不平等
不平等
2005年8月
(本文源自2005年Defcon大会的演讲。)
假设你想要消除经济不平等。有两种方法可以做到:给穷人钱,或者从富人那里拿走钱。但它们实际上是一回事,因为如果你想给穷人钱,你必须从某个地方得到它。你不能从穷人那里得到,否则他们最终会回到起点。你必须从富人那里得到。
当然,有一种方法可以让穷人变得更富裕,而不仅仅是从富人那里转移资金。你可以帮助穷人提高生产力——例如,通过改善获得教育的机会。而不是从工程师那里拿钱给收银员,你可以让那些可能成为收银员的人成为工程师。
这是让穷人变得更富裕的绝佳策略。但过去200年的证据表明,这并没有减少经济不平等,因为它也让富人变得更富裕。如果有更多的工程师,那么就有更多机会雇佣他们和向他们出售东西。亨利·福特不可能在一个大多数人仍然是自给农民的社会中通过制造汽车致富;他既没有工人也没有顾客。
如果你想要减少经济不平等,而不仅仅是提高整体生活水平,仅仅提升穷人是不够的。如果你的新工程师之一有雄心壮志,并成为另一个比尔·盖茨怎么办?经济不平等将和以前一样糟糕。如果你真的想要压缩贫富差距,你必须向下压制顶部,同时向上提升底部。
你如何向下压制顶部?你可以尝试减少那些赚钱最多的人的生产力:让最好的外科医生用左手操作,强迫受欢迎的演员暴饮暴食,等等。但这种方法很难实施。唯一的实际解决方案是让人们尽其所能做最好的工作,然后(通过税收或限制他们可以收取的费用)没收你认为任何盈余。
所以让我们明确减少经济不平等意味着什么。它与从富人那里拿钱完全相同。
当你将数学表达式转换为另一种形式时,你经常会注意到新事物。在这里也是如此。从富人那里拿钱结果会产生一些意想不到的后果,当你用”减少不平等”来表达同样的想法时。
问题是,风险和回报必须成比例。一个只有10%获胜机会的赌注必须比有50%获胜机会的赌注支付更多,否则没有人会接受它。所以如果你削减可能回报的顶部,你从而减少了人们承担风险的意愿。
转换为我们的原始表达式,我们得到:减少经济不平等意味着减少人们愿意承担的风险。
如果最大回报减少,整个类别的风险就不再值得承担。高税率灾难性原因之一是,这类风险包括创办新公司。
投资者
创业公司本质上是有风险的。创业公司就像公海上的小船。一个大波浪你就会沉没。竞争产品、经济低迷、获得资金或监管批准的延迟、专利诉讼、技术标准变化、关键员工的离职、大客户的损失——任何这些都可能在一夜之间摧毁你。似乎只有大约十分之一的创业公司成功。[1]
我们的创业公司支付给第一轮外部投资者36倍的回报。这意味着,按照当前的美国税率,如果我们有超过二十四分之一的成功机会,投资我们是有意义的。听起来大约正确。当我们是几个没有商业经验、在公寓里运营的书呆子时,这可能大致是我们的样子。
如果这种风险没有回报,我们所知的风险投资就不会发生。
如果新公司有其他资本来源,这可能没问题。为什么不就让政府或一些类似房利美的大型准政府组织来做风险投资,而不是私人基金呢?
我告诉你为什么那不会奏效。因为那时你在要求政府或准政府员工做他们最不擅长的事情:承担风险。
任何为政府工作的人都知道,重要的不是做出正确的选择,而是做出如果失败可以在以后证明合理的选择。如果有一个安全的选择,那就是官僚会选择的选择。但这恰恰是做风险投资的错误方式。业务的性质意味着你想做出风险极高的选择,如果前景看起来足够好的话。
风险投资家目前的薪酬方式使他们专注于前景:他们获得基金收益的百分比。这有助于克服他们对投资一家由看起来像(也许确实是)大学生的书呆子运营的公司的可以理解的恐惧。
如果不允许风险投资家变富,他们会表现得像官僚。没有获利的希望,他们只会害怕损失。所以他们会做出错误的选择。他们会拒绝书呆子,而选择穿着西装的花言巧语的MBA,因为如果失败了,那项投资更容易在以后证明合理。
创始人
但即使你能以某种方式重新设计风险投资,使其在不允许风险投资家变富的情况下工作,还有另一种投资者你根本无法替代:创业公司的创始人和早期员工。
他们投资的是他们的时间和想法。但这些等同于金钱;证明是投资者愿意(如果被迫)将它们视为可互换的,给予” sweat equity”和他们用现金购买的股权相同的地位。
你在投资时间这一事实并没有改变风险和回报之间的关系。如果你要把时间投资在成功机会很小的事情上,只有当有相应大的回报时你才会这样做。[2] 如果不允许大的回报,你不如稳妥行事。
像许多创业创始人一样,我这样做是为了致富。但不是因为我想买昂贵的东西。我想要的是安全感。我想赚足够的钱,不必担心钱。如果我被禁止从创业公司赚足够的钱来做到这一点,我会通过其他方式寻求安全感:例如,去为一个大型的、稳定的组织工作,从那里很难被解雇。而不是在创业公司拼命工作,我会试图在一个大型研究实验室获得一个不错的、低压力的工作,或者在大学获得终身职位。
这就是在不奖励风险的社会中每个人所做的。如果你不能确保自己的安全,下一个最好的事情是在某个大型组织中为自己筑巢,你的地位主要取决于资历。[3]
即使我们能以某种方式替代投资者,我也不明白我们如何能替代创始人。投资者主要贡献金钱,原则上无论来源如何都是一样的。但创始人贡献想法。你无法替代那些。
让我们复习一下到目前为止的论证链条。我正在得出一个许多读者可能会踢着尖叫地接受的结论,所以我试图使每个环节都牢不可破。减少经济不平等意味着从富人那里拿钱。由于风险和回报是等价的,减少潜在回报会自动减少人们对风险的偏好。创业公司本质上是有风险的。如果没有与风险成比例回报的前景,创始人不会将他们的时间投资在创业公司中。创始人是不可替代的。所以消除经济不平等意味着消除创业公司。
经济不平等不仅仅是创业公司的结果。它是驱动它们的引擎,就像水的落差驱动水磨一样。人们创办创业公司是希望变得比以前富裕得多。如果你的社会试图阻止任何人比其他人富裕得多,它也会阻止一个人在t2比t1富裕得多。
增长
这个论证相应适用。不仅仅是你消除经济不平等,你就没有创业公司。在你减少经济不平等的程度上,你减少了创业公司的数量。[4] 增加税收,承担风险的意愿相应减少。
这似乎对每个人都不好。新技术和新工作都不成比例地来自新公司。事实上,如果你没有创业公司,很快你也不会有老牌公司,就像如果你停止生孩子,很快你也不会有任何成年人一样。
说我们应该减少经济不平等听起来很仁慈。当你那样说的时候,谁能与你争论?不平等一定是坏的,对吧?说我们应该减少新公司成立率听起来就不那么仁慈了。然而一个意味着另一个。
事实上,减少投资者对风险的偏好可能不仅仅扼杀初生的创业公司,而且特别扼杀最有前途的创业公司。与老牌公司相比,创业公司以更大的风险产生更快的增长。这种趋势在创业公司中也成立吗?也就是说,风险最高的创业公司是否是那些如果成功就产生最大增长的公司?我怀疑答案是肯定的。这是一个令人不寒而栗的想法,因为这意味着如果你削减投资者对风险的偏好,最有益的创业公司是第一批消失的。
当然,并非所有富人都是通过创业公司致富的。如果我们让人们通过创办创业公司致富,但通过税收拿走所有其他盈余财富,那会怎样?那至少会减少不平等吗?
比你想象的要少。如果你让人们只能通过创办创业公司致富,想要致富的人都会创办创业公司。这可能是一件伟大的事情。但我认为这不会对财富分配产生太大影响。想要致富的人会做他们必须做的一切。如果创业公司是唯一的方法,你只会得到更多的人创办创业公司。(也就是说,如果你非常仔细地制定法律。更可能的是,你会得到很多人做那些可以在纸上看起来像创业公司的事情。)
如果我们决心消除经济不平等,仍然有一条出路:我们可以说我们愿意继续前进,不要创业公司。如果我们这样做了会发生什么?
至少,我们不得不接受较低的技术增长率。如果你相信大型、老牌的公司可以某种程度地像创业公司一样快速开发新技术,那么球在你这边,解释如何。(如果你能提出一个看似合理的说法,你可以通过写商业书籍和为大公司咨询赚大钱。)[5]
好的,所以我们增长变慢。有那么糟糕吗?嗯,实际中它糟糕的一个原因是其他国家可能不同意与我们一起放慢。如果你满足于以比世界其他地区慢的速度开发新技术,实际发生的是你根本不会发明任何东西。你可能发现的任何东西都已经在其他地方被发明了。你唯一能回报的就是原材料和廉价劳动力。一旦你沦落到那么低,其他国家可以对你做任何他们喜欢的事情:安装傀儡政府、抽走你最好的工人、让你的女人当妓女、在你的领土上倾倒他们的有毒废物——我们现在对穷国做的所有事情。唯一的防御是孤立自己,就像共产主义国家在二十世纪所做的那样。但那时的问题是,你必须成为警察国家来执行它。
财富和权力
我意识到创业公司不是那些想要消除经济不平等的人的主要目标。他们真正厌恶的是通过与权力联盟而自我永续的那种财富。例如,为政治家竞选活动提供资金以换取政府合同的建筑公司,或者通过把孩子送到为此目的而设计的昂贵学校来让孩子进入好大学的富父母。但如果你试图通过经济政策攻击这种类型的财富,很难不摧毁创业公司作为附带损害。
这里的问题不是财富,而是腐败。那么为什么不针对腐败呢?
如果我们能防止财富转化为权力,我们就不需要防止人们变富。在这方面已经取得了进展。1925年康内留斯·范德比尔特的浪费孙子雷吉因饮酒过度去世之前,曾五次撞倒行人,其中两人死亡。到1969年泰德·肯尼迪在查帕奎迪克桥上开车坠桥时,这个限制似乎下降到一个。今天可能完全是零。但改变的不是财富的变化。改变的是财富转化为权力的能力。
你如何打破财富和权力之间的联系?要求透明度。密切关注权力如何行使,并要求说明决策是如何做出的。为什么不是所有警察审问都被录像?为什么普林斯顿大学2007届36%的学生来自预科学校,而只有1.7%的美国孩子上这些学校?美国真正入侵伊拉克的原因是什么?为什么政府官员不披露更多关于他们财务的信息,而且为什么只在任期内?
我的一位非常了解计算机安全的朋友说,最重要的步骤是记录一切。在他还是个孩子试图闯入计算机时,最担心他的是留下痕迹的想法。避免给他带来的不便比任何故意设置在他路径上的障碍都大。
像所有非法联系一样,财富和权力之间的联系在秘密中繁荣。暴露所有交易,你将大大减少它。记录一切。那是一个似乎已经在起作用的策略,它没有让你的整个国家变穷的副作用。
我不认为很多人意识到经济不平等和风险之间有联系。我直到最近才完全理解。我多年来当然知道,如果在创业公司中没有成功,另一个选择是获得一个舒适的、终身制的研究工作。但我不明白支配我行为的方程式。同样,经验上明显,一个不让人们致富的国家注定要灾难,无论是戴克里先的罗马还是哈罗德·威尔逊的英国。但直到最近我才理解风险所起的作用。
如果你试图攻击财富,你最终也会钉住风险,以及增长。如果我们想要一个更公平的世界,我认为更好地攻击下游一步,财富转化为权力的地方。
注释
[1] 这里的成功是从初始投资者的角度定义的:要么是IPO,要么是以超过最后一轮融资估值的收购。传统的十分之一成功率看起来可疑地整齐,但与风险投资家的对话表明,对于整体创业公司来说这大致正确。顶级风险投资公司期望做得更好。
[2] 我不是声称创始人坐下来计算创业公司的预期税后回报。他们受到其他做过这件事的人的例子激励。而这些例子确实反映了税后回报。
[3] 推测:在一个(不腐败)国家或组织中的财富变化将与资历制度的普遍性成反比。所以如果你压制财富变化,资历将相应变得更加重要。到目前为止,我不知道有反例,虽然在非常腐败的国家你可能同时得到两者。(感谢Daniel Sobral指出这一点。)
[4] 在一个真正封建经济的国家,你可能能够成功地重新分配财富,因为没有创业公司可杀。
[5] 创业公司开发新技术的速度是他们支付如此之好的另一个原因。正如我在《如何创造财富》中所解释的,你在创业公司中所做的是将一生的价值的工作压缩到几年中。阻止那看起来和阻止承担风险一样愚蠢。
感谢克里斯·安德森、特雷弗·布莱克威尔、丹·吉芬、杰西卡·利文斯顿和埃文·威廉姆斯阅读本文草稿,以及兰利·斯坦纳特、桑加姆·潘特和迈克·莫里茨提供关于风险投资的信息。
罗马尼亚语翻译 | 荷兰语翻译 | 繁体中文翻译 | 日语翻译 | 希伯来语翻译
如果你喜欢这篇文章,你可能也喜欢《黑客与画家》。
Inequality
August 2005
(This essay is derived from a talk at Defcon 2005.)
Suppose you wanted to get rid of economic inequality. There are two ways to do it: give money to the poor, or take it away from the rich. But they amount to the same thing, because if you want to give money to the poor, you have to get it from somewhere. You can’t get it from the poor, or they just end up where they started. You have to get it from the rich.
There is of course a way to make the poor richer without simply shifting money from the rich. You could help the poor become more productive — for example, by improving access to education. Instead of taking money from engineers and giving it to checkout clerks, you could enable people who would have become checkout clerks to become engineers.
This is an excellent strategy for making the poor richer. But the evidence of the last 200 years shows that it doesn’t reduce economic inequality, because it makes the rich richer too. If there are more engineers, then there are more opportunities to hire them and to sell them things. Henry Ford couldn’t have made a fortune building cars in a society in which most people were still subsistence farmers; he would have had neither workers nor customers.
If you want to reduce economic inequality instead of just improving the overall standard of living, it’s not enough just to raise up the poor. What if one of your newly minted engineers gets ambitious and goes on to become another Bill Gates? Economic inequality will be as bad as ever. If you actually want to compress the gap between rich and poor, you have to push down on the top as well as pushing up on the bottom.
How do you push down on the top? You could try to decrease the productivity of the people who make the most money: make the best surgeons operate with their left hands, force popular actors to overeat, and so on. But this approach is hard to implement. The only practical solution is to let people do the best work they can, and then (either by taxation or by limiting what they can charge) to confiscate whatever you deem to be surplus.
So let’s be clear what reducing economic inequality means. It is identical with taking money from the rich.
When you transform a mathematical expression into another form, you often notice new things. So it is in this case. Taking money from the rich turns out to have consequences one might not foresee when one phrases the same idea in terms of “reducing inequality.”
The problem is, risk and reward have to be proportionate. A bet with only a 10% chance of winning has to pay more than one with a 50% chance of winning, or no one will take it. So if you lop off the top of the possible rewards, you thereby decrease people’s willingness to take risks.
Transposing into our original expression, we get: decreasing economic inequality means decreasing the risk people are willing to take.
There are whole classes of risks that are no longer worth taking if the maximum return is decreased. One reason high tax rates are disastrous is that this class of risks includes starting new companies.
Investors
Startups are intrinsically risky. A startup is like a small boat in the open sea. One big wave and you’re sunk. A competing product, a downturn in the economy, a delay in getting funding or regulatory approval, a patent suit, changing technical standards, the departure of a key employee, the loss of a big account — any one of these can destroy you overnight. It seems only about 1 in 10 startups succeeds. [1]
Our startup paid its first round of outside investors 36x. Which meant, with current US tax rates, that it made sense to invest in us if we had better than a 1 in 24 chance of succeeding. That sounds about right. That’s probably roughly how we looked when we were a couple of nerds with no business experience operating out of an apartment.
If that kind of risk doesn’t pay, venture investing, as we know it, doesn’t happen.
That might be ok if there were other sources of capital for new companies. Why not just have the government, or some large almost-government organization like Fannie Mae, do the venture investing instead of private funds?
I’ll tell you why that wouldn’t work. Because then you’re asking government or almost-government employees to do the one thing they are least able to do: take risks.
As anyone who has worked for the government knows, the important thing is not to make the right choices, but to make choices that can be justified later if they fail. If there is a safe option, that’s the one a bureaucrat will choose. But that is exactly the wrong way to do venture investing. The nature of the business means that you want to make terribly risky choices, if the upside looks good enough.
VCs are currently paid in a way that makes them focus on the upside: they get a percentage of the fund’s gains. And that helps overcome their understandable fear of investing in a company run by nerds who look like (and perhaps are) college students.
If VCs weren’t allowed to get rich, they’d behave like bureaucrats. Without hope of gain, they’d have only fear of loss. And so they’d make the wrong choices. They’d turn down the nerds in favor of the smooth-talking MBA in a suit, because that investment would be easier to justify later if it failed.
Founders
But even if you could somehow redesign venture funding to work without allowing VCs to become rich, there’s another kind of investor you simply cannot replace: the startups’ founders and early employees.
What they invest is their time and ideas. But these are equivalent to money; the proof is that investors are willing (if forced) to treat them as interchangeable, granting the same status to “sweat equity” and the equity they’ve purchased with cash.
The fact that you’re investing time doesn’t change the relationship between risk and reward. If you’re going to invest your time in something with a small chance of succeeding, you’ll only do it if there is a proportionately large payoff. [2] If large payoffs aren’t allowed, you may as well play it safe.
Like many startup founders, I did it to get rich. But not because I wanted to buy expensive things. What I wanted was security. I wanted to make enough money that I didn’t have to worry about money. If I’d been forbidden to make enough from a startup to do this, I would have sought security by some other means: for example, by going to work for a big, stable organization from which it would be hard to get fired. Instead of busting my ass in a startup, I would have tried to get a nice, low-stress job at a big research lab, or tenure at a university.
That’s what everyone does in societies where risk isn’t rewarded. If you can’t ensure your own security, the next best thing is to make a nest for yourself in some large organization where your status depends mostly on seniority. [3]
Even if we could somehow replace investors, I don’t see how we could replace founders. Investors mainly contribute money, which in principle is the same no matter what the source. But the founders contribute ideas. You can’t replace those.
Let’s rehearse the chain of argument so far. I’m heading for a conclusion to which many readers will have to be dragged kicking and screaming, so I’ve tried to make each link unbreakable. Decreasing economic inequality means taking money from the rich. Since risk and reward are equivalent, decreasing potential rewards automatically decreases people’s appetite for risk. Startups are intrinsically risky. Without the prospect of rewards proportionate to the risk, founders will not invest their time in a startup. Founders are irreplaceable. So eliminating economic inequality means eliminating startups.
Economic inequality is not just a consequence of startups. It’s the engine that drives them, in the same way a fall of water drives a water mill. People start startups in the hope of becoming much richer than they were before. And if your society tries to prevent anyone from being much richer than anyone else, it will also prevent one person from being much richer at t2 than t1.
Growth
This argument applies proportionately. It’s not just that if you eliminate economic inequality, you get no startups. To the extent you reduce economic inequality, you decrease the number of startups. [4] Increase taxes, and willingness to take risks decreases in proportion.
And that seems bad for everyone. New technology and new jobs both come disproportionately from new companies. Indeed, if you don’t have startups, pretty soon you won’t have established companies either, just as, if you stop having kids, pretty soon you won’t have any adults.
It sounds benevolent to say we ought to reduce economic inequality. When you phrase it that way, who can argue with you? Inequality has to be bad, right? It sounds a good deal less benevolent to say we ought to reduce the rate at which new companies are founded. And yet the one implies the other.
Indeed, it may be that reducing investors’ appetite for risk doesn’t merely kill off larval startups, but kills off the most promising ones especially. Startups yield faster growth at greater risk than established companies. Does this trend also hold among startups? That is, are the riskiest startups the ones that generate most growth if they succeed? I suspect the answer is yes. And that’s a chilling thought, because it means that if you cut investors’ appetite for risk, the most beneficial startups are the first to go.
Not all rich people got that way from startups, of course. What if we let people get rich by starting startups, but taxed away all other surplus wealth? Wouldn’t that at least decrease inequality?
Less than you might think. If you made it so that people could only get rich by starting startups, people who wanted to get rich would all start startups. And that might be a great thing. But I don’t think it would have much effect on the distribution of wealth. People who want to get rich will do whatever they have to. If startups are the only way to do it, you’ll just get far more people starting startups. (If you write the laws very carefully, that is. More likely, you’ll just get a lot of people doing things that can be made to look on paper like startups.)
If we’re determined to eliminate economic inequality, there is still one way out: we could say that we’re willing to go ahead and do without startups. What would happen if we did?
At a minimum, we’d have to accept lower rates of technological growth. If you believe that large, established companies could somehow be made to develop new technology as fast as startups, the ball is in your court to explain how. (If you can come up with a remotely plausible story, you can make a fortune writing business books and consulting for large companies.) [5]
Ok, so we get slower growth. Is that so bad? Well, one reason it’s bad in practice is that other countries might not agree to slow down with us. If you’re content to develop new technologies at a slower rate than the rest of the world, what happens is that you don’t invent anything at all. Anything you might discover has already been invented elsewhere. And the only thing you can offer in return is raw materials and cheap labor. Once you sink that low, other countries can do whatever they like with you: install puppet governments, siphon off your best workers, use your women as prostitutes, dump their toxic waste on your territory — all the things we do to poor countries now. The only defense is to isolate yourself, as communist countries did in the twentieth century. But the problem then is, you have to become a police state to enforce it.
Wealth and Power
I realize startups are not the main target of those who want to eliminate economic inequality. What they really dislike is the sort of wealth that becomes self-perpetuating through an alliance with power. For example, construction firms that fund politicians’ campaigns in return for government contracts, or rich parents who get their children into good colleges by sending them to expensive schools designed for that purpose. But if you try to attack this type of wealth through economic policy, it’s hard to hit without destroying startups as collateral damage.
The problem here is not wealth, but corruption. So why not go after corruption?
We don’t need to prevent people from being rich if we can prevent wealth from translating into power. And there has been progress on that front. Before he died of drink in 1925, Commodore Vanderbilt’s wastrel grandson Reggie ran down pedestrians on five separate occasions, killing two of them. By 1969, when Ted Kennedy drove off the bridge at Chappaquiddick, the limit seemed to be down to one. Today it may well be zero. But what’s changed is not variation in wealth. What’s changed is the ability to translate wealth into power.
How do you break the connection between wealth and power? Demand transparency. Watch closely how power is exercised, and demand an account of how decisions are made. Why aren’t all police interrogations videotaped? Why did 36% of Princeton’s class of 2007 come from prep schools, when only 1.7% of American kids attend them? Why did the US really invade Iraq? Why don’t government officials disclose more about their finances, and why only during their term of office?
A friend of mine who knows a lot about computer security says the single most important step is to log everything. Back when he was a kid trying to break into computers, what worried him most was the idea of leaving a trail. He was more inconvenienced by the need to avoid that than by any obstacle deliberately put in his path.
Like all illicit connections, the connection between wealth and power flourishes in secret. Expose all transactions, and you will greatly reduce it. Log everything. That’s a strategy that already seems to be working, and it doesn’t have the side effect of making your whole country poor.
I don’t think many people realize there is a connection between economic inequality and risk. I didn’t fully grasp it till recently. I’d known for years of course that if one didn’t score in a startup, the other alternative was to get a cozy, tenured research job. But I didn’t understand the equation governing my behavior. Likewise, it’s obvious empirically that a country that doesn’t let people get rich is headed for disaster, whether it’s Diocletian’s Rome or Harold Wilson’s Britain. But I did not till recently understand the role risk played.
If you try to attack wealth, you end up nailing risk as well, and with it growth. If we want a fairer world, I think we’re better off attacking one step downstream, where wealth turns into power.
Notes
[1] Success here is defined from the initial investors’ point of view: either an IPO, or an acquisition for more than the valuation at the last round of funding. The conventional 1 in 10 success rate is suspiciously neat, but conversations with VCs suggest it’s roughly correct for startups overall. Top VC firms expect to do better.
[2] I’m not claiming founders sit down and calculate the expected after-tax return from a startup. They’re motivated by examples of other people who did it. And those examples do reflect after-tax returns.
[3] Conjecture: The variation in wealth in a (non-corrupt) country or organization will be inversely proportional to the prevalence of systems of seniority. So if you suppress variation in wealth, seniority will become correspondingly more important. So far, I know of no counterexamples, though in very corrupt countries you may get both simultaneously. (Thanks to Daniel Sobral for pointing this out.)
[4] In a country with a truly feudal economy, you might be able to redistribute wealth successfully, because there are no startups to kill.
[5] The speed at which startups develop new techology is the other reason they pay so well. As I explained in “How to Make Wealth”, what you do in a startup is compress a lifetime’s worth of work into a few years. It seems as dumb to discourage that as to discourage risk-taking.
Thanks to Chris Anderson, Trevor Blackwell, Dan Giffin, Jessica Livingston, and Evan Williams for reading drafts of this essay, and to Langley Steinert, Sangam Pant, and Mike Moritz for information about venture investing.