证券化公民身份!
证券化公民身份!
人们憎恨移民和移民政策,因为这被视为在零和游戏中与新来者争夺有限资源。这种观点在许多经济层面都存在缺陷,但让我们暂时忽略这一点。让我们给每个人一份权益。
假设我们给每个美国公民发放一本额外护照——一本空白护照。在某些常识性限制内(即不发给恐怖分子),每个人都可以将自己的额外护照卖给潜在的移民。你可以把它送给值得拥有的人、爱国者、杰出人才,或者任何愿意付给你一大笔钱的人。你或许还可以用它来交换外国护照。很可能,市场会出现来评估和交易这些护照,人们会支付或承诺未来收入流(最好的情况是个人IPO,最坏的情况是契约奴役)来进入理想的国家。
但现在想想,如果一个国家实施糟糕的贸易或税收政策会发生什么。所有护照价值的总和将等于该国政府的资本化价值。降低这一价值的糟糕政策将导致护照需求和价格下降。你的护照和额外护照很可能是你最宝贵的财产,价值数百万美元。糟糕的政府政策将导致公民股东的大规模负面反馈。
事实上,某些无法货币化的政策现在将显露出其成本,我们可以看到支持选择权与支持生命权的价值、某些环境政策等等。如果你的政府没有按照你希望的方式行事,你总是可以卖掉护照离开,但很可能糟糕的政府会首先被公民股东赶下台。
最后,在异想天开的极端情况下,那些表现出精明经济管理能力的国家可以对管理不善国家的公开交易护照进行敌意但和平的收购。如果每本护照赋予你在民主制度中的一票投票权,中国可以买下印度,将其置于对中国有效的相同经济计划中,甚至可能在以后获利出售!
Securitize Citizenship!
People hate immigration and immigrants as it’s seen as competing with newcomers over finite resources in a zero-sum game. This argument is flawed on many economic levels, but let’s overlook that for a moment. Let’s give everyone a stake.
Suppose that we gave every US citizen an extra passport – a blank one. Within certain common-sense restrictions (i.e., no terrorists) each person could sell their extra passport to a would-be immigrant. You could give it to someone deserving, or patriotic, or brilliant, or whoever would just pay you a lot of cash. You could perhaps exchange it for a foreign one. Likely, markets would emerge to value and trade these things, and people would pay or promise future earnings streams (personal IPOs in the best case, indentured servitude in the worst) to get into desirable countries.
But now think what would happen if a country enacted bad trade or tax policy. The sum of all of the value of the passports would equal the capitalized value of the government of the country. Poor policy that reduced this value would result in the demand, and therefore the price, of passports falling. Your passport and your extra one would probably be your most valuable possessions, worth millions of dollars. Poor government policy would lead to massive negative feedback from the citizen-shareholders.
In fact, certain un-monetizable policies would now reveal their costs, and we could see the value of pro-choice v. pro-life, certain environmental policies, etc. If your government isn’t doing things the way that you want, you can always sell your passport and get out, but likely the poor government would be ousted by citizen-shareholders first.
Finally, in the fanciful stretch case, countries that have shown themselves to be astute economic managers could engage in hostile yet peaceful takeovers of the publicly-traded passports of poorly managed countries. If each passport entitled you to one vote in a democracy, China could buy India, put it on the same economic program that has worked well for the Chinese, and perhaps even sell it off for a profit later!