创业公司真实情况

Paul Graham 2009-10-01

创业公司真实情况

2009年10月

(本文源于2009年创业学校的演讲。)

我不确定在创业学校上该讲什么,所以我决定问问我们资助的创业公司的创始人。我还没有写过什么?

我处于一个不寻常的位置,能够测试我写的关于创业公司的文章。我希望关于其他主题的文章是正确的,但我没有办法测试它们。关于创业公司的文章每6个月由大约70人测试。

所以我给所有创始人发了一封电子邮件,询问他们在创业过程中让他们感到惊讶的事情。这相当于问我哪里错了,因为如果我解释得足够好,任何事都不应该让他们感到惊讶。

我很自豪地报告,我收到一个回应说:最让我惊讶的是,一切都相当可预测!坏消息是,我收到了100多个其他回应,列出了他们遇到的惊讶。

回应中有非常清晰的模式;令人惊讶的是,多个人经常因为完全相同的事情而感到惊讶。以下是最大的几个:

1. 谨慎选择联合创始人

这是最多创始人提到的惊讶。有两种回应:你必须小心选择谁作为你的联合创始人,而且你必须努力维护你们的关系。

人们在选择联合创始人时希望自己更关注的是品格和承诺,而不是能力。这对于失败的创业公司尤其如此。教训是:不要选择会退缩的联合创始人。

一个典型的回应是:除非你与某人在创业公司一起工作过,否则你没有看到过他们的真实面目。品格如此重要的原因是它在大多数情况下受到更严峻的考验。一个创始人明确表示创始人之间的关系比能力更重要:我宁愿与朋友一起创办创业公司,也不愿与产出更高的陌生人一起。创业公司如此艰难和情感化,以至于友谊带来的情感和社会支持超过了失去的额外产出。我们很早就学到了这个教训。如果你看YC申请表,关于创始人的承诺和关系的问题比他们能力的问题多。

成功的创业公司创始人较少谈论选择联合创始人,更多谈论他们如何努力维护他们的关系。让我感到惊讶的一件事是创业公司创始人之间的关系如何从友谊变成婚姻。我与我的联合创始人的关系从仅仅是朋友变成整天见面,为财务烦恼和清理烂摊子。而创业公司是我们的孩子。我曾经这样总结:“就像我们结婚了,但我们没有性关系。“好几个人用了”结婚”这个词。这是一种比你通常在同事之间看到的更强烈的关系——部分是因为压力大得多,部分是因为最初创始人就是整个公司。所以这种关系必须用优质材料建造并仔细维护。这是一切的基础。

2. 创业公司占据你的生活

正如联合创始人之间的关系比通常同事之间的关系更强烈一样,创始人和公司之间的关系也是如此。经营创业公司不像有工作或当学生,因为它永远不会停止。这对大多数人的经验来说是如此陌生,以至于他们直到发生才理解。[1]

我没有意识到我会几乎每一刻醒着的时间都在工作或思考我们的创业公司。当这是你的公司而不是为别人的公司工作时,你进入了一种完全不同的生活方式。创业公司的快节奏加剧了这一点,这使得时间似乎变慢了:让我感到最惊讶的是一个人对时间的看法如何转变。在我们的创业公司工作时,我记得时间似乎拉长了,以至于一个月是一个巨大的间隔。在最好的情况下,完全沉浸可能令人兴奋:令人惊讶的是你被创业公司消耗了多少,你日夜思考它,但一次都不觉得像”工作”。不过我必须说,这句话是我们今年夏天资助的一个人说的。几年后他可能不会听起来那么精神。

3. 这是情感过山车

这是另一个人感到惊讶的事情。起伏比他们准备的更极端。

在创业公司,事情在某一刻看起来很棒,下一刻就无望了。我说下一刻,是指几小时后。情感的起伏对我来说是最大的惊讶。有一天,我们会把自己想象成下一个谷歌,梦想购买岛屿;第二天,我们会思考如何让我们所爱的人知道我们的彻底失败;如此反复。显然,困难的部分是低谷。对于许多创始人来说,这是大的惊讶:在困难的日子或周里保持每个人的积极性是多么困难,即低谷可以有多低。过了一段时间,如果你没有显著的成功来让你振作,它会让你筋疲力尽:你对创始人的最基本建议是”只是不要死”,但在缺乏令人解脱的成功的情况下保持公司运转的能量不是免费的;它是从创始人自身抽取的。你能承受的是有限度的。如果你到了不能再工作的地步,这不是世界末日。许多著名创始人在路上也有一些失败。

4. 它可以是有趣的

好消息是,高潮也非常高。几个创始人说,做创业公司最让他们惊讶的是它多么有趣:我认为你遗漏了做创业公司是多么有趣。我在工作中比我几乎所有没有开公司的朋友都更有成就感。他们最喜欢的是自由:令我惊讶的是,做一些具有挑战性和创造性的事情,一些我相信的事情,感觉比以前做的雇佣枪手式工作好多少。我知道它会感觉更好;令人惊讶的是好多少。坦率地说,如果我在这里误导了人们,我不急于纠正。我宁愿让每个人都认为创业公司是严峻和艰难的,也不愿创始人期望它有趣,几个月后说”这应该是有趣的?你在开玩笑吗?”

事实是,对大多数人来说不会有趣。我们在申请过程中试图做的大部分事情是筛选出不会喜欢它的人,既为我们自己也为他们。

最好的说法可能是,创业公司有趣的方式就像生存训练课程如果你是那种人会那样有趣。也就是说,如果你不是那种人,就一点也不有趣。

5. 毅力是关键

许多创始人对毅力在创业公司中的重要性感到惊讶。这既是负面也是正面的惊讶:他们对所需的毅力程度感到惊讶,每个人都说你必须多么坚定和有韧性,但经历它让我意识到所需的坚定仍然被低估了。也对毅力单独能够消除障碍的程度感到惊讶:如果你有毅力,即使是看起来超出你控制的问题(即移民)似乎也能自行解决。几个创始人特别提到毅力比智力重要多少。我一再惊讶于毅力比原始智力重要多少。这不仅适用于智力,也适用于一般能力,这就是为什么那么多人在选择联合创始人时说品格更重要。

6. 长期思考

你需要毅力,因为一切都比你预期的需要更长时间。许多人对此感到惊讶。我一直对一切可能需要多长时间感到惊讶。假设你的产品没有经历很少有产品经历的爆炸性增长,从开发到交易(尤其是交易)的一切似乎总是比我想象的要长2-3倍。

创始人感到惊讶的一个原因是,因为他们工作得快,他们期望其他人也这样。在创业公司触及更官僚的组织,如大公司或风险投资基金的每一点,都有令人震惊的剪切应力。这就是为什么融资和企业市场杀死和伤害这么多创业公司的原因。[2]

但我认为大多数创始人对所需时间感到惊讶的原因是他们过于自信。他们认为他们会立即成功,像YouTube或Facebook一样。你告诉他们只有100个成功的创业公司中有1个有这样的轨迹,他们都认为”我们将是那1个”。

也许他们会听一个更成功的创始人:进入创业公司之前我没有理解的最重要的事情是毅力是游戏的名称。对于绝大多数变得成功的创业公司,这将是一个非常漫长的旅程,至少3年,可能5年以上。

长期思考有积极的一面。不仅仅是你必须屈从于一切都比应该的要花更长时间的事实。如果你耐心地工作,压力更小,你可以做得更好:因为我们放松,做我们做的事情有趣得多。消失的是由不要失败的迫切需求驱动的尴尬紧张能量指导我们的行动。我们可以专注于做对我们公司、产品、员工和客户最好的事情。这就是为什么当你达到拉面盈利时事情变得好得多。你可以转换到不同的工作模式。

7. 许多小事

我们经常强调创业公司很少仅仅因为碰上某种神奇的想法而获胜。我认为创始人现在把这个记在脑子里了。但许多人惊讶地发现这也适用于创业公司内部。你必须做许多不同的事情:它更像苦差事而不是光鲜。随机选择的时间片段更可能发现我在瑞典Windows上追踪奇怪的DLL加载错误,或在董事会会议前一天晚上在财务模型Excel电子表格中追踪错误,而不是拥有战略洞察力的辉煌闪光。大多数黑客创始人喜欢把所有时间花在编程上。你不会,除非你失败了。这可以转化为:如果你把所有时间花在编程上,你将会失败。

这个原则甚至延伸到编程中。很少有单一的聪明技巧能确保成功:我学会永远不要赌任何一个功能或交易或任何东西能给你带来成功。从来不是单一的东西。一切都只是渐进的,你只需继续做许多这样的事情,直到你碰到什么。即使在聪明的技巧让你发财的罕见情况下,你可能后来才知道:没有所谓的杀手功能。或者至少你不知道它是什么。所以最好的策略是尝试许多不同的事情。不要把所有鸡蛋放在一个篮子里的原因不是通常的原因,即使当你知道哪个篮子最好时也适用。在创业公司中,你甚至不知道那个。

8. 从最小化的东西开始

许多创始人提到用最简单可能的东西启动是多么重要。此时每个人都知道你应该快速发布和迭代。这在YC几乎是一种口头禅。但即使如此,许多人似乎因为不这样做而受到伤害:构建可以被视为完整应用程序的绝对最小化东西并发布它。

为什么人们在第一个版本上花太长时间?主要是骄傲。他们讨厌发布可以更好的东西。他们担心人们会说什么。但你必须克服这个:乍一看做”简单”的事情并不意味着你没有在做有意义、可防御或有价值的事情。不要担心人们会说什么。如果你的第一个版本如此令人印象深刻以至于巨魔不开玩笑,你发布太晚了。[3]

一个创始人说这应该是你所有编程的方法,不仅仅是创业公司,我倾向于同意。现在,当编程时,我试图思考”我如何写这个,如果人们看到我的代码,他们会惊讶于代码如此之少和做的事情如此之少?“过度工程化是有毒的。不像为了额外学分做额外工作。它更像说一个谎言,然后你必须记住它,以便你不会自相矛盾。

9. 吸引用户

产品开发是与用户的对话,直到你发布才真正开始。在你发布之前,你就像一个警察艺术家在他向证人展示第一版素描之前。

快速发布如此重要,以至于最好将你的初始版本视为让用户开始与你交谈的技巧,而不是产品。我学会将创业公司的初始阶段视为一个巨大的实验。所有产品都应被视为实验,那些有市场的产品会极其迅速地显示出有希望的结果。一旦你开始与用户交谈,我保证你会对他们告诉你的事情感到惊讶。当你让客户告诉你他们在追求什么时,他们经常会揭示惊人的细节,关于他们发现什么有价值以及他们愿意为什么付钱。惊讶通常是积极的也是消极的。他们不会喜欢你构建的东西,但会有其他他们喜欢的东西,实现起来会非常容易。直到你通过发布错误的东西开始对话,他们才能表达(或甚至意识到)他们在寻找什么。

10. 改变你的想法

要从与用户互动中受益,你必须愿意改变你的想法。我们总是鼓励创始人将创业公司想法视为假设而不是蓝图。然而,他们仍然惊讶于改变想法的效果有多好。通常如果你抱怨某事很难,一般建议是更努力工作。对于创业公司,我认为你应该找到一个对你来说容易解决的问题。在解决方案空间中优化是熟悉和直接的,但你可以在问题空间中玩耍获得巨大的收益。而仅仅是决心,没有灵活性,是一个贪婪的算法,可能不会给你带来比平庸的局部最大值更多的东西:当一个人坚定时,仍然有危险他们会遵循一条漫长而艰难的道路,最终无处可去。你想向前推进,但同时扭动和转向以找到最有希望的道路。一个创始人非常简洁地表达:快速迭代是成功的关键。

这个建议如此难遵循的一个原因是人们没有意识到判断创业公司想法有多难,特别是他们自己的想法。有经验的创始人学会保持开放的心态:现在我不嘲笑想法了,因为我意识到我在知道它们是否好方面多么糟糕。你永远不知道什么会有效。你只需在每个点做似乎最好的事情。我们对YC本身也这样做。我们仍然不知道它是否会工作,但它似乎像一个不错的假设。

11. 不要担心竞争对手

当你认为你有一个伟大的想法时,这有点像对某事有负罪感。某人只需要对你好笑,你就想”哦天哪,他们知道了。”

这些警报几乎总是错误的:乍看似乎像竞争对手和威胁的公司,当你真正看时通常从来都不是。即使他们在同一领域运作,他们也有不同的目标。人们对竞争对手过度反应的一个原因是他们高估想法。如果想法真的是关键,有相同想法的竞争对手将是真正的威胁。但通常是执行最重要:看到新竞争对手出现引起的所有恐慌几周后都被忘记了。总是归结为你自己的产品和市场方法。即使竞争对手获得很多关注,这通常也是真的。骑在许多好的博客感知上的竞争对手并不是真正的赢家,可以很快从地图上消失。你毕竟需要消费者。炒作不会制造满意的用户,至少对于像技术这样复杂的东西不会。

12. 获得用户很难

不过,许多创始人抱怨获得用户有多难。我不知道需要多少时间和精力去获得用户。这是一个复杂的话题。当你不能获得用户时,很难说问题是缺乏曝光,还是产品简单就是坏的。即使是好产品也可能被切换或集成成本阻挡:让人们使用新服务是极其困难的。对于其他公司可以使用的产品尤其如此,因为它需要他们的开发者做工作。如果你很小,他们认为这不紧急。[4] 对YC最尖锐的批评来自一个创始人,说我们没有足够关注客户获取:YC宣扬”做人们想要的东西”作为一项工程任务,一个永不结束的功能流,直到足够的人满意并且应用程序起飞。对客户获取成本的关注很少。这可能是真的;这可能是我需要修复的东西,特别是对于像游戏这样的应用程序。如果你做的东西挑战主要是技术性的,你可以依靠口碑,就像Google那样。一个创始人惊讶于那对他有多有效:有一种非理性的恐惧,没有人会买你的产品。但如果你努力并逐步使其更好,就没有必要担心。但对于其他类型的创业公司,你可能通过功能和交易和营销赢得更少。

13. 对交易期望最坏

交易失败。这是创业世界的常数。创业公司是无力的,好的创业公司想法通常似乎是错误的。所以每个人都对与你关闭交易感到紧张,你没有办法让他们这样做。

对于投资者尤其如此:回想起来,如果我们假设我们永远不会得到任何额外的外部投资运作,那会好得多。那会让我们专注于早期找到收入流。我的建议一般是悲观的。假设你不会得到钱,如果有人确实提供给你任何,假设你永远不会得到任何更多。如果有人提供给你钱,接受它。你经常这么说,但我认为它需要更多强调。我们有机会比去年筹集更多的钱,我希望我们这样做了。

为什么创始人忽视我?主要是因为他们天生乐观。错误是对你无法控制的事情乐观。无论如何对你能够做出伟大的东西的能力要乐观。但如果你对大公司或投资者乐观,你就是在自找麻烦。

14. 投资者一无所知

许多创始人提到他们对投资者的一无所知感到惊讶:他们甚至不知道他们投资的东西。我遇到了一些投资了硬件设备的投资者,当我要求他们演示设备时,他们很难打开它。天使投资者比风险投资家好一点,因为他们通常自己有创业经验:风险投资家不知道他们在谈论什么的一半时间,他们的思想落后几年。几个是伟大的,但我们处理的95%的投资者不专业,似乎不是很擅长商业或有任何创意愿景。天使投资者通常好谈得多。

为什么创始人对风险投资家一无所知感到惊讶?我认为是因为他们看起来如此令人生畏。

风险投资家看起来令人生畏的原因是这是他们的职业。你成为风险投资家的方法是说服资产管理者信任你掌握数亿美元。你怎么做到这一点?你必须显得自信,你必须看起来像你理解技术。[5]

15. 你可能不得不玩游戏

因为投资者如此糟糕地判断你,你必须比应该的更努力地推销自己。一个创始人说最让他惊讶的是假装确定给投资者留下印象的程度。这是YC创始人经历中最让我惊讶的事情。今年夏天我们邀请了一些校友与新创业公司谈论融资,几乎100%的建议是关于投资者心理学。我以为我对风险投资家很愤世嫉俗,但创始人更加愤世嫉俗。创业公司创始人做的很多事情只是摆姿势。它有效。风险投资家自己不知道他们喜欢的创业公司在多大程度上是最擅长向风险投资家推销自己的。[6] 这与我们在前一步看到的现象完全相同。风险投资家通过向有限合伙人显得自信获得金钱,创始人通过向风险投资家显得自信获得金钱。

16. 运气是一个重要因素

在创业公司和金钱之间的路径中有两个这样的随机联系,运气在交易中是一个重要因素应该不足为奇。然而,许多创始人对此感到惊讶。我没有意识到运气扮演多大的角色,以及有多少超出我们的控制。如果你想想著名的创业公司,运气扮演多大的角色相当清楚。如果IBM坚持对DOS的独家许可,微软会在哪里?

为什么创始人被这个愚弄?商业人士可能不会,但黑客习惯于技能至上的世界,你得到你应得的。当我们开始我们的创业公司时,我购买了创业公司梦想的炒作:这是一个技能游戏。它在某些方面是。有技能是有价值的。像地狱一样坚定也是如此。但幸运是关键成分。实际上最好的模型是说结果是技能、决心和运气的产物。无论你有多少技能和决心,如果你运气为零,结果就是零。

这些关于运气的话不是来自创业公司失败的创始人。快速失败的创始人倾向于责备自己。快速成功的创始人通常没有意识到他们多么幸运。是处于中间的人看到运气多么重要。

17. 社区的价值

令人惊讶的许多创始人说,创业最让他们惊讶的是社区的价值。有些是指YC创始人的微社区:YC公司同行群体的巨大价值,以及在相似时间面临相似障碍。这不应该那么令人惊讶,因为这就是它如此结构化的原因。其他人惊讶于更广泛意义上的创业社区的价值:生活在硅谷是多么有利,你无法不听到所有前沿的技术和创业新闻,并不断遇到有用的人。最让他们惊讶的具体事情是一般的仁慈精神:我看到的最令人惊讶的事情之一是人们帮助我们的意愿。即使没有什么可获得的人也特意帮助我们的创业公司成功。特别是它如何一直延伸到顶层:让我惊讶的是重要和有趣的人是多么平易近人。令人惊讶的是你可以多么容易地联系到人们并获得即时反馈。这是我喜欢成为这个世界一部分的原因之一。创造财富不是零和游戏,所以你不必为了赢而在背后捅刀子。

18. 你得不到尊重

有一个创始人提到的惊讶我已经忘记了:在创业世界之外,创业公司创始人得不到尊重。在社交场合,我发现当我说”我在微软Office工作”而不是”我在一个你从未听说过的小创业公司x工作”时,我得到了更多的尊重。部分原因是其他世界只是不理解创业公司,部分原因是另一个大多数好的创业公司想法看起来很糟糕的事实的后果:如果你向随机的人推销你的想法,95%的时间你会发现这个人本能地认为想法会失败,你是在浪费时间(尽管他们可能不会直接说)。不幸的是,这甚至延伸到约会:作为创业公司创始人不会让你从女性那里获得更多钦佩,这让我惊讶。我确实知道这一点,但我忘记了。

19. 随着你成长事情会改变

创始人提到的最后一个大惊讶是随着他们成长事情变化了多少。最大的变化是你编程更少:你作为技术创始人/CEO的职位描述每6-12个月完全重写。更少的编码,更多的管理/规划/公司建设,招聘,清理烂摊子,以及通常为几个月后需要发生的事情做好准备。特别是,你现在必须处理员工,他们经常有不同的动机:我知道创始人方程式,自从我知道19岁时想开始创业公司就一直专注于它。员工方程式完全不同,所以我花了一段时间才理解它。幸运的是,一旦你达到巡航高度,它可以变得压力小得多:我说现在比我们刚开始时75%的压力都没有了。经营生意现在享受多了。我们更自信。我们更有耐心。我们争吵更少。我们睡得更多。我希望我能说对于每个成功的创业公司都是这样,但75%可能偏高。

超级模式

还有其他一些模式,但这些是最大的。当看它们时,一个人的第一个想法是问是否有超级模式,模式的模式。

我立即看到了,我读给听的YC创始人也看到了。这些应该是惊讶的事情,我没有告诉人们的事情。它们有什么共同点?它们都是我告诉人们的事情。如果我写一篇具有相同大纲的新文章,不是总结创始人的回应,每个人都会说我没有想法了,只是在重复自己。

这里发生了什么?

当我看回应时,共同主题是创业公司像我说的那样,但程度更甚。人们似乎不理解它有多么不同,直到他们做了。为什么?这个谜题的关键是问,与什么不同?一旦你这样表达,答案很明显:与工作。每个人的工作模型是工作。它是完全普遍的。即使你从未有过工作,你的父母可能有过,以及你遇到的几乎每个其他成年人。

无意识地,每个人都期望创业公司像工作一样,这解释了大多数惊讶。它解释了为什么人们对你必须多么小心选择联合创始人以及你必须多么努力维护你们的关系感到惊讶。你不必对同事这样做。它解释了为什么起伏出乎意料地极端。在工作中有很多阻尼。但它也解释了为什么好时光出乎意料地好:大多数人无法想象这样的自由。当你沿着列表往下看,几乎所有的惊讶都在创业公司与工作不同的程度上令人惊讶。

你可能无法克服像你成长过程中工作模型那样普遍的东西。所以最好的解决方案是有意识地意识到这一点。当你进入创业公司时,你会想”每个人都说它真的很极端。“你的下一个想法可能是”但我不能相信它会那么糟糕。“如果你想避免惊讶,之后的想法应该是:“我不能相信它会那么糟糕的原因是我的工作模型是工作。“

注释

[1] 研究生可能理解它。在研究生院,你总觉得你应该在写论文。它不像课程那样每学期结束。

[2] 创业公司与缓慢移动组织互动的最好方式是分叉单独的进程来处理它们。当它们在关键路径上时它们杀死你——当你依赖关闭交易来前进时。值得采取极端措施避免那样。

[3] 这是里德·霍夫曼原则的一个变体,如果你对你发布的东西不感到尴尬,你发布太晚了。

[4] 关于你构建的东西要问的问题不是它是否好,而是它是否好到足以提供所需的激活能量。

[5] 一些风险投资家似乎理解技术,因为他们确实理解,但这是过度的;定义测试是你能否足够好地谈论它以说服有限合伙人。

[6] 这是你在国防承包商或时尚品牌中看到的现象。客户越愚蠢,你花在向他们推销东西的过程上的努力就越多,而不是制作你卖的东西。

感谢:杰西卡·利文斯顿阅读本文草稿,以及所有回应我电子邮件的创始人。

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What Startups Are Really Like

October 2009

(This essay is derived from a talk at the 2009 Startup School.)

I wasn’t sure what to talk about at Startup School, so I decided to ask the founders of the startups we’d funded. What hadn’t I written about yet?

I’m in the unusual position of being able to test the essays I write about startups. I hope the ones on other topics are right, but I have no way to test them. The ones on startups get tested by about 70 people every 6 months.

So I sent all the founders an email asking what surprised them about starting a startup. This amounts to asking what I got wrong, because if I’d explained things well enough, nothing should have surprised them.

I’m proud to report I got one response saying: What surprised me the most is that everything was actually fairly predictable! The bad news is that I got over 100 other responses listing the surprises they encountered.

There were very clear patterns in the responses; it was remarkable how often several people had been surprised by exactly the same thing. These were the biggest:

1. Be Careful with Cofounders

This was the surprise mentioned by the most founders. There were two types of responses: that you have to be careful who you pick as a cofounder, and that you have to work hard to maintain your relationship.

What people wished they’d paid more attention to when choosing cofounders was character and commitment, not ability. This was particularly true with startups that failed. The lesson: don’t pick cofounders who will flake.

Here’s a typical reponse: You haven’t seen someone’s true colors unless you’ve worked with them on a startup. The reason character is so important is that it’s tested more severely than in most other situations. One founder said explicitly that the relationship between founders was more important than ability: I would rather cofound a startup with a friend than a stranger with higher output. Startups are so hard and emotional that the bonds and emotional and social support that come with friendship outweigh the extra output lost. We learned this lesson a long time ago. If you look at the YC application, there are more questions about the commitment and relationship of the founders than their ability.

Founders of successful startups talked less about choosing cofounders and more about how hard they worked to maintain their relationship. One thing that surprised me is how the relationship of startup founders goes from a friendship to a marriage. My relationship with my cofounder went from just being friends to seeing each other all the time, fretting over the finances and cleaning up shit. And the startup was our baby. I summed it up once like this: “It’s like we’re married, but we’re not fucking.” Several people used that word “married.” It’s a far more intense relationship than you usually see between coworkers—partly because the stresses are so much greater, and partly because at first the founders are the whole company. So this relationship has to be built of top quality materials and carefully maintained. It’s the basis of everything.

2. Startups Take Over Your Life

Just as the relationship between cofounders is more intense than it usually is between coworkers, so is the relationship between the founders and the company. Running a startup is not like having a job or being a student, because it never stops. This is so foreign to most people’s experience that they don’t get it till it happens. [1]

I didn’t realize I would spend almost every waking moment either working or thinking about our startup. You enter a whole different way of life when it’s your company vs. working for someone else’s company. It’s exacerbated by the fast pace of startups, which makes it seem like time slows down: I think the thing that’s been most surprising to me is how one’s perspective on time shifts. Working on our startup, I remember time seeming to stretch out, so that a month was a huge interval. In the best case, total immersion can be exciting: It’s surprising how much you become consumed by your startup, in that you think about it day and night, but never once does it feel like “work.” Though I have to say, that quote is from someone we funded this summer. In a couple years he may not sound so chipper.

3. It’s an Emotional Roller-coaster

This was another one lots of people were surprised about. The ups and downs were more extreme than they were prepared for.

In a startup, things seem great one moment and hopeless the next. And by next, I mean a couple hours later. The emotional ups and downs were the biggest surprise for me. One day, we’d think of ourselves as the next Google and dream of buying islands; the next, we’d be pondering how to let our loved ones know of our utter failure; and on and on. The hard part, obviously, is the lows. For a lot of founders that was the big surprise: How hard it is to keep everyone motivated during rough days or weeks, i.e. how low the lows can be. After a while, if you don’t have significant success to cheer you up, it wears you out: Your most basic advice to founders is “just don’t die,” but the energy to keep a company going in lieu of unburdening success isn’t free; it is siphoned from the founders themselves. There’s a limit to how much you can take. If you get to the point where you can’t keep working anymore, it’s not the end of the world. Plenty of famous founders have had some failures along the way.

4. It Can Be Fun

The good news is, the highs are also very high. Several founders said what surprised them most about doing a startup was how fun it was: I think you’ve left out just how fun it is to do a startup. I am more fulfilled in my work than pretty much any of my friends who did not start companies. What they like most is the freedom: I’m surprised by how much better it feels to be working on something that is challenging and creative, something I believe in, as opposed to the hired-gun stuff I was doing before. I knew it would feel better; what’s surprising is how much better. Frankly, though, if I’ve misled people here, I’m not eager to fix that. I’d rather have everyone think starting a startup is grim and hard than have founders go into it expecting it to be fun, and a few months later saying “This is supposed to be fun? Are you kidding?”

The truth is, it wouldn’t be fun for most people. A lot of what we try to do in the application process is to weed out the people who wouldn’t like it, both for our sake and theirs.

The best way to put it might be that starting a startup is fun the way a survivalist training course would be fun, if you’re into that sort of thing. Which is to say, not at all, if you’re not.

5. Persistence Is the Key

A lot of founders were surprised how important persistence was in startups. It was both a negative and a positive surprise: they were surprised both by the degree of persistence required Everyone said how determined and resilient you must be, but going through it made me realize that the determination required was still understated. and also by the degree to which persistence alone was able to dissolve obstacles: If you are persistent, even problems that seem out of your control (i.e. immigration) seem to work themselves out. Several founders mentioned specifically how much more important persistence was than intelligence. I’ve been surprised again and again by just how much more important persistence is than raw intelligence. This applies not just to intelligence but to ability in general, and that’s why so many people said character was more important in choosing cofounders.

6. Think Long-Term

You need persistence because everything takes longer than you expect. A lot of people were surprised by that. I’m continually surprised by how long everything can take. Assuming your product doesn’t experience the explosive growth that very few products do, everything from development to dealmaking (especially dealmaking) seems to take 2-3x longer than I always imagine. One reason founders are surprised is that because they work fast, they expect everyone else to. There’s a shocking amount of shear stress at every point where a startup touches a more bureaucratic organization, like a big company or a VC fund. That’s why fundraising and the enterprise market kill and maim so many startups. [2]

But I think the reason most founders are surprised by how long it takes is that they’re overconfident. They think they’re going to be an instant success, like YouTube or Facebook. You tell them only 1 out of 100 successful startups has a trajectory like that, and they all think “we’re going to be that 1.”

Maybe they’ll listen to one of the more successful founders: The top thing I didn’t understand before going into it is that persistence is the name of the game. For the vast majority of startups that become successful, it’s going to be a really long journey, at least 3 years and probably 5+. There is a positive side to thinking longer-term. It’s not just that you have to resign yourself to everything taking longer than it should. If you work patiently it’s less stressful, and you can do better work: Because we’re relaxed, it’s so much easier to have fun doing what we do. Gone is the awkward nervous energy fueled by the desperate need to not fail guiding our actions. We can concentrate on doing what’s best for our company, product, employees and customers. That’s why things get so much better when you hit ramen profitability. You can shift into a different mode of working.

7. Lots of Little Things

We often emphasize how rarely startups win simply because they hit on some magic idea. I think founders have now gotten that into their heads. But a lot were surprised to find this also applies within startups. You have to do lots of different things: It’s much more of a grind than glamorous. A timeslice selected at random would more likely find me tracking down a weird DLL loading bug on Swedish Windows, or tracking down a bug in the financial model Excel spreadsheet the night before a board meeting, rather than having brilliant flashes of strategic insight. Most hacker-founders would like to spend all their time programming. You won’t get to, unless you fail. Which can be transformed into: If you spend all your time programming, you will fail.

The principle extends even into programming. There is rarely a single brilliant hack that ensures success: I learnt never to bet on any one feature or deal or anything to bring you success. It is never a single thing. Everything is just incremental and you just have to keep doing lots of those things until you strike something. Even in the rare cases where a clever hack makes your fortune, you probably won’t know till later: There is no such thing as a killer feature. Or at least you won’t know what it is. So the best strategy is to try lots of different things. The reason not to put all your eggs in one basket is not the usual one, which applies even when you know which basket is best. In a startup you don’t even know that.

8. Start with Something Minimal

Lots of founders mentioned how important it was to launch with the simplest possible thing. By this point everyone knows you should release fast and iterate. It’s practically a mantra at YC. But even so a lot of people seem to have been burned by not doing it: Build the absolute smallest thing that can be considered a complete application and ship it. Why do people take too long on the first version? Pride, mostly. They hate to release something that could be better. They worry what people will say about them. But you have to overcome this: Doing something “simple” at first glance does not mean you aren’t doing something meaningful, defensible, or valuable. Don’t worry what people will say. If your first version is so impressive that trolls don’t make fun of it, you waited too long to launch. [3]

One founder said this should be your approach to all programming, not just startups, and I tend to agree. Now, when coding, I try to think “How can I write this such that if people saw my code, they’d be amazed at how little there is and how little it does?” Over-engineering is poison. It’s not like doing extra work for extra credit. It’s more like telling a lie that you then have to remember so you don’t contradict it.

9. Engage Users

Product development is a conversation with the user that doesn’t really start till you launch. Before you launch, you’re like a police artist before he’s shown the first version of his sketch to the witness.

It’s so important to launch fast that it may be better to think of your initial version not as a product, but as a trick for getting users to start talking to you. I learned to think about the initial stages of a startup as a giant experiment. All products should be considered experiments, and those that have a market show promising results extremely quickly. Once you start talking to users, I guarantee you’ll be surprised by what they tell you. When you let customers tell you what they’re after, they will often reveal amazing details about what they find valuable as well what they’re willing to pay for. The surprise is generally positive as well as negative. They won’t like what you’ve built, but there will be other things they would like that would be trivially easy to implement. It’s not till you start the conversation by launching the wrong thing that they can express (or perhaps even realize) what they’re looking for.

10. Change Your Idea

To benefit from engaging with users you have to be willing to change your idea. We’ve always encouraged founders to see a startup idea as a hypothesis rather than a blueprint. And yet they’re still surprised how well it works to change the idea. Normally if you complain about something being hard, the general advice is to work harder. With a startup, I think you should find a problem that’s easy for you to solve. Optimizing in solution-space is familiar and straightforward, but you can make enormous gains playing around in problem-space. Whereas mere determination, without flexibility, is a greedy algorithm that may get you nothing more than a mediocre local maximum: When someone is determined, there’s still a danger that they’ll follow a long, hard path that ultimately leads nowhere. You want to push forward, but at the same time twist and turn to find the most promising path. One founder put it very succinctly: Fast iteration is the key to success.

One reason this advice is so hard to follow is that people don’t realize how hard it is to judge startup ideas, particularly their own. Experienced founders learn to keep an open mind: Now I don’t laugh at ideas anymore, because I realized how terrible I was at knowing if they were good or not. You can never tell what will work. You just have to do whatever seems best at each point. We do this with YC itself. We still don’t know if it will work, but it seems like a decent hypothesis.

11. Don’t Worry about Competitors

When you think you’ve got a great idea, it’s sort of like having a guilty conscience about something. All someone has to do is look at you funny, and you think “Oh my God, they know.”

These alarms are almost always false: Companies that seemed like competitors and threats at first glance usually never were when you really looked at it. Even if they were operating in the same area, they had a different goal. One reason people overreact to competitors is that they overvalue ideas. If ideas really were the key, a competitor with the same idea would be a real threat. But it’s usually execution that matters: All the scares induced by seeing a new competitor pop up are forgotten weeks later. It always comes down to your own product and approach to the market. This is generally true even if competitors get lots of attention. Competitors riding on lots of good blogger perception aren’t really the winners and can disappear from the map quickly. You need consumers after all. Hype doesn’t make satisfied users, at least not for something as complicated as technology.

12. It’s Hard to Get Users

A lot of founders complained about how hard it was to get users, though. I had no idea how much time and effort needed to go into attaining users. This is a complicated topic. When you can’t get users, it’s hard to say whether the problem is lack of exposure, or whether the product’s simply bad. Even good products can be blocked by switching or integration costs: Getting people to use a new service is incredibly difficult. This is especially true for a service that other companies can use, because it requires their developers to do work. If you’re small, they don’t think it is urgent. [4] The sharpest criticism of YC came from a founder who said we didn’t focus enough on customer acquisition: YC preaches “make something people want” as an engineering task, a never ending stream of feature after feature until enough people are happy and the application takes off. There’s very little focus on the cost of customer acquisition. This may be true; this may be something we need to fix, especially for applications like games. If you make something where the challenges are mostly technical, you can rely on word of mouth, like Google did. One founder was surprised by how well that worked for him: There is an irrational fear that no one will buy your product. But if you work hard and incrementally make it better, there is no need to worry. But with other types of startups you may win less by features and more by deals and marketing.

13. Expect the Worst with Deals

Deals fall through. That’s a constant of the startup world. Startups are powerless, and good startup ideas generally seem wrong. So everyone is nervous about closing deals with you, and you have no way to make them.

This is particularly true with investors: In retrospect, it would have been much better if we had operated under the assumption that we would never get any additional outside investment. That would have focused us on finding revenue streams early. My advice is generally pessimistic. Assume you won’t get money, and if someone does offer you any, assume you’ll never get any more. If someone offers you money, take it. You say it a lot, but I think it needs even more emphasizing. We had the opportunity to raise a lot more money than we did last year and I wish we had. Why do founders ignore me? Mostly because they’re optimistic by nature. The mistake is to be optimistic about things you can’t control. By all means be optimistic about your ability to make something great. But you’re asking for trouble if you’re optimistic about big companies or investors.

14. Investors Are Clueless

A lot of founders mentioned how surprised they were by the cluelessness of investors: They don’t even know about the stuff they’ve invested in. I met some investors that had invested in a hardware device and when I asked them to demo the device they had difficulty switching it on. Angels are a bit better than VCs, because they usually have startup experience themselves: VC investors don’t know half the time what they are talking about and are years behind in their thinking. A few were great, but 95% of the investors we dealt with were unprofessional, didn’t seem to be very good at business or have any kind of creative vision. Angels were generally much better to talk to. Why are founders surprised that VCs are clueless? I think it’s because they seem so formidable.

The reason VCs seem formidable is that it’s their profession to. You get to be a VC by convincing asset managers to trust you with hundreds of millions of dollars. How do you do that? You have to seem confident, and you have to seem like you understand technology. [5]

15. You May Have to Play Games

Because investors are so bad at judging you, you have to work harder than you should at selling yourself. One founder said the thing that surprised him most was The degree to which feigning certitude impressed investors. This is the thing that has surprised me most about YC founders’ experiences. This summer we invited some of the alumni to talk to the new startups about fundraising, and pretty much 100% of their advice was about investor psychology. I thought I was cynical about VCs, but the founders were much more cynical. A lot of what startup founders do is just posturing. It works. VCs themselves have no idea of the extent to which the startups they like are the ones that are best at selling themselves to VCs. [6] It’s exactly the same phenomenon we saw a step earlier. VCs get money by seeming confident to LPs, and founders get money by seeming confident to VCs.

16. Luck Is a Big Factor

With two such random linkages in the path between startups and money, it shouldn’t be surprising that luck is a big factor in deals. And yet a lot of founders are surprised by it. I didn’t realize how much of a role luck plays and how much is outside of our control. If you think about famous startups, it’s pretty clear how big a role luck plays. Where would Microsoft be if IBM insisted on an exclusive license for DOS?

Why are founders fooled by this? Business guys probably aren’t, but hackers are used to a world where skill is paramount, and you get what you deserve. When we started our startup, I had bought the hype of the startup founder dream: that this is a game of skill. It is, in some ways. Having skill is valuable. So is being determined as all hell. But being lucky is the critical ingredient. Actually the best model would be to say that the outcome is the product of skill, determination, and luck. No matter how much skill and determination you have, if you roll a zero for luck, the outcome is zero.

These quotes about luck are not from founders whose startups failed. Founders who fail quickly tend to blame themselves. Founders who succeed quickly don’t usually realize how lucky they were. It’s the ones in the middle who see how important luck is.

17. The Value of Community

A surprising number of founders said what surprised them most about starting a startup was the value of community. Some meant the micro-community of YC founders: The immense value of the peer group of YC companies, and facing similar obstacles at similar times. which shouldn’t be that surprising, because that’s why it’s structured that way. Others were surprised at the value of the startup community in the larger sense: How advantageous it is to live in Silicon Valley, where you can’t help but hear all the cutting-edge tech and startup news, and run into useful people constantly. The specific thing that surprised them most was the general spirit of benevolence: One of the most surprising things I saw was the willingness of people to help us. Even people who had nothing to gain went out of their way to help our startup succeed. and particularly how it extended all the way to the top: The surprise for me was how accessible important and interesting people are. It’s amazing how easily you can reach out to people and get immediate feedback. This is one of the reasons I like being part of this world. Creating wealth is not a zero-sum game, so you don’t have to stab people in the back to win.

18. You Get No Respect

There was one surprise founders mentioned that I’d forgotten about: that outside the startup world, startup founders get no respect. In social settings, I found that I got a lot more respect when I said, “I worked on Microsoft Office” instead of “I work at a small startup you’ve never heard of called x.” Partly this is because the rest of the world just doesn’t get startups, and partly it’s yet another consequence of the fact that most good startup ideas seem bad: If you pitch your idea to a random person, 95% of the time you’ll find the person instinctively thinks the idea will be a flop and you’re wasting your time (although they probably won’t say this directly). Unfortunately this extends even to dating: It surprised me that being a startup founder does not get you more admiration from women. I did know about that, but I’d forgotten.

19. Things Change as You Grow

The last big surprise founders mentioned is how much things changed as they grew. The biggest change was that you got to program even less: Your job description as technical founder/CEO is completely rewritten every 6-12 months. Less coding, more managing/planning/company building, hiring, cleaning up messes, and generally getting things in place for what needs to happen a few months from now. In particular, you now have to deal with employees, who often have different motivations: I knew the founder equation and had been focused on it since I knew I wanted to start a startup as a 19 year old. The employee equation is quite different so it took me a while to get it down. Fortunately, it can become a lot less stressful once you reach cruising altitude: I’d say 75% of the stress is gone now from when we first started. Running a business is so much more enjoyable now. We’re more confident. We’re more patient. We fight less. We sleep more. I wish I could say it was this way for every startup that succeeded, but 75% is probably on the high side.

The Super-Pattern

There were a few other patterns, but these were the biggest. One’s first thought when looking at them all is to ask if there’s a super-pattern, a pattern to the patterns.

I saw it immediately, and so did a YC founder I read the list to. These are supposed to be the surprises, the things I didn’t tell people. What do they all have in common? They’re all things I tell people. If I wrote a new essay with the same outline as this that wasn’t summarizing the founders’ responses, everyone would say I’d run out of ideas and was just repeating myself.

What is going on here?

When I look at the responses, the common theme is that starting a startup was like I said, but way more so. People just don’t seem to get how different it is till they do it. Why? The key to that mystery is to ask, how different from what? Once you phrase it that way, the answer is obvious: from a job. Everyone’s model of work is a job. It’s completely pervasive. Even if you’ve never had a job, your parents probably did, along with practically every other adult you’ve met.

Unconsciously, everyone expects a startup to be like a job, and that explains most of the surprises. It explains why people are surprised how carefully you have to choose cofounders and how hard you have to work to maintain your relationship. You don’t have to do that with coworkers. It explains why the ups and downs are surprisingly extreme. In a job there is much more damping. But it also explains why the good times are surprisingly good: most people can’t imagine such freedom. As you go down the list, almost all the surprises are surprising in how much a startup differs from a job.

You probably can’t overcome anything so pervasive as the model of work you grew up with. So the best solution is to be consciously aware of that. As you go into a startup, you’ll be thinking “everyone says it’s really extreme.” Your next thought will probably be “but I can’t believe it will be that bad.” If you want to avoid being surprised, the next thought after that should be: “and the reason I can’t believe it will be that bad is that my model of work is a job.”

Notes

[1] Graduate students might understand it. In grad school you always feel you should be working on your thesis. It doesn’t end every semester like classes do.

[2] The best way for a startup to engage with slow-moving organizations is to fork off separate processes to deal with them. It’s when they’re on the critical path that they kill you—when you depend on closing a deal to move forward. It’s worth taking extreme measures to avoid that.

[3] This is a variant of Reid Hoffman’s principle that if you aren’t embarrassed by what you launch with, you waited too long to launch.

[4] The question to ask about what you’ve built is not whether it’s good, but whether it’s good enough to supply the activation energy required.

[5] Some VCs seem to understand technology because they actually do, but that’s overkill; the defining test is whether you can talk about it well enough to convince limited partners.

[6] This is the same phenomenon you see with defense contractors or fashion brands. The dumber the customers, the more effort you expend on the process of selling things to them rather than making the things you sell.

Thanks

to Jessica Livingston for reading drafts of this, and to all the founders who responded to my email.

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