招聘已经过时

Paul Graham 2005-05-01

招聘已经过时

2005年5月

(本文源于在伯克利CSUA的演讲。)

现在互联网上的三大巨头是雅虎、谷歌和微软。他们创始人的平均年龄:24岁。所以现在已经很确定地建立了研究生可以创办成功公司的观念。如果研究生能做到,为什么本科生不能呢?

像技术领域的一切一样,创办创业公司的成本已经急剧下降。现在它如此之低,以至于消失在了噪音中。创办基于网络的创业公司的主要成本是食物和房租。这意味着创办公司并不比做一个彻底的懒虫花费更多。如果你准备靠拉面生活,你很可能用一万美元的种子资金就可以创办一家创业公司。

创办公司的成本越低,你需要投资者的许可来做的就越少。所以很多现在永远无法创办公司的人将能够创办公司。

最有趣的子集可能是那些二十出头的人。我对拥有投资者想要的一切除了智力的创始人,或者除了精力以外的一切都不感兴趣的创始人并不那么兴奋。被新的更低门槛解放的最有前途的群体是那些拥有投资者想要的一切除了经验的人。

市场价格

我曾经声称书呆子在中学不受欢迎主要是因为他们有比全职追求受欢迎更重要的事情要做。有些人说我只是在告诉人们他们想听的话。好吧,我现在要以一种壮观的方式来这样做:我认为大学生被低估了。

或者更准确地说,我认为很少有人意识到20岁人价值的巨大差异。有些,确实,不是很能干。但其他人比几乎所有30岁的人更能干。[1]

直到现在,问题一直在于很难挑选出他们。世界上每个风险投资家,如果他们能回到过去,都会尝试投资微软。但当时会有谁投资?有多少人会意识到这个特定的19岁少年是比尔·盖茨?

很难判断年轻人,因为(a)他们变化很快,(b)他们之间有很大差异,(c)他们个人前后不一致。最后一点是个大问题。当你年轻时,即使你很聪明,你偶尔也会说蠢话做蠢事。所以如果算法是过滤掉说蠢话的人,就像许多投资者和雇主无意识做的那样,你会得到很多误报。

大多数刚从大学招聘人的组织只意识到22岁人的平均价值,这并不高。因此,二十世纪的大多数理念是每个人都必须从某种入门级工作的实习生开始。组织意识到进来的人流有很大差异,但他们没有追求这个想法,而是倾向于压制它,相信即使是最有前途的孩子从底层开始也是好的,这样他们就不会头脑膨胀。

最有生产力的年轻人总是被大组织低估,因为年轻人还没有表现可以衡量,而且对他们能力的任何猜测错误都会趋向于平均值。

一个特别有生产力的22岁人该做什么?你能做的一件事是绕过组织,直接到用户那里。任何雇佣你的公司,从经济上讲,都在作为顾客的代理。他们给你的薪酬率(尽管他们可能没有意识到这一点)是试图猜测你对用户的价值。但有一种方法可以上诉他们的判断。如果你愿意,你可以选择通过创办自己的公司来直接被用户估值。

市场比任何雇主都要有洞察力得多。而且它是完全非歧视性的。在互联网上,没人知道你是一条狗。更重要的是,没人知道你22岁。用户关心的只是你的网站或软件是否给他们想要的东西。他们不关心背后的人是否是个高中生。

如果你真的很有生产力,为什么不让雇主按市场价格付给你薪水?为什么去大公司做普通员工,而你可以创办创业公司让他们收购你来得到你?

当大多数人听到”创业公司”这个词时,他们想到的是那些已经上市的名公司。但大多数成功的创业公司都是通过被收购成功的。而且通常收购者不仅想要技术,还想要创造它的人。

大公司通常在创业公司盈利之前就收购它们。显然,在这种情况下,他们不是为了收入。他们想要的是开发团队和迄今为止他们构建的软件。当一家创业公司在六个月内被以200或300万美元收购时,这实际上更像是一种签约奖金而不是收购。

我认为这种事情会越来越多发生,而且这对每个人都更好。显然,对创办创业公司的人来说更好,因为他们前期得到一大笔钱。但我认为对收购者来说也会更好。大公司的中心问题,也是他们比小公司生产力低得多的主要原因,是难以评估每个人的工作。购买萌芽阶段的创业公司为他们解决了这个问题:收购者在开发人员证明自己之前不用付款。收购者在下行方面受到保护,但仍然获得大部分上行收益。

产品开发

购买创业公司还解决了困扰大公司的另一个问题:他们不能做产品开发。大公司擅长从现有产品中提取价值,但不擅长创造新产品。

为什么?值得详细研究这种现象,因为这是创业公司存在的理由。

首先,大多数大公司都有某种地盘要保护,这往往会扭曲他们的开发决策。例如,基于网络的应用程序现在很热门,但在微软内部肯定对它们有很多矛盾情绪,因为基于软件的整个想法威胁着桌面。所以微软最终得到的任何基于网络的应用程序,可能像Hotmail一样,是在公司外部开发的。

大公司不擅长开发新产品的另一个原因是,做那种事情的人往往在大公司中没有多大权力(除非碰巧是CEO)。颠覆性技术是由颠覆性的人开发的。他们要么不为大公司工作,要么被唯唯诺诺的人智取,相比之下影响力很小。

大公司还失败是因为他们通常每种东西只做一个。当你只有一个网络浏览器时,你不能用它做任何真正有风险的事情。如果十个不同的创业公司设计十个不同的网络浏览器,你选择最好的,你可能会得到更好的东西。

这个问题更一般的版本是,对公司来说,新想法太多了,无法全部探索。现在可能有500家创业公司认为他们在制造微软可能购买的东西。即使是微软可能也无法管理500个内部开发项目。

大公司也不以正确的方式付钱给人。在大公司开发新产品的人无论成功与否都得到大致相同的报酬。在创业公司的人期望如果产品成功就变得富有,如果失败就一无所获。[2] 所以很自然,创业公司的人工作努力得多。

大公司的庞大规模本身就是个障碍。在创业公司,开发人员经常被迫直接与用户交谈,无论他们是否愿意,因为没有其他人做销售和支持。做销售很痛苦,但通过尝试向人们推销东西,你比阅读他们在焦点小组中所说的学到更多。

然后当然,大公司在产品开发方面很糟糕,因为他们在一切方面都很糟糕。在大公司比小公司发生的一切都慢,而产品开发是必须快速发生的事情,因为你必须经过很多次迭代才能得到好东西。

趋势

我认为大公司购买创业公司的趋势只会加速。 remaining的最大障碍之一是骄傲。大多数公司,至少无意识地,觉得他们应该能够在内部开发东西,而购买创业公司在某种程度上是承认失败。因此,就像人们通常对待承认失败一样,他们尽可能推迟它。这使得收购在最终发生时非常昂贵。

公司应该做的是在创业公司年轻时就发现它们,在风险投资家把它们膨胀成需要花费数亿美元收购的东西之前。风险投资家添加的大部分内容,收购者无论如何都不需要。

为什么收购者不尝试预测他们将不得不以数亿美元收购的公司,并以十分之一或二十分之一的价格及早抓住它们?因为他们无法提前预测赢家?如果他们只支付二十分之一的价格,他们只需要预测到二十分之一那么好就行。他们肯定能做到这一点。

我认为收购技术的公司将逐渐学会追逐更早期的创业公司。他们不一定直接收购。解决方案可能是投资和收购的某种混合:例如,购买公司的一部分并获得以后购买其余部分的选择权。

当公司购买创业公司时,他们有效地融合了招聘和产品开发。我认为这比分别做两件事更有效,因为你总是得到真正致力于他们所做事情的人。

此外,这种方法产生了已经很好合作的开发团队。他们之间的任何冲突都在创业公司的火热考验中解决了。到收购者得到他们时,他们在互相完成对方的句子。这在软件中很有价值,因为如此多的错误发生在不同人代码之间的边界上。

投资者

创办公司越来越便宜不仅让黑客相对于雇主有更多权力。它也让他们相对于投资者有更多权力。

风险投资家中的传统智慧是,不应该允许黑客经营自己的公司。创始人应该接受MBA作为他们的老板,自己承担某种首席技术官的头衔。可能有情况下这是个好主意。但我认为创始人将越来越能够就控制问题推回去,因为他们不再像过去那样需要投资者的钱。

创业公司是一个相对较新的现象。仙童半导体被认为是第一家风险投资支持的创业公司,他们成立于1959年,不到五十年前。以社会变化的时间尺度衡量,我们现在拥有的还是测试版。所以我们不应该假设创业公司现在的工作方式就是它们必须工作的方式。

仙童需要很多钱才能开始。他们必须建造实际的工厂。现在基于网络的创业公司的第一轮风险融资资金花在什么上?更多的钱不能让软件写得更快;设施不需要,因为现在那些可以相当便宜;钱真正能为你买到的只是销售和营销。我承认销售队伍是有价值的。但营销越来越无关紧要。在互联网上,任何真正好的东西都会通过口碑传播。

投资者的权力来自金钱。当创业公司需要更少的钱时,投资者对他们的权力就更小。所以未来的创始人可能不必接受新的CEO,如果他们不想要的话。风险投资家将不得不被踢着尖叫地沿着这条路走,但就像许多人们必须被踢着尖叫着推向的事情一样,这可能实际上对他们有好处。

谷歌是事情发展方向的一个标志。作为资助的条件,他们的投资者坚持他们雇佣一个有经验的老家伙作为CEO。但据我所知,创始人没有 just 屈服并接受风险投资家想要的任何人。他们推迟了整整一年,当他们最终接受CEO时,他们选择了一个拥有计算机科学博士学位的人。

听起来创始人仍然是公司中最有权力的人,而且从谷歌的表现来看,他们的年轻和缺乏经验似乎并没有伤害他们。确实,我怀疑谷歌比如果创始人在风险投资家想要的时候给他们想要的东西,并在他们获得第一轮融资后让某个MBA接管会做得更好。

我不是说风险投资家安装的商业人士没有价值。当然他们有价值。但他们不需要成为创始人的老板,这就是CEO这个头衔的意思。我预测未来风险投资家安装的高管将越来越多地是COO而不是CEO。创始人将直接管理工程,其余的通过COO管理。

开放的笼子

与雇主和投资者双方,权力的天平都在慢慢向年轻人转移。然而他们似乎最后一个意识到这一点。只有最有雄心的大学生甚至在毕业时考虑创办自己的公司。大多数人只想找份工作。

也许事情就应该这样。也许如果创办创业公司的想法令人生畏,你就过滤掉了不坚定的人。但我怀疑过滤器设置得有点太高。我认为有些人如果尝试的话,能够创办成功的创业公司,而他们却让自己被扫入大公司的进气管道。

你有没有注意到,当动物被放出笼子时,他们并不总是意识到门开了?通常他们需要用棍子戳才能出来。博客也发生了类似的事情。人们在1995年本可以在线发布,但博客直到近几年才真正流行起来。1995年我们认为只有专业作家才有权发表他们的想法,而任何这样做的人都是怪人。现在在线发布变得如此流行,以至于每个人都想做,甚至印刷记者。但博客最近不是因为任何技术创新而流行起来;只是花了八年时间让每个人意识到笼子开了。

我认为大多数大学生还没有意识到经济笼子是开着的。很多人被父母告诉成功的道路是找到一份好工作。当他们的父母在大学时这是真的,但现在不那么真实了。成功的道路是建造有价值的东西,你不必为现有公司工作才能做到。事实上,如果你不这样做,你往往能做得更好。

当我和大学生交谈时,最让我惊讶的是他们多么保守。当然不是政治上。我的意思是他们似乎不想冒险。这是个错误,因为你越年轻,你能承担的风险就越多。

风险

风险和回报总是成比例的。例如,股票比债券风险更大,而且随着时间的推移总是有更大的回报。那么为什么有人投资债券呢?问题在于”随着时间的推移”这个短语。股票在三十年内会产生更大的回报,但它们可能逐年失去价值。所以你应该投资什么取决于你多快需要钱。如果你年轻,你应该选择你能找到的最有风险的投资。

所有这些关于投资的说法可能看起来很理论化。大多数大学生可能债务多于资产。他们可能觉得他们没有什么可以投资的。但那不是真的:他们有时间可以投资,同样的风险规则也适用于此。你二十出头正是承担疯狂职业风险的时候。

风险总是与回报成比例的原因是市场力量使然。人们会为稳定性支付额外费用。所以如果你选择稳定性——通过购买债券,或者去大公司工作——那将花费你。

风险更大的职业选择平均来说报酬更好,因为对它们的需求更少。像创办创业公司这样的极端选择如此可怕,以至于大多数人甚至不会尝试。所以考虑到赌注,你最终不会遇到你可能期望的那么多竞争。

数学是无情的。虽然也许10个创业公司中有9个失败,但成功的一个会付给创始人超过他们在普通工作中赚到的10倍。[3] 这就是创业公司在”平均”意义上报酬更好的意思。

记住这一点。如果你创办创业公司,你可能会失败。大多数创业公司都失败。这是行业的本质。但尝试有90%失败几率的事情不一定是个错误,如果你能承担风险的话。40岁时失败,当你有家庭要抚养时,可能是严重的。但如果你22岁失败,那又怎样?如果你大学一毕业就尝试创办创业公司却失败了,你会在23岁时破产但聪明得多。如果你想想,这大致是你希望从研究生课程中得到的东西。

即使你的创业公司确实失败了,你也不会损害你在雇主那里的前景。为了确认,我问了一些在大公司工作的朋友。我问了雅虎、谷歌、亚马逊、思科和微软的经理,他们会对两个能力相等的24岁候选人有什么感觉,一个尝试创办了失败的创业公司,另一个大学毕业后两年一直在一家大公司做开发。每个人都回答说他们更 prefer 尝试创办自己公司的人。雅虎的工程负责人Zod Nazem说:“我实际上更看重有失败创业公司经历的人。你可以引用我的话!“所以你有它了。想被雅虎雇佣吗?创办你自己的公司。

老板是顾客

如果连大雇主都对创办公司的年轻黑客评价很高,为什么没有更多人这么做?为什么大学生如此保守?我认为这是因为他们花了太多时间在机构中。

每个人生命的前二十年 consist of 被从一个机构 piped 到另一个机构。你可能对你上的中学没有太多选择。高中毕业后,可能理所当然地认为你应该上大学。你可能有几所不同的大学可以选择,但它们可能 pretty 相似。所以此时你已经坐了二十年的地铁线,下一站似乎是工作。

实际上大学是线路结束的地方。表面上,为一家公司工作可能感觉像只是机构系列中的下一个,但 underneath,一切都不同了。学校的结束是你人生的支点,你从净消费者变为净生产者的点。

另一个大变化是,现在,你在驾驶。你可以去任何你想去的地方。所以可能值得退后一步理解正在发生的事情,而不是只做默认的事情。

整个大学期间,可能在此之前很久,大多数大学生一直在思考雇主想要什么。但真正重要的是顾客想要什么,因为他们是给雇主钱付给你的人。

所以与其思考雇主想要什么,你可能不如直接思考用户想要什么。在两者有任何差异的程度上,如果你创办自己的公司,你甚至可以利用这一点来 advantage。例如,大公司喜欢温顺的顺从者。但这只是他们规模大的副产品,不是顾客需要的东西。

研究生院

我大学毕业时没有意识到所有这些——部分因为我直接去了研究生院。研究生院可能是个相当不错的交易,即使你想着有一天创办创业公司。你可以在完成后创办一个,甚至在中途 pull the ripcord,就像雅虎和谷歌的创始人那样。

研究生院是创业公司的良好发射台,因为你与很多聪明人聚集在一起,而且你有比本科生或公司雇员更大的时间块来处理你自己的项目。只要你有一个相当宽容的导师,你可以在把想法变成公司之前花时间开发它。大卫·费罗和杨致远在1994年2月开始雅虎目录,到秋天每天获得一百万次访问,但他们直到1995年3月才真正退学创业。

你也可以先尝试创业公司,如果不行,然后去研究生院。当创业公司失败时,他们通常相当快地做。一年内你就会知道是否在浪费时间。

如果它失败了,也就是说。如果它成功了,你可能不得不推迟研究生院更长时间。但一旦到了那里,你会比在普通研究生奖学金过上更愉快的生活。

经验

二十出头的人不创办创业公司的另一个原因是他们觉得他们没有足够的经验。大多数投资者也有同感。

我记得在大学时经常听到很多”经验”这个词。人们真正用它是什么意思?显然,不是经验本身有价值,而是它在你大脑中改变的东西。拥有”经验”后你的大脑有什么不同,你能让这种改变更快发生吗?

我现在有一些关于这个的数据,我可以告诉你当人们缺乏经验时倾向于缺失什么。我说过每家创业公司都需要三样东西:从优秀的人开始,制造用户想要的东西,不要花太多钱。当你没有经验时,中间那个你会做错。有足够技术技能编写好软件的大学生 plenty,大学生也不特别容易浪费钱。如果他们做错了什么,通常是没有意识到他们必须制造人们想要的东西。

这并不 exclusively 是年轻人的失败。所有年龄的创业公司创始人制造没人想要的东西很常见。

幸运的是,这个缺陷应该很容易修复。如果大学生都是糟糕的程序员,问题会困难得多。学习编程可能需要数年。但我不认为学习制造人们想要的东西需要数年时间。我的假设是你需要做的就是 smack 黑客的头告诉他们:醒来。不要坐在这里制造关于用户需要的先验理论。去找一些用户,看看他们需要什么。

大多数成功的创业公司不仅做非常具体的事情,而且解决人们已经知道他们有的问题。

“经验”在你大脑中引起的大变化是学习你需要解决人们的问题。一旦你掌握了这一点,你就迅速前进到下一步,那就是找出那些问题是什么。这需要一些努力,因为软件的实际使用方式,特别是为它付出最多的人的使用方式,完全不是你可能期望的。例如,Powerpoint的声称目的是展示想法。它的真正作用是克服人们对公开演讲的恐惧。它让你能做关于什么都没有的看起来令人印象深刻的演讲,它使观众坐在黑暗的房间里看幻灯片,而不是在明亮的房间里看你。

这种事情任何人都能看到。关键是知道要寻找它——意识到有创业公司的想法不像有课堂项目的想法。创业公司的目标不是写一个很酷的软件。它是制造人们想要的东西。要做到这一点,你必须看用户——忘记黑客,只是看用户。这可能是一个相当大的心理调整,因为你在学校写的软件即使有用户也很少。魔方解决前几步,它仍然看起来一团糟。我认为有很多大学生的大脑处于类似位置:如果他们愿意,他们离能够创办成功的创业公司只有几步之遥,但他们没有意识到。他们有足够的技术技能。他们只是还没有意识到创造财富的方式是制造用户想要的东西,而雇主只是用户的代理,风险在其中汇集。

如果你年轻聪明,你两者都不需要。你不需要别人告诉你用户想要什么,因为你自己能弄明白。而且你不想汇集风险,因为你越年轻,你应该承担的风险就越多。

公共服务信息

我想以我和你父母的联合信息结束。不要为了创办创业公司而退学。不着急。毕业后将有 plenty 时间创办公司。事实上,毕业后去为现有公司工作几年,学习公司如何运作,可能也是一样好的。

然而,当我思考时,我无法想象告诉19岁的比尔·盖茨他应该等到毕业再创办公司。他会告诉我滚开。我能诚实地说他在伤害自己的未来吗——他在微型计算机革命的最前线工作比在哈佛上课学到的东西少吗?不,可能不是。

是的,虽然很可能在你创办自己的公司之前,为现有公司工作几年会学到一些有价值的东西,但那段时间你经营自己的公司也会学到一两件事。

为别人工作的建议会得到19岁比尔·盖茨更冷淡的接待。所以我应该先完成大学,然后为另一家公司工作两年,然后我才能创办自己的公司?我必须等到23岁?那是四年。那是我迄今为止生命超过百分之二十的时间。另外,四年后为Altair编写Basic解释器赚钱就太晚了。

他是对的。苹果II仅仅两年后就发布了。事实上,如果像我们建议的那样,比尔完成了大学并去为另一家公司工作,他很可能会去为苹果工作。虽然那对我们其他人可能更好,但对他不会更好。

所以虽然我坚持我们负责任的建议完成大学然后在创办创业公司前工作一段时间,但我必须承认这是老人告诉年轻人但期望他们不听的事情之一。我们说这种事情主要是为了能声称我们警告过你。所以别说没警告过你。

注释

[1] 第二次世界大战中B-17飞行员的平均年龄在二十出头。(感谢Tad Marko指出这一点。)

[2] 如果公司试图用这种方式付钱给员工,他们会被称为不公平。然而当他们收购一些创业公司而不收购其他时,没有人想到称之为不公平。

[3] 创业公司十分之一的成功率有点像都市传奇。它 suspiciously 整齐。我的猜测是几率稍微更差一些。

感谢杰西卡·利文斯顿阅读本文的草稿,感谢我承诺匿名的朋友们对招聘的意见,感谢Karen Nguyen和伯克利CSUA组织这次演讲。

Hiring is Obsolete

May 2005

(This essay is derived from a talk at the Berkeley CSUA.)

The three big powers on the Internet now are Yahoo, Google, and Microsoft. Average age of their founders: 24. So it is pretty well established now that grad students can start successful companies. And if grad students can do it, why not undergrads?

Like everything else in technology, the cost of starting a startup has decreased dramatically. Now it’s so low that it has disappeared into the noise. The main cost of starting a Web-based startup is food and rent. Which means it doesn’t cost much more to start a company than to be a total slacker. You can probably start a startup on ten thousand dollars of seed funding, if you’re prepared to live on ramen.

The less it costs to start a company, the less you need the permission of investors to do it. So a lot of people will be able to start companies now who never could have before.

The most interesting subset may be those in their early twenties. I’m not so excited about founders who have everything investors want except intelligence, or everything except energy. The most promising group to be liberated by the new, lower threshold are those who have everything investors want except experience.

Market Rate

I once claimed that nerds were unpopular in secondary school mainly because they had better things to do than work full-time at being popular. Some said I was just telling people what they wanted to hear. Well, I’m now about to do that in a spectacular way: I think undergraduates are undervalued.

Or more precisely, I think few realize the huge spread in the value of 20 year olds. Some, it’s true, are not very capable. But others are more capable than all but a handful of 30 year olds. [1]

Till now the problem has always been that it’s difficult to pick them out. Every VC in the world, if they could go back in time, would try to invest in Microsoft. But which would have then? How many would have understood that this particular 19 year old was Bill Gates?

It’s hard to judge the young because (a) they change rapidly, (b) there is great variation between them, and (c) they’re individually inconsistent. That last one is a big problem. When you’re young, you occasionally say and do stupid things even when you’re smart. So if the algorithm is to filter out people who say stupid things, as many investors and employers unconsciously do, you’re going to get a lot of false positives.

Most organizations who hire people right out of college are only aware of the average value of 22 year olds, which is not that high. And so the idea for most of the twentieth century was that everyone had to begin as a trainee in some entry-level job. Organizations realized there was a lot of variation in the incoming stream, but instead of pursuing this thought they tended to suppress it, in the belief that it was good for even the most promising kids to start at the bottom, so they didn’t get swelled heads.

The most productive young people will always be undervalued by large organizations, because the young have no performance to measure yet, and any error in guessing their ability will tend toward the mean.

What’s an especially productive 22 year old to do? One thing you can do is go over the heads of organizations, directly to the users. Any company that hires you is, economically, acting as a proxy for the customer. The rate at which they value you (though they may not consciously realize it) is an attempt to guess your value to the user. But there’s a way to appeal their judgement. If you want, you can opt to be valued directly by users, by starting your own company.

The market is a lot more discerning than any employer. And it is completely non-discriminatory. On the Internet, nobody knows you’re a dog. And more to the point, nobody knows you’re 22. All users care about is whether your site or software gives them what they want. They don’t care if the person behind it is a high school kid.

If you’re really productive, why not make employers pay market rate for you? Why go work as an ordinary employee for a big company, when you could start a startup and make them buy it to get you?

When most people hear the word “startup,” they think of the famous ones that have gone public. But most startups that succeed do it by getting bought. And usually the acquirer doesn’t just want the technology, but the people who created it as well.

Often big companies buy startups before they’re profitable. Obviously in such cases they’re not after revenues. What they want is the development team and the software they’ve built so far. When a startup gets bought for 2 or 3 million six months in, it’s really more of a hiring bonus than an acquisition.

I think this sort of thing will happen more and more, and that it will be better for everyone. It’s obviously better for the people who start the startup, because they get a big chunk of money up front. But I think it will be better for the acquirers too. The central problem in big companies, and the main reason they’re so much less productive than small companies, is the difficulty of valuing each person’s work. Buying larval startups solves that problem for them: the acquirer doesn’t pay till the developers have proven themselves. Acquirers are protected on the downside, but still get most of the upside.

Product Development

Buying startups also solves another problem afflicting big companies: they can’t do product development. Big companies are good at extracting the value from existing products, but bad at creating new ones.

Why? It’s worth studying this phenomenon in detail, because this is the raison d’etre of startups.

To start with, most big companies have some kind of turf to protect, and this tends to warp their development decisions. For example, Web-based applications are hot now, but within Microsoft there must be a lot of ambivalence about them, because the very idea of Web-based software threatens the desktop. So any Web-based application that Microsoft ends up with, will probably, like Hotmail, be something developed outside the company.

Another reason big companies are bad at developing new products is that the kind of people who do that tend not to have much power in big companies (unless they happen to be the CEO). Disruptive technologies are developed by disruptive people. And they either don’t work for the big company, or have been outmaneuvered by yes-men and have comparatively little influence.

Big companies also lose because they usually only build one of each thing. When you only have one Web browser, you can’t do anything really risky with it. If ten different startups design ten different Web browsers and you take the best, you’ll probably get something better.

The more general version of this problem is that there are too many new ideas for companies to explore them all. There might be 500 startups right now who think they’re making something Microsoft might buy. Even Microsoft probably couldn’t manage 500 development projects in-house.

Big companies also don’t pay people the right way. People developing a new product at a big company get paid roughly the same whether it succeeds or fails. People at a startup expect to get rich if the product succeeds, and get nothing if it fails. [2] So naturally the people at the startup work a lot harder.

The mere bigness of big companies is an obstacle. In startups, developers are often forced to talk directly to users, whether they want to or not, because there is no one else to do sales and support. It’s painful doing sales, but you learn much more from trying to sell people something than reading what they said in focus groups.

And then of course, big companies are bad at product development because they’re bad at everything. Everything happens slower in big companies than small ones, and product development is something that has to happen fast, because you have to go through a lot of iterations to get something good.

Trend

I think the trend of big companies buying startups will only accelerate. One of the biggest remaining obstacles is pride. Most companies, at least unconsciously, feel they ought to be able to develop stuff in house, and that buying startups is to some degree an admission of failure. And so, as people generally do with admissions of failure, they put it off for as long as possible. That makes the acquisition very expensive when it finally happens.

What companies should do is go out and discover startups when they’re young, before VCs have puffed them up into something that costs hundreds of millions to acquire. Much of what VCs add, the acquirer doesn’t need anyway.

Why don’t acquirers try to predict the companies they’re going to have to buy for hundreds of millions, and grab them early for a tenth or a twentieth of that? Because they can’t predict the winners in advance? If they’re only paying a twentieth as much, they only have to predict a twentieth as well. Surely they can manage that.

I think companies that acquire technology will gradually learn to go after earlier stage startups. They won’t necessarily buy them outright. The solution may be some hybrid of investment and acquisition: for example, to buy a chunk of the company and get an option to buy the rest later.

When companies buy startups, they’re effectively fusing recruiting and product development. And I think that’s more efficient than doing the two separately, because you always get people who are really committed to what they’re working on.

Plus this method yields teams of developers who already work well together. Any conflicts between them have been ironed out under the very hot iron of running a startup. By the time the acquirer gets them, they’re finishing one another’s sentences. That’s valuable in software, because so many bugs occur at the boundaries between different people’s code.

Investors

The increasing cheapness of starting a company doesn’t just give hackers more power relative to employers. It also gives them more power relative to investors.

The conventional wisdom among VCs is that hackers shouldn’t be allowed to run their own companies. The founders are supposed to accept MBAs as their bosses, and themselves take on some title like Chief Technical Officer. There may be cases where this is a good idea. But I think founders will increasingly be able to push back in the matter of control, because they just don’t need the investors’ money as much as they used to.

Startups are a comparatively new phenomenon. Fairchild Semiconductor is considered the first VC-backed startup, and they were founded in 1959, less than fifty years ago. Measured on the time scale of social change, what we have now is pre-beta. So we shouldn’t assume the way startups work now is the way they have to work.

Fairchild needed a lot of money to get started. They had to build actual factories. What does the first round of venture funding for a Web-based startup get spent on today? More money can’t get software written faster; it isn’t needed for facilities, because those can now be quite cheap; all money can really buy you is sales and marketing. A sales force is worth something, I’ll admit. But marketing is increasingly irrelevant. On the Internet, anything genuinely good will spread by word of mouth.

Investors’ power comes from money. When startups need less money, investors have less power over them. So future founders may not have to accept new CEOs if they don’t want them. The VCs will have to be dragged kicking and screaming down this road, but like many things people have to be dragged kicking and screaming toward, it may actually be good for them.

Google is a sign of the way things are going. As a condition of funding, their investors insisted they hire someone old and experienced as CEO. But from what I’ve heard the founders didn’t just give in and take whoever the VCs wanted. They delayed for an entire year, and when they did finally take a CEO, they chose a guy with a PhD in computer science.

It sounds to me as if the founders are still the most powerful people in the company, and judging by Google’s performance, their youth and inexperience doesn’t seem to have hurt them. Indeed, I suspect Google has done better than they would have if the founders had given the VCs what they wanted, when they wanted it, and let some MBA take over as soon as they got their first round of funding.

I’m not claiming the business guys installed by VCs have no value. Certainly they have. But they don’t need to become the founders’ bosses, which is what that title CEO means. I predict that in the future the executives installed by VCs will increasingly be COOs rather than CEOs. The founders will run engineering directly, and the rest of the company through the COO.

The Open Cage

With both employers and investors, the balance of power is slowly shifting towards the young. And yet they seem the last to realize it. Only the most ambitious undergrads even consider starting their own company when they graduate. Most just want to get a job.

Maybe this is as it should be. Maybe if the idea of starting a startup is intimidating, you filter out the uncommitted. But I suspect the filter is set a little too high. I think there are people who could, if they tried, start successful startups, and who instead let themselves be swept into the intake ducts of big companies.

Have you ever noticed that when animals are let out of cages, they don’t always realize at first that the door’s open? Often they have to be poked with a stick to get them out. Something similar happened with blogs. People could have been publishing online in 1995, and yet blogging has only really taken off in the last couple years. In 1995 we thought only professional writers were entitled to publish their ideas, and that anyone else who did was a crank. Now publishing online is becoming so popular that everyone wants to do it, even print journalists. But blogging has not taken off recently because of any technical innovation; it just took eight years for everyone to realize the cage was open.

I think most undergrads don’t realize yet that the economic cage is open. A lot have been told by their parents that the route to success is to get a good job. This was true when their parents were in college, but it’s less true now. The route to success is to build something valuable, and you don’t have to be working for an existing company to do that. Indeed, you can often do it better if you’re not.

When I talk to undergrads, what surprises me most about them is how conservative they are. Not politically, of course. I mean they don’t seem to want to take risks. This is a mistake, because the younger you are, the more risk you can take.

Risk

Risk and reward are always proportionate. For example, stocks are riskier than bonds, and over time always have greater returns. So why does anyone invest in bonds? The catch is that phrase “over time.” Stocks will generate greater returns over thirty years, but they might lose value from year to year. So what you should invest in depends on how soon you need the money. If you’re young, you should take the riskiest investments you can find.

All this talk about investing may seem very theoretical. Most undergrads probably have more debts than assets. They may feel they have nothing to invest. But that’s not true: they have their time to invest, and the same rule about risk applies there. Your early twenties are exactly the time to take insane career risks.

The reason risk is always proportionate to reward is that market forces make it so. People will pay extra for stability. So if you choose stability— by buying bonds, or by going to work for a big company— it’s going to cost you.

Riskier career moves pay better on average, because there is less demand for them. Extreme choices like starting a startup are so frightening that most people won’t even try. So you don’t end up having as much competition as you might expect, considering the prizes at stake.

The math is brutal. While perhaps 9 out of 10 startups fail, the one that succeeds will pay the founders more than 10 times what they would have made in an ordinary job. [3] That’s the sense in which startups pay better “on average.”

Remember that. If you start a startup, you’ll probably fail. Most startups fail. It’s the nature of the business. But it’s not necessarily a mistake to try something that has a 90% chance of failing, if you can afford the risk. Failing at 40, when you have a family to support, could be serious. But if you fail at 22, so what? If you try to start a startup right out of college and it tanks, you’ll end up at 23 broke and a lot smarter. Which, if you think about it, is roughly what you hope to get from a graduate program.

Even if your startup does tank, you won’t harm your prospects with employers. To make sure I asked some friends who work for big companies. I asked managers at Yahoo, Google, Amazon, Cisco and Microsoft how they’d feel about two candidates, both 24, with equal ability, one who’d tried to start a startup that tanked, and another who’d spent the two years since college working as a developer at a big company. Every one responded that they’d prefer the guy who’d tried to start his own company. Zod Nazem, who’s in charge of engineering at Yahoo, said: “I actually put more value on the guy with the failed startup. And you can quote me!” So there you have it. Want to get hired by Yahoo? Start your own company.

The Man is the Customer

If even big employers think highly of young hackers who start companies, why don’t more do it? Why are undergrads so conservative? I think it’s because they’ve spent so much time in institutions.

The first twenty years of everyone’s life consists of being piped from one institution to another. You probably didn’t have much choice about the secondary schools you went to. And after high school it was probably understood that you were supposed to go to college. You may have had a few different colleges to choose between, but they were probably pretty similar. So by this point you’ve been riding on a subway line for twenty years, and the next stop seems to be a job.

Actually college is where the line ends. Superficially, going to work for a company may feel like just the next in a series of institutions, but underneath, everything is different. The end of school is the fulcrum of your life, the point where you go from net consumer to net producer.

The other big change is that now, you’re steering. You can go anywhere you want. So it may be worth standing back and understanding what’s going on, instead of just doing the default thing.

All through college, and probably long before that, most undergrads have been thinking about what employers want. But what really matters is what customers want, because they’re the ones who give employers the money to pay you.

So instead of thinking about what employers want, you’re probably better off thinking directly about what users want. To the extent there’s any difference between the two, you can even use that to your advantage if you start a company of your own. For example, big companies like docile conformists. But this is merely an artifact of their bigness, not something customers need.

Grad School

I didn’t consciously realize all this when I was graduating from college— partly because I went straight to grad school. Grad school can be a pretty good deal, even if you think of one day starting a startup. You can start one when you’re done, or even pull the ripcord part way through, like the founders of Yahoo and Google.

Grad school makes a good launch pad for startups, because you’re collected together with a lot of smart people, and you have bigger chunks of time to work on your own projects than an undergrad or corporate employee would. As long as you have a fairly tolerant advisor, you can take your time developing an idea before turning it into a company. David Filo and Jerry Yang started the Yahoo directory in February 1994 and were getting a million hits a day by the fall, but they didn’t actually drop out of grad school and start a company till March 1995.

You could also try the startup first, and if it doesn’t work, then go to grad school. When startups tank they usually do it fairly quickly. Within a year you’ll know if you’re wasting your time.

If it fails, that is. If it succeeds, you may have to delay grad school a little longer. But you’ll have a much more enjoyable life once there than you would on a regular grad student stipend.

Experience

Another reason people in their early twenties don’t start startups is that they feel they don’t have enough experience. Most investors feel the same.

I remember hearing a lot of that word “experience” when I was in college. What do people really mean by it? Obviously it’s not the experience itself that’s valuable, but something it changes in your brain. What’s different about your brain after you have “experience,” and can you make that change happen faster?

I now have some data on this, and I can tell you what tends to be missing when people lack experience. I’ve said that every startup needs three things: to start with good people, to make something users want, and not to spend too much money. It’s the middle one you get wrong when you’re inexperienced. There are plenty of undergrads with enough technical skill to write good software, and undergrads are not especially prone to waste money. If they get something wrong, it’s usually not realizing they have to make something people want.

This is not exclusively a failing of the young. It’s common for startup founders of all ages to build things no one wants.

Fortunately, this flaw should be easy to fix. If undergrads were all bad programmers, the problem would be a lot harder. It can take years to learn how to program. But I don’t think it takes years to learn how to make things people want. My hypothesis is that all you have to do is smack hackers on the side of the head and tell them: Wake up. Don’t sit here making up a priori theories about what users need. Go find some users and see what they need.

Most successful startups not only do something very specific, but solve a problem people already know they have.

The big change that “experience” causes in your brain is learning that you need to solve people’s problems. Once you grasp that, you advance quickly to the next step, which is figuring out what those problems are. And that takes some effort, because the way software actually gets used, especially by the people who pay the most for it, is not at all what you might expect. For example, the stated purpose of Powerpoint is to present ideas. Its real role is to overcome people’s fear of public speaking. It allows you to give an impressive-looking talk about nothing, and it causes the audience to sit in a dark room looking at slides, instead of a bright one looking at you.

This kind of thing is out there for anyone to see. The key is to know to look for it— to realize that having an idea for a startup is not like having an idea for a class project. The goal in a startup is not to write a cool piece of software. It’s to make something people want. And to do that you have to look at users— forget about hacking, and just look at users. This can be quite a mental adjustment, because little if any of the software you write in school even has users. A few steps before a Rubik’s Cube is solved, it still looks like a mess. I think there are a lot of undergrads whose brains are in a similar position: they’re only a few steps away from being able to start successful startups, if they wanted to, but they don’t realize it. They have more than enough technical skill. They just haven’t realized yet that the way to create wealth is to make what users want, and that employers are just proxies for users in which risk is pooled.

If you’re young and smart, you don’t need either of those. You don’t need someone else to tell you what users want, because you can figure it out yourself. And you don’t want to pool risk, because the younger you are, the more risk you should take.

A Public Service Message

I’d like to conclude with a joint message from me and your parents. Don’t drop out of college to start a startup. There’s no rush. There will be plenty of time to start companies after you graduate. In fact, it may be just as well to go work for an existing company for a couple years after you graduate, to learn how companies work.

And yet, when I think about it, I can’t imagine telling Bill Gates at 19 that he should wait till he graduated to start a company. He’d have told me to get lost. And could I have honestly claimed that he was harming his future— that he was learning less by working at ground zero of the microcomputer revolution than he would have if he’d been taking classes back at Harvard? No, probably not.

And yes, while it is probably true that you’ll learn some valuable things by going to work for an existing company for a couple years before starting your own, you’d learn a thing or two running your own company during that time too.

The advice about going to work for someone else would get an even colder reception from the 19 year old Bill Gates. So I’m supposed to finish college, then go work for another company for two years, and then I can start my own? I have to wait till I’m 23? That’s four years. That’s more than twenty percent of my life so far. Plus in four years it will be way too late to make money writing a Basic interpreter for the Altair.

And he’d be right. The Apple II was launched just two years later. In fact, if Bill had finished college and gone to work for another company as we’re suggesting, he might well have gone to work for Apple. And while that would probably have been better for all of us, it wouldn’t have been better for him.

So while I stand by our responsible advice to finish college and then go work for a while before starting a startup, I have to admit it’s one of those things the old tell the young, but don’t expect them to listen to. We say this sort of thing mainly so we can claim we warned you. So don’t say I didn’t warn you.

Notes

[1] The average B-17 pilot in World War II was in his early twenties. (Thanks to Tad Marko for pointing this out.)

[2] If a company tried to pay employees this way, they’d be called unfair. And yet when they buy some startups and not others, no one thinks of calling that unfair.

[3] The 1/10 success rate for startups is a bit of an urban legend. It’s suspiciously neat. My guess is the odds are slightly worse.

Thanks to Jessica Livingston for reading drafts of this, to the friends I promised anonymity to for their opinions about hiring, and to Karen Nguyen and the Berkeley CSUA for organizing this talk.