们比你早一代人。他们真的不知道未来是什么样子。我的意思是,我知道我会给我女儿不好的建议,所以别听你父母的。
Gibson Biddle (55:16): 然后到了后来,自从我停止直接入账以后,我就把自己当成纯粹在”职业黑客”——不断破解自己的职业路径。所以你的职业,其实很像做产品。你有理论和假设,你找到方式去实验它们,然后你成功了或者失败了。比如我的一个假设,大概六年前吧,是我会觉得教书有意思。我真的去试了。我在斯坦福教过课,教研究生级别的工程师创业课,我确实挺喜欢的,但不是热爱,主要原因是每年秋天我都必须待在 Palo Alto。我没法像我喜欢的那样到处旅行,对吧?
Gibson Biddle (55:52): 好的,所以一方面,好吧,别在教室里教。我的下一个方向是,如果在教室外面教呢?那才是我真正热爱做的事。过去两年里,我在世界各地做演讲、工作坊,线上的。我就是喜欢做这些,而且我有极大的灵活性。所以这只是一个小例子,我把职业当作——我的假设是什么?找到实验的地方,然后根据结果,做下一步。我整个职业生涯一直都是这么做的。
Gibson Biddle (56:16): 所以,如果你接受了这种实验的理念——你就像一个产品,需要有假设,需要去尝试看看什么有效。在做产品或经营职业时,你接下来需要做的,就是大胆。所以,别畏缩。到了某个阶段,当我跟不同公司合作时,它们都会被那些小的、渐进式的胜利所吸引,渐渐忘了最初让它们成为成功创业公司的东西——承担根本性的风险。所以,我会善意地鼓励人们大胆一点,走出舒适区一些,因为那才是你学到更多的地方,这也回到了以学习为导向这个理念。
Gibson Biddle (56:52): 总之,你怎么鼓励人们大胆?怎么鼓励他们尝试新事物?简单来说,就是开始行动。明天就试。对我来说,最初的小步子是,我做演讲的时候,就问朋友们能不能让我顺路去做一个演讲。我就这么做了。我没有想太多。我没有花九十七年去布置我的展示设备、找合适的翻页笔。我就是做了一个很烂的演讲。但那就是我的起点,然后我从那里慢慢优化。
Lenny (57:21): 真是结束我们对话的完美方式。非常鼓舞人心、很有用的建议,我自己都要回去重听一遍、用起来。最后,大家可以在哪里找到你、联系你?还有,听众们怎样才能帮到你?
Gibson Biddle (57:33): 好问题。谢谢。首先,我想说 Lenny 一直在”Ask Gib”产品通讯上担任我的导师。我是通过 Twitter 联系他的,问了很多早期很蠢的问题,所以他给了我极大的帮助。所以,可能最重要的一点是知道我每两周写一篇通讯。这是我现在的节奏。Lenny 认识我的时候我还在每天发。他说,“兄弟,别把自己累垮了。“这个通讯叫 Ask Gib。到目前为止我已经回答了大约 63 个问题。我真的很享受这个过程。
Gibson Biddle (58:04): 第二是我的个人网站 GibsonBiddle.com。我的优势是我是互联网上唯一的 Gibson Biddle。我相信你也是唯一的 Lenny,但没人会拼你的姓,对吧?
Gibson Biddle (58:15): 对,然后第三,大家怎么能帮到我?我是一个反馈狂人,所以你会注意到,在我做的每次演讲的结尾、每篇文章里,无论你是在 Medium 上找到我,还是 Ask Gib,或者其他什么地方,都有一个给我反馈的链接。问题永远是一样的:从 0 到 10 分,0 分代表糟糕,10 分代表优秀,你有多大可能把这个推荐给朋友?
Gibson Biddle (58:38): 这对我来说帮助极大,这也是我学会慢慢把每件事做得更好的方式。每天从大家那里得到的洞见令人惊叹。我还会追问一个:你喜欢什么,什么可以改进?这真的帮了我大忙。所以,不要忽略末尾的那个链接。别把它当成联合航空问你”您的航班体验如何”那种东西。这很重要,真的!你们的反馈对我来说极其有帮助,所以谢谢你们。
Lenny (59:04): 我现在就去填一些你的调查问卷。非常感谢你做这次访谈。我学到了很多,真的很感谢你的时间。
Gibson Biddle (59:10): 非常愉快,Lenny,也非常感谢你对我的 Ask Gib 通讯的帮助。
Lenny (59:15): 永远有效。
Gibson Biddle (59:16): 好,酷。我会记住你这句承诺的。
Lenny (59:19): 太棒了。感谢收听。如果你喜欢这次对谈,别忘了订阅播客。你也可以在 LennysPodcast.com 了解更多。下期再见。
术语表
| 原文 | 中文 |
|---|---|
| Barry McCarthy | 保留原文(Netflix 前任 CFO) |
| Blockbuster | 百视达(前美国连锁影视租赁公司) |
| Bob Baxley | 保留原文(产品设计领域的从业者,无公认中文译名) |
| BoJack Horseman | 《马男波杰克》(Netflix 原创动画剧集) |
| builder | 建设者 |
| cannibalistic | 互相蚕食的 |
| Chegg | 保留原文 |
| Coda | 保留原文 |
| Creative Wonders | 保留原文 |
| Dan | 保留原文(Chegg 前任 CEO Dan Rosensweig) |
| DHM | 保留原文(Delight, Hard to copy, Margin-enhancing,愉悦、难以复制、利润提升模型) |
| economies of scale | 规模经济 |
| Eddie Woo | 保留原文(Netflix 产品经理) |
| Electronic Arts | Electronic Arts(EA) |
| engagement | 参与度 |
| fence sitters | 骑墙派(指观望中、犹豫是否加入的用户) |
| Flat File | 保留原文 |
| flywheel | 飞轮 |
| focus group | 焦点小组 |
| force rank | 强制排序 |
| From Zero to One | 《从0到一》(Peter Thiel 著作) |
| Gibson Biddle | 保留原文 |
| Greg | 保留原文(Chegg 前任 CFO) |
| growth loops | 增长飞轮 |
| HB Mock | 保留原文 |
| hot seat | 热座(指被当众提问、承受压力的位置) |
| JAM model | JAM 模型(增长 Jumpstart/增长、参与度、变现优先排序模型) |
| John Daz | 保留原文 |
| John Lou | 保留原文 |
| Learning Company | 保留原文 |
| Lenny | 保留原文 |
| lifetime value | 生命周期价值 |
| Melissa Perri | 保留原文(产品管理领域专家) |
| mentor | 导师 |
| monetization | 变现 |
| Mr. Wonderful | 保留原文 |
| muckety muck | 大人物(俚语,指高职位的人) |
| network effects | 网络效应 |
| non-member page | 非会员页面 |
| one way door | 单向门 |
| operating income | 营业利润 |
| Oregon Trails | 保留原文 |
| Patreon | 保留原文(创作者订阅平台) |
| personal board of directors | 个人董事会 |
| Peter Thiel | 彼得·蒂尔(知名企业家、投资人) |
| PostHog | 保留原文(产品分析平台) |
| previously viewed discs | 二手碟片 |
| price and plan page | 价格与套餐页面 |
| Product School | 保留原文 |
| product-market fit | 产品市场契合 |
| profiles | 用户画像(Netflix 的多用户分身功能) |
| proxy metric | 代理指标 |
| punk | 保留原文(此处为口语化用法,形容初创、草根的) |
| qual | 定性研究(qualitative research 的简称) |
| Reader Rabbit | 保留原文 |
| Reed Hastings | 里德·哈斯廷斯(Netflix 联合创始人兼 CEO) |
| retention | 留存率 |
| right sizing the investment | 合理匹配投资规模 |
| scraping the barnacles | 刮藤壶(比喻砍掉使用率极低的功能) |
| Shark Tank | 《创智赢家》 |
| Showtime | 保留原文 |
| sponsor | 赞助方(此处指账号的主付费人) |
| stopping direct deposit | 停止直接入账(指不再拿固定工资/不再做全职受薪雇员) |
| Stranger Things | 《怪奇物语》(Netflix 原创剧集) |
| Super Pumped | 保留原文(Showtime 出品的电视剧) |
| Survey Monkey | 保留原文 |
| SWAG | 保留原文(stupid wild-ass guess,蠢大胆瞎猜) |
| switching costs | 转换成本 |
| Teleparty | 保留原文(原 Netflix Party 的更名) |
| Topic This and That | 保留原文(Gibson Biddle 在周五早上做的内部学习分享活动名称) |
| Tuck | 保留原文 |
| two percenter | 百分之二选手(比喻只有极少数用户使用的功能) |
| two-way door decision | 双向门决策 |
| word of mouth factor | 口碑系数 |
| Xbox Party | 保留原文 |
此文档由 AI 分片翻译(translate_long_document)