VC 捆绑销售

Naval Ravikant 2005-12-01

VC 捆绑销售

微软捆绑销售其Office应用程序。唱片公司和游戏发行商捆绑现金和分销渠道。硅谷风险投资则捆绑建议、控制权和资金。在艰难时期,作为创业者的你,不得不购买这些捆绑商品。

想要现金?它总是与一位董事会顾问捆绑在一起,不管你喜不喜欢。而且他们会拿走控制权。

想要建议?风险投资家不投入现金就不会接受董事会席位——这是获得足够影响力的唯一途径。而且他们会拿走控制权。永远都是控制权。

在资金充裕时期(比如我们当前的融资泡沫期),精明的创业者、连续创业者以及那些拥有盈利业务的企业能够拆散这些捆绑。要解除捆绑,你必须有多个竞标者(这需要更长的篇幅来讨论),并且你必须有能力拒绝资本(在Sand Hill Road,合谋只需一顿午餐的时间)。

让我们来拆解这个捆绑包。

现金

– 你希望以最优条件获得现金。品牌在这里无关紧要。Kleiner Perkins和Sequoia通过首先为他们的投资者创造巨大回报来建立品牌,但至少部分回报来自于低估你的初创公司价值。最优条件意味着高估值、小规模的前期期权池(你以后总是可以发行更多,稀释所有人,而不仅仅是融资前的普通股)、小额清算优先权(1倍,非参与分配)以及弱反稀释条款。你必须小心,因为你的投资者会阻止那些无法让他们获得最低投资回报率的退出交易,所以你可能不应该接受高于适度退出价值1/3的估值。

建议

– 假设你有一位出色的投资者加入董事会。受欢迎的投资者通常担任8-10个董事会的职务。他们大约一半时间用于寻找新交易。由于年长且富有,他们通常将更多时间花在慈善事业、社交活动和度假上。这意味着,如果你幸运的话,他们每月为每家公司分配一个完整的工作日,通常甚至更少。这几乎不足以了解你在做什么,更不用说”建立公司”了。要务实,选择那些判断力强、愿景一致、谦逊并愿意将你视为同行的投资者(最后一点你需要花很长时间仔细寻找)。如果你想要”增值服务”,其他地方可以更便宜地购买——外部董事会成员可以精心挑选,成本远低于昂贵的风险投资家,而且不附带控制权。如果你在寻找能”打开大门”的人,这几乎从不奏效。大公司根据你的优点、发展势头和时机与你合作,而不是基于哪个大人物介绍你。一个旁注:你董事会中的个别风险投资合伙人比公司名称重要得多,所以要把合伙人的名字写入条款清单,如果该合伙人离开公司,确保你必须同意替换人选。

控制权

– 啊,这才是棘手之处。一个月只出现一次的兼职者,带着错位的激励(不同类别的股票)和MBA学位,却控制着你的命运。要最小化控制权,你需要自己组建投资者财团,如果可能的话保留董事会多数席位,或者至少将外部席位交给真正无偏见的顾问,并在需要时不要害怕展现独立性。如果你为了取悦董事会成员而调整Powerpoint格式,那你就已经输了……要意识到即使是少数股东也可以通过不参与来破坏未来的融资,所以风险投资投资者对公司的影响力总是比你希望的要大,因此你必须不断努力保持激励的一致性。

谷歌在这方面做得非常出色——Larry Page和Sergei Brin以高估值筹集资金,坚持选择最好的顾问(Doerr和Moritz——这里没有解除捆绑),并始终保持对公司的控制权、CEO招聘以及上市过程的掌控。有传言称,曾有一段时间,不习惯退居次要位置的风险投资投资者被提供返还资金的机会!不用说,他们没有接受。

我意识到这里使用了很多行业术语。如果你对某些含义不确定或有疑问,请在下方发表评论。


VC Bundling

Microsoft bundles its Office applications. Record Labels and Game Publishers bundle cash and distribution. Silicon Valley Venture Capital bundles Advice, Control, and Money. In lean times, you, the entrepreneur, have to buy the bundled good.

Want Cash? It comes bundled with an Advisor on your Board of Directors, like it or not. And they take Control.

Want Advice? VCs won’t take Board seats without putting in Cash – it’s the only way to get enough leverage. And they take Control. Always the Control.

Smart entrepreneurs in times of plenty (like our current financing bubblet), serial entrepreneurs, and those with profitable businesses break apart these bundles. To un-bundle, you must have multiple bidders (that’s a longer entry), and you must have the ability to refuse capital (on Sand Hill Road, collusion is just a lunch away).

Let’s break apart the bundle.

Cash

– you want this on the best terms possible. The brand is irrelevant here. Kleiner Perkins and Sequoia have built their brands by generating huge returns for their investors first and foremost, but at least a portion of that comes from undervaluing your startup. Best terms means a great valuation, small up-front option pool (you can always issue more later, diluting everyone, not just the pre-money common), small liquidation preference (1X, non-participating), and weak anti-dilution. You do have to be careful in that your investors will block exits that don’t make them a certain minimum rate-of-return on their investment, so you probably shouldn’t take money at a valuation higher than 1/3 of what a modest exit looks like.

Advice

– Suppose that you have a brilliant investor on your Board. The in-demand investors are on about 8-10 Boards. They spend about half their time looking for new deals. And being older and having money, they usually spend more of their time on philanthropy, social events, vacations. Meaning that, if you’re lucky, they allocate one solid business day per company per month, and usually not even that. That’s barely enough time to keep up-to-date with what you’re doing, let alone “build the company.” Be pragmatic and select your investors for good judgement, unity of vision, and for their humility and willingness to treat you as peers (you’ll have to look long and hard for that last one). If you want “Value Add,” that can be purchased more cheaply elsewhere – an external Board member can be hand picked and will cost a small fraction of what an expensive VC will, and comes without the Control. If you’re looking for someone to “open doors,” that almost never works. Big companies deal with you based on your merits, momementum and timing, not based on which big-shot happened to introduce you. A side-note: the individual VC partner on your Board matters a lot more than the firm’s name does, so write the partner’s name into the termsheet, and if that partner leaves the firm, make sure that you have to consent to the replacement.

Control

– Ay, here’s the rub. A once-a-month part-timer with mis-aligned incentives (different class of stock) and an MBA, who controls your destiny. To minimize control, assemble your investor syndicates yourself, retain Board majority if you can, or at least give the outsider seat to a truly unbiased advisor, and don’t be afraid to exert independence when needed. If you’re moving around Powerpoint formats to please your Board members, you’ve already lost this one… Realize that even minority shareholders can sink future financings by not participating, so VC investors will always have more control over the company than you might like, so you have to constantly work at keeping an alignment of incentives.

Google did a masterful job with this – Larry Page and Sergei Brin raised money at a high valuation, insisted on the best advisors (Doerr and Moritz – no unbundling here), and kept control of the company, the CEO recruiting, and the going-public process throughout. Rumor has it that at one point, the VC investors, un-accustomed to taking a back seat, were offered their money back! Needless to say, they didn’t take it.

I realize that I’ve used a lot of industry jargon here. If you’re unsure of the meaning of something, or have questions, just post a comment below.