疯狂的新想法

Paul Graham 2021-05-01

疯狂的新想法

2021年5月

有一种观点我非常害怕在公开场合表达。如果我认识的某个既是领域专家又是通情达理的人提出了一个听起来荒谬的想法,我会非常不愿意说”这永远不会成功”。

任何研究过思想史,特别是科学史的人都知道,大事就是这样开始的。有人提出了一个听起来疯狂的想法,大多数人 dismiss 它,然后它逐渐占领了世界。

大多数听起来荒谬的想法事实上是坏的,可以安全地 dismiss。但当它们是由通情达理的领域专家提出时就不是了。如果提出这个想法的人是通情达理的,那么他们知道这听起来多么荒谬。然而他们还是提出了它。这表明他们知道一些你不知道的事情。如果他们有深厚的领域专业知识,那很可能就是来源。[1]

这样的想法不仅仅不能安全地 dismiss,而且特别可能是有趣的。当普通人提出一个听起来荒谬的想法时,它的荒谬性是他们无能的证据。但当一个通情达理的领域专家这样做时,情况就相反了。这里有一种类似有效市场的东西:平均来说,看起来最疯狂的想法,如果正确,将产生最大的影响。所以如果你能消除提出荒谬想法的人是无能的理论,它的荒谬性就从它很无聊的证据变成了它很令人兴奋的证据。[2]

这样的想法并不保证成功。但它们不必成功。它们只需要是足够好的赌注——具有足够高的期望值。我认为平均来说它们是。我认为如果你赌上所有由通情达理的领域专家提出的听起来荒谬的想法,你最终会净赚。

原因是每个人都太保守了。“范式”这个词被过度使用了,但这是一个值得使用的情况。每个人都过于受当前范式的束缚。即使那些有新想法的人最初也低估了它们。这意味着在它们达到公开提出的阶段之前,它们已经经过了过于严格的过滤。[3]

对这种想法的明智回应不是发表声明,而是提出问题,因为这里有一个真正的谜团。为什么这个聪明且通情达理的人提出了一个似乎如此错误的想法?是他们错了,还是你错了?你们中必须有一个。如果你是那个错了的人,那最好是知道这一点,因为这意味着你的世界观模型中有一个漏洞。但即使他们错了,了解为什么也应该是有趣的。专家陷入的陷阱是你也必须担心的。

这一切似乎很明显。然而,显然有很多人不分享我对 dismiss 新想法的恐惧。他们为什么这样做?为什么现在看起来像个混蛋,以后看起来像个傻瓜,而不是仅仅保留判断?

他们这样做的一个原因是嫉妒。如果你提出了一个激进的新想法并且它成功了,你的声誉(可能还有你的财富)将成比例地增加。如果这种情况发生,有些人会嫉妒,这种潜在的嫉妒会传播成一种你必须错误的信念。

人们 dismiss 新想法的另一个原因是这是显得老练的简单方法。当一个新想法首次出现时,它通常看起来相当弱小。它只是一个刚孵化的小鸡。相比之下,公认的智慧是一只完全成熟的鹰。所以很容易对新想法发动毁灭性的攻击,任何这样做的人在那些不理解这种不对称性的人看来会很聪明。

这种现象因从事新想法的人和攻击他们的人所获得的回报差异而加剧。从事新想法的回报是根据结果的价值来加权的。所以值得从事只有10%成功机会的事情,如果它能使事情变得好10倍以上。而攻击新想法的回报大致是恒定的;无论目标如何,这种攻击看起来大致同样聪明。

当他们既得利益在旧想法中时,人们也会攻击新想法。例如,达尔文的一些最严厉的批评者是牧师,这并不奇怪。人们在某些想法上建立了整个职业生涯。当有人声称这些想法是错误或过时的,他们会感到受到威胁。

最低级的 dismiss 是纯粹的派系主义:自动 dismiss 与反对派系相关的任何想法。最低级的是因为提出者是谁而 dismiss 一个想法。

但导致通情达理的人 dismiss 新想法的主要事情,与阻止人们提出新想法的原因是一样的:当前范式的普遍存在。它不仅影响我们的思维方式;它是我们构建思想的乐高积木。跳出当前范式是只有少数人能做到的。即使他们通常也必须首先抑制他们的直觉,就像一个在云层中飞行的飞行员必须相信他的仪器而不是他的平衡感。[4]

范式不仅定义我们现在的思维。它们还吸干了导致它们的面包屑痕迹,使我们对新想法的标准变得不可能高。当前范式对我们这些后代来说看起来如此完美,以至于我们想象它一定在被发现时就被完全接受了——无论教会对日心模型怎么看,天文学家一定在哥白尼提出它时就信服了。事实上,远非如此。哥白尼在1532年出版了日心模型,但直到17世纪中期科学舆论的天平才转向它。[5]

很少有人理解新想法在首次出现时看起来多么弱小。所以如果你想自己有新想法,你能做的最有价值的事情之一就是了解它们在出生时的样子。阅读新想法是如何发生的,并试图让自己进入当时人们的头脑。当新想法只完成一半,甚至拥有它的人也只是半信半疑地认为它是正确的时候,事情对他们来说是什么样子的?

但你不必停留在历史上。你现在可以观察到周围正在诞生的新想法。只要寻找一个通情达理的领域专家提出一些听起来错误的观点。

如果你既善良又聪明,你不仅不会攻击这样的人,还会鼓励他们。拥有新想法是孤独的事情。只有尝试过的人才知道有多孤独。这些人需要你的帮助。如果你帮助他们,你很可能在这个过程中学到一些东西。

笔记

[1] 这种领域专业知识可能在另一个领域。事实上,这种交叉往往特别有希望。

[2] 我并不声称这个原则在数学、工程和硬科学之外延伸很远。例如,在政治中,听起来疯狂的想法通常和听起来一样坏。虽然可以说这不是例外,因为提出它们的人实际上不是领域专家;政治家是政治策略的领域专家,比如如何当选和如何通过立法,而不是政策所作用的世界。也许没有人能是。

[3] 这种”范式”的意义由Thomas Kuhn在他的《科学革命的结构》中定义,但我也推荐他的《哥白尼革命》,在那里你可以看到他在工作中发展这个想法。

[4] 这是为什么有点阿斯伯格症的人可能在发现新想法方面有优势的一个原因。他们总是在靠仪器飞行。

[5] Hall, Rupert. From Galileo to Newton. Collins, 1963. 这本书特别擅长进入同时代人的头脑。

感谢 Trevor Blackwell, Patrick Collison, Suhail Doshi, Daniel Gackle, Jessica Livingston, and Robert Morris 阅读本文草稿。

Crazy New Ideas

May 2021

There’s one kind of opinion I’d be very afraid to express publicly. If someone I knew to be both a domain expert and a reasonable person proposed an idea that sounded preposterous, I’d be very reluctant to say “That will never work.”

Anyone who has studied the history of ideas, and especially the history of science, knows that’s how big things start. Someone proposes an idea that sounds crazy, most people dismiss it, then it gradually takes over the world.

Most implausible-sounding ideas are in fact bad and could be safely dismissed. But not when they’re proposed by reasonable domain experts. If the person proposing the idea is reasonable, then they know how implausible it sounds. And yet they’re proposing it anyway. That suggests they know something you don’t. And if they have deep domain expertise, that’s probably the source of it. [1]

Such ideas are not merely unsafe to dismiss, but disproportionately likely to be interesting. When the average person proposes an implausible-sounding idea, its implausibility is evidence of their incompetence. But when a reasonable domain expert does it, the situation is reversed. There’s something like an efficient market here: on average the ideas that seem craziest will, if correct, have the biggest effect. So if you can eliminate the theory that the person proposing an implausible-sounding idea is incompetent, its implausibility switches from evidence that it’s boring to evidence that it’s exciting. [2]

Such ideas are not guaranteed to work. But they don’t have to be. They just have to be sufficiently good bets — to have sufficiently high expected value. And I think on average they do. I think if you bet on the entire set of implausible-sounding ideas proposed by reasonable domain experts, you’d end up net ahead.

The reason is that everyone is too conservative. The word “paradigm” is overused, but this is a case where it’s warranted. Everyone is too much in the grip of the current paradigm. Even the people who have the new ideas undervalue them initially. Which means that before they reach the stage of proposing them publicly, they’ve already subjected them to an excessively strict filter. [3]

The wise response to such an idea is not to make statements, but to ask questions, because there’s a real mystery here. Why has this smart and reasonable person proposed an idea that seems so wrong? Are they mistaken, or are you? One of you has to be. If you’re the one who’s mistaken, that would be good to know, because it means there’s a hole in your model of the world. But even if they’re mistaken, it should be interesting to learn why. A trap that an expert falls into is one you have to worry about too.

This all seems pretty obvious. And yet there are clearly a lot of people who don’t share my fear of dismissing new ideas. Why do they do it? Why risk looking like a jerk now and a fool later, instead of just reserving judgement?

One reason they do it is envy. If you propose a radical new idea and it succeeds, your reputation (and perhaps also your wealth) will increase proportionally. Some people would be envious if that happened, and this potential envy propagates back into a conviction that you must be wrong.

Another reason people dismiss new ideas is that it’s an easy way to seem sophisticated. When a new idea first emerges, it usually seems pretty feeble. It’s a mere hatchling. Received wisdom is a full-grown eagle by comparison. So it’s easy to launch a devastating attack on a new idea, and anyone who does will seem clever to those who don’t understand this asymmetry.

This phenomenon is exacerbated by the difference between how those working on new ideas and those attacking them are rewarded. The rewards for working on new ideas are weighted by the value of the outcome. So it’s worth working on something that only has a 10% chance of succeeding if it would make things more than 10x better. Whereas the rewards for attacking new ideas are roughly constant; such attacks seem roughly equally clever regardless of the target.

People will also attack new ideas when they have a vested interest in the old ones. It’s not surprising, for example, that some of Darwin’s harshest critics were churchmen. People build whole careers on some ideas. When someone claims they’re false or obsolete, they feel threatened.

The lowest form of dismissal is mere factionalism: to automatically dismiss any idea associated with the opposing faction. The lowest form of all is to dismiss an idea because of who proposed it.

But the main thing that leads reasonable people to dismiss new ideas is the same thing that holds people back from proposing them: the sheer pervasiveness of the current paradigm. It doesn’t just affect the way we think; it is the Lego blocks we build thoughts out of. Popping out of the current paradigm is something only a few people can do. And even they usually have to suppress their intuitions at first, like a pilot flying through cloud who has to trust his instruments over his sense of balance. [4]

Paradigms don’t just define our present thinking. They also vacuum up the trail of crumbs that led to them, making our standards for new ideas impossibly high. The current paradigm seems so perfect to us, its offspring, that we imagine it must have been accepted completely as soon as it was discovered — that whatever the church thought of the heliocentric model, astronomers must have been convinced as soon as Copernicus proposed it. Far, in fact, from it. Copernicus published the heliocentric model in 1532, but it wasn’t till the mid seventeenth century that the balance of scientific opinion shifted in its favor. [5]

Few understand how feeble new ideas look when they first appear. So if you want to have new ideas yourself, one of the most valuable things you can do is to learn what they look like when they’re born. Read about how new ideas happened, and try to get yourself into the heads of people at the time. How did things look to them, when the new idea was only half-finished, and even the person who had it was only half-convinced it was right?

But you don’t have to stop at history. You can observe big new ideas being born all around you right now. Just look for a reasonable domain expert proposing something that sounds wrong.

If you’re nice, as well as wise, you won’t merely resist attacking such people, but encourage them. Having new ideas is a lonely business. Only those who’ve tried it know how lonely. These people need your help. And if you help them, you’ll probably learn something in the process.

Notes

[1] This domain expertise could be in another field. Indeed, such crossovers tend to be particularly promising.

[2] I’m not claiming this principle extends much beyond math, engineering, and the hard sciences. In politics, for example, crazy-sounding ideas generally are as bad as they sound. Though arguably this is not an exception, because the people who propose them are not in fact domain experts; politicians are domain experts in political tactics, like how to get elected and how to get legislation passed, but not in the world that policy acts upon. Perhaps no one could be.

[3] This sense of “paradigm” was defined by Thomas Kuhn in his Structure of Scientific Revolutions, but I also recommend his Copernican Revolution, where you can see him at work developing the idea.

[4] This is one reason people with a touch of Asperger’s may have an advantage in discovering new ideas. They’re always flying on instruments.

[5] Hall, Rupert. From Galileo to Newton. Collins, 1963. This book is particularly good at getting into contemporaries’ heads.

Thanks to Trevor Blackwell, Patrick Collison, Suhail Doshi, Daniel Gackle, Jessica Livingston, and Robert Morris for reading drafts of this.