高分辨率社会

Paul Graham 2008-12-01

高分辨率社会

2008年12月

在几乎整个历史中,一个社会的成功与其组建大型和有纪律的组织能力成正比。那些押注规模经济的人通常获胜,这意味着最大的组织是最成功的。

事物已经发生了如此大的变化,以至于我们难以相信,但直到几十年前,最大的组织往往是最进步的。1960年,一个雄心勃勃的大学毕业生想在福特、通用电气或NASA巨大而光鲜的办公室工作。小意味着小打小闹。1960年的小并不意味着一个酷酷的小型创业公司。它意味着希德叔叔的鞋店。

当我在1970年代长大时,“公司阶梯”的概念仍然非常活跃。标准计划是努力进入一所好大学,然后被征召到某个组织,然后逐渐上升到责任越来越大的职位。更有雄心的人只是希望更快地爬上同一个阶梯。[1]

但在二十世纪晚期,某些事情发生了变化。事实证明,规模经济并不是唯一起作用的力量。特别是在技术领域,从小团体获得的更高速度开始超越规模的优势。

未来被证明与我们1970年预期的不同。我们预期的圆顶城市和飞行汽车未能实现。但幸运的是,带有标明我们专业和等级徽章的连体服也未能实现。经济现在看起来不是由少数几个巨大的树形组织主导,而是一个由较小独立单位组成的流动网络。

并不是说大组织停止了工作。没有证据表明像罗马军队或英国东印度公司这样著名成功的组织比今天同规模的组织少受繁文缛节和政治的困扰。但他们的对手是那些不能通过发现新技术来即时改变规则的人。现在事实证明,“大型和有纪律的组织获胜”这个规则需要附加一个限定条件:“在变化缓慢的游戏中”。在变化达到足够速度之前,没有人知道这一点。

不过,大组织现在将开始做得更差,因为历史上第一次他们不再获得最优秀的人才。现在雄心勃勃的大学毕业生不想为大公司工作。他们想为正在迅速成长为大公司的热门创业公司工作。如果他们真的有雄心,他们想自己创业。[2]

这并不意味着大公司会消失。说创业公司会成功意味着大公司将存在,因为成功的创业公司要么成为大公司,要么被它们收购。[3] 但大型组织可能永远不会再次扮演它们在二十世纪末以前所扮演的主导角色。

一个持续如此之久的趋势竟然会耗尽,这有点令人惊讶。一个规则工作了数千年然后改变极性,这种情况多久发生一次?

“越大越好”的千年运行给我们留下了许多现在已经过时但极其根深蒂固的传统。这意味着雄心勃勃的人现在可以对其进行套利。准确理解要保留哪些想法,哪些现在可以丢弃,将非常有价值。

观察的地方是小规模传播开始的地方:创业公司的世界。

一直有偶尔的案例,特别是在美国,雄心勃勃的人在自己下面成长阶梯而不是爬上去。但直到最近,这是一条异常的路线,往往只有局外人才会走。十九世纪伟大的实业家如此缺乏正规教育并非巧合。无论他们的公司最终变得多大,他们最初基本上都是机械师和店主。没有大学教育的人如果能避免的话,是不会走这一步的。直到技术创业公司,特别是互联网创业公司的兴起,受过教育的人自己创业是非常不寻常的。

离开肖克利半导体创立仙童半导体的八个人,最初的硅谷创业公司,最初甚至没有试图创业。他们只是在寻找一家愿意雇佣他们作为团队的公司。然后他们中一个人的父母介绍他们给一家小型投资银行,后者提出为他们创业融资,所以他们就这样做了。但创业对他们来说是一个陌生的想法;他们是不小心走到这一步的。[4]

现在我想,几乎所有会编程的斯坦福或伯克利本科生都至少考虑过创业的想法。东海岸的大学并不落后,英国大学只比他们落后一点点。这种模式表明,斯坦福和伯克利的态度不是异常,而是领先指标。这就是世界发展的方向。

当然,互联网创业公司仍然只是世界经济的一小部分。基于它们的趋势能有那么强大吗?

我认为是的。没有理由假设这个领域可以完成的工作量有任何限制。像科学一样,财富似乎以分形方式扩展。当瓦特开始研究蒸汽动力时,它只是英国经济的很小一部分。但他的工作导致了更多的工作,直到这一部分扩展到比最初所属的整个经济更大的东西。

互联网也可能发生同样的事情。如果互联网创业公司为雄心勃勃的人提供了最好的机会,那么很多雄心勃勃的人会创办它们,这部分经济会以通常的分形方式膨胀。

即使与互联网相关的应用程序只成为世界经济的十分之一,这个组成部分也会为其他部分定下基调。经济中最活跃的部分总是如此,从薪资到着装标准。不仅仅是因为它的声望,还因为经济中最活跃部分所依据的原则往往是行之有效的原则。

对于未来,押注的趋势似乎是个体绩效衡量的、小型自治团体组成的网络。获胜的社会将是那些阻碍最小的社会。

就像最初的工业革命一样,一些社会将比其他社会更擅长这个。在英国诞生的一代内,工业革命传播到欧洲大陆和北美。但它并没有传播到任何地方。这种新的做事方式只能在为此做好准备的地方扎根。它只能传播到已经有活力中产阶级的地方。

1960年代在硅谷开始的变革有类似的社会组成部分。那里开发了两种新技术:建造集成电路的技术,以及建造一种通过创造新技术来快速成长的新型公司的技术。建造集成电路的技术迅速传播到其他国家。但建造创业公司的技术没有。五十年后,创业公司在硅谷无处不在,在美国其他少数几个城市也很常见,但在世界大部分地区仍然是异常现象。

创业公司没有像工业革命那样广泛传播的部分原因——可能主要是社会破坏性。尽管工业革命带来了许多社会变化,但它并没有与”越大越好”的原则作斗争。恰恰相反:两者完美地契合。新的工业公司适应了像军队和公务员这样现有大组织的习俗,产生的混合体运作良好。“工业领袖”向”工人军队”发布命令,每个人都知道他们应该做什么。

创业公司在社会上似乎更逆流而上。它们很难在重视等级制度和稳定性的社会中繁荣,就像工业化很难在被随意从商人阶级偷窃的人统治的社会中繁荣一样。但在工业革命发生时,已经有少数几个国家度过了那个阶段。这次似乎没有那么多准备好的国家。

注释

[1] 这个模式的一个奇怪后果是,通常赚更多钱的方法是成为经理。这是创业公司解决的问题之一。

[2] 美国汽车公司一直比日本汽车公司做得差得多有很多原因,但至少其中一个是乐观的原因:美国毕业生有更多选择。

[3] 公司有一天可能在收入上做大而在人员规模上不做大是有可能的,但我们在这个趋势上还没有走得很远。

[4] Lecuyer, Christophe, 《制造硅谷》,MIT出版社,2006年。

感谢特雷弗·布莱克韦尔、保罗·布赫海特、杰西卡·利文斯顿和罗伯特·莫里斯阅读本文的草稿。

The High-Res Society

December 2008

For nearly all of history the success of a society was proportionate to its ability to assemble large and disciplined organizations. Those who bet on economies of scale generally won, which meant the largest organizations were the most successful ones.

Things have already changed so much that this is hard for us to believe, but till just a few decades ago the largest organizations tended to be the most progressive. An ambitious kid graduating from college in 1960 wanted to work in the huge, gleaming offices of Ford, or General Electric, or NASA. Small meant small-time. Small in 1960 didn’t mean a cool little startup. It meant uncle Sid’s shoe store.

When I grew up in the 1970s, the idea of the “corporate ladder” was still very much alive. The standard plan was to try to get into a good college, from which one would be drafted into some organization and then rise to positions of gradually increasing responsibility. The more ambitious merely hoped to climb the same ladder faster. [1]

But in the late twentieth century something changed. It turned out that economies of scale were not the only force at work. Particularly in technology, the increase in speed one could get from smaller groups started to trump the advantages of size.

The future turned out to be different from the one we were expecting in 1970. The domed cities and flying cars we expected have failed to materialize. But fortunately so have the jumpsuits with badges indicating our specialty and rank. Instead of being dominated by a few, giant tree-structured organizations, it’s now looking like the economy of the future will be a fluid network of smaller, independent units.

It’s not so much that large organizations stopped working. There’s no evidence that famously successful organizations like the Roman army or the British East India Company were any less afflicted by protocol and politics than organizations of the same size today. But they were competing against opponents who couldn’t change the rules on the fly by discovering new technology. Now it turns out the rule “large and disciplined organizations win” needs to have a qualification appended: “at games that change slowly.” No one knew till change reached a sufficient speed.

Large organizations will start to do worse now, though, because for the first time in history they’re no longer getting the best people. An ambitious kid graduating from college now doesn’t want to work for a big company. They want to work for the hot startup that’s rapidly growing into one. If they’re really ambitious, they want to start it. [2]

This doesn’t mean big companies will disappear. To say that startups will succeed implies that big companies will exist, because startups that succeed either become big companies or are acquired by them. [3] But large organizations will probably never again play the leading role they did up till the last quarter of the twentieth century.

It’s kind of surprising that a trend that lasted so long would ever run out. How often does it happen that a rule works for thousands of years, then switches polarity?

The millennia-long run of bigger-is-better left us with a lot of traditions that are now obsolete, but extremely deeply rooted. Which means the ambitious can now do arbitrage on them. It will be very valuable to understand precisely which ideas to keep and which can now be discarded.

The place to look is where the spread of smallness began: in the world of startups.

There have always been occasional cases, particularly in the US, of ambitious people who grew the ladder under them instead of climbing it. But till recently this was an anomalous route that tended to be followed only by outsiders. It was no coincidence that the great industrialists of the nineteenth century had so little formal education. As huge as their companies eventually became, they were all essentially mechanics and shopkeepers at first. That was a social step no one with a college education would take if they could avoid it. Till the rise of technology startups, and in particular, Internet startups, it was very unusual for educated people to start their own businesses.

The eight men who left Shockley Semiconductor to found Fairchild Semiconductor, the original Silicon Valley startup, weren’t even trying to start a company at first. They were just looking for a company willing to hire them as a group. Then one of their parents introduced them to a small investment bank that offered to find funding for them to start their own, so they did. But starting a company was an alien idea to them; it was something they backed into. [4]

Now I would guess that practically every Stanford or Berkeley undergrad who knows how to program has at least considered the idea of starting a startup. East Coast universities are not far behind, and British universities only a little behind them. This pattern suggests that attitudes at Stanford and Berkeley are not an anomaly, but a leading indicator. This is the way the world is going.

Of course, Internet startups are still only a fraction of the world’s economy. Could a trend based on them be that powerful?

I think so. There’s no reason to suppose there’s any limit to the amount of work that could be done in this area. Like science, wealth seems to expand fractally. Steam power was a sliver of the British economy when Watt started working on it. But his work led to more work till that sliver had expanded into something bigger than the whole economy of which it had initially been a part.

The same thing could happen with the Internet. If Internet startups offer the best opportunity for ambitious people, then a lot of ambitious people will start them, and this bit of the economy will balloon in the usual fractal way.

Even if Internet-related applications only become a tenth of the world’s economy, this component will set the tone for the rest. The most dynamic part of the economy always does, in everything from salaries to standards of dress. Not just because of its prestige, but because the principles underlying the most dynamic part of the economy tend to be ones that work.

For the future, the trend to bet on seems to be networks of small, autonomous groups whose performance is measured individually. And the societies that win will be the ones with the least impedance.

As with the original industrial revolution, some societies are going to be better at this than others. Within a generation of its birth in England, the Industrial Revolution had spread to continental Europe and North America. But it didn’t spread everywhere. This new way of doing things could only take root in places that were prepared for it. It could only spread to places that already had a vigorous middle class.

There is a similar social component to the transformation that began in Silicon Valley in the 1960s. Two new kinds of techniques were developed there: techniques for building integrated circuits, and techniques for building a new type of company designed to grow fast by creating new technology. The techniques for building integrated circuits spread rapidly to other countries. But the techniques for building startups didn’t. Fifty years later, startups are ubiquitous in Silicon Valley and common in a handful of other US cities, but they’re still an anomaly in most of the world.

Part of the reason—possibly the main reason—that startups have not spread as broadly as the Industrial Revolution did is their social disruptiveness. Though it brought many social changes, the Industrial Revolution was not fighting the principle that bigger is better. Quite the opposite: the two dovetailed beautifully. The new industrial companies adapted the customs of existing large organizations like the military and the civil service, and the resulting hybrid worked well. “Captains of industry” issued orders to “armies of workers,” and everyone knew what they were supposed to do.

Startups seem to go more against the grain, socially. It’s hard for them to flourish in societies that value hierarchy and stability, just as it was hard for industrialization to flourish in societies ruled by people who stole at will from the merchant class. But there were already a handful of countries past that stage when the Industrial Revolution happened. There do not seem to be that many ready this time.

Notes

[1] One of the bizarre consequences of this model was that the usual way to make more money was to become a manager. This is one of the things startups fix.

[2] There are a lot of reasons American car companies have been doing so much worse than Japanese car companies, but at least one of them is a cause for optimism: American graduates have more options.

[3] It’s possible that companies will one day be able to grow big in revenues without growing big in people, but we are not very far along that trend yet.

[4] Lecuyer, Christophe, Making Silicon Valley, MIT Press, 2006.

Thanks to Trevor Blackwell, Paul Buchheit, Jessica Livingston, and Robert Morris for reading drafts of this.