不可能存在最终的引力理论

Naval Ravikant 2021-10-18

不可能存在最终的引力理论

不可能存在最终的引力理论

我们拥有的只是对现实越来越好的近似

Brett: 在几乎所有情况下,你面前只有一个理论可供选择。

就引力而言,目前确实只有一个理论可供选择。那就是广义相对论。以前我们确实有两个理论。我们有牛顿引力理论和广义相对论——但我们做了一个关键实验。

关键实验的概念是科学的精华。你有两个相互竞争的理论。如果实验结果偏向一方,一个理论就被排除了,但另一个理论没有被排除。在这种情况下,只要没有出现问题,你就会保留那个理论。

这种知识观使我们能够进行开放式的进步追求。

这与任何其他关于知识的观念完全不同。绝大多数物理学家仍然是贝叶斯主义者。他们仍然是贝叶斯主义者的原因是,这通常是大学里教授的内容,被认为是理解世界的智力严谨方式。

但这只是我称之为科学主义的一种形式。因为他们背后有一个公式,即贝叶斯定理,这是一个完全可以接受的统计公式。人们一直以完全合法的方式使用它。只是它不是一种认识论。它不是保证,甚至不能让你确信你的理论实际上是真实的。

我最喜欢的例子是:在1919年之前,每一个关于引力的实验都表明它与牛顿的引力理论一致。贝叶斯主义者在那种情况下会说什么?他们会说你越来越相信牛顿的理论。

这怎么能说得通呢?你怎么能解释在它被证明是错误的当天,是你对它最有信心的时候?

现在,波普尔主义者没有这个问题。波普尔主义者说:“牛顿的理论在任何时候都不是真实的。它包含一些真理,但这种真理不是我们可以衡量的东西。”

我说它包含一些真理,因为它肯定比其他随机人对引力本质的猜测与现实的联系更直接。引力的确大致按照平方反比定律变化,但不完全如此。我们需要广义相对论来纠正牛顿引力理论中的错误。

尽管广义相对论是我们目前最好的猜测,但它最终不可能是引力的最终理论。不可能存在最终的引力理论。我们拥有的只是对现实越来越好的近似。

Naval: 我认为我们如此容易陷入贝叶斯主义的原因可能与为什么我们如此容易陷入悲观主义有关。我们在进化上天生就倾向于贝叶斯主义。

地球上每一个能形成合理解释的其他动物都是贝叶斯主义者。它们只是观察重复的事件并说:“太阳昨天升起了。太阳明天也会升起。“或者,“我碰过的那个东西很热。它将来可能也会很热。“这就是我们大多数生物系统和大多数进化遗产的工作方式。

只是现在我们有了这个新皮层,可以根据看不见的东西对看得见的东西形成合理解释。这给了我们更高层次的推理能力,但这种更高层次的推理对我们来说不是本能的。它需要努力。它需要深度思考。

我们默认采用贝叶斯主义,因为至少在我们周围的自然界的纯粹生物层面上,很多事情似乎就是这样运作的。


There Can Be No Final Theory of Gravity

There Can Be No Final Theory of Gravity

All we have are better and better approximations to reality

Brett: In almost all cases, you only ever have one theory on offer.

In the case of gravity, there literally is only one theory on offer at the moment. There’s general relativity. Previously we did have two theories. We had Newtonian gravity and we had general relativity—but we did a crucial experiment.

This idea of a crucial experiment is the cherry on top of science. You’ve got these two competing theories. If the experiment goes one way, one theory is ruled out but the other theory is not. In which case, you keep that theory for so long as no problems arise.

This vision of knowledge enables us to have an open-ended quest for progress.

This is completely unlike any other idea about knowledge. The overwhelming majority of physicists are still Bayesian. And the reason they’re still Bayesian is that this is typically what’s taught in universities and this is what passes for an intellectually rigorous way of understanding the world.

But all it is is what I would call species of scientism. It’s because they have a formula behind them, the Bayes’ theorem, which is a perfectly acceptable statistical formula. People use it all the time in perfectly legitimate ways. It’s just that it’s not an epistemology. It’s not a way of guaranteeing, or even being confident, that your theory is actually true.

My favorite example of this: Prior to 1919, every single experiment that was done on gravity showed that it was consistent with Newton’s theory of gravity. What do Bayesians say in that situation? They say you’re getting more and more confident in Newton’s theory.

How does that make sense? How do you square that the day before it was shown to be false was the day when you’re most confident in it?

Now, a Popperian doesn’t have this problem. A Popperian says, “At no point was Newton’s theory actually true. It contained some truth, but that truth isn’t a thing that we can measure.”

I say it contained some truth because it’s certainly got a more direct connection to reality than some other random person’s guess about the nature of gravity. Gravity does indeed approximately vary as the inverse square law, but not exactly. We needed general relativity to correct the errors in Newton’s theory of gravity.

And even though general relativity is our best guess right now, it can’t ultimately be the final theory of gravity. There can be no final theory of gravity. All we have is better and better approximations to reality.

Naval: I think the reason we fall into Bayesianism so easily is probably related to why we fall into pessimism so easily. We’re evolutionarily hardwired for Bayesianism.

Every other animal on the planet that can form good explanations is a Bayesian. They’re just looking at repeated events and saying, “The sun rose yesterday. The sun will rise tomorrow.” Or, “That thing I touched is hot. It’s probably going to be hot in the future.” That is how most of our biological systems and most of our evolutionary heritage worked.

It’s just now we have this neocortex that can form good explanations about the seen in terms of the unseen. That gives us a higher level of reasoning, but that higher level of reasoning is not instinctual to us. It requires effort. It requires deep thinking.

We default to Bayesianism because that is how a lot of the natural world around us seems to work at least at the purely biological level.