微软已死
微软已死
2007年4月
几天前我突然意识到微软已经死了。我正在和一个年轻的创业公司创始人谈论谷歌与雅虎的不同。我说雅虎从一开始就被对微软的恐惧所扭曲。这就是为什么他们将自己定位为”媒体公司”而不是”技术公司”。然后我看着他的脸,意识到他并不理解。这就像我告诉他80年代中期女孩们多么喜欢巴里·马尼洛一样。巴里谁?微软?他什么也没说,但我能看出他不相信有人会害怕他们。
从80年代末开始,微软在软件界投下阴影将近20年。我能记得在他们之前是IBM。我大多忽略了这阴影。我从不使用微软软件,所以它只间接影响我——例如,我从僵尸网络收到的垃圾邮件。因为我没有注意,所以我没有注意到阴影何时消失。
但现在它已经消失了。我能感觉到。再也没有人害怕微软了。他们仍然赚很多钱——IBM也是如此。但他们并不危险。
微软什么时候死的,死于什么?我知道他们在2001年时似乎还很危险,因为我当时写了一篇论文,说他们没有看起来那么危险。我猜他们在2005年就死了。我知道当我们创办Y Combinator时,我们并不担心微软会与我们资助的创业公司竞争。事实上,我们甚至从未邀请他们参加我们为创业公司向投资者展示而组织的演示日。我们邀请雅虎、谷歌和其他一些互联网公司,但我们从未费心邀请微软。那里也从未有人给我们发过邮件。他们在不同的世界。
是什么杀死了他们?我认为是四件事,都发生在2000年代中期。
最明显的是谷歌。镇上只能有一个大佬,而他们显然就是。谷歌现在是迄今为止最危险的公司,无论从好的还是坏的意义上来说。微软最多只能 afterward 蹒跚而行。
谷歌什么时候领先?人们会倾向于将其推回到2004年8月的IPO,但那时他们并没有设定辩论的条款。我认为他们在2005年领先。Gmail是让他们越过边缘的事情之一。Gmail表明他们能做的不仅仅是搜索。
Gmail还展示了如果你利用后来被称为”Ajax”的技术,基于网络的软件能做多少事情。这是微软死亡的第二个原因:每个人都能看到桌面已经结束。现在应用程序似乎不可避免地会在网络上生存——不仅仅是电子邮件,而是一切,直到Photoshop。甚至微软现在也看到了这一点。
具有讽刺意味的是,微软无意中帮助创造了Ajax。Ajax中的x来自XMLHttpRequest对象,它让浏览器在显示页面的同时在后台与服务器通信。(最初与服务器通信的唯一方式是请求新页面。)XMLHttpRequest是微软在90年代末创建的,因为他们需要它用于Outlook。他们没有意识到的是,它对很多其他人也有用——事实上,对任何想要让网络应用程序像桌面应用程序一样工作的人都有用。
Ajax的另一个关键组件是Javascript,这种在浏览器中运行的编程语言。微软看到了Javascript的危险,并试图尽可能长时间地保持其损坏。[1] 但最终开源世界赢了,通过产生Javascript库,这些库就像树长在铁丝网上一样,覆盖了浏览器的缺陷。
微软死亡的第三个原因是宽带互联网。现在任何关心的人都可以拥有快速的网络接入。连接到服务器的管道越大,你对桌面的需求就越少。
棺材上的最后一颗钉子来自苹果。感谢OS X,苹果以在技术界极为罕见的方式死而复生。[2] 他们的胜利如此彻底,以至于当我遇到运行Windows的计算机时,我现在感到惊讶。我们在Y Combinator资助的几乎所有人都使用苹果笔记本电脑。在创业学校的观众中也是如此。现在所有计算机人员都使用Mac或Linux。Windows是给祖母用的,就像90年代的Mac一样。所以不仅桌面不再重要,关心计算机的人也没有人使用微软的了。
当然,苹果在音乐方面也让微软节节败退,电视和手机也在路上。
我很高兴微软死了。他们像尼禄或康茂德——邪恶得只有继承的权力才能让你如此。因为记住,微软的垄断不是从微软开始的。他们是从IBM那里得到的。软件业务从大约1950年代中期到大约2005年一直被垄断所笼罩。也就是说,几乎它的整个存在时间。“Web 2.0”之所以如此兴高采烈,原因之一就是这种感觉,无论是有意识还是无意识的,这个垄断时代可能终于结束了。
当然,作为一个黑客,我禁不住思考如何修复一些损坏的东西。微软有什么方法可以东山再起吗?原则上,是的。要看看如何做到,想象两件事:(a)微软现在手头的现金量,以及(b)拉里和谢尔盖十年前在所有搜索引擎中奔波,试图以100万美元出售谷歌的想法,但被每个人拒绝。
令人惊讶的事实是,按照像微软这样富有的公司的标准, brilliant hackers——危险地brilliant的hackers——可以非常便宜地得到。他们再也无法雇佣聪明的人了,但他们可以购买他们想要的数量,只需多一个数量级的钱。所以如果他们想再次成为竞争者,他们可以这样做:购买所有好的”Web 2.0”创业公司。他们可以用比必须为Facebook支付的少的钱获得几乎所有这些公司。把它们都放在硅谷的一栋楼里,用铅屏蔽包围它们,保护它们不受雷德蒙德的任何接触。我建议这个很安全,因为他们永远不会这样做。微软最大的弱点是他们仍然没有意识到他们有多么糟糕。他们仍然认为他们可以在内部编写软件。也许他们可以,按照桌面世界的标准。但那个世界几年前就结束了。
我已经知道人们对这篇论文的反应会是什么。一半的读者会说微软仍然是一家利润极其丰厚的公司,我应该更小心,不要基于我们与世隔绝的”Web 2.0”小泡泡中少数人的想法得出结论。另一半,年轻的一半,会抱怨这是旧闻。
另见:微软已死:Cliffs Notes
注释
[1] 制作不兼容的软件不需要有意识的努力。你所要做的就是不太努力地修复错误——如果你是一家大公司,你会产生大量的错误。这种情况类似于”文学理论家”的写作。大多数人不试图晦涩;他们只是不努力做到清晰。这不会带来回报。
[2] 部分原因是史蒂夫·乔布斯被约翰·斯卡利推走,这在技术公司中是罕见的。如果苹果的董事会没有犯那个错误,他们就不必反弹。
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Microsoft is Dead
April 2007
A few days ago I suddenly realized Microsoft was dead. I was talking to a young startup founder about how Google was different from Yahoo. I said that Yahoo had been warped from the start by their fear of Microsoft. That was why they’d positioned themselves as a “media company” instead of a technology company. Then I looked at his face and realized he didn’t understand. It was as if I’d told him how much girls liked Barry Manilow in the mid 80s. Barry who? Microsoft? He didn’t say anything, but I could tell he didn’t quite believe anyone would be frightened of them.
Microsoft cast a shadow over the software world for almost 20 years starting in the late 80s. I can remember when it was IBM before them. I mostly ignored this shadow. I never used Microsoft software, so it only affected me indirectly—for example, in the spam I got from botnets. And because I wasn’t paying attention, I didn’t notice when the shadow disappeared.
But it’s gone now. I can sense that. No one is even afraid of Microsoft anymore. They still make a lot of money—so does IBM, for that matter. But they’re not dangerous.
When did Microsoft die, and of what? I know they seemed dangerous as late as 2001, because I wrote an essay then about how they were less dangerous than they seemed. I’d guess they were dead by 2005. I know when we started Y Combinator we didn’t worry about Microsoft as competition for the startups we funded. In fact, we’ve never even invited them to the demo days we organize for startups to present to investors. We invite Yahoo and Google and some other Internet companies, but we’ve never bothered to invite Microsoft. Nor has anyone there ever even sent us an email. They’re in a different world.
What killed them? Four things, I think, all of them occurring simultaneously in the mid 2000s.
The most obvious is Google. There can only be one big man in town, and they’re clearly it. Google is the most dangerous company now by far, in both the good and bad senses of the word. Microsoft can at best limp along afterward.
When did Google take the lead? There will be a tendency to push it back to their IPO in August 2004, but they weren’t setting the terms of the debate then. I’d say they took the lead in 2005. Gmail was one of the things that put them over the edge. Gmail showed they could do more than search.
Gmail also showed how much you could do with web-based software, if you took advantage of what later came to be called “Ajax.” And that was the second cause of Microsoft’s death: everyone can see the desktop is over. It now seems inevitable that applications will live on the web—not just email, but everything, right up to Photoshop. Even Microsoft sees that now.
Ironically, Microsoft unintentionally helped create Ajax. The x in Ajax is from the XMLHttpRequest object, which lets the browser communicate with the server in the background while displaying a page. (Originally the only way to communicate with the server was to ask for a new page.) XMLHttpRequest was created by Microsoft in the late 90s because they needed it for Outlook. What they didn’t realize was that it would be useful to a lot of other people too—in fact, to anyone who wanted to make web apps work like desktop ones.
The other critical component of Ajax is Javascript, the programming language that runs in the browser. Microsoft saw the danger of Javascript and tried to keep it broken for as long as they could. [1] But eventually the open source world won, by producing Javascript libraries that grew over the brokenness of Explorer the way a tree grows over barbed wire.
The third cause of Microsoft’s death was broadband Internet. Anyone who cares can have fast Internet access now. And the bigger the pipe to the server, the less you need the desktop.
The last nail in the coffin came, of all places, from Apple. Thanks to OS X, Apple has come back from the dead in a way that is extremely rare in technology. [2] Their victory is so complete that I’m now surprised when I come across a computer running Windows. Nearly all the people we fund at Y Combinator use Apple laptops. It was the same in the audience at startup school. All the computer people use Macs or Linux now. Windows is for grandmas, like Macs used to be in the 90s. So not only does the desktop no longer matter, no one who cares about computers uses Microsoft’s anyway.
And of course Apple has Microsoft on the run in music too, with TV and phones on the way.
I’m glad Microsoft is dead. They were like Nero or Commodus—evil in the way only inherited power can make you. Because remember, the Microsoft monopoly didn’t begin with Microsoft. They got it from IBM. The software business was overhung by a monopoly from about the mid-1950s to about 2005. For practically its whole existence, that is. One of the reasons “Web 2.0” has such an air of euphoria about it is the feeling, conscious or not, that this era of monopoly may finally be over.
Of course, as a hacker I can’t help thinking about how something broken could be fixed. Is there some way Microsoft could come back? In principle, yes. To see how, envision two things: (a) the amount of cash Microsoft now has on hand, and (b) Larry and Sergey making the rounds of all the search engines ten years ago trying to sell the idea for Google for a million dollars, and being turned down by everyone.
The surprising fact is, brilliant hackers—dangerously brilliant hackers—can be had very cheaply, by the standards of a company as rich as Microsoft. They can’t hire smart people anymore, but they could buy as many as they wanted for only an order of magnitude more. So if they wanted to be a contender again, this is how they could do it: Buy all the good “Web 2.0” startups. They could get substantially all of them for less than they’d have to pay for Facebook. Put them all in a building in Silicon Valley, surrounded by lead shielding to protect them from any contact with Redmond. I feel safe suggesting this, because they’d never do it. Microsoft’s biggest weakness is that they still don’t realize how much they suck. They still think they can write software in house. Maybe they can, by the standards of the desktop world. But that world ended a few years ago.
I already know what the reaction to this essay will be. Half the readers will say that Microsoft is still an enormously profitable company, and that I should be more careful about drawing conclusions based on what a few people think in our insular little “Web 2.0” bubble. The other half, the younger half, will complain that this is old news.
See also: Microsoft is Dead: the Cliffs Notes
Notes
[1] It doesn’t take a conscious effort to make software incompatible. All you have to do is not work too hard at fixing bugs—which, if you’re a big company, you produce in copious quantities. The situation is analogous to the writing of “literary theorists.” Most don’t try to be obscure; they just don’t make an effort to be clear. It wouldn’t pay.
[2] In part because Steve Jobs got pushed out by John Sculley in a way that’s rare among technology companies. If Apple’s board hadn’t made that blunder, they wouldn’t have had to bounce back.
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