Matt Ridley: How Innovation Works, Part 2
Innovation is the parent of prosperity
Naval interviews Matt Ridley , the author of The Red Queen and, recently, How Innovation Works . Also see Part 1 .
Innovation Famine
Matt: I have a chapter towards the end of the book where I complain about the fact that we are living through an innovation famine, not an innovation feast—particularly in areas other than digital. One of the reasons for this is the power of the environmental movement to oppose new technologies, which are often good for the environment. I detail the case of genetically modified organisms, where you make a plant insect-resistant and have the capacity to wean agriculture of chemical pesticides. This has been proven to work and is now being used in India, Brazil and North America as well—but not in Europe and Africa where an entire technology has effectively been rejected by the pressure of environmentalists.
My good friend Mark Lynas was one of the most prominent campaigners against this technology in the 1990s and did a lot of the protesting a lot of the writing about it. And then he changed his mind and said, “We were doing the wrong thing, but it’s almost too late.” It’s very hard to see how Europe now changes its minds and adopts this new technology. The best hope is that with the next technology that comes along, which is genome editing through things like CRISPR, a lot of the concerns of environmentalists can be set to one side because this is not a technology that involves bringing foreign genetic material from other creatures, whatever that means, into plants. So it’s possible that we can leapfrog into some cleaner technologies there.
The end point must be that the more we innovate, the fewer resources we need, the less land we need, the more land we can give back to nature, the more we can make people prosperous, and that results in them cutting their birth rate. It also results in them planting more trees. There is a possible soft landing for humanity later in this century, if we do plenty more innovation. We could end up with 8 or 9 billion people living lives that are much more benign towards the natural environment and that enable most of us to have greenery around us.
The COVID pandemic has shown us, quite starkly, that we have not been doing enough innovation. We’ve not been developing enough vaccines; we’ve not been finding ways of developing vaccines faster; we’ve not been developing enough diagnostic devices. When you look at why not, you find that there is 17 to 20 months of delay to get a license to sell a new diagnostic device. This is enough to deter most entrepreneurs from even trying to go into that area. I hope one message people take is that, if we can do more innovation, we will not destroy the planet. It’s quite the reverse. It’s the safest way of saving the planet. The poorest countries are the ones seeing the most damage to the environment at the moment.
Naval: One of the things that David Deutsch does in his works that he often talks about is how anything that is possible or not forbidden by the laws of physics is possible for us to create through technology and science. As universal explainers, humans are capable of understanding anything that any being or any theoretical creatures capable of understanding. All we have to do is figure out how to reconfigure the existing atoms and particles out there to do what we want within the laws of physics, which are quite generous and quite broad. In that sense, all failures and all sins are just ignorance. It’s just the lack of knowledge.
“We are capable of making objects, even our simplest objects that are beyond the capability of one human mind to comprehend.”
If we were to speed up the accumulation and application of knowledge through innovation, we would be able to solve all of humanity’s problems. And we’re always at the beginning of this infinity, as he says, because there’s an infinite amount of progress to be made. There’s so far to go that when you look at where we are at any given point on that curve, infinity stretches out in front of you. I find that extremely hopeful. But as you point out, we can be our own worst enemies in these cases.
Matt: It’s a very important part of rational optimism that we are not saying the world is perfect. Quite the reverse. That’s what the word optimism meant when it was coined by Voltaire: You thought the world was perfect and couldn’t be improved anymore. That’s not what people like me and David Deutsch are saying. We’re saying there is an incredible amount of improvement that we haven’t even yet begun to imagine. We are at the start of a very long run on Broadway, as a species. We’re not towards the end. We are going to see some amazing novelties in the current century. One of my beefs with the environmental movement—as you say, not the conservation movement that deals with local greenery but the planetary one—is that it imagines that we’re not going to be able to invent very much and, if we do invent things, they will do harm. That doesn’t feel right to me. We’ve hardly scraped the surface of different ways of combining and recombining the atoms and elements of the world. Paul Romer talked about how many different compounds of the minerals in the periodic table could be made. It’s an astronomical number, and we’ve hardly explored the properties of half of them. Like you, I’m a fan of fusion energy and I think that could make a huge difference within our lifetimes. There’s all sorts of things that we’re going to be able to do in this century to improve humanity but also to make it a livable place.
Naval: There’s this spaceship-earth metaphor that a lot of people latch onto instinctively because it’s seductive. People say the earth is this fragile, precious blue marble that gives us everything we want, and that when we destroy our home, there’s no place else left. We can’t get off Spaceship Earth. This treats earth as a zero-sum game. But upon closer examination, it falls apart. Even earth is hostile to the idea of 7 billion humans living on it. The only way 7 billion humans live on earth is through innovation through technology and through modifying the environment. The challenge is how to do it in a sustainable way—and then figure out how to do it on other planets, and Terraform Mars and the moon to make them livable. It requires a careful reexamination of this spaceship-earth metaphor, which most people instinctively believe, but upon examination turns out to be incorrect.
Matt: You mentioned knowledge as being potentially infinite. It’s very important to emphasize that knowledge is a distributed and collective phenomenon. I go back to this wonderful little essay that was written by Leonard Reed in the 1950s called “ I Pencil ” in which a pencil works out how it came into existence and discovers that millions of people contributed to its manufacturer—from people cutting down trees for the wood to people mining graphite for the lead. The important point is that not one of them knows how to make a pencil.
We are capable of making objects, even our simplest objects that are beyond the capability of one human mind to comprehend. It requires lots of human minds to collaborate, to make them and to accumulate the knowledge of how to invent them as well. At this point I begin to sound a bit like a Marxist because I start talking about collective humanity, but it’s a way of rescuing collaboration, cooperation and partnership from a communist perspective and restoring it to a much more voluntary end of the political spectrum, if you like.
Naval: Cooperation is the basis for the species. For example, ants and bees look like hive creatures, but they don’t cooperate across genetic boundaries. We’re the only creatures that cooperate across genetic boundaries and do long-range planning with each other. Yuval Noah Harari, he talks about this.
Matt: We know how to cooperate with strangers, and they don’t.
Naval: If you and I were to belong to any other species—whether dogs or mice or ants—given how genetically different you and I are and how culturally different you and I are, if we encountered each other in real life we’d probably attack each other or fight over the same habitat. We couldn’t cooperate or converse. That is a unique feature that we should be proud of. You need cooperation, and no one person understands any of these complex systems. It’s why I laugh when macro economists build their models trying to figure out where the economy is going to go. The economy is far too big for any one individual to understand. It’s an emergent, complex system of billions of actors. So these models, by definition, cherry-pick a few shaky assumptions and end up miraculously converging and whatever political bias the macro economists happened to have in the first place.
COVID-19
Matt: That’s one of the problems we’re seeing at the moment with the modeling of the pandemic. It’s an attempt to understand a bottom-up phenomenon with a top-down approach. The other way of putting it is to say roughly 10 million people eat lunch in London on a normal day, but most of them choose what to eat at the last minute. How is it possible that the right amounts of the right kinds of food are available, in the right places, at the right time for that to happen? Who is London’s lunch commissioner? He or she must be unbelievably intelligent. And, of course, there is no such person. And if there was, it would be an absolute disaster.
Naval: Then we would all be eating Soviet-style glop rations, and half of us would be starving. There’d be long lines. Unfortunately in 2020, the economists are building epidemic models and the epidemiologists are running the economy, so we’ve got it backwards. We’re trapped in a bad situation in which we are not willing to put a value on a single human life. You’ve put these health officers in charge who didn’t train or sign up to run the entire world—and they’re terrified they’ll be blamed for excess deaths if they let up too early. It’s very hard to calculate the economic consequences, so they’re going to keep us locked down for quite a while. I’m intrigued by the Swedish model, not because it’s necessarily the best one. (The best one would have been if we had isolated and crushed the curve like Hong Kong and Taiwan did.) But given that most of the Western countries are large democracies and don’t have the ability or the willpower to do that, we’re all headed towards a Swedish model one way or another, whatever that turns out to be.
Matt: Thank goodness for Sweden not locking down because, otherwise, the Western world would have been able to say, “Well, there is no alternative.” We know there is an alternative. Though Sweden had a huge amount of voluntary social distancing, the country didn’t have compulsory lockdowns and hasn’t damage its economy nearly as badly as countries like Britain and the U.S. Sweden has shown that the most important measures in getting on top of this pandemic are almost certainly the voluntary ones—things like not shaking hands, not having large gatherings, staying a safe distance from each other—not confining everyone to their homes.
Naval: It makes no sense that big box retailers are open, but small businesses are not allowed to open. Obviously, the best response is a bottoms-up distributed response. You can beat the virus when individuals all panic, not when the governments panic. But a single panicked individual can outsmart the virus. Governments don’t know how to control viruses, but they do know how to control individuals; whereas an individual can control their own health, safety and viral spread. So we’ve taken an education problem and turned it into a government top-down control problem.
Matt: The British government is discovering at the moment that it’s quite easy to scare people and not so easy to unscare them. The draconian introduction of the lockdown was very effective. It turned out that people were willing to go along with it and even report on their neighbors. They became surprisingly authoritarian in a surprisingly short time because they were being given a very scary story. People are easily frightened about things. but when you come along and say, “Right, scare over, please come back to work,” half the country is saying, “No, I thought you said it was scary. We’re not going out yet. And by the way, you’re paying us to stay at home, so why should I?”
Naval: That’s going to change. The cynical view is that, up to this point, blue collar people are the ones losing their jobs. So far it hasn’t been the white collar people who run society and control the media, government, universities, think tanks and modelers. But when the white collar people start losing their jobs, people say, “Wait a minute. We need to take the economy into account.”
“Unfortunately in 2020, the economists are building epidemic models and the epidemiologists are running the economy.”
As the Swedish experiment is going to show, there’s three different variables you simultaneously track in your head. It’s very hard for most people to do that. One is, of course, the infection fatality rate and how many people end up sick or dying. The second is the economic impact—you have to have some standard way of measuring and comparing that. And the third is what percentage of the population has built up a herd immunity, while keeping in mind that herd immunity through a natural spread is very different from herd immunity through a vaccine. A vaccine is indiscriminately applied; whereas when a virus naturally spreads, it’ infects the more mobile super-spreaders as well as the most vulnerable first. So the people who get taken out first were either the ones who are most likely to spread it or the most likely to die. So natural herd immunity is the lower threshold than vaccine immediate herd immunity.
Matt: It’s become clear in the U.K., and I think this is largely true in the U.S., that a huge proportion of the deaths are attributable to acquired infections at hospitals and care homes. With insufficient early testing, healthcare workers became infected quite early—which means they became carriers quite early—because sick people were visiting healthcare facilities. As a result, a very vulnerable population— which not only had a high death rate but also a high transmission rate because they were carrying a higher loads of the virus—has seen a very high reproductive rate of the virus. That doesn’t mean it’s high in the rest of the community. The examples of Sweden and others show that, for those who are not in that category, it should be possible to use voluntary measures to suppress this virus and get to herd immunity at quite low levels of infection.
Naval: We’re going to end up in that scenario regardless, so the question will be: How much benefit did people get who tried to flatten the curve for longer periods of time? We’re seeing this experiment at a state-by-state level in the U.S. right now. Of course, the battle is turning into the narrative and the interpretation of the data that’s coming out saying, “Oh, well they’re hiding deaths,” “They’re exaggerating this,” or “They’re not exaggerating that.” When this is all said and done, I don’t know if we will have the honesty to look back and say, “Well, this is what happened,” because now in an age of social media, everyone’s trapped in their filter bubble/silo. Journalists serve all taken sides. Their objective journalism, to the extent that it existed, has gone out the window. So we may end up living in two different narrative worlds even once we know what happened.
Filter Bubbles
Matt: It does alarm me the degree to which we have, fragmented into these filter bubbles and echo chambers. In the book, I speculate that that is a consequence of technological determinism. Whereas I thought the invention of the Internet would lead to social media, would lead to us all seeing each other’s points of view, it hasn’t turned out that way. Social media has proved to be a very divisive medium,as radio did in the early years of the 20th century when it was a significant tool helping the rise of dictators. But television did not—it was a medium that pulled us all into the mushy middle.
Naval: I absolutely agree. When I read that section of the book, I put it down. By the way, the thing I love about your book is, every third page I had to put it down and think about it, which to me is the mark of a good book. I think the faster you can read a book, the worse the book is. If you can speed-read a book, you shouldn’t. Just put that book away, it doesn’t deserve to be a book. But when you cover that section, very briefly I realized: There’s a big idea in here; there’s a book in here. A lesser person would take these two paragraphs and turn it into a book. But you covered it very briefly.
My thinking on it was that the reason is because television had very high production values and very high distribution costs. You could only afford to get the message out once or twice. Especially in the old days of television, you didn’t have that many channels. Therefore, people were getting their news sanitized from the same set of sources. The bad part is you could be living in a bubble controlled by the elites, by the government, or by whatever the media wants you to think. But the good news is that at least you were relatively aligned and there wasn’t this constant low-level civil war going on inside society. When you get to something like radio or to the extreme social media, anybody can contribute and create content all the time. Because of that, the divisiveness is almost a given.
In fact, with radio there was filtering by tuning the channel. But in social media, you’ve built your own channel. The level of a filter bubble that you can go into is much deeper and much more tuned to the individual than any previous filter bubble.
Matt: There’s an echo here of what happened with the invention of printing. The most entrepreneurial printer of the lot and the best published author in Europe was Martin Luther. And he is using this new technology effectively to cause a social revolution, and eventually it turns into a series of religious wars. We have been here before and it wasn’t a pretty sight, if you like.
Naval: It wasn’t. And it’s amazing how much the distribution of media and information changes the structure of society. You cite Amara’s Law , which talks about how the effects of innovation are overestimated in the short term and underestimated the long term. I have absolutely seen that. I’ve seen that in Silicon Valley over and over, everything from autonomous vehicles to the internet, to mobile phones, to crypto.
More Crypto
Matt: Crypto is a good example, and I don’t write enough about crypto. I wish I had done more. But I do think crypto is a good example of a technology that will continue to disappoint us for a number of years yet. Although you made some very interesting remarks about its potential, I suspect that a lot of people will lose their shirt on crypto plans for quite a while before it starts to deliver that promise—if government ever allows it to, of course,
Naval: This is where crypto is going to work a little differently than people might expect. Amara’s Law generally tends to be that we overestimate 10 years, we underestimate 20 years. So 15 years is the crossover. But, obviously, as we know, history doesn’t quite repeat. It can rhyme, but you never get the same result twice because, if you did, there’d be no new information. It wouldn’t be a complex system if you could easily predict the next step.
So, first of all, crypto has been around since 2009. That was the original creation of Bitcoin, so it’s been longer than people think. Also, you mentioned at the end of your last statement: if states allow it. That is the whole point of crypto. Crypto solves the coordination problem that normally you could only have solved with a state, but you solve it without the state. Originally it’s a solution to the Byzantine generals problem . It’s not clear to me that states can stop it, because if they can, they will. No state wants an extra-judiciary system in existence, because the control of the money printing press is the ultimate power. That said, in the last two years since the hype bubble popped, there have been great entrepreneurs hard at work, and I can now see the first green shoots coming out of crypto.
I would put them into two categories. One is we’re building a decentralized finance infrastructure for borrowing, lending, derivatives, trading, custody, all of that stuff. The things that Wall Street does for 20% of the GDP of the United States will be done for 1% of the GDP in cryptoland. It’s getting so good that I wouldn’t be surprised if, a few years from now, you see more Wall Street traders saying, “I want to make a certain bet.” “I have a certain point of view.” “I want to hedge in a certain way.” Or, “I want to buy a certain asset, but I can’t do it with the existing financial infrastructure. I have to convert into Bitcoin or Ethereum and go do that through decentralized finance.” It’s just technologically far superior, that’s one thing I’m seeing.
The other thing I’m seeing is, the first applications of crypto come out in file storage and authentication and identity. These are plumbing infrastructure for Internet companies being built in the crypto domain. And the crypto versions are superior to the non-crypto versions because they’re decentralized. They’re no longer under the control of Apple, Google or Facebook.
Independent developers do not like to live under the control of Apple, Google, Facebook, Twitter or whoever, because they know they can be de-platformed at any time. They know that platform operator will capture the majority of the value. They know if they strike oil, the platform operator will come in and take it over.
We’re going to see crypto-based plumbing laid out, and we’re going to see decentralized finance lay that out over the next five years. That is where the green shoots of crypto are coming up. And then, in the following decade, we’re going see the results of that and they’re gonna be bigger than we can anticipate
Matt: That’s very hopeful, as you say, because it is important to be able to retain our individual autonomy in this world. And I do, at the moment, feel as if the government on the one hand and Facebook on the other, is finding ways of constricting my freedom of expression, thought and argument and, indeed, the facts I have access to.
Naval: The government gets to restrict you because it has a monopoly on violence. People try to hijack the government, because if you can get the government to do your bidding, you’ve got guys with guns to do your bidding and you run everything. What cryptography enables is, it’s the first asymmetric advantage for the defender against the attacker, probably since the castle wall or the moat.
In the history of warfare, the attacker has been gaining huge advantages and the defender has been losing them since the canon and the gun were invented. That favors the attacker. Nuclear weapons obviously favor the attacker. Biological weapons favor the attacker. Airstrikes favor the attacker. Tanks favor the attacker.
Matt: The machine gun favored the defender, funny enough. That’s what made trench warfare so static.
Naval: That’s a good point. Yes, I missed that one. So crypto the attacker can throw unlimited compute power at it, but if you’ve done your security correctly, they can’t break your encryption key, so it favors the defender. And of course, whichever way the power goes, that’s the way the control, identity and anonymity goes. We’re losing physical anonymity with camera surveillance, the NSA spying on everybody and Internet-connected cameras everywhere. Physical privacy is dead.
The government will always know where you are physically, unless you’re going to do a face change all the time. People talk about the comeback of masks covering it. No, that won’t cover it—just a slightly better algorithm is required. If another human can recognize you, eventually the computer will recognize you, because that’s one of the very easy problems for AI and machine learning.
That said, digital privacy is real. You will be able to create a personal cryptographically protected identity that goes on the Internet, and you can build a reputation against it, you can do business against it, you can make friends against it, and no one will quite know who you are. Sure, the NSA and people sniffing the fiber lines could potentially unmask you, but if you are sophisticated enough, there are even ways to get past that.
Automation
That leads us to how governments approach our freedoms. They have a lot of power over us, and so people like to create narratives to take that power over. One of the narratives that comes up every 20 years is automation and job loss.
This time it’s AGI, artificial general intelligence, that we’re going to come up with a technology that advances so quickly that it improves itself faster than we can retrain, faster than we can create new jobs, and we all get put out of jobs. There’s two pieces to this. There is the pace of innovation of AI and what AI means. The second piece is that, this time, it’s different: We’re going to lose our jobs. And I thought you had very good viewpoints on that.
Matt: We’ve been here before. We’ve expected innovation and automation to destroy jobs. It never does. It always creates new kinds of opportunities for employment. It creates the wealth that enables people to employ other people.
It also does create leisure. It does reduce the amount of time we have to work in our life. We can spend more time in education and retirement. We can have longer weekends than our grandparents did. To some extent, for the first time the upper-middle class bourgeois professions are feeling under threat from automation. While factory workers and farm hands were being automated, they didn’t mind. But now doctors and lawyers can be displaced by machines, and suddenly we must all panic. Every time it’s been raised as an urgent issue in the past 50 years, it’s proved to be wrong. I think it will be this time, too. Of course, there will be local disruptions caused to employment by different forms of automation and innovation. One can’t deny that.
Naval: And, in fact, many of these disruptions could not have existed if a previous generation of automation had been allowed to take place. For example, you can’t lose your job as a truck driver if trucks didn’t exist. If you had stopped trucks in the first place, because you were trying to protect people in the railway industry or people who were carrying things on their backs.
A lot of the economy today is based on luxury goods. As you mentioned in the book, until I can get all the peeled grapes and massages that I want on demand, there’s still room for more employment. And we shift what we consider jobs to be. There are things that we just haven’t figured out how to do yet with automation and robotics.
Matt: If you could reach this theoretical end point where a machine does everything you could possibly need, then you don’t have a problem.
Naval: Why would you? Work is not good in and of itself. You should just be able to write books, record podcasts and entertain your fellow monkeys all day long. As you point out through innovation, a lot of this automation that happens is highly democratizing. It’s democratic consumption. You also make a good point where it is the nature of modern civilization to consolidate production through specialization. So the one person in the world who’s best at anything gets to do that for everybody. But on the flip side, you democratize consumption, where not everybody can have access to everything.
Matt: What we tend to do as a species, as we progress, is to become more and more specialized in what we produce but more and more diversified in what we consume. That saying I got from a wonderful book called Second Nature , years ago by a man named Haim Ofek. I wrote to him and said, “This is an interesting insight. Have you written anything more about it?” He replied, “Well, I think I got that idea from one of your books.”
Naval: It’s funny because I have a tweet about that exact topic that goes back a few years, and I have no idea where I got that from. It might’ve been from one of your books. It might’ve been from David Deutsch . It might’ve been some random thing, I don’t even know.
Matt: You have said things to me today about things you’ve got from my books that are fresh to me, as if you’ve made this point, as it were, we each put ideas into the public realm, we pick them up, we changed them slightly, we give them back to each other—that’s the nature of intelligent conversation.
Great Man Theory
Naval: This ties back into the great man or great woman theory of history. After reading your book, I had to think about that a little bit because I had subconsciously subscribed 70-80% to the great man theory of history and 20-30% to the evolutionary theory of history. And in hindsight, that was probably a flawed balance.
One reconciliation that I came up with is that it does take great people to move the world forward, but it doesn’t necessarily take that specific great person. Although we needed Edison to create the light bulb, there were 21 other people creating the light bulb at around the same time. We needed one of those 21 people to be the innovator to drive it forward.
So it’s not that there’s one individual at any given time who can do anything, but there is a set of special individuals and any one of them in the right situation will suffice—or any set of them will suffice. That’s the conclusion that I came to.
Matt: Whereas Leonardo DaVinci did not have to worry about somebody else painting the Mona Lisa before he did, there’s something particularly challenging, brilliant and clever about being the first person to develop a practical light bulb.
If you’re in a race, it’s even more impressive that you do it. To some extent, the fact that it’s not a unique achievement is even more impressive.
Naval: I had a mild case of Gell-Mann Amnesia within your book, if you remember that framework. Gell-Mann Amnesia says that, you believe everything you read in the newspapers, then when it gets to a topic that you’re intimately familiar with, you realize it’s nonsense. Or it doesn’t quite apply, yet you continue believing everything else that they write about.
I’m not blaming you. You did a great job. But there was a dissonance where you proved your point by showing that we tend to over lionize and remember a few inventors as being the creators when it’s much more of a team and distributed process. You were giving examples of inventors and people who get credit throughout history. Then later in the book, you talk about Facebook as an innovator, Airbnb as an innovator, and you mentioned the founders, Brian Chesky
and Mark Zuckerberg.
But anyone who’s been in Silicon Valley for a while knows that before there was Facebook, there was Myspace and before there was Myspace, there was Friendster. Poor Jonathan Abrams , who created Friendster, is left as the beaver looking at the dam and saying, “Whose dam?” It’s the same with Airbnb: There was VRBO, HomeAway and a bunch of vacation rental sites before that, although Airbnb did pioneer the individual room breakup.
But there was Couchsurfing, there was Craigslist and a whole bunch of others. Unfortunately, history is written by the victors. And in this case, the victors don’t even have to write history; it’s everyone around them who’s writing history. There’s availability bias: They see the victor, so to the victor go the spoils and the credit.
Matt: That’s absolutely right, and I stand corrected on both of those. You couldn’t be more right.
The Book
Naval: Matt, you have this new book out, How Innovation Works . It’s a must-read for entrepreneurs and government officials who want to either be innovative themselves or foster innovation in their geography or society. Frankly, if you were an entrepreneur, self-styled inventor or innovator, this is probably the cheapest, fastest education you can get on the history and future of innovation. I highly recommend it. I’m going to leave with a quote that I like from the book that summarizes what innovation is and where it’s fostered. It has a very optimistic and correct view of how it operates. That quote is: “Innovation is the child of freedom because it is a free and creative attempt to satisfy freely expressed human desires.” That’s a powerful quote for me. It tells me that innovation requires freedom. It’s creative, and we’re satisfying what people want to do, as opposed to what they’re told or forced to do.
So thank you, Matt, for helping me figure out evolution. I highly recommend Genome as well, to figure out the rational basis behind ethics and the origin of virtue. You helped make me an optimist in a rational way through your famous Rational Optimist , and you drive home the point of the evolution of innovation and how to foster it in How Innovation Works . It’s been a pleasure.
Matt: Naval, thank you for the incredible insights that you’ve given me today, for your fantastic, kind remarks and for the fact that you said this book should be read by people who do innovation, because I’m a bit of a fraud. I’m not an innovator; I’ve not invented anything; I’ve not built a business; I’m not an entrepreneur. I’m a writer. So I’m greatly honored that you think the book is a practical use to people, as well as being an interesting tour of the ideas behind this mysterious concept of human innovation.
纳瓦尔(Naval)采访了《红皇后》(The Red Queen)以及近期出版的《创新如何发生》(How Innovation Works)一书的作者马特·里德利(Matt Ridley)。另请参阅第一部分。
创新饥荒
马特: 在书的最后有一章,我抱怨说我们正在经历一场创新饥荒,而不是创新盛宴——特别是在数字领域之外的地方。原因之一是环保运动有能力反对通常对环境有益的新技术。我详细列举了转基因生物(GMOs)的例子,通过这种技术你使植物产生抗虫性,从而使农业有能力摆脱化学杀虫剂。这已被证明行之有效,目前在印度、巴西和北美也被广泛使用——但在欧洲和非洲,一项完整的技术实际上已被环保主义者的压力所拒绝。
我的好朋友马克·莱纳斯(Mark Lynas)在20世纪90年代是反对这项技术的最著名活动家之一,他参与了许多抗议活动,写了许多相关文章。后来他改变了想法,说:“我们做错了,但现在几乎为时已晚。”很难想象欧洲现在会如何改变主意并采用这项新技术。最大的希望是,随着下一项技术——即通过CRISPR等手段进行基因组编辑——的出现,环保主义者的很多担忧可以被抛开,因为这不是一项涉及将外来遗传物质(无论这意味着什么)从其他生物引入植物的技术。所以我们有可能借此跨越到一些更清洁的技术。
最终的目标必须是:我们创新得越多,我们需要的资源就越少,我们需要的土地就越少,我们能还给大自然的土地就越多,我们能让人们越繁荣,从而导致他们降低生育率。这也会导致他们种植更多的树木。如果我们在本世纪后期进行大量创新,人类就有可能实现软着陆。我们最终可能会有八九十亿人过着对自然环境更加友好的生活,并使我们大多数人周围都能有绿植环绕。
COVID大流行非常严酷地向我们表明,我们在创新方面做得不够。我们没有研发出足够的疫苗;我们没有找到更快研发疫苗的方法;我们没有研发出足够的诊断设备。当你探究为什么没有时,你会发现,获得销售新诊断设备的许可需要延迟17到20个月。这足以阻止大多数企业家甚至尝试进入该领域。我希望人们能明白一个信息,即如果我们能进行更多的创新,我们就不会毁灭地球。恰恰相反,这是拯救地球最安全的方法。目前最贫穷的国家正是环境遭到最大破坏的国家。
纳瓦尔: 大卫·多伊奇(David Deutsch)在他的著作中经常谈到的一点是,任何物理学定律允许的或不被其禁止的事物,我们都有可能通过技术和科学创造出来。作为“通用解释者”,人类有能力理解任何存在或任何理论上的生物所能理解的事物。我们所要做的就是弄清楚如何在极其宽泛和慷慨的物理定律范围内,重新配置现有的原子和粒子,以达到我们想要的目的。从这个意义上说,所有的失败和罪恶都只是无知。这仅仅是知识的匮乏。
“我们有能力制造出甚至超越单个心智理解能力的最简单的物品。”
如果我们通过创新来加速知识的积累和应用,我们就能解决人类所有的难题。正如他所说,我们始终处于这种无限的开端,因为我们要取得的进步是无限的。前方还有很长的路要走,当你看到我们在这条曲线上处于任何给定点时,无限就在你面前延伸。我觉得这充满希望。但正如你指出的,在这些情况下,我们可能会成为自己最大的敌人。
马特: 理性乐观主义中一个非常重要的部分是,我们并不是说这个世界是完美的。恰恰相反。这就是伏尔泰创造“乐观主义”这个词时的意思:你认为世界是完美的,不能再改进了。这不是像我和大卫·多伊奇这样的人所表达的意思。我们说的是,世界还有令人难以置信的巨量改进空间,我们甚至还没有开始想象。作为一个物种,我们就像是在百老汇一场超长演出的开端。我们还没有走到尽头。在本世纪,我们将看到一些惊人的新奇事物。我对环保运动(正如你所说,不是处理当地绿化保护的自然保护运动,而是针对全球范围的环保运动)的一个不满是,它想象我们无法发明太多东西,而且如果我们发明了东西,它们会造成危害。我觉得这不对。对于结合和重组世界上原子和元素的不同方式,我们几乎还没有触及皮毛。保罗·罗默(Paul Romer)曾谈到,元素周期表中的矿物质可以组成多少种不同的化合物。这是一个天文数字,我们甚至还没有探索其中一半的特性。像你一样,我也是核聚变能的粉丝,我认为它可以在我们有生之年带来巨大的改变。在本世纪,我们将能够做各种各样的事情来改善人类,同时也让地球成为一个宜居的地方。
纳瓦尔: 许多人本能地迷恋“地球飞船”的比喻,因为它很有诱惑力。人们说地球是一颗脆弱、珍贵的蓝色弹珠,它给了我们想要的一切,当我们摧毁了我们的家园,就无处可去了。我们无法离开“地球飞船”。这把地球看作是一个零和博弈。但仔细审查后,这个观点就站不住脚了。即使是地球本身,对让70亿人类居住在上面这个想法都是排斥的。70亿人能够在地球上生存的唯一途径,就是通过技术创新和改变环境。挑战在于如何以可持续的方式做到这一点——然后想出如何在其他星球上做到这一点,去地球化改造火星和月球,使它们变得宜居。这需要仔细重新审视“地球飞船”这个大多数人本能相信的比喻,因为一经审视,它其实是不正确的。
马特: 你提到知识具有潜在的无限性。非常重要的一点是要强调知识是一种分布式的、集体的现象。我回想起20世纪50年代伦纳德·里德(Leonard Reed)写的一篇极好的小散文,名叫《我,铅笔》。在这篇文章中,一支铅笔梳理了它是如何被制造出来的,并发现数百万人为它的制造做出了贡献——从砍伐树木获取木材的人到开采石墨获取铅芯的人。重要的一点是,他们中没有一个人(独自)知道如何制造一支铅笔。
我们有能力制造出最简单的物品,这些物品哪怕是最简单的,也超出了单个人类心智的理解能力。这需要许多人类的心智协同合作,来制造它们,并积累如何发明它们的知识。说到这里,我听起来有点像个马克思主义者了,因为我开始谈论人类集体,但如果你愿意的话,这是一种将协作、合作和伙伴关系从共产主义的视角中解救出来,并将其恢复到政治光谱中更偏向自愿端的一种方式。
纳瓦尔: 合作是物种的基础。例如,蚂蚁和蜜蜂看起来像蜂群生物,但它们不会跨越基因边界进行合作。我们是唯一能跨越基因边界进行合作,并相互进行长远规划的生物。尤瓦尔·诺亚·赫拉利(Yuval Noah Harari)谈到过这一点。
马特: 我们知道如何与陌生人合作,而它们不知道。
纳瓦尔: 如果你我属于任何其他物种——无论是狗、老鼠还是蚂蚁——考虑到你我之间在基因和文化上的巨大差异,如果我们在现实生活中相遇,我们可能会互相攻击,或者为同一个栖息地而战。我们无法合作或交谈。这是一个我们应该感到自豪的独特特征。你需要合作,没有一个人能独自理解这些复杂的系统中的任何一个。这就是为什么当我看到宏观经济学家建立模型试图预测经济走向时会发笑的原因。经济体量太大了,任何个人都无法理解。这是一个由数十亿参与者组成的新生的、复杂的系统。因此,按照定义,这些模型只是挑选了几个站不住脚的假设,最后奇迹般地收敛于这些宏观经济学家最初碰巧持有的任何政治偏见上。
COVID-19
马特: 这是我们目前在流行病建模中看到的问题之一。这是试图用自上而下的方法来理解一个自下而上的现象。换一种说法,在正常的一天里,大约有1000万人在伦敦吃午餐,但他们大多数人都是在最后一刻才决定吃什么。要做到在正确的时间、正确的地点,提供正确数量的、种类正确的食物,这怎么可能呢?谁是伦敦的午餐专员?他或她必须聪明绝顶。而实际上,当然没有这样的人。如果真有,那绝对是一场灾难。
纳瓦尔: 那样的话,我们都会吃苏联式的糊状配给粮,而且我们中一半的人会挨饿。还排着长队。不幸的是,在2020年,经济学家在建立流行病模型,而流行病学家在管理经济,所以我们本末倒置了。我们被困在一个糟糕的处境中,在这里我们不愿意为单一的生命标价。你让这些卫生官员掌权,他们并没有受过管理整个世界的训练,也没有主动要求担此重任——而且他们非常害怕,如果过早放松管制,他们会因为额外的死亡人数而受到指责。计算经济后果非常困难,所以他们会让我们封锁相当长的一段时间。我对瑞典模式很感兴趣,不是因为它一定就是最好的。(最好的是我们能像香港和台湾那样隔离并压平曲线。)但考虑到大多数西方国家是大型民主国家,没有能力或意愿那样做,无论结果如何,我们都在走向某种形式的瑞典模式。
马特: 谢天谢地瑞典没有进行封锁,因为否则的话,西方世界就可以说:“嗯,没有其他选择。”我们知道是有其他选择的。尽管瑞典有大量的自愿保持社交距离行为,但该国没有强制封锁,其经济也没有像英国和美国等国家那样受到那么严重的损害。瑞典已经表明,控制这场流行病最重要的措施几乎肯定是那些自愿采取的措施——比如不握手、不举行大型聚会、彼此保持安全距离——而不是把所有人都关在家里。
纳瓦尔: 大型连锁零售店可以营业,但小企业却不被允许营业,这毫无道理。显然,最好的回应是自下而上的分布式回应。当个人普遍产生防范意识时,你就可以击败病毒,而不是当政府恐慌时。一个警觉的个体可以战胜病毒。政府不知道如何控制病毒,但他们确实知道如何控制个人;而个人却可以控制自己的健康、安全和病毒传播。所以我们把一个教育问题变成了一个政府自上而下的控制问题。
马特: 英国政府目前发现,吓唬人们很容易,但要让他们消除恐惧就不那么容易了。严厉的封锁措施非常有效。事实证明,人们愿意配合,甚至举报他们的邻居。他们能在惊人地短的时间内变得惊人地专制,因为他们被灌输了一个非常可怕的故事。人们很容易对事物感到害怕。但是当你过来说:“好了,警报解除了,请回去工作吧,”全国有一半的人会说:“不,我以为你说这很可怕呢。我们还不打算出去。顺便说一句,你们付钱让我们待在家里,我为什么要出去?”
纳瓦尔: 这将会改变。愤世嫉俗的观点是,截至目前,失去工作的是蓝领阶层。到目前为止,还没有轮到运营社会和控制媒体、政府、大学、智库以及做模型的白领阶层。但当白领们开始失去工作时,人们就会说,“等一下。我们需要把经济因素考虑进去。”
“不幸的是,在2020年,经济学家在建立流行病模型,而流行病学家在管理经济。”
正如瑞典的实验将表明的那样,你需要同时在脑海中追踪三个不同的变量。对大多数人来说这很难做到。首先,当然是感染致死率以及最终有多少人生病或死亡。其次是经济影响——你必须有某种标准的衡量和比较方法。第三是人口中有多少百分比建立了群体免疫,同时要记住通过自然传播产生的群体免疫和通过疫苗产生的群体免疫是非常不同的。疫苗是无差别应用的;而病毒自然传播时,它首先感染流动性更强的超级传播者以及最脆弱的人群。所以最先被淘汰的人,要么是最可能传播病毒的人,要么是最可能死亡的人。因此,自然群体免疫的阈值要低于疫苗带来的即时群体免疫的阈值。
马特: 在英国(我认为在美国很大程度上也是如此)已经很清楚,很大一部分死亡可归咎于在医院和养老院的院内感染。由于早期检测不足,医护人员很早就被感染了——这意味着他们很早就成了携带者——因为生病的人会去医疗机构。结果,一个非常脆弱的群体——他们不仅死亡率高,而且传播率也高,因为他们携带了更高的病毒载量——出现了极高的病毒传染率。这并不意味着在社区的其他地方也是这么高。瑞典和其他国家的例子表明,对于那些不属于该类别的人,应该有可能使用自愿措施来抑制这种病毒,并在相当低的感染水平下达到群体免疫。
纳瓦尔: 不管怎样,我们最终都会陷入那种局面,所以问题将是:那些试图在更长时间内压平曲线的人获得了多少好处?我们现在正在美国各州层面上看到这个实验。当然,这场战斗正在演变成关于正在公布的数据的叙事和解读,人们说,“哦,他们在隐瞒死亡人数,”“他们夸大了这个,”或者“他们没有夸大那个。”当这一切尘埃落定时,我不知道我们是否会有足够的诚实回顾过去并说,“嗯,这就是发生的事情”,因为现在在一个社交媒体的时代,每个人都被困在自己的信息茧房/信息孤岛里。记者们已经各自站队。只要客观新闻曾经存在过,现在它也已经荡然无存了。所以,即使我们知道发生了什么,我们最终可能还是生活在两个不同的叙事世界中。
信息茧房
马特: 我们在多大程度上碎片化成了这些信息茧房和回音室,这确实让我感到震惊。在书中,我推测这是技术决定论的结果。我原以为互联网的发明会带来社交媒体,从而让我们都能看到彼此的观点,但结果并非如此。事实证明,社交媒体是一种非常具有分裂性的媒介,就像20世纪早期的无线电广播一样,当时它是帮助独裁者崛起的重要工具。但电视并非如此——它是一种将我们所有人都拉向温和中间立场的媒介。
纳瓦尔: 我完全同意。当我读到书中的那部分时,我放下了书。顺便说一句,我喜欢你这本书的一点是,每读三页我就不得不把它放下思考一下,对我来说,这是一本好书的标志。我认为你读一本书的速度越快,这本书就越差。如果你能快速阅读一本书,你就不应该读它。直接把那本书丢掉,它不配成为一本书。但是当你非常简短地涵盖那一部分时,我意识到:这里面有一个大思想;这里面可以写一本书。一个平庸的人会把这两段话变成一本书。但你非常简短地概括了它。
我的想法是,这是因为电视有很高的制作标准和很高的分发成本。你只能负担得起一次或两次把信息传达出去。特别是在电视的早期阶段,你没有那么多的频道。因此,人们从同一套来源获取经过筛选的新闻。坏处是,你可能生活在一个被精英、政府或媒体希望你如何思考的观念所控制的泡沫中。但好处是,至少你们的立场相对一致,社会内部不会发生这种持续的、低级别的内战。当你接触到收音机或极端的社交媒体时,任何人都可以随时贡献和创建内容。正因为如此,分裂几乎是必然的。
事实上,在无线电广播时代,过滤是通过调频来实现的。但在社交媒体中,你建立了自己的频道。你能进入的信息茧房的级别比以前的任何信息茧房都要深得多,也更针对个人进行了高度定制。
马特: 这与印刷术发明时发生的事情有某种历史的呼应。其中最具企业家精神的印刷商以及欧洲最畅销的作者是马丁·路德(Martin Luther)。他有效地利用这项新技术引发了一场社会革命,最终演变成了一系列宗教战争。可以说,我们以前就经历过这种事,而当时的景象并不美好。
纳瓦尔: 确实不美好。媒体和信息的分发能在多大程度上改变社会结构,这令人惊叹。你引用了阿玛拉定律,该定律指出,人们往往会高估创新的短期影响,而低估其长期影响。我绝对见证过这一点。在硅谷,我一次又一次地看到这种情况,从自动驾驶汽车到互联网,再到移动电话,以及加密技术。
更多关于加密货币的话题
马特: 加密技术就是一个很好的例子,我关于加密技术写得不够多。我希望我能多写点。但我确实认为加密技术是一项在未来几年里会继续让我们失望的技术的好例子。虽然你对其潜力发表了一些非常有趣的言论,但我怀疑在加密技术计划开始兑现其承诺之前,很多人还会为此倾家荡产很长一段时间——当然,前提是政府允许它发展的话。
纳瓦尔: 这正是加密技术发挥作用的方式,可能会与人们预期的有些不同。阿玛拉定律通常认为我们高估了前10年,低估了后20年。所以15年是一个交叉点。但显然,正如我们所知,历史并不会完全重复。它会押韵,但你永远不会得到两次相同的结果,因为如果会那样的话,就不会有新信息了。如果你能轻易预测下一步,它就不再是一个复杂的系统了。
所以,首先,加密技术自2009年起就已经存在了。那是比特币的最初创立期,所以它的存在时间比人们想象的要长。此外,你在刚才陈述的最后提到:如果国家允许的话。这正是加密技术的核心所在。加密技术解决了一个通常只能通过国家才能解决的协调问题,但你在没有国家的情况下解决了它。最初,它是拜占庭将军问题的解决方案。国家能否阻止它,对我来说并不清楚,因为如果他们能,他们早就这么做了。没有哪个国家希望存在一个法外体系,因为控制印钞机是终极的权力。尽管如此,在炒作泡沫破裂后的过去两年里,很多伟大的企业家在努力工作,我现在能看到加密领域出现的第一批复苏的绿芽。
我将它们分为两类。一类是我们正在构建去中心化金融的基础设施,用于借贷、衍生品、交易、托管等所有这些事务。华尔街为美国20%的GDP所做的事情,在加密世界只需花费1%的GDP就能完成。它正变得越来越好,如果几年后你看到越来越多的华尔街交易员说这样的话,我不会感到惊讶:“我想下某种赌注。”“我有某种观点。”“我想以某种方式对冲。”或者,“我想买某种资产,但在现有的金融基础设施下做不到。我必须将其兑换成比特币或以太坊,然后通过去中心化金融来做这件事。”它在技术上要优越得多,这是我看到的一点。
另一件我看到的事情是,加密技术的首批应用出现在文件存储、身份验证和身份识别上。这些是在加密领域中为互联网公司建立的水管式基础设施。相比非加密版本,加密版本因为去中心化而更具优势。它们不再受苹果、谷歌或Facebook的控制。
独立开发者不喜欢生活在苹果、谷歌、Facebook、Twitter等任何平台的控制之下,因为他们知道随时可能被封号。他们知道平台运营商会攫取大部分价值。他们知道如果他们找到了金矿,平台运营商就会进来接管。
在接下来的五年里,我们将看到基于加密技术的基础设施被铺设好,我们将看到去中心化金融铺设开来。那就是加密技术生机勃发的地方。然后,在接下来的十年里,我们将看到由此产生的结果,它们将比我们预期的更庞大。
马特: 正如你所说,这非常有希望,因为在这个世界上保持我们的个人自主权很重要。目前,我确实感觉到,一方面是政府,另一方面是Facebook,都在想方设法限制我的言论、思想和争论的自由,甚至限制我获取事实的自由。
纳瓦尔: 政府能够限制你,因为它垄断了暴力。人们试图挟持政府,因为如果你能让政府听你的,你就有带枪的人听你指挥,从而控制一切。密码学带来的改变是,它可能是自城堡城墙或护城河以来,防御者对抗攻击者的第一个不对称优势。
在战争史上,自从发明了火炮和枪支以来,攻击者一直占据巨大的优势,而防御者一直在失去优势。这有利于攻击者。核武器显然有利于攻击者。生物武器有利于攻击者。空袭有利于攻击者。坦克有利于攻击者。
马特: 有趣的是,机枪是有利于防守方的。这就是阵地战变得如此僵持的原因。
纳瓦尔: 这是个好观点。是的,我漏掉了那个。对于加密技术,攻击者可以投入无限的计算能力,但如果你正确地做好了安全防护,他们无法破解你的加密密钥,所以它有利于防御者。当然,权力流向哪里,控制、身份和匿名性就流向哪里。由于摄像头监控、美国国家安全局监听每个人以及无处不在的联网摄像头,我们正在失去物理匿名性。物理隐私已经消亡。
政府永远会知道你肉身所在的位置,除非你一直改变面貌。人们谈论戴口罩来遮挡。不,那遮挡不住——只需要一个稍微好一点的算法就行了。如果另一个人能认出你,最终计算机也能认出你,因为对于人工智能和机器学习来说,这是非常简单的问题之一。
尽管如此,数字隐私是真实的。你将能够在互联网上创建一个受密码学保护的个人身份,你可以基于此建立声誉,进行商业活动,结交朋友,而没有人会确切知道你是谁。当然,美国国家安全局和监听光纤线路的人有可能揭开你的面具,但如果你足够精明,甚至有办法避开这一点。
自动化
这就引出了政府如何对待我们的自由。他们对我们拥有很大的权力,所以人们喜欢制造叙事来夺取这种权力。每20年就会出现一次的叙事之一就是自动化和失业。
这一次是AGI(通用人工智能),据说我们将开发出一种发展极快的技术,它自我改进的速度快于我们重新培训的速度,快于我们创造新工作的速度,结果我们都会失业。这里有两个部分。一是人工智能的创新步伐以及人工智能意味着什么。第二部分是,这一次情况不同:我们将失去我们的工作。我认为你对此有非常好的看法。
马特: 我们以前也经历过这种阶段。我们曾预期创新和自动化会摧毁就业机会。但这种事从未发生过。它总是能创造出新型的就业机会。它创造了财富,使人们能够雇佣其他人。
它也确实创造了休闲时间。它确实减少了我们一生中必须工作的时间。我们可以在教育和退休上花费更多的时间。我们能享受比我们祖父母那一代更长的周末。在某种程度上,上层中产阶级专业人士首次感到了自动化的威胁。当工厂工人和农场雇工被自动化取代时,他们并不介意。但现在医生和律师可能被机器取代,突然间我们大家就必须得恐慌了。在过去的50年里,每次它作为紧急问题被提出来时,都被证明是错的。我认为这次也是一样。当然,不同形式的自动化和创新会在局部对就业造成破坏。这一点是不可否认的。
纳瓦尔: 事实上,如果前一代的自动化没有被允许发生,今天许多(被认为是破坏的)这些就业机会本身就不可能存在。例如,如果卡车根本不存在,你就不会失去作为卡车司机的工作。如果在最初阶段,为了保护铁路行业的人或背负重物的人,你阻止了卡车的出现。
如今大部分的经济是基于奢侈品建立的。正如你在书中所提到的,除非我能随叫随到地获得我想要的所有剥好皮的葡萄和按摩服务,否则就业依然有增长的空间。并且我们会改变我们对“工作”的定义。有些事情我们只是还没弄清楚如何利用自动化和机器人技术来完成。
马特: 如果你能达到这样一个理论上的终点:机器可以完成你可能需要的一切,那么你就不存在问题了。
纳瓦尔: 为什么会有问题呢?工作本身并不是件好事。你应该能够整天写书、录制播客、娱乐你的猴子同伴(指人类)就行了。正如你所指出的,通过创新发生的大量此类自动化是高度民主化的。这是民主化的消费。你也提出了一个很好的观点,即通过专业化来整合生产是现代文明的本质。所以世界上在某件事上做得最好的那个人可以为所有人做这件事。但在另一方面,你让消费民主化了,原本并不是所有人都能获得所有东西的。
马特: 作为一个物种,随着我们的进步,我们倾向于在生产上变得越来越专业化,但在消费上变得越来越多样化。这句话我多年前是从海姆·奥菲克(Haim Ofek)的一本名叫《第二自然》(Second Nature)的好书中看来的。我写信给他说:“这是一个有趣的见解。你有写过更多关于它的内容吗?”他回复说:“嗯,我想我这个想法是从你的一本书里得来的。”
纳瓦尔: 真有趣,因为几年前我曾发过一条关于这个确切话题的推文,但我完全不知道我是从哪里看来的。它可能出自你的一本书。可能出自大卫·多伊奇。也可能是一些随机的内容,我甚至都不知道。
马特: 你今天对我说的有些话,据说你是从我的书里看来的,但对我来说却很新鲜,就好像这是你提出的观点一样,也就是说,我们各自把想法放入公共领域,我们捡起它们,稍微改变它们,然后再把它们交还给彼此——这就是智慧对话的本质。
伟人理论
纳瓦尔: 这又回到了历史的“伟人”(伟大男性或伟大女性)理论。读完你的书后,我不得不思考一下这个问题,因为我潜意识里70%-80%认同历史的伟人理论,20%-30%认同历史的演化理论。事后看来,这可能是一个有缺陷的比例平衡。
我得出的一个折中观点是,推动世界前进确实需要伟大的人,但不一定非得是某个特定的伟人。虽然我们需要爱迪生来发明灯泡,但在同一时期,还有另外21个人也在研发灯泡。我们需要这21个人中的一个成为推动这一进程的创新者。
所以,并不是在任何给定时间都有一个能做任何事的独特个体,而是存在一群特殊的个体,在合适的情况下,其中任何一个就足够了——或者他们中的任何一组就足够了。这就是我得出的结论。
马特: 不同于莱昂纳多·达·芬奇不需要担心别人在他之前画出《蒙娜丽莎》,成为第一个研发出实用灯泡的人具有特别的挑战性,需要才华和聪明才智。
如果你在参加一场比赛,你做到了,这甚至更令人印象深刻。在某种程度上,它不是一项独一无二的成就这一事实,让它更令人印象深刻。
纳瓦尔: 在读你的书时,我遭遇了一次轻微的盖尔曼失忆效应(Gell-Mann Amnesia),如果你还记得那个理论框架的话。盖尔曼失忆效应是指,你相信你在报纸上读到的一切,然后当报道涉及到你非常熟悉的话题时,你会发现那完全是胡扯。或者说它并不完全适用,但你依然继续相信他们写的其他所有内容。
我不是在怪你。你做得很好。但是书中存在一种不一致的地方:你证明你的观点时,指出我们倾向于过度推崇并记住少数几个发明家,把他们当成创造者,而实际上这更多是一个团队合作和分布式的过程。你列举了历史上获得赞誉的发明家和人物的例子。但在书的后面,你谈到Facebook作为创新者、Airbnb作为创新者,并提到了创始人布莱恩·切斯基(Brian Chesky)和马克·扎克伯格(Mark Zuckerberg)。
但任何在硅谷待过一段时间的人都知道,在Facebook之前有Myspace,在Myspace之前有Friendster。创造Friendster的可怜的乔纳森·艾布拉姆斯(Jonathan Abrams)只能像一只看着水坝的海狸一样问:“谁的水坝?”Airbnb也是一样:之前有VRBO、HomeAway以及一堆度假租赁网站,尽管Airbnb确实开创了单间分租的先河。
但也曾有Couchsurfing(沙发客)、Craigslist以及一大堆其他网站。不幸的是,历史是由胜利者书写的。而在这种情况下,胜利者甚至不需要自己写历史;是他们周围的每个人在书写历史。这里存在可得性偏差:他们看到了胜利者,于是战利品和功劳都归于胜利者。
马特: 你完全正确,我在两点上都承认有误。你说得再对不过了。
关于这本书
纳瓦尔: 马特,你出版了这本新书《创新如何发生》。对于想要自己成为创新者或想要在自己所在的地区或社会中培养创新精神的企业家和政府官员来说,这是一本必读书。坦白说,如果你是一个企业家、自封的发明家或创新者,这可能是你能获得的最便宜、最快的关于创新历史和未来的教育。我强烈推荐它。我要以书中一句我很喜欢的名言作为结尾,这句话总结了什么是创新以及创新是在哪里孕育的。它对创新的运作方式持有一种非常乐观和正确的看法。这句话是:“创新是自由之子,因为它是为了满足自由表达的人类欲望而进行的一次自由而富有创造性的尝试。”这句话对我来说很有力量。它告诉我创新需要自由。它是富有创造力的,我们是在满足人们想做的事情,而不是他们被告知或被迫去做的事情。
所以谢谢你,马特,感谢你帮我理清了演化。我也强烈推荐《基因组》(Genome),去弄清伦理学背后的理性基础和美德的起源。通过你著名的《理性乐观派》(Rational Optimist),你以一种理性的方式让我成为一个乐观主义者,你在《创新如何发生》中深刻阐明了创新的演进以及如何培养创新。这真是一种极大的乐趣。
马特: 纳瓦尔,谢谢你今天给我带来的令人难以置信的见解,谢谢你那些极好的、友善的评论,也谢谢你说这本书应该被做创新的人阅读,因为我感觉自己有点像个冒牌货。我不是一个创新者;我没有发明任何东西;我没有建立过企业;我不是企业家。我是一个作家。所以,你认为这本书对人们有实际用途,并且是一次探究人类创新这个神秘概念背后的思想的有趣之旅,我深感荣幸。
术语表
| 原文 | 中文 |
|---|---|
| Innovation Famine | 创新饥荒 |
| Genetically modified organisms (GMOs) | 转基因生物 |
| CRISPR | CRISPR(一种基因组编辑技术) |
| Genome editing | 基因组编辑 |
| Soft landing | 软着陆 |
| Universal explainers | 通用解释者 |
| Rational optimism | 理性乐观主义 |
| Spaceship earth | 地球飞船 |
| Zero-sum game | 零和博弈 |
| Terraform | 地球化(改造行星环境) |
| Emergent, complex system | 涌现的(新生的)复杂系统 |
| Epidemiologists | 流行病学家 |
| Infection fatality rate (IFR) | 感染致死率 |
| Herd immunity | 群体免疫 |
| Super-spreaders | 超级传播者 |
| Reproductive rate | 传染率(基本传染数) |
| Filter bubble | 信息茧房 / 过滤气泡 |
| Silo | 信息孤岛 |
| Echo chambers | 回音室 |
| Technological determinism | 技术决定论 |
| Amara’s Law | 阿玛拉定律 |
| Crypto | 加密货币 / 加密技术 |
| Byzantine generals problem | 拜占庭将军问题 |
| Decentralized finance (DeFi) | 去中心化金融 |
| Ethereum | 以太坊 |
| De-platformed | 被封号 / 取消平台资格 |
| Autonomy | 个人自主权 |
| Monopoly on violence | 垄断暴力 |
| Cryptography | 密码学 |
| Asymmetric advantage | 不对称优势 |
| Trench warfare | 阵地战 |
| Machine learning | 机器学习 |
| Artificial general intelligence (AGI) | 通用人工智能 |
| Democratizing | 民主化 |
| Great man theory | 伟人理论 |
| Evolutionary theory of history | 历史的演化理论 |
| Gell-Mann Amnesia | 盖尔曼失忆效应 |
| Availability bias | 可得性偏差 |
此文章由 AI 翻译(人工整理版)