风险投资行业的解绑
风险投资行业的解绑
人们经常嘲笑超级天使不纯粹,因为他们投资别人的钱。我们也经常被问到”风险投资机构和种子基金在AngelList上做什么?“(顺便说一句,他们都有明确标记,你可以选择你的融资方案对谁可见。)
然而,我要提出的是,你投资的是谁的钱,不如这些钱附带什么条款来得重要。Venture Hacks是在天使投资市场远不如现在成熟时为教育创业者而创建的。当时,如果你想要超过25万美元的资金,基本上只能去找风险投资。
那时的风险投资是三个要素的捆绑——建议、控制权和资金。
资金显而易见——你需要钱,就去获取。但在风险投资的情况下,资金伴随着控制权——因为投资的金额足够大,所以需要进行积极管理是合理的。最后,由于是积极管理,你会关心管理的质量,因此就有了建议。
现在,得益于网络上信息传播的增加,Venture Hacks和许多其他平台(Series Seed、A VC、Feld Thoughts、The Funded等)帮助创业者理解了控制权层面。Y Combinator和其他种子孵化器实质上帮助”工会化”了初创企业劳动力,并通过声誉和标准化文件减少了风险投资对初创企业的控制。更低的资本要求为投资者打开了竞争场域,并减少了对早期投资者进行积极投资组合管理的需求甚至能力。
所以天使投资者是那些省略了控制权的投资者。他们实质上只捆绑了建议和资金。
投资金额和资金归属是影响因素,但大多数超级天使都回避控制权。同样,一些种子基金(如True Ventures)和一些大型基金(如Andreessen-Horowitz)将创业者友好性作为其核心理念的一部分,因此经常省略传统的控制条款(并购否决权)或机制(董事会席位)。相反,你会看到一些超级天使甚至传统天使在投资其可投资资本的很大一部分时要求更多控制权。
我们也看到种子组合器和纯资金玩家的出现。Y Combinator、TechStars、I/O Ventures、AngelPad、Founder Institute等基本上提供建议——如果你去那里是为了资金,那你就没算对账。DST和后期基金是纯粹的资金来源。
净效应是风险投资正在慢慢被解绑,就像成熟行业经常发生的那样。
所有这些的一个副作用是声誉变得不那么重要了。过去,风险投资的声誉建立在挑选赢家的能力(这对其他投资者和潜在员工具有信号价值)、他们提供的建议,以及考虑到他们实质上拥有董事会控制权时对创业者的友好程度。这些大多已经不再重要——对于精明的创业者来说,只有信号和建议还有很大价值,甚至建议部分也在逐渐被增强并可能被取代。
新的解绑模式有一件事无法替代——那就是激励机制的微妙影响。你或许能从最好的顾问那里获得建议,从最便宜的资金来源获得资金,并为自己保留控制权,但一位经验丰富的风险投资合伙人能独特地为你提供的是:一个拥有强烈激励(因为他们拥有你公司的大量股份)以及完全不同视角和经验基础的人。这就是老式的”投资者作为合作伙伴”模式。它将在某种程度上永远存在,但这不是除了最好公司之外任何机构实践的模式。
The Unbundling of the Venture Capital Industry
People often mock Super-Angels as being impure because they invest other people’s money. We also often get asked “What are VCs and Seed Funds doing on AngelList?” (They’re clearly marked, by the way, and you can choose who your pitch is visible to.)
I will propose, however, that whose money you’re investing is less relevant than on what terms it comes on. Venture Hacks was created to educate entrepreneurs when the Angel market was much less robust. At the time, if you wanted anything more than $250K, you basically had to go to Venture Capital.
Venture Capital, at the time, was a bundle of three things – Advice, Control, and Money.
The money is obvious – you want money, you go get it. But in the case of VC, it came with control – because the amounts being disbursed were large enough, it made sense that they needed to be actively managed. And finally, because it was actively managed, you cared about how well it was managed, and thus the advice.
Now, thanks to increased dissemination of information on the web, Venture Hacks and many others (Series Seed, A VC, Feld Thoughts, The Funded, etc.) have helped entrepreneurs understand the control layer. Y Combinator and other seed incubators have essentially helped “union-ize” the startup workforce, and via reputation and standardized documents, reduce the control that VCs have over startups. Lower capital requirements have opened up the playing field of investors, and reduced the need or even the ability of early-stage investors to do active portfolio management.
So Angels are investors who leave out the control. They essentially bundle just Advice and Money.
The amount of money invested and whose money it is are factors that play into it, but most Super-Angels eschew control. Similarly, some seed funds (i.e., True Ventures), and some larger funds (i.e., Andreessen-Horowitz) make entrepreneur-friendliness a core part of their ethos, and as such often leave out classic control provisions (M&A vetos) or mechanisms (Board seats). Conversely, you’ll see some Super-Angels or even traditional angels asking for more control if they’re investing a significant portion of their investable capital.
We are also seeing the emergence of Seed Combinators and Pure Money plays. Y Combinator, TechStars, I/O Ventures, AngelPad, Founder Institute, etc., are basically giving advice – if you’re going there for the funding, then you’re not doing the math. DST and later stage funds are pure sources of money.
The net effect is that the Venture Capital is slowly being un-bundled, as mature industries often are.
One side effect of all of this is that reputation matters a lot less. It used to be that VC reputation was built on their ability to pick winners (this has signaling value to other investors and potential employees), the advice that they gave, and how friendly they were to the entrepreneurs, given that they essentially had Board control. Most of this doesn’t matter anymore – it’s only the signaling and advice that carries much value for savvy entrepreneurs, and even the advice part is gradually being augmented and possibly replaced.
There is one thing that the new unbundled model can’t replace – which is the subtle influence of incentives. You may be able to get advice from the best advisors, money from the cheapest source, and keep control for yourself, but the one thing that an experienced VC partner can uniquely provide you is someone who has a strong incentive (because they own a lot of your company), and a very different perspective and experience base. That’s the old-fashioned “Investor as a Partner” model. It will always survive, to some extent, but it’s not the model that any but the best firms practice.