如何为创业公司融资
如何为创业公司融资
2005年11月
风险投资就像齿轮一样运作。典型的创业公司会经历多轮融资,在每一轮中,你希望获得足够的资金来达到可以换到下一档的速度。
很少有创业公司能完全做到这一点。许多公司资金不足。少数公司资金过多,这就像试图用三档起步一样。
我认为帮助创始人更好地理解融资会很有用——不仅仅是机制,还有投资者在想什么。最近我惊讶地意识到,我们在创业公司面临的最糟糕问题都不是来自竞争对手,而是来自投资者。相比之下,应对竞争对手很容易。
我并不是说我们的投资者只是我们的累赘。例如,他们在谈判交易方面很有帮助。我的意思是,与投资者的冲突特别令人讨厌。竞争对手会打你的下巴,但投资者会抓住你的要害。
显然,我们的情况并不少见。如果投资者问题是创业公司最大的威胁之一,那么管理他们就是创始人需要学习的最重要技能之一。
让我们从谈论创业公司融资的五个来源开始。然后我们将追踪一个假设的(非常幸运的)创业公司如何通过连续几轮融资换档的过程。
朋友和家人
许多创业公司的第一笔资金来自朋友和家人。例如,Excite就是这样做的:创始人大学毕业后,向父母借了15,000美元来创办公司。在一些兼职工作的帮助下,他们维持了18个月。
如果你的朋友或家人恰好很富有,他们和天使投资者之间的界限就会变得模糊。在Viaweb,我们从我们的朋友Julian那里获得了第一笔10,000美元的种子资金,但他相当富有,很难说应该把他归类为朋友还是天使。他还是一名律师,这很好,因为这意味着我们不必用这笔初始的小额资金支付法律账单。
从朋友和家人那里筹集资金的好处是他们很容易找到。你已经认识他们。主要有三个缺点:你把商业和个人生活混在一起;他们可能没有天使或风险投资公司那样良好的人脉;他们可能不是认证投资者,这可能会在以后复杂化你的生活。
美国证券交易委员会将”认证投资者”定义为拥有超过100万美元流动资产或年收入超过20万美元的人。如果公司的股东都是认证投资者,监管负担要低得多。一旦你从公众那里获得资金,你在行动上就会受到更多限制。[1]
如果任何投资者不是认证投资者,创业公司的生活在法律上会更复杂。在首次公开募股中,这可能不仅是增加费用的问题,还可能改变结果。我问过的一个律师说:当公司上市时,证券交易委员会将仔细研究公司之前的所有股票发行,并要求其立即采取行动纠正任何过去的证券违法行为。这些补救行动可能会延迟、阻碍甚至扼杀IPO。当然,任何给定创业公司进行IPO的几率都很小。但并不像看起来那么小。许多最终上市的创业公司最初看起来并不可能。(谁能想到沃兹尼亚克和乔布斯在业余时间出售微计算机计划的公司的IPO会成为十年中最大的IPO之一?)创业公司的很大一部分价值在于这个微小的概率乘以巨大的结果。
我没有向父母要种子资金并不是因为他们不是认证投资者。当我们创办Viaweb时,我不知道认证投资者的概念,也没有停下来考虑投资者人脉的价值。我没有向父母要钱的原因是我不想让他们损失这些钱。
咨询
为创业公司融资的另一种方式是找份工作。最好的工作是咨询项目,你可以在其中构建你想作为创业公司销售的任何软件。然后你可以逐渐将自己从咨询公司转变为产品公司,让你的客户支付你的开发费用。
对于有孩子的人来说,这是一个好计划,因为它消除了创业公司的大部分风险。你永远不会有没有收入的时候。然而,风险和回报通常是成正比的:你应该期望一个减少创业公司风险的计划也会降低平均回报。在这种情况下,你用降低的财务风险换取了你的公司不会成功作为创业公司的风险增加。
但咨询公司本身不就是创业公司吗?不,通常不是。一个公司要成为创业公司,必须不仅仅是小型和新成立的。美国有数百万小企业,但只有几千家是创业公司。要成为创业公司,公司必须是产品业务,而不是服务业务。我的意思不是说它必须制造物理产品,而是它必须有一种产品卖给许多人,而不是为个别客户做定制工作。定制工作无法扩展。要成为创业公司,你需要成为卖出百万份歌曲的乐队,而不是通过在个别婚礼和成人礼上表演赚钱的乐队。
咨询的问题在于客户有一个令人讨厌的习惯,就是给你打电话。大多数创业公司在失败的边缘运作,而必须处理客户的干扰可能会让你越过边缘。特别是如果你的竞争对手可以全职工作,只做创业公司。
所以如果你走咨询路线,你必须非常自律。你必须积极工作,防止你的公司成长为”杂草树”,依赖这种容易但利润率低的资金来源。[2]
实际上,咨询最大的危险可能是它给了你失败的借口。在创业公司中,就像在研究生院中一样,最终驱动你的很多事情是你家人和朋友的期望。一旦你开始创业公司并告诉每个人这就是你要做的事情,你现在就走上了”致富或破产”的道路。你现在必须变得富有,否则你就失败了。
对失败的恐惧是一种非常强大的力量。通常它会阻止人们开始事情,但一旦你公布了某种雄心壮志,它就会改变方向并开始对你有利。我认为用这种不可抗拒的力量对抗成为富人这个稍微不可移动的目标是相当聪明的一招。如果你所说的雄心仅仅是创办一个有一天会变成创业公司的咨询公司,你就不会有这种力量推动你。
作为开发产品的一种方式,咨询的一个优势是你知道你正在制造至少一个客户想要的东西。但如果你有创办创业公司的能力,你应该有足够的远见,不需要这种拐杖。
天使投资者
天使是富有的个人。这个词最初用于百老汇戏剧的支持者,但现在适用于一般的个人投资者。在科技领域赚钱的天使更受欢迎,原因有二:他们理解你的处境,他们也是人脉和建议的来源。
人脉和建议可能比金钱更重要。当del.icio.us从投资者那里获得资金时,他们从Tim O’Reilly等人那里获得了资金。他投入的金额相比领导这轮的风险投资公司来说很小,但Tim是一个聪明而有影响力的人,让他站在你这边是好事。
你可以用来自咨询或朋友和家人的钱做任何你想做的事。有了天使,我们现在谈论的是适当的风险投资,所以是时候介绍退出策略的概念了。年轻的潜在创始人常常惊讶地发现投资者期望他们要么出售公司,要么上市。原因是投资者需要收回他们的资本。他们只会考虑有退出策略的公司——意味着那些可能被收购或上市的公司。
这听起来并不像听起来那么自私。大型私人科技公司很少。那些没有失败的似乎都会被收购或上市。原因是员工也是投资者——他们的时间投资者——他们也希望能够套现。如果你的竞争对手为员工提供可能让他们致富的股票期权,而你明确表示你计划保持私人控股,你的竞争对手会获得最优秀的人才。因此,“退出”的原则不仅仅是投资者强加给创业公司的,而是作为创业公司的意义的一部分。
我们现在需要介绍的另一个概念是估值。当有人购买一家公司的股份时,这隐含地为其建立了价值。如果有人为一家公司的10%支付20,000美元,理论上该公司价值200,000美元。我说”理论上”是因为在早期投资中,估值是巫术。随着公司变得更加成熟,其估值更接近实际市场价值。但在一个新成立的创业公司中,估值数字只是每个人各自贡献的人工产物。
创业公司经常通过让以低估值投资的投资者来”支付”那些将在某种程度上帮助公司的投资者。如果我有一个创业公司,而史蒂夫·乔布斯想投资其中,我会以10美元的价格把股票给他,只是为了能够吹嘘他是投资者。不幸的是,为每个投资者调整公司的估值是不实际的(如果不是非法的话)。创业公司的估值应该随时间上升。所以如果你要向知名天使出售廉价股票,要早点做,当公司自然有低估值时。
一些天使投资者组成辛迪加。任何人们创办创业公司的城市都会有一个或多个这样的组织。在波士顿,最大的是Common Angels。在湾区,是Band of Angels。你可以通过Angel Capital Association找到你附近的小组。[3]然而,大多数天使投资者不属于这些组织。事实上,天使越知名,他们属于组织的可能性就越小。
一些天使组织向你收费来向他们推销你的想法。不用说,你永远不应该这样做。
从个人天使那里投资,而不是通过天使组织或投资公司,危险之一是他们的声誉保护较少。知名风险投资公司不会太过分地坑你,因为如果消息传出去,其他创始人会避开他们。对于个人天使,你没有这种保护,我们在自己的创业公司中痛苦地发现了这一点。在许多创业公司的生活中,会有一个时刻你处于投资者的 mercy——当你没钱时,唯一能获得更多资金的地方是你的现有投资者。当我们陷入这样的困境时,我们的投资者利用了这一点,而品牌风险投资公司可能不会这样做。
然而,天使有一个相应的优势:他们也不受风险投资公司所有规则的约束。因此他们可以,例如,允许创始人通过在融资轮中向投资者直接出售一些股票来部分套现。我认为这将变得越来越普遍;普通创始人渴望这样做,而出售,比如说,价值五十万美元的股票不会像风险投资公司担心的那样导致大多数创始人对业务的投入减少。
那些试图坑我们的天使也让我们这样做,所以总的来说我感激而不是愤怒。(就像在家庭中,创始人和投资者之间的关系可能是复杂的。)
找到天使投资者的最佳方式是通过个人介绍。你可以尝试冷呼叫你附近的天使组织,但天使像风险投资公司一样,会更注意他们尊重的人推荐的机会。
与天使的交易条款差异很大。没有普遍接受的标准。有时天使的交易条款和风险投资公司一样可怕。其他天使,特别是在最早阶段,可能会基于两页协议进行投资。
偶尔投资的天使可能自己也不知道他们想要什么条款。他们只是想投资这家创业公司。他们想要什么样的反稀释保护?他们怎么知道。在这种情况下,交易条款往往是随机的:天使让他的律师创建一个普通协议,条款最终成为律师认为普通的任何东西。这实际上通常意味着,他在公司里找到的任何现有协议。(很少有法律文件是从头开始创建的。)
这些标准文件对小创业公司来说是个问题,因为它们往往会成长为所有先前文件的总和。我知道一家创业公司从天使投资者那里得到了相当于五百磅握手的东西:决定投资后,天使向他们提供了70页的协议。创业公司没有足够的钱支付律师来阅读它,更不用说谈判条款,所以交易失败了。
这个问题的一个解决方案是让创业公司的律师起草协议,而不是天使的。一些天使可能会对此犹豫,但其他人可能会欢迎它。
没有经验的天使在到了写大额支票的时候常常会变冷。在我们的创业公司中,初始轮中的两个天使之一花了几个月才付钱给我们,而且是在我们的律师反复催促之后才做的,幸运的是,他的律师也是我们的律师。
投资者延迟的原因很明显。投资创业公司是有风险的!当一家公司只有两个月大时,你每等待一天,你就会获得关于其轨迹的1.7%的更多信息。但投资者已经在股票的低价中得到了这种风险的补偿,所以延迟是不公平的。
不管是否公平,如果你让他们,投资者就会这样做。即使是风险投资公司也会这样做。融资延迟对创始人来说是一个很大的干扰,他们应该专注于自己的公司,而不是担心投资者。创业公司该怎么办?对于投资者和收购者,你唯一的筹码是竞争。如果投资者知道你还有其他投资者排队,他会更急于成交——不仅因为他会担心失去交易,而且因为如果其他投资者感兴趣,你一定值得投资。收购也是如此。在有人想要购买你之前,没有人想购买你,然后每个人都想购买你。
成交的关键是永远不要停止寻找替代方案。当投资者说想投资你,或者收购者说想购买你时,在拿到支票之前不要相信。当投资者说yes时,你的自然倾向是放松并回去写代码。唉,你不能;你必须继续寻找更多投资者,即使只是为了让这个投资者行动。[4]
种子融资公司
种子公司像天使一样,在早期阶段投资相对较少的金额,但像风险投资公司一样,它们是做这个业务的公司,而不是偶尔进行投资的个人。
直到现在,几乎所有的种子公司都是所谓的”孵化器”,所以Y Combinator也被称为孵化器,尽管我们唯一的共同点是我们都在最早阶段投资。
根据国家商业孵化器协会的数据,美国大约有800个孵化器。这是一个惊人的数字,因为我认识很多创业公司的创始人,我想不起有一个是在孵化器开始的。
什么是孵化器?我自己也不确定。定义性的品质似乎你在他们的空间工作。这就是”孵化器”这个名字的由来。他们在其他方面似乎差异很大。一个极端是某种政治分肥项目,一个城镇从州政府获得资金将空置建筑翻新为”高科技孵化器”,好像仅仅是缺乏合适的办公空间阻止了该镇成为创业公司中心。另一个极端是像Idealab这样的地方,它在内部为新创业公司产生想法,并雇佣人们为他们工作。
典型的泡沫时代的孵化器,现在大多数似乎已经死了,像风险投资公司,除了它们在资助的创业公司中扮演更大的角色。除了在他们的空间工作之外,你应该使用他们的办公室职员、律师、会计师等等。
而孵化器倾向于(或倾向于)比风险投资公司施加更多控制,Y Combinator施加更少。我们认为创业公司在自己的场所运作更好,无论多么糟糕,而不是在投资者的办公室。所以我们不断被称为”孵化器”是很烦人的,但也许是不可避免的,因为目前只有我们一个,还没有词来形容我们是什么。如果非得被称为什么,显而易见的名字是”excubator”。(如果考虑到它意味着我们使人们能够逃离小隔间,这个名字就更可辩解了。)
因为种子公司是公司而不是个人,所以接触他们比接触天使更容易。只需去他们的网站并向他们发送电子邮件。个人介绍的重要性各不相同,但比天使或风险投资公司少。
种子公司是公司这一事实也意味着投资过程更加标准化。(天使组织通常也是如此。)种子公司可能会有他们为资助的每个创业公司使用的设定交易条款。交易条款是标准的事实并不意味着它们对你有利,但如果其他创业公司签署了相同的协议并且事情进展顺利,这是一个条款合理的标志。
种子公司与天使和风险投资公司的不同之处在于他们专门在最早阶段投资——通常当公司还只是一个想法时。天使甚至风险投资公司偶尔也会这样做,但他们也在后期阶段投资。
早期阶段的问题是不同的。例如,在最初几个月,创业公司可能会完全重新定义他们的想法。所以种子投资者通常更关心人而不是想法。这对所有风险投资都是如此,但在种子阶段尤其如此。
像风险投资公司一样,种子公司的优势之一是他们提供的建议。但因为种子公司在更早的阶段运作,他们需要提供不同类型的建议。例如,种子公司应该能够提供关于如何接触风险投资公司的建议,这显然是风险投资公司不需要做的;而风险投资公司应该能够提供关于如何雇佣”高管团队”的建议,这在种子阶段不是问题。
在最早阶段,很多问题是技术性的,所以种子公司应该能够在技术和商业问题上都提供帮助。
种子公司和天使投资者通常希望在创业公司的初始阶段投资,然后将他们交给风险投资公司进行下一轮融资。然而,创业公司偶尔会从种子融资直接进入收购,我预计这种情况会变得越来越普遍。
谷歌一直在积极地走这条路,现在雅虎也是如此。现在两者都与风险投资公司直接竞争。这是一个明智的举动。为什么要等待进一步的融资轮来提高创业公司的价格?当创业公司达到风险投资公司有足够信息进行投资的地步时,收购者应该有足够的信息来购买它。实际上更多的信息;凭借他们的技术深度,收购者在选择赢家方面应该比风险投资公司更好。
风险投资基金
风险投资公司像种子公司一样是实际的公司,但他们投资别人的钱,而且金额大得多。风险投资平均几百万美元。因此它们往往在创业公司生命的后期出现,更难获得,并且条款更苛刻。
“风险投资家”这个词有时被宽松地用于任何风险投资者,但风险投资公司和其他投资者之间有明显的区别:风险投资公司组织为基金,很像对冲基金或共同基金。被称为”普通合伙人”的基金经理获得约2%的年管理费,加上约20%的基金收益。
风险投资公司之间的绩效下降非常急剧,因为在风险投资业务中,成功和失败都是自我延续的。当一项投资获得巨大成功时,就像谷歌对Kleiner和Sequoia那样,它为风险投资公司带来了很多好的宣传。许多创始人更喜欢从成功的风险投资公司拿钱,因为它赋予的合法性。因此,这是一个对失败者来说恶性(恶性)的循环:表现不佳的风险投资公司只会得到大鱼已经拒绝的交易,导致他们继续表现不佳。
结果,在美国现在大约一千个风险投资基金中,只有大约50个可能赚钱,新基金很难进入这个群体。
在某种意义上,低层风险投资公司对创始人来说是便宜的。他们可能不像知名公司那么聪明或人脉那么好,但他们更渴望交易。这意味着你应该能够从他们那里获得更好的条款。
更好如何?最明显的是估值:他们会拿你公司的更少股份。但除了钱,还有权力。我认为创始人将越来越有可能继续担任CEO,并且条款会让以后解雇他们变得相当困难。
我预测的最剧烈变化是,风险投资公司将允许创始人通过向风险投资公司直接出售一些股票来部分套现。风险投资公司传统上抵制让创始人在最终的”流动性事件”之前获得任何东西。但他们也拼命寻找交易。而且因为从我自己的经验中我知道反对从创始人那里购买股票的规则是愚蠢的,这是随着风险投资变得越来越卖方市场,事情自然会让步的地方。
从不太知名的公司拿钱的缺点是人们会假设,无论是否正确,你被更优秀的公司拒绝了。但是,就像你上过的大学一样,一旦你有一些表现来衡量,你的风险投资公司的名字就不再重要了。所以你越自信,你越不需要品牌风险投资公司。我们完全用天使资金资助了Viaweb;我们从未想过知名风险投资公司的支持会让我们看起来更令人印象深刻。[5]
不太知名公司的另一个危险是,像天使一样,他们保护的声誉较少。我怀疑是低层公司负责大多数给风险投资公司在黑客中带来坏声誉的把戏。他们双重受损:普通合伙人本身能力较差,然而他们有更难的问题要解决,因为顶级风险投资公司挑走了所有最好的交易,留给低层公司的正是那些可能爆炸的创业公司。
例如,低层公司更可能假装想与你达成交易,只是为了锁定你,同时他们决定是否真的想要。一位经验丰富的首席财务官说:较好的公司通常不会给出条款清单,除非他们真的想做交易。第二或第三层公司的违约率要高得多——可能高达50%。原因很明显:当机会给低层公司一根骨头时,他们最大的恐惧是其中一个大公司会注意到并拿走它。大公司不必担心这个。
成为这个把戏的受害者真的会伤害你。正如一位风险投资家告诉我的:如果你在和四个风险投资公司交谈,告诉其中三个你接受了条款清单,然后必须打电话告诉他们你只是在开玩笑,你绝对是受损商品。这是一个部分解决方案:当风险投资公司向你提供条款清单时,问他们过去10个条款清单中有多少变成了交易。这至少会迫使他们如果误导你就直接撒谎。
不是所有在风险投资公司工作的人都是合伙人。大多数公司还有一些叫助理或分析师之类的初级员工。如果你接到风险投资公司的电话,去他们的网站检查你交谈的人是否是合伙人。很可能是初级人员;他们在网上寻找他们的老板可能投资的创业公司。初级人员往往对你的公司看起来非常积极。他们不是在假装;他们想相信你是一个热门前景,因为如果他们的公司投资了他们发现的公司,这对他们来说将是一个巨大的成功。不要被这种乐观所误导。做决定的是合伙人,他们用更冷的眼光看待事情。
因为风险投资公司投资大量金额,钱带有更多限制。大多数只有在公司陷入困境时才会生效。例如,风险投资公司通常将其写入交易,在任何销售中,他们首先收回他们的投资。所以如果公司以低价出售,创始人可能什么都得不到。一些风险投资公司现在要求在任何销售中,他们在普通股股东(也就是你)获得任何东西之前获得4倍的投资回报,但这是应该抵制的一种滥用。
与大额投资的另一个区别是创始人通常被要求接受”vesting”——放弃他们的股票并在接下来的4-5年内赚回它。风险投资公司不想投资数百万美元到一个创始人可以走掉的公司。在财务上,vesting影响不大,但在某些情况下这可能意味着创始人的权力会减少。如果风险投资公司获得公司的实际控制权并解雇其中一个创始人,除非有针对此的具体保护,否则他将失去任何未vest的股票。所以在这种情况下,vesting会迫使创始人遵守规定。
当创业公司获得严肃融资时,最明显的变化是创始人将不再拥有完全控制权。十年前,风险投资公司曾经坚持创始人 stepping down as CEO并将工作交给他们提供的商业人士。现在这种情况较少,部分原因是泡沫的灾难表明,普通商业人士不会成为那么好的CEO。
但是虽然创始人将越来越有可能继续担任CEO,但他们将不得不放弃一些权力,因为董事会将变得更加强大。在种子阶段,董事会通常是形式上的;如果你想和其他董事会成员交谈,你只需要向下一个房间喊叫。这在风险投资规模的资金上停止了。在典型的风险投资交易中,董事会可能由两个风险投资家、两个创始人和一个双方都接受的第五人组成。董事会将拥有最终权力,这意味着创始人现在必须说服而不是命令。
然而,这并不像听起来那么糟糕。比尔·盖茨处于同样的位置;他不拥有微软的多数控制权;原则上他也必须说服而不是命令。然而他看起来相当有指挥力,不是吗?只要事情顺利进行,董事会不会干涉太多。危险来自于道路上的颠簸,就像史蒂夫·乔布斯在苹果公司经历的那样。
像天使一样,风险投资公司更喜欢投资通过他们认识的人来的交易。所以虽然几乎所有的风险投资基金都有一些你可以发送商业计划的地址,但风险投资公司私下承认通过这种方式获得融资的机会接近零。最近一个告诉我,他不知道有任何创业公司是通过这种方式获得资金的。
我怀疑风险投资公司接受”直接提交”的商业计划更多是为了跟踪行业趋势,而不是作为交易来源。事实上,我强烈建议不要随意将你的商业计划邮寄给风险投资公司,因为他们将这视为懒惰的证据。做额外的工作来获得个人介绍。正如一位风险投资家所说:我不难找到。我认识很多人。如果你找不到某种方式联系我,你如何创造一家成功的公司?创业公司创始人最困难的问题之一是决定何时接触风险投资公司。你真的只有一次机会,因为他们很大程度上依赖第一印象。你不能接触一些而保留其他的以后,因为(a)他们问你和其他人谈过以及何时谈的,(b)他们之间互相交谈。如果你在和一家风险投资公司交谈,他发现你在几个月前被另一家拒绝过,你肯定会显得陈旧。
那么你什么时候接触风险投资公司?当你能说服他们的时候。如果创始人令人印象深刻的简历和想法不难理解,你可以相当早地接触风险投资公司。而如果创始人不知名并且想法非常新颖,你可能必须推出这个东西并展示用户喜欢它,风险投资公司才会被说服。
如果几家风险投资公司对你感兴趣,他们有时愿意在他们之间分拆交易。如果他们在风险投资公司等级中接近,他们更可能这样做。这样的交易对创始人来说可能是净赢家,因为你让多个风险投资公司对你的成功感兴趣,你可以就对方询问每个的建议。我认识的一位创始人写道:两公司交易很棒。它会花费你更多的股权,但能够让两家公司相互对抗(以及询问一个是否越界)是无价的。当你与风险投资公司谈判时,记住他们比你做得更多得多。他们投资了几十家创业公司,而这可能是你创办的第一家。但不要让他们或情况吓倒你。普通创始人比普通风险投资家更聪明。所以就像在任何复杂的、不熟悉的情况下一样:慎重行事,质疑任何看起来奇怪的东西。
不幸的是,风险投资公司经常在协议中放入条款,其后果后来让创始人感到惊讶,风险投资公司也经常通过说这是行业标准来为他们做的事情辩护。标准,schmandard;整个行业只有几十年的历史,并且迅速发展。“标准”的概念在小规模操作时是有用的(Y Combinator对每笔交易使用相同的条款,因为对于微小的种子阶段投资,不值得为个别交易进行谈判的开销),但它在风险投资级别上不适用。在那个规模上,每次谈判都是独特的。
大多数成功的创业公司从前面五个来源中的不止一个获得资金。[6]而且,令人困惑的是,融资来源的名称也往往被用作不同轮次的名称。解释这一切如何运作的最好方法是遵循一个假设创业公司的案例。
第1阶段:种子轮
我们的创业公司开始时,一群朋友有一个想法——要么是他们可能构建的东西的想法,要么就是”让我们创办一家公司”的想法。想必他们已经有某种食物和住所的来源。但如果你有食物和住所,你可能也有某种你应该做的事情:无论是课程作业还是工作。所以如果你想全职工作在创业公司上,你的资金状况可能会改变。
许多创业公司创始人说他们在没有任何计划做什么想法的情况下创办了公司。这实际上比看起来更少见;许多人不得不声称他们在辞职后想到了这个想法,否则他们前雇主会拥有它。
这三个朋友决定冒险一试。由于大多数创业公司处于竞争性行业中,你不仅想全职工作,而且要超时工作。所以一些或所有朋友辞职或离开学校。(创业公司中的一些创始人可以留在研究生院,但至少有一个必须让公司成为他的全职工作。)
他们一开始将在其中一个朋友的公寓里经营公司,由于他们没有任何用户,他们不必为基础设施支付太多。他们的主要费用是设立公司,这需要几千美元的法律工作和注册费,以及创始人的生活费用。
“种子投资”这个词涵盖了一个广泛的范围。对于一些风险投资公司来说,这意味着500,000美元,但对于大多数创业公司来说,这意味着几个月的生活费。我们假设我们的朋友小组从他们朋友的富叔叔那里开始15,000美元,他们为此给公司5%的股份。这个阶段只有普通股。他们留下20%作为后期员工的期权池(但他们设置的方式是,如果他们早期被收购且大部分仍未发行,他们可以将此股票发行给自己),三个创始人各得25%。
通过生活得非常便宜,他们认为自己可以让剩余的资金持续五个月。当你还有五个月的资金时,你需要多久开始寻找下一轮?答案:立即。寻找投资者需要时间,而且时间(总是比你预期的更多)即使在他们说yes之后交易也要花时间才能完成。所以如果我们这组创始人知道他们在做什么,他们会立即开始寻找天使投资者。但当然他们的主要工作是构建他们的软件的第1版。
朋友们可能希望在这个第一阶段有更多钱,但资金稍微不足教会了他们重要的一课。对于创业公司来说,便宜就是力量。你的成本越低,你拥有的选择就越多——不仅在这个阶段,而是直到你盈利的每个点。当你有高”burn rate”时,你总是处于时间压力之下,这意味着(a)你没有时间让你的想法发展,(b)你经常被迫接受你不喜欢的交易。
每家创业公司的规则应该是:花得少,工作得快。
十周的工作后,这三个朋友构建了一个原型,让人尝到他们的产品将做什么的味道。这不是他们最初设定的目标——在编写它的过程中,他们有了一些新想法。而且它只做成品将做的一小部分,但那一部分包括没有其他人做过的事情。
他们还写了至少一个骨架商业计划,解决了五个基本问题:他们要做什么,为什么用户需要它,市场有多大,他们将如何赚钱,以及竞争对手是谁以及为什么这家公司将击败他们。(最后一个必须比”他们很糟糕”或”我们将努力工作”更具体。)
如果你必须在演示和商业计划之间选择时间分配,把大部分时间花在演示上。软件不仅更有说服力,而且是探索想法的更好方式。
第2阶段:天使轮
在编写原型的同时,小组一直在他们的朋友网络中寻找天使投资者。他们正好在原型可演示时找到了一些。当他们演示时,其中一个天使愿意投资。现在小组在寻找更多资金:他们想要足够的资金持续一年,也许可以雇佣几个朋友。所以他们将筹集200,000美元。
天使同意以100万美元的pre-money估值投资。公司向天使发行价值200,000美元的新股份;如果交易前有1000股,这意味着200股。天使现在拥有200/1200股,或公司的六分之一,所有先前股东的股权稀释了六分之一。交易后,资本表如下所示:
| 股东 | 股份 | 百分比 |
|---|---|---|
| 天使 | 200 | 16.7 |
| 叔叔 | 50 | 4.2 |
| 每个创始人 | 250 | 20.8 |
| 期权池 | 200 | 16.7 |
| 总计 | 1200 | 100 |
为了简单起见,我让天使做了直接的现金换股交易。实际上,天使更有可能以可转换贷款的形式进行投资。可转换贷款是以后可以转换为股票的贷款;最终结果与股票购买相同,但给天使更多保护,以免在以后轮次中被风险投资公司压垮。
谁为这个交易支付法律账单?记住,创业公司只剩下几千美元。在实践中,这通常是一个粘性问题,通常以某种即兴方式解决。也许创业公司可以找到愿意廉价做的律师,希望如果创业公司成功,未来会有工作。也许某人有律师朋友。也许天使支付他的律师代表双方。(确保如果你走后一条路线,律师是在代表你,而不仅仅是建议你,或者他的唯一职责是对投资者。)
投资200k的天使可能会期望在董事会中占有一席之地。他可能还想要优先股,这意味着一种特殊的股票类别,对普通股拥有一些额外权利。通常这些权利包括对重大战略决策的否决权,防止在以后轮次中被稀释,以及在公司出售时首先收回投资的权利。
一些投资者可能期望创始人接受这样规模的vesting,而其他人不会。风险投资公司比天使更有可能要求vesting。在Viaweb,我们设法从天使那里筹集了250万美元而从未接受vesting,主要是因为我们如此没有经验,以至于我们对这个想法感到震惊。在实践中这被证明是好的,因为我们更难被推来推去。
我们的经历是不寻常的;这样规模的vesting是常态。Y Combinator不要求vesting,因为(a)我们投资如此小的金额,(b)我们认为这是不必要的,而且致富的希望足够让创始人保持工作动力。但也许如果我们投资数百万,我们会认为不同。
我应该补充说,vesting也是创始人相互保护的一种方式。它解决了如果其中一个创始人退出该怎么办的问题。所以一些创始人在创办公司时对自己强加这个。
天使交易需要两周时间完成,所以我们现在处于公司生命的第三个月。
在你得到第一笔大额天使资金后,通常是创业公司生命中最快乐的阶段。这很像做博士后:你没有即时的财务担忧,很少有责任。你可以从事有趣的工作,比如设计软件。你不必花时间在官僚主义的事情上,因为你还没有雇佣任何官僚。尽情享受它,并尽可能多地完成工作,因为你再也不会如此高效。
银行里坐着一笔看似取之不尽的资金,创始人高兴地开始将他们的原型变成可以发布的东西。他们雇佣他们的一个朋友——起初只是作为顾问,所以他们可以试试他——然后一个月后作为员工#1。他们支付他能生活的最低工资,加上公司的3%限制性股票,在四年内vesting。(所以此后期权池下降到13.7%。)[7]他们还在自由职业平面设计师上花了一点钱。
你给早期员工多少股票?这变化如此之大以至于没有常规数字。如果你在很早的时候得到一个真正优秀的人,给他和创始人一样多的股票可能是明智的。唯一的普遍规则是员工获得的股票数量随着公司年龄多项式减少。换句话说,你致富的程度是你早期程度的幂。所以如果一些朋友希望你来为他们的创业公司工作,不要等几个月才决定。
一个月后,在第四个月底,我们的创始人小组有了可以发布的东西。逐渐通过口碑,他们开始获得用户。看到真实用户——他们不认识的人——使用系统给了他们很多新想法。他们也发现现在他们过分担心服务器的状态。(当创业公司编写VisiCalc时,创始人的生活一定多么放松。)
到第六个月底,系统开始有一个坚实的功能核心,以及一个小但忠实的追随者。人们开始写关于它的文章,创始人们开始感觉像他们领域的专家。
我们假设他们的创业公司是那种可以投入数百万美元使用的。也许他们需要在营销上花很多钱,或者构建某种昂贵的基础设施,或者雇佣高薪销售人员。所以他们决定开始与风险投资公司交谈。他们从各种来源获得风险投资公司的介绍:他们的天使投资者将他们与几个联系起来;他们在会议上遇到几个;几个风险投资公司在读到关于他们的文章后打电话给他们。
第3阶段:A轮
armed with他们现在相当充实的商业计划,能够演示真实的、工作的系统,创始人们拜访他们有介绍的风险投资公司。他们发现风险投资公司令人生畏和难以理解。他们都问同一个问题:你还向谁推销过?(风险投资公司就像高中女生;他们敏锐地意识到自己在风险投资公司等级中的位置,他们对一家公司的兴趣是其他风险投资公司对它兴趣的函数。)
其中一家风险投资公司说他们想投资并向创始人提供条款清单。条款清单是当他们做交易时交易条款的摘要;律师将稍后填写细节。通过接受条款清单,创业公司同意在该公司进行交易所需的”尽职调查”期间拒绝其他风险投资公司一段时间。尽职调查是公司背景调查的等价物:目的是发现任何可能以后淹没公司的隐藏炸弹,比如产品中的严重设计缺陷,待处理的针对公司的诉讼,知识产权问题等等。风险投资公司的法律和财务尽职调查相当彻底,但技术尽职调查通常是个笑话。[8]
尽职调查没有发现定时炸弹,六周后他们继续进行交易。条款如下:以400万美元的pre-money估值投资200万美元,这意味着交易完成后风险投资公司将拥有公司的三分之一(2 / (4 + 2))。风险投资公司还坚持在交易之前期权池增加另外一百股。所以发行的新股总数是750股,资本表变成:
| 股东 | 股份 | 百分比 |
|---|---|---|
| 风险投资公司 | 650 | 33.3 |
| 天使 | 200 | 10.3 |
| 叔叔 | 50 | 2.6 |
| 每个创始人 | 250 | 12.8 |
| 员工 | 36* | 1.8 |
| *未vest期权池 | 264 | 13.5 |
| 总计 | 1950 | 100 |
这个图片在几个方面不现实。例如,虽然百分比可能最终看起来像这样,但风险投资公司不太可能保持现有的股份数量。事实上,创业公司的每一份文件都可能被替换,就像公司重新成立一样。此外,资金可能分几次到账,后面的受各种条件制约——尽管这在较低层风险投资公司(其命运是资助更可疑的创业公司)的交易中比顶级公司更常见。
当然,任何读到这篇的风险投资公司可能会对我假设的风险投资公司让天使保持他的10.3%的公司股权在地上打滚。我承认,这是班比版本;在简化图片时,我也让每个人都更友善。在现实世界中,风险投资公司看待天使就像嫉妒的丈夫对他妻子的前男友的感觉。对他们来说,在公司投资之前它并不存在。[9]
我不想给人印象你必须在天使轮之前去风险投资公司。在这个例子中,我拉长事情来展示多个融资来源的运作。一些创业公司可以直接从种子融资到风险投资轮;我们资助的几家公司就是这样。
创始人被要求在四年内vesting他们的股份,董事会现在重组为包括两个风险投资家、两个创始人和一个双方都接受的第五人。天使投资者高兴地放弃了他的董事会席位。
在这一点上,我们的创业公司在融资方面没有什么新东西可以教给我们了——或者至少,没有什么好的。[10]创业公司此时几乎肯定会雇佣更多的人;那些数百万必须投入工作。公司可能会进行额外的融资轮,大概以更高的估值。如果他们特别幸运,他们可能会进行IPO,我们应该记住,这原则上也是一轮融资,无论其实际目的如何。但是,如果这没有超出可能性的范围,它超出了本文的范围。
交易失败
任何经历过创业公司的人会发现前面的肖像缺少一些东西:灾难。如果所有创业公司有一个共同点,那就是事情总是出错。而且没有比融资方面更严重的了。
例如,我们的假设创业公司从未在一轮中花费超过一半的钱就确保了下一轮。这比典型的更理想。许多创业公司——即使是成功的——在某个时候接近用完钱。当创业公司用完钱时,可怕的事情会发生,因为它们是为增长而设计的,而不是为逆境。
但我描述的一系列交易中最不现实的是它们都完成了。在创业公司世界,成交不是交易做的。交易做的是失败。如果你要创办创业公司,最好记住这一点。鸟飞;鱼游;交易失败。
为什么?部分原因是交易似乎经常失败是因为你对自己撒谎。你想要交易完成,所以你开始相信它会完成。但即使纠正了这个,创业公司交易惊人地经常失败——远比比如说房地产购买交易更频繁。原因是这是一个风险如此之大的环境。即将资助或收购创业公司的人容易产生严重的买家悔意。他们直到交易即将完成时才真正把握他们所承担的风险。然后他们恐慌。而且不仅是没有经验的天使投资者,大公司也是如此。
所以如果你是一个创业公司创始人,想知道为什么某个天使投资者不回你的电话,你至少可以从这样的想法中得到安慰:同样的事情正在发生在规模大一百倍的其他交易上。
我提出的创业公司历史例子就像一个骨架——就其进行而言是准确的,但需要充实才能成为完整的图片。要获得完整的图片,只需添加每一个可能的灾难。
一个可怕的前景?在某种程度上。然而在某种程度上也是令人鼓舞的。创业公司的不确定性几乎让每个人都感到恐惧。人们高估稳定性——尤其是年轻人,讽刺的是他们最不需要它。所以在创办创业公司时,就像在任何真正大胆的冒险中一样,仅仅决定要做就让你成功了一半。在比赛那天,大多数其他选手不会出现。
注意事项
[1] 这类规定的目的是保护寡妇和孤儿免受欺诈性投资计划的伤害;拥有超过一百万美元流动资产的人被认为能够保护自己。意外的后果是,产生最高回报的投资,如对冲基金,只对富人可用。
[2] 咨询是产品公司去死的地方。IBM是最著名的例子。所以从咨询公司开始就像从坟墓里开始并试图努力回到生者的世界。
[3] 如果”你附近”不是指湾区、波士顿或西雅图,考虑搬家。你没有听说过来自费城的许多创业公司不是巧合。
[4] 投资者经常被比作羊。他们确实像羊,但这是对他们情况的理性反应。羊这样做是有原因的。如果所有其他羊都奔向某个领域,那里可能有好草场。当狼出现时,它会吃羊群中间的羊,还是靠近边缘的羊?
[5] 这部分是自信,部分是简单的无知。我们自己不知道哪些风险投资公司是令人印象深刻的。我们认为软件是最重要的。但这被证明是天真的正确方向:高估而不是低估做好产品的重要性要好得多。
[6] 我省略了一个来源:政府资助。我认为这对普通创业公司甚至不值得考虑。政府设立资助计划鼓励创业公司时可能是好意,但他们一手给一手拿走:申请过程不可避免地如此繁重,以及对用这些钱能做什么的限制如此繁重,以至于找工作获得钱会更容易。你应该特别警惕目的是某种社会工程的资助——例如鼓励更多创业公司在密西西比州创办。在很少成功的地方免费资金创办创业公司几乎不免费。
一些政府机构经营风险投资集团,他们进行投资而不是给予资助。例如,中央情报局经营一个名为In-Q-Tel的风险基金,该基金模仿私营部门基金,并且显然产生良好的回报。他们可能值得接触——如果你不介意从中央情报局拿钱。
[7] 期权在很大程度上已被限制性股票取代,这相当于同一件事。员工不是获得购买股票的权利,而是提前获得股票,并赢得不必将其归还的权利。为此目的留出的股份仍被称为”期权池”。
[8] 一流的技术人员通常不会受雇为风险投资公司做尽职调查。所以创业公司创始人最困难的部分往往是礼貌回应他们派来检查你的”专家”的愚蠢问题。
[9] 风险投资公司通过发行任意数量的新股来消灭天使。他们似乎对这种情况有一个标准的诡辩:天使不再帮助公司,所以不值得保留他们的股票。这当然反映了什么是投资的故意误解;像任何投资者一样,天使正在为他们之前承担的风险获得补偿。通过类似的逻辑,有人可以争辩说当公司上市时应该剥夺风险投资公司的股份。
[10] 公司可能遇到的新事情是down round,即估值低于前一轮的融资轮。Down round是坏消息;通常是普通股股东受到打击。风险投资交易条款中最可怕的条款中有一些与down round有关——比如”full ratchet anti-dilution”,这听起来和它一样可怕。
创始人倾向于忽略这些条款,因为他们认为公司要么会大成功,要么会完全失败。风险投资公司知道并非如此:创业公司在最终成功之前经历逆境时刻并不罕见。所以值得谈判反稀释条款,即使你认为你不需要,风险投资公司会试图让你觉得你在无谓地制造麻烦。
感谢Sam Altman、Hutch Fishman、Steve Huffman、Jessica Livingston、Sesha Pratap、Stan Reiss、Andy Singleton、Zak Stone和Aaron Swartz阅读本文草稿。
阿拉伯语翻译
How to Fund a Startup
November 2005
Want to start a startup? Get funded by Y Combinator.
Venture funding works like gears. A typical startup goes through several rounds of funding, and at each round you want to take just enough money to reach the speed where you can shift into the next gear.
Few startups get it quite right. Many are underfunded. A few are overfunded, which is like trying to start driving in third gear.
I think it would help founders to understand funding better—not just the mechanics of it, but what investors are thinking. I was surprised recently when I realized that all the worst problems we faced in our startup were due not to competitors, but investors. Dealing with competitors was easy by comparison.
I don’t mean to suggest that our investors were nothing but a drag on us. They were helpful in negotiating deals, for example. I mean more that conflicts with investors are particularly nasty. Competitors punch you in the jaw, but investors have you by the balls.
Apparently our situation was not unusual. And if trouble with investors is one of the biggest threats to a startup, managing them is one of the most important skills founders need to learn.Let’s start by talking about the five sources of startup funding. Then we’ll trace the life of a hypothetical (very fortunate) startup as it shifts gears through successive rounds.Friends and FamilyA lot of startups get their first funding from friends and family. Excite did, for example: after the founders graduated from college, they borrowed 10,000 of seed money from our friend Julian, but he was sufficiently rich that it’s hard to say whether he should be classified as a friend or angel. He was also a lawyer, which was great, because it meant we didn’t have to pay legal bills out of that initial small sum.The advantage of raising money from friends and family is that they’re easy to find. You already know them. There are three main disadvantages: you mix together your business and personal life; they will probably not be as well connected as angels or venture firms; and they may not be accredited investors, which could complicate your life later.The SEC defines an “accredited investor” as someone with over a million dollars in liquid assets or an income of over 20,000 for 10% of a company, the company is in theory worth 10, just to be able to brag that he was an investor. Unfortunately, it’s impractical (if not illegal) to adjust the valuation of the company up and down for each investor. Startups’ valuations are supposed to rise over time. So if you’re going to sell cheap stock to eminent angels, do it early, when it’s natural for the company to have a low valuation.Some angel investors join together in syndicates. Any city where people start startups will have one or more of them. In Boston the biggest is the Common Angels. In the Bay Area it’s the Band of Angels. You can find groups near you through the Angel Capital Association. [3] However, most angel investors don’t belong to these groups. In fact, the more prominent the angel, the less likely they are to belong to a group.Some angel groups charge you money to pitch your idea to them. Needless to say, you should never do this.One of the dangers of taking investment from individual angels, rather than through an angel group or investment firm, is that they have less reputation to protect. A big-name VC firm will not screw you too outrageously, because other founders would avoid them if word got out. With individual angels you don’t have this protection, as we found to our dismay in our own startup. In many startups’ lives there comes a point when you’re at the investors’ mercy—when you’re out of money and the only place to get more is your existing investors. When we got into such a scrape, our investors took advantage of it in a way that a name-brand VC probably wouldn’t have.Angels have a corresponding advantage, however: they’re also not bound by all the rules that VC firms are. And so they can, for example, allow founders to cash out partially in a funding round, by selling some of their stock directly to the investors. I think this will become more common; the average founder is eager to do it, and selling, say, half a million dollars worth of stock will not, as VCs fear, cause most founders to be any less committed to the business.The same angels who tried to screw us also let us do this, and so on balance I’m grateful rather than angry. (As in families, relations between founders and investors can be complicated.)The best way to find angel investors is through personal introductions. You could try to cold-call angel groups near you, but angels, like VCs, will pay more attention to deals recommended by someone they respect.Deal terms with angels vary a lot. There are no generally accepted standards. Sometimes angels’ deal terms are as fearsome as VCs’. Other angels, particularly in the earliest stages, will invest based on a two-page agreement.Angels who only invest occasionally may not themselves know what terms they want. They just want to invest in this startup. What kind of anti-dilution protection do they want? Hell if they know. In these situations, the deal terms tend to be random: the angel asks his lawyer to create a vanilla agreement, and the terms end up being whatever the lawyer considers vanilla. Which in practice usually means, whatever existing agreement he finds lying around his firm. (Few legal documents are created from scratch.)These heaps o’ boilerplate are a problem for small startups, because they tend to grow into the union of all preceding documents. I know of one startup that got from an angel investor what amounted to a five hundred pound handshake: after deciding to invest, the angel presented them with a 70-page agreement. The startup didn’t have enough money to pay a lawyer even to read it, let alone negotiate the terms, so the deal fell through.One solution to this problem would be to have the startup’s lawyer produce the agreement, instead of the angel’s. Some angels might balk at this, but others would probably welcome it.Inexperienced angels often get cold feet when the time comes to write that big check. In our startup, one of the two angels in the initial round took months to pay us, and only did after repeated nagging from our lawyer, who was also, fortunately, his lawyer.It’s obvious why investors delay. Investing in startups is risky! When a company is only two months old, every day you wait gives you 1.7% more data about their trajectory. But the investor is already being compensated for that risk in the low price of the stock, so it is unfair to delay.Fair or not, investors do it if you let them. Even VCs do it. And funding delays are a big distraction for founders, who ought to be working on their company, not worrying about investors. What’s a startup to do? With both investors and acquirers, the only leverage you have is competition. If an investor knows you have other investors lined up, he’ll be a lot more eager to close— and not just because he’ll worry about losing the deal, but because if other investors are interested, you must be worth investing in. It’s the same with acquisitions. No one wants to buy you till someone else wants to buy you, and then everyone wants to buy you.The key to closing deals is never to stop pursuing alternatives. When an investor says he wants to invest in you, or an acquirer says they want to buy you, don’t believe it till you get the check. Your natural tendency when an investor says yes will be to relax and go back to writing code. Alas, you can’t; you have to keep looking for more investors, if only to get this one to act. [4]Seed Funding FirmsSeed firms are like angels in that they invest relatively small amounts at early stages, but like VCs in that they’re companies that do it as a business, rather than individuals making occasional investments on the side.Till now, nearly all seed firms have been so-called “incubators,” so Y Combinator gets called one too, though the only thing we have in common is that we invest in the earliest phase.According to the National Association of Business Incubators, there are about 800 incubators in the US. This is an astounding number, because I know the founders of a lot of startups, and I can’t think of one that began in an incubator.What is an incubator? I’m not sure myself. The defining quality seems to be that you work in their space. That’s where the name “incubator” comes from. They seem to vary a great deal in other respects. At one extreme is the sort of pork-barrel project where a town gets money from the state government to renovate a vacant building as a “high-tech incubator,” as if it were merely lack of the right sort of office space that had till now prevented the town from becoming a startup hub. At the other extreme are places like Idealab, which generates ideas for new startups internally and hires people to work for them.The classic Bubble incubators, most of which now seem to be dead, were like VC firms except that they took a much bigger role in the startups they funded. In addition to working in their space, you were supposed to use their office staff, lawyers, accountants, and so on.Whereas incubators tend (or tended) to exert more control than VCs, Y Combinator exerts less. And we think it’s better if startups operate out of their own premises, however crappy, than the offices of their investors. So it’s annoying that we keep getting called an “incubator,” but perhaps inevitable, because there’s only one of us so far and no word yet for what we are. If we have to be called something, the obvious name would be “excubator.” (The name is more excusable if one considers it as meaning that we enable people to escape cubicles.)Because seed firms are companies rather than individual people, reaching them is easier than reaching angels. Just go to their web site and send them an email. The importance of personal introductions varies, but is less than with angels or VCs.The fact that seed firms are companies also means the investment process is more standardized. (This is generally true with angel groups too.) Seed firms will probably have set deal terms they use for every startup they fund. The fact that the deal terms are standard doesn’t mean they’re favorable to you, but if other startups have signed the same agreements and things went well for them, it’s a sign the terms are reasonable.Seed firms differ from angels and VCs in that they invest exclusively in the earliest phases—often when the company is still just an idea. Angels and even VC firms occasionally do this, but they also invest at later stages.The problems are different in the early stages. For example, in the first couple months a startup may completely redefine their idea. So seed investors usually care less about the idea than the people. This is true of all venture funding, but especially so in the seed stage.Like VCs, one of the advantages of seed firms is the advice they offer. But because seed firms operate in an earlier phase, they need to offer different kinds of advice. For example, a seed firm should be able to give advice about how to approach VCs, which VCs obviously don’t need to do; whereas VCs should be able to give advice about how to hire an “executive team,” which is not an issue in the seed stage.In the earliest phases, a lot of the problems are technical, so seed firms should be able to help with technical as well as business problems.Seed firms and angel investors generally want to invest in the initial phases of a startup, then hand them off to VC firms for the next round. Occasionally startups go from seed funding direct to acquisition, however, and I expect this to become increasingly common.Google has been aggressively pursuing this route, and now Yahoo is too. Both now compete directly with VCs. And this is a smart move. Why wait for further funding rounds to jack up a startup’s price? When a startup reaches the point where VCs have enough information to invest in it, the acquirer should have enough information to buy it. More information, in fact; with their technical depth, the acquirers should be better at picking winners than VCs.Venture Capital FundsVC firms are like seed firms in that they’re actual companies, but they invest other people’s money, and much larger amounts of it. VC investments average several million dollars. So they tend to come later in the life of a startup, are harder to get, and come with tougher terms.The word “venture capitalist” is sometimes used loosely for any venture investor, but there is a sharp difference between VCs and other investors: VC firms are organized as funds, much like hedge funds or mutual funds. The fund managers, who are called “general partners,” get about 2% of the fund annually as a management fee, plus about 20% of the fund’s gains.There is a very sharp dropoff in performance among VC firms, because in the VC business both success and failure are self-perpetuating. When an investment scores spectacularly, as Google did for Kleiner and Sequoia, it generates a lot of good publicity for the VCs. And many founders prefer to take money from successful VC firms, because of the legitimacy it confers. Hence a vicious (for the losers) cycle: VC firms that have been doing badly will only get the deals the bigger fish have rejected, causing them to continue to do badly.As a result, of the thousand or so VC funds in the US now, only about 50 are likely to make money, and it is very hard for a new fund to break into this group.In a sense, the lower-tier VC firms are a bargain for founders. They may not be quite as smart or as well connected as the big-name firms, but they are much hungrier for deals. This means you should be able to get better terms from them.Better how? The most obvious is valuation: they’ll take less of your company. But as well as money, there’s power. I think founders will increasingly be able to stay on as CEO, and on terms that will make it fairly hard to fire them later.The most dramatic change, I predict, is that VCs will allow founders to cash out partially by selling some of their stock direct to the VC firm. VCs have traditionally resisted letting founders get anything before the ultimate “liquidity event.” But they’re also desperate for deals. And since I know from my own experience that the rule against buying stock from founders is a stupid one, this is a natural place for things to give as venture funding becomes more and more a seller’s market.The disadvantage of taking money from less known firms is that people will assume, correctly or not, that you were turned down by the more exalted ones. But, like where you went to college, the name of your VC stops mattering once you have some performance to measure. So the more confident you are, the less you need a brand-name VC. We funded Viaweb entirely with angel money; it never occurred to us that the backing of a well known VC firm would make us seem more impressive. [5]Another danger of less known firms is that, like angels, they have less reputation to protect. I suspect it’s the lower-tier firms that are responsible for most of the tricks that have given VCs such a bad reputation among hackers. They are doubly hosed: the general partners themselves are less able, and yet they have harder problems to solve, because the top VCs skim off all the best deals, leaving the lower-tier firms exactly the startups that are likely to blow up.For example, lower-tier firms are much more likely to pretend to want to do a deal with you just to lock you up while they decide if they really want to. One experienced CFO said: The better ones usually will not give a term sheet unless they really want to do a deal. The second or third tier firms have a much higher break rate—it could be as high as 50%. It’s obvious why: the lower-tier firms’ biggest fear, when chance throws them a bone, is that one of the big dogs will notice and take it away. The big dogs don’t have to worry about that.Falling victim to this trick could really hurt you. As one VC told me: If you were talking to four VCs, told three of them that you accepted a term sheet, and then have to call them back to tell them you were just kidding, you are absolutely damaged goods. Here’s a partial solution: when a VC offers you a term sheet, ask how many of their last 10 term sheets turned into deals. This will at least force them to lie outright if they want to mislead you.Not all the people who work at VC firms are partners. Most firms also have a handful of junior employees called something like associates or analysts. If you get a call from a VC firm, go to their web site and check whether the person you talked to is a partner. Odds are it will be a junior person; they scour the web looking for startups their bosses could invest in. The junior people will tend to seem very positive about your company. They’re not pretending; they want to believe you’re a hot prospect, because it would be a huge coup for them if their firm invested in a company they discovered. Don’t be misled by this optimism. It’s the partners who decide, and they view things with a colder eye.Because VCs invest large amounts, the money comes with more restrictions. Most only come into effect if the company gets into trouble. For example, VCs generally write it into the deal that in any sale, they get their investment back first. So if the company gets sold at a low price, the founders could get nothing. Some VCs now require that in any sale they get 4x their investment back before the common stock holders (that is, you) get anything, but this is an abuse that should be resisted.Another difference with large investments is that the founders are usually required to accept “vesting”—to surrender their stock and earn it back over the next 4-5 years. VCs don’t want to invest millions in a company the founders could just walk away from. Financially, vesting has little effect, but in some situations it could mean founders will have less power. If VCs got de facto control of the company and fired one of the founders, he’d lose any unvested stock unless there was specific protection against this. So vesting would in that situation force founders to toe the line.The most noticeable change when a startup takes serious funding is that the founders will no longer have complete control. Ten years ago VCs used to insist that founders step down as CEO and hand the job over to a business guy they supplied. This is less the rule now, partly because the disasters of the Bubble showed that generic business guys don’t make such great CEOs.But while founders will increasingly be able to stay on as CEO, they’ll have to cede some power, because the board of directors will become more powerful. In the seed stage, the board is generally a formality; if you want to talk to the other board members, you just yell into the next room. This stops with VC-scale money. In a typical VC funding deal, the board of directors might be composed of two VCs, two founders, and one outside person acceptable to both. The board will have ultimate power, which means the founders now have to convince instead of commanding.This is not as bad as it sounds, however. Bill Gates is in the same position; he doesn’t have majority control of Microsoft; in principle he also has to convince instead of commanding. And yet he seems pretty commanding, doesn’t he? As long as things are going smoothly, boards don’t interfere much. The danger comes when there’s a bump in the road, as happened to Steve Jobs at Apple.Like angels, VCs prefer to invest in deals that come to them through people they know. So while nearly all VC funds have some address you can send your business plan to, VCs privately admit the chance of getting funding by this route is near zero. One recently told me that he did not know a single startup that got funded this way.I suspect VCs accept business plans “over the transom” more as a way to keep tabs on industry trends than as a source of deals. In fact, I would strongly advise against mailing your business plan randomly to VCs, because they treat this as evidence of laziness. Do the extra work of getting personal introductions. As one VC put it: I’m not hard to find. I know a lot of people. If you can’t find some way to reach me, how are you going to create a successful company? One of the most difficult problems for startup founders is deciding when to approach VCs. You really only get one chance, because they rely heavily on first impressions. And you can’t approach some and save others for later, because (a) they ask who else you’ve talked to and when and (b) they talk among themselves. If you’re talking to one VC and he finds out that you were rejected by another several months ago, you’ll definitely seem shopworn.So when do you approach VCs? When you can convince them. If the founders have impressive resumes and the idea isn’t hard to understand, you could approach VCs quite early. Whereas if the founders are unknown and the idea is very novel, you might have to launch the thing and show that users loved it before VCs would be convinced.If several VCs are interested in you, they will sometimes be willing to split the deal between them. They’re more likely to do this if they’re close in the VC pecking order. Such deals may be a net win for founders, because you get multiple VCs interested in your success, and you can ask each for advice about the other. One founder I know wrote: Two-firm deals are great. It costs you a little more equity, but being able to play the two firms off each other (as well as ask one if the other is being out of line) is invaluable. When you do negotiate with VCs, remember that they’ve done this a lot more than you have. They’ve invested in dozens of startups, whereas this is probably the first you’ve founded. But don’t let them or the situation intimidate you. The average founder is smarter than the average VC. So just do what you’d do in any complex, unfamiliar situation: proceed deliberately, and question anything that seems odd.It is, unfortunately, common for VCs to put terms in an agreement whose consequences surprise founders later, and also common for VCs to defend things they do by saying that they’re standard in the industry. Standard, schmandard; the whole industry is only a few decades old, and rapidly evolving. The concept of “standard” is a useful one when you’re operating on a small scale (Y Combinator uses identical terms for every deal because for tiny seed-stage investments it’s not worth the overhead of negotiating individual deals), but it doesn’t apply at the VC level. On that scale, every negotiation is unique.Most successful startups get money from more than one of the preceding five sources. [6] And, confusingly, the names of funding sources also tend to be used as the names of different rounds. The best way to explain how it all works is to follow the case of a hypothetical startup.Stage 1: Seed RoundOur startup begins when a group of three friends have an idea— either an idea for something they might build, or simply the idea “let’s start a company.” Presumably they already have some source of food and shelter. But if you have food and shelter, you probably also have something you’re supposed to be working on: either classwork, or a job. So if you want to work full-time on a startup, your money situation will probably change too.A lot of startup founders say they started the company without any idea of what they planned to do. This is actually less common than it seems: many have to claim they thought of the idea after quitting because otherwise their former employer would own it.The three friends decide to take the leap. Since most startups are in competitive businesses, you not only want to work full-time on them, but more than full-time. So some or all of the friends quit their jobs or leave school. (Some of the founders in a startup can stay in grad school, but at least one has to make the company his full-time job.)They’re going to run the company out of one of their apartments at first, and since they don’t have any users they don’t have to pay much for infrastructure. Their main expenses are setting up the company, which costs a couple thousand dollars in legal work and registration fees, and the living expenses of the founders.The phrase “seed investment” covers a broad range. To some VC firms it means 15,000 from their friend’s rich uncle, who they give 5% of the company in return. There’s only common stock at this stage. They leave 20% as an options pool for later employees (but they set things up so that they can issue this stock to themselves if they get bought early and most is still unissued), and the three founders each get 25%.By living really cheaply they think they can make the remaining money last five months. When you have five months’ runway left, how soon do you need to start looking for your next round? Answer: immediately. It takes time to find investors, and time (always more than you expect) for the deal to close even after they say yes. So if our group of founders know what they’re doing they’ll start sniffing around for angel investors right away. But of course their main job is to build version 1 of their software.The friends might have liked to have more money in this first phase, but being slightly underfunded teaches them an important lesson. For a startup, cheapness is power. The lower your costs, the more options you have—not just at this stage, but at every point till you’re profitable. When you have a high “burn rate,” you’re always under time pressure, which means (a) you don’t have time for your ideas to evolve, and (b) you’re often forced to take deals you don’t like.Every startup’s rule should be: spend little, and work fast.After ten weeks’ work the three friends have built a prototype that gives one a taste of what their product will do. It’s not what they originally set out to do—in the process of writing it, they had some new ideas. And it only does a fraction of what the finished product will do, but that fraction includes stuff that no one else has done before.They’ve also written at least a skeleton business plan, addressing the five fundamental questions: what they’re going to do, why users need it, how large the market is, how they’ll make money, and who the competitors are and why this company is going to beat them. (That last has to be more specific than “they suck” or “we’ll work really hard.”)If you have to choose between spending time on the demo or the business plan, spend most on the demo. Software is not only more convincing, but a better way to explore ideas.Stage 2: Angel RoundWhile writing the prototype, the group has been traversing their network of friends in search of angel investors. They find some just as the prototype is demoable. When they demo it, one of the angels is willing to invest. Now the group is looking for more money: they want enough to last for a year, and maybe to hire a couple friends. So they’re going to raise 1 million. The company issues 200k would probably expect a seat on the board of directors. He might also want preferred stock, meaning a special class of stock that has some additional rights over the common stock everyone else has. Typically these rights include vetoes over major strategic decisions, protection against being diluted in future rounds, and the right to get one’s investment back first if the company is sold.Some investors might expect the founders to accept vesting for a sum this size, and others wouldn’t. VCs are more likely to require vesting than angels. At Viaweb we managed to raise 2.5 million from angels without ever accepting vesting, largely because we were so inexperienced that we were appalled at the idea. In practice this turned out to be good, because it made us harder to push around.Our experience was unusual; vesting is the norm for amounts that size. Y Combinator doesn't require vesting, because (a) we invest such small amounts, and (b) we think it's unnecessary, and that the hope of getting rich is enough motivation to keep founders at work. But maybe if we were investing millions we would think differently.I should add that vesting is also a way for founders to protect themselves against one another. It solves the problem of what to do if one of the founders quits. So some founders impose it on themselves when they start the company.The angel deal takes two weeks to close, so we are now three months into the life of the company.The point after you get the first big chunk of angel money will usually be the happiest phase in a startup's life. It's a lot like being a postdoc: you have no immediate financial worries, and few responsibilities. You get to work on juicy kinds of work, like designing software. You don't have to spend time on bureaucratic stuff, because you haven't hired any bureaucrats yet. Enjoy it while it lasts, and get as much done as you can, because you will never again be so productive.With an apparently inexhaustible sum of money sitting safely in the bank, the founders happily set to work turning their prototype into something they can release. They hire one of their friends—at first just as a consultant, so they can try him out—and then a month later as employee #1. They pay him the smallest salary he can live on, plus 3% of the company in restricted stock, vesting over four years. (So after this the option pool is down to 13.7%). [7] They also spend a little money on a freelance graphic designer.How much stock do you give early employees? That varies so much that there's no conventional number. If you get someone really good, really early, it might be wise to give him as much stock as the founders. The one universal rule is that the amount of stock an employee gets decreases polynomially with the age of the company. In other words, you get rich as a power of how early you were. So if some friends want you to come work for their startup, don't wait several months before deciding.A month later, at the end of month four, our group of founders have something they can launch. Gradually through word of mouth they start to get users. Seeing the system in use by real users—people they don't know—gives them lots of new ideas. Also they find they now worry obsessively about the status of their server. (How relaxing founders' lives must have been when startups wrote VisiCalc.)By the end of month six, the system is starting to have a solid core of features, and a small but devoted following. People start to write about it, and the founders are starting to feel like experts in their field.We'll assume that their startup is one that could put millions more to use. Perhaps they need to spend a lot on marketing, or build some kind of expensive infrastructure, or hire highly paid salesmen. So they decide to start talking to VCs. They get introductions to VCs from various sources: their angel investor connects them with a couple; they meet a few at conferences; a couple VCs call them after reading about them.Step 3: Series A RoundArmed with their now somewhat fleshed-out business plan and able to demo a real, working system, the founders visit the VCs they have introductions to. They find the VCs intimidating and inscrutable. They all ask the same question: who else have you pitched to? (VCs are like high school girls: they're acutely aware of their position in the VC pecking order, and their interest in a company is a function of the interest other VCs show in it.)One of the VC firms says they want to invest and offers the founders a term sheet. A term sheet is a summary of what the deal terms will be when and if they do a deal; lawyers will fill in the details later. By accepting the term sheet, the startup agrees to turn away other VCs for some set amount of time while this firm does the "due diligence" required for the deal. Due diligence is the corporate equivalent of a background check: the purpose is to uncover any hidden bombs that might sink the company later, like serious design flaws in the product, pending lawsuits against the company, intellectual property issues, and so on. VCs' legal and financial due diligence is pretty thorough, but the technical due diligence is generally a joke. [8]The due diligence discloses no ticking bombs, and six weeks later they go ahead with the deal. Here are the terms: a 2 million investment at a pre-money valuation of $4 million, meaning that after the deal closes the VCs will own a third of the company (2 / (4 + 2)). The VCs also insist that prior to the deal the option pool be enlarged by an additional hundred shares. So the total number of new shares issued is 750, and the cap table becomes: shareholder shares percent ------------------------------- VCs 650 33.3 angel 200 10.3 uncle 50 2.6 each founder 250 12.8 employee 36* 1.8 *unvested option pool 264 13.5 ---- ----- total 1950 100 This picture is unrealistic in several respects. For example, while the percentages might end up looking like this, it’s unlikely that the VCs would keep the existing numbers of shares. In fact, every bit of the startup’s paperwork would probably be replaced, as if the company were being founded anew. Also, the money might come in several tranches, the later ones subject to various conditions—though this is apparently more common in deals with lower-tier VCs (whose lot in life is to fund more dubious startups) than with the top firms.And of course any VCs reading this are probably rolling on the floor laughing at how my hypothetical VCs let the angel keep his 10.3 of the company. I admit, this is the Bambi version; in simplifying the picture, I’ve also made everyone nicer. In the real world, VCs regard angels the way a jealous husband feels about his wife’s previous boyfriends. To them the company didn’t exist before they invested in it. [9]I don’t want to give the impression you have to do an angel round before going to VCs. In this example I stretched things out to show multiple sources of funding in action. Some startups could go directly from seed funding to a VC round; several of the companies we’ve funded have.The founders are required to vest their shares over four years, and the board is now reconstituted to consist of two VCs, two founders, and a fifth person acceptable to both. The angel investor cheerfully surrenders his board seat.At this point there is nothing new our startup can teach us about funding—or at least, nothing good. [10] The startup will almost certainly hire more people at this point; those millions must be put to work, after all. The company may do additional funding rounds, presumably at higher valuations. They may if they are extraordinarily fortunate do an IPO, which we should remember is also in principle a round of funding, regardless of its de facto purpose. But that, if not beyond the bounds of possibility, is beyond the scope of this article.Deals Fall ThroughAnyone who’s been through a startup will find the preceding portrait to be missing something: disasters. If there’s one thing all startups have in common, it’s that something is always going wrong. And nowhere more than in matters of funding.For example, our hypothetical startup never spent more than half of one round before securing the next. That’s more ideal than typical. Many startups—even successful ones—come close to running out of money at some point. Terrible things happen to startups when they run out of money, because they’re designed for growth, not adversity.But the most unrealistic thing about the series of deals I’ve described is that they all closed. In the startup world, closing is not what deals do. What deals do is fall through. If you’re starting a startup you would do well to remember that. Birds fly; fish swim; deals fall through.Why? Partly the reason deals seem to fall through so often is that you lie to yourself. You want the deal to close, so you start to believe it will. But even correcting for this, startup deals fall through alarmingly often—far more often than, say, deals to buy real estate. The reason is that it’s such a risky environment. People about to fund or acquire a startup are prone to wicked cases of buyer’s remorse. They don’t really grasp the risk they’re taking till the deal’s about to close. And then they panic. And not just inexperienced angel investors, but big companies too.So if you’re a startup founder wondering why some angel investor isn’t returning your phone calls, you can at least take comfort in the thought that the same thing is happening to other deals a hundred times the size.The example of a startup’s history that I’ve presented is like a skeleton—accurate so far as it goes, but needing to be fleshed out to be a complete picture. To get a complete picture, just add in every possible disaster.A frightening prospect? In a way. And yet also in a way encouraging. The very uncertainty of startups frightens away almost everyone. People overvalue stability—especially young people, who ironically need it least. And so in starting a startup, as in any really bold undertaking, merely deciding to do it gets you halfway there. On the day of the race, most of the other runners won’t show up. Notes[1] The aim of such regulations is to protect widows and orphans from crooked investment schemes; people with a million dollars in liquid assets are assumed to be able to protect themselves. The unintended consequence is that the investments that generate the highest returns, like hedge funds, are available only to the rich.[2] Consulting is where product companies go to die. IBM is the most famous example. So starting as a consulting company is like starting out in the grave and trying to work your way up into the world of the living.[3] If “near you” doesn’t mean the Bay Area, Boston, or Seattle, consider moving. It’s not a coincidence you haven’t heard of many startups from Philadelphia.[4] Investors are often compared to sheep. And they are like sheep, but that’s a rational response to their situation. Sheep act the way they do for a reason. If all the other sheep head for a certain field, it’s probably good grazing. And when a wolf appears, is he going to eat a sheep in the middle of the flock, or one near the edge?[5] This was partly confidence, and partly simple ignorance. We didn’t know ourselves which VC firms were the impressive ones. We thought software was all that mattered. But that turned out to be the right direction to be naive in: it’s much better to overestimate than underestimate the importance of making a good product.[6] I’ve omitted one source: government grants. I don’t think these are even worth thinking about for the average startup. Governments may mean well when they set up grant programs to encourage startups, but what they give with one hand they take away with the other: the process of applying is inevitably so arduous, and the restrictions on what you can do with the money so burdensome, that it would be easier to take a job to get the money. You should be especially suspicious of grants whose purpose is some kind of social engineering— e.g. to encourage more startups to be started in Mississippi. Free money to start a startup in a place where few succeed is hardly free.Some government agencies run venture funding groups, which make investments rather than giving grants. For example, the CIA runs a venture fund called In-Q-Tel that is modelled on private sector funds and apparently generates good returns. They would probably be worth approaching—if you don’t mind taking money from the CIA.[7] Options have largely been replaced with restricted stock, which amounts to the same thing. Instead of earning the right to buy stock, the employee gets the stock up front, and earns the right not to have to give it back. The shares set aside for this purpose are still called the “option pool.”[8] First-rate technical people do not generally hire themselves out to do due diligence for VCs. So the most difficult part for startup founders is often responding politely to the inane questions of the “expert” they send to look you over.[9] VCs regularly wipe out angels by issuing arbitrary amounts of new stock. They seem to have a standard piece of casuistry for this situation: that the angels are no longer working to help the company, and so don’t deserve to keep their stock. This of course reflects a willful misunderstanding of what investment means; like any investor, the angel is being compensated for risks he took earlier. By a similar logic, one could argue that the VCs should be deprived of their shares when the company goes public.[10] One new thing the company might encounter is a down round, or a funding round at valuation lower than the previous round. Down rounds are bad news; it is generally the common stock holders who take the hit. Some of the most fearsome provisions in VC deal terms have to do with down rounds—like “full ratchet anti-dilution,” which is as frightening as it sounds.Founders are tempted to ignore these clauses, because they think the company will either be a big success or a complete bust. VCs know otherwise: it’s not uncommon for startups to have moments of adversity before they ultimately succeed. So it’s worth negotiating anti-dilution provisions, even though you don’t think you need to, and VCs will try to make you feel that you’re being gratuitously troublesome.Thanks to Sam Altman, Hutch Fishman, Steve Huffman, Jessica Livingston, Sesha Pratap, Stan Reiss, Andy Singleton, Zak Stone, and Aaron Swartz for reading drafts of this.Arabic Translation