做善事
做善事
2008年4月
(本文源自2008年创业学校的演讲。)
我们在Y Combinator开始大约一个月后,提出了一个成为我们座右铭的短语:做人们想要的东西。从那时起我们学到了很多东西,但如果现在要我选择,这仍然是我会选的那个。
我们告诉创始人的另一件事是不要太担心商业模式,至少在开始时是这样。不是因为赚钱不重要,而是因为它比做出伟大的东西容易得多。
几周前我意识到,如果你把这两个想法放在一起,你会得到一些令人惊讶的东西。做人们想要的东西。不要太担心赚钱。你得到的是对慈善机构的描述。
当你得到这样一个意外的结果时,它可能是一个错误,也可能是一个新的发现。要么企业不应该像慈善机构,我们已经通过归谬法证明我们开始时的一个或两个原则是错误的。或者我们有一个新的想法。
我怀疑是后者,因为一旦这个想法出现在我脑海中,许多其他事情就都水落石出了。
例子
例如,Craigslist。它不是慈善机构,但他们像慈善机构一样运营它。而且他们惊人地成功。当你浏览最受欢迎网站列表时,Craigslist的员工数量看起来像是印刷错误。他们的收入没有可能的高,但大多数创业公司都很乐意与他们交换位置。
在帕特里克·奥布莱恩的小说中,他的船长总是试图占据对手的上风。如果你处于上风,你决定何时以及是否与另一艘船交战。Craigslist实际上处于巨大收入的上风。如果他们想赚更多钱,会面临一些挑战,但不是那种当你逆风航行时面临的挑战,试图通过在销售上的花费是开发的十倍来将糟糕的产品强加给冷漠的用户。[1]
我不是说创业公司的目标应该是最终像Craigslist。它们是特殊环境的产物。但它们是早期阶段的好模式。
Google在开始时看起来很像慈善机构。他们一年多没有广告。在第一年,Google与非营利组织无法区分。如果非营利组织或政府组织已经开始了一个索引网络的项目,第一年的Google就是他们能生产的极限。
当我从事垃圾邮件过滤器工作时,我认为拥有一个带有良好垃圾邮件过滤功能的基于网络的电子邮件服务是个好主意。我没有把它当作公司来考虑。我只是想防止人们收到垃圾邮件。但当我更多地考虑这个项目时,我意识到它可能必须是一家公司。运行它需要成本,而通过赠款和捐赠资助会很麻烦。
这是一个令人惊讶的认识。公司经常声称是仁慈的,但令人惊讶的是发现纯粹仁慈的项目必须体现为公司才能运作。
我不想再开一家公司,所以我没有这样做。但如果有人这样做了,他们现在可能相当富有。大约有两年的时间窗口,垃圾邮件正在迅速增加,但所有大型电子邮件服务都有糟糕的过滤器。如果有人推出一个新的、无垃圾邮件的邮件服务,用户会涌向它。
注意到这里的模式了吗?从任何一个方向我们都到达同一个地方。如果你从成功的创业公司开始,你会发现它们经常表现得像非营利组织。如果你从非营利组织的想法开始,你会发现它们经常成为好的创业公司。
力量
这个领域有多广泛?所有好的非营利组织都会成为好公司吗?可能不会。Google如此有价值的原因是他们的用户有钱。如果你让有钱的人喜欢你,你可能会得到一些。但你也可以通过对待没有钱的人像非营利组织一样来建立成功的创业公司吗?例如,你能通过治疗一种不时尚但致命的疾病如疟疾来发展成功的创业公司吗?
我不确定,但我怀疑如果你推进这个想法,你会惊讶它能走多远。例如,申请Y Combinator的人通常没有多少钱,然而我们可以通过帮助他们获利,因为在我们的帮助下他们可以赚钱。也许疟疾的情况类似。也许帮助一个国家摆脱负担的组织可以从 resulting 增长中受益。
我并不是说这是一个严肃的想法。我对疟疾一无所知。但我一直在思考想法足够长的时间,知道什么时候遇到了强大的想法。
猜测一个想法能延伸多远的一种方法是问自己,在什么时候你会反对它。反对仁慈的想法令人警醒,就像说某事在技术上不可能一样。你只是在自找麻烦,因为这些是如此强大的力量。[2]
例如,最初我认为这个原则可能只适用于互联网创业公司。显然它对Google有效,但微软呢?微软肯定不仁慈吗?但当我回想开始时,他们是仁慈的。与IBM相比,他们像罗宾汉。当IBM推出PC时,他们以为会通过高价销售硬件赚钱。但通过获得PC标准的控制权,微软向任何制造商开放了市场。硬件价格暴跌,很多人能够拥有电脑,否则他们负担不起。这是你期望Google做的事情。
微软现在不那么仁慈了。现在当人们想到微软对用户所做的事情时,脑海中出现的所有动词都以F开头。[3]然而这似乎没有回报。他们的股票价格多年来一直持平。当他们是罗宾汉时,他们的股票价格像Google一样上涨。这有联系吗?
你可以看到为什么会这样。当你很小的时候,你不能欺负客户,所以你必须取悦他们。而当你很大时,你可以随意虐待他们,而且你倾向于这样做,因为这比满足他们更容易。你通过友善成长壮大,但你可以通过恶毒保持强大。
在潜在条件改变之前你可以逃脱惩罚,然后所有的受害者都会逃跑。所以”不要作恶”可能是Paul Buchheit为Google创造的最有价值的东西,因为它可能成为公司青春的灵丹妙药。我确信他们觉得这很受限制,但想想如果它能挽救他们免于困扰微软和IBM的致命懒惰,它将会有多宝贵。
奇怪的是,这种灵丹妙药对任何其他公司都是免费提供的。任何人都可以采用”不要作恶”。问题是人们会坚持这一点。所以我认为你不会看到唱片公司或烟草公司使用这一发现。
士气
有很多外部证据表明仁慈是有效的。但它如何运作?投资大量创业公司的一个优势是你获得了很多关于它们如何运作的数据。从我们所见到的,做好似乎以三种方式帮助创业公司:它提高了他们的士气,它使其他人想要帮助他们,最重要的是,它帮助他们果断。
士气对创业公司极为重要——如此重要以至于士气本身就几乎足以决定成功。创业公司经常被描述为情绪过山车。一分钟你要接管世界,下一分钟你就注定要失败。感觉注定要失败的问题不仅仅是它让你不快乐,而是它让你停止工作。所以过山车的下坡比上坡更像是自我实现的预言。如果感觉你会成功让你更努力工作,这可能会提高你成功的机会,但如果感觉你会失败让你停止工作,这几乎保证你会失败。
这就是仁慈的用武之地。如果你觉得你真的在帮助人们,即使看起来你的创业公司注定要失败,你也会继续工作。我们大多数人都有一些天生的仁慈。有人需要你的单纯事实就让你想要帮助他们。所以如果你开始那种用户每天都会回来的创业公司,你基本上为自己建立了一个巨大的电子宠物。你制造了一些你需要照顾的东西。
Blogger是一个经历了真正的低谷并幸存下来的著名创业公司例子。有一次他们没钱了,所有人都离开了。Evan Williams第二天来上班,只有他一个人。是什么让他继续前进?部分原因是用户需要他。他在托管数千人的博客。他不能让网站就这么死了。
快速启动有很多优势,但最重要的可能是,一旦你有了用户,电子宠物效应就开始了。一旦你有用户需要照顾,你被迫找出会让他们开心的事情,这实际上是很有价值的信息。
来自试图帮助人们的额外信心也可以帮助你与投资者打交道。Chatterous的一位创始人最近告诉我,他和他的联合创始人已经决定这项服务是世界需要的,所以无论发生什么他们都会继续努力,即使他们不得不搬回加拿大住在父母的地下室。
一旦他们意识到这一点,他们就不再那么在意投资者对他们的看法。他们仍然与他们见面,但如果没有得到他们的钱,他们也不会死。你知道吗?投资者变得更加感兴趣了。他们能感觉到Chatterouses无论如何都会做这个创业公司,无论有没有他们。
如果你真的承诺并且你的创业公司运行成本低,你就变得很难被杀死。而且实际上所有创业公司,即使是最成功的,都会在某个时候接近死亡。所以为人们做好事给你一种使命感,使你更难被杀死,仅这一点就足以补偿你没有选择更自私项目所损失的任何东西。
帮助
做好事的另一个优势是它使其他人想要帮助你。这似乎也是人类的一种天生特质。
我们资助的创业公司之一Octopart,目前正在进行善与恶的经典战斗。他们是工业零部件的搜索网站。很多人需要搜索零部件,在Octopart之前没有好的方法可以做到。事实证明,这并非巧合。
Octopart建立了搜索零部件的正确方法。用户喜欢它,他们一直在快速增长。然而在Octopart的大部分时间里,最大的分销商Digi-Key一直试图强迫他们将价格从网站上删除。Octopart免费向他们发送客户,然而Digi-Key却试图阻止这种流量。为什么?因为他们当前的商业模式依赖于对价格信息不完整的人过度收费。他们不希望搜索正常工作。
Octopart是世界上最好的人。他们从伯克利的物理博士项目退学来做这件事。他们只是想修复他们在研究中遇到的问题。想象一下,如果工程师可以在线搜索,你可以为世界工程师节省多少时间。所以当我听说一个大的、邪恶的公司为了保持搜索的 broken 状态而试图阻止他们时,这让我真的想要帮助他们。这让我花在Octopart上的时间比我们资助的其他大多数创业公司都多。这让我花了几分钟告诉你他们有多棒。为什么?因为他们是好人,他们试图帮助世界。
如果你是仁慈的,人们会聚集在你周围:投资者、客户、其他公司和潜在员工。从长远来看,最重要的可能是潜在员工。我想现在每个人都知道好的黑客比平庸的黑客好得多。如果你能像Google一样吸引最好的黑客为你工作,你就有很大的优势。而且最好的黑客往往是理想主义的。他们对工作不感到绝望。他们可以在任何地方工作。所以大多数人都想做能让世界变得更好的事情。
指南针
但做好事最重要的优势是它起到指南针的作用。做创业公司最难的部分之一是你有太多的选择。只有两三个人,但你可以做一千件事。你怎么决定?
答案是:做对你的用户最好的事情。你可以在飓风中像抓住绳子一样抓住这个,如果有什么能救你,它会的。跟随它,它会带你完成你需要做的一切。
它甚至是对看似无关问题的答案,比如如何说服投资者给你钱。如果你是个好的推销员,你可以尝试说服他们。但更可靠的途径是通过你的用户说服他们:如果你做出用户足够喜欢以至于告诉朋友的东西,你就会呈指数级增长,这会说服任何投资者。
做好事是在复杂情况下做决策的特别有用的策略,因为它是无状态的。这就像说真话。说谎的问题是你必须记住你过去所说的一切,以确保你不自相矛盾。如果你说真话,你不需要记住任何东西,这在事情发生得很快的领域是很有用的属性。
例如,Y Combinator现在已经投资了80家创业公司,其中57家仍然活着。(其余的已经死亡、合并或被收购。)当你试图为57家创业公司提供建议时,结果是你必须有一个无状态的算法。当同时有57件事情在进行时,你不能有不可告人的动机,因为你记不住它们。所以我们的规则只是做对创始人最有利的事情。不是因为我们特别仁慈,而是因为这是唯一能在这种规模上运作的算法。
当你写一些告诉人们要好的东西时,你似乎在声称自己是个好人。所以我想明确地说我不是个特别好的人。当我还是个孩子的时候,我坚定地站在坏人阵营。成年人使用”好”这个词的方式,似乎与安静同义,所以我长大后对此非常怀疑。
你知道有些人当在谈话中提到他们的名字时每个人都会说”他是个好人”吗?人们从来不会这样说我。我得到的最好的评价是”他本意是好的”。我并不声称自己是个好人。充其量我只能算说好语作为第二语言。
所以我不是建议你以通常伪善的方式做好事。我建议这样做是因为它有效。它不仅作为”价值观”的陈述有效,而且作为战略指南,甚至作为软件设计规范都有效。不仅仅是不要作恶。要做好事。
注释
[1] 五十年前,上市公司不支付红利似乎令人震惊。现在许多科技公司都不支付。市场似乎已经搞清楚了如何评估潜在股息。也许这不是这个演变的最后一步。也许市场最终会对潜在收益感到舒服。(风险投资家已经这样了,至少其中一些人一直都在赚钱。)
我意识到这听起来像是在泡沫时期听到的关于”新经济”的东西。相信我,我当时没有喝那种kool-aid。但我确信泡沫思维中埋藏着一些好想法。例如,专注于增长而不是利润是可以的——但前提是增长是真实的。你不能购买用户;那是金字塔计划。但具有快速真实增长的公司是有价值的,最终市场学会如何评估有价值的东西。
[2] 以仁慈为目标创办公司的想法目前被低估了,因为目前将此作为明确目标的人通常做得很差。
开始某种模糊的慈善企业是信托基金受益人的标准职业道路之一。大多数人的问题在于他们要么有虚假的政治议程,要么执行不力。信托基金受益人的祖先并不是通过保护他们的传统文化而致富的;也许玻利维亚人也不想这样做。而且开始有机农场,虽然至少是直接的慈善,但并不能像Google那样帮助人们。
大多数明确的慈善项目都没有充分对自己负责。他们表现得好像良好的意图足以保证良好的效果。
[3] 用户如此不喜欢他们的新操作系统,以至于他们开始请愿来拯救旧的。而旧的并没有什么特别。微软内部的黑客一定在内心深处知道,如果公司真正关心用户,他们只会建议他们切换到OSX。
感谢Trevor Blackwell、Paul Buchheit、Jessica Livingston和Robert Morris阅读本文的草稿。
俄语翻译
德语翻译
Be Good
April 2008
(This essay is derived from a talk at the 2008 Startup School.)
About a month after we started Y Combinator we came up with the phrase that became our motto: Make something people want. We’ve learned a lot since then, but if I were choosing now that’s still the one I’d pick.
Another thing we tell founders is not to worry too much about the business model, at least at first. Not because making money is unimportant, but because it’s so much easier than building something great.
A couple weeks ago I realized that if you put those two ideas together, you get something surprising. Make something people want. Don’t worry too much about making money. What you’ve got is a description of a charity.
When you get an unexpected result like this, it could either be a bug or a new discovery. Either businesses aren’t supposed to be like charities, and we’ve proven by reductio ad absurdum that one or both of the principles we began with is false. Or we have a new idea.
I suspect it’s the latter, because as soon as this thought occurred to me, a whole bunch of other things fell into place.
Examples
For example, Craigslist. It’s not a charity, but they run it like one. And they’re astoundingly successful. When you scan down the list of most popular web sites, the number of employees at Craigslist looks like a misprint. Their revenues aren’t as high as they could be, but most startups would be happy to trade places with them.
In Patrick O’Brian’s novels, his captains always try to get upwind of their opponents. If you’re upwind, you decide when and if to engage the other ship. Craigslist is effectively upwind of enormous revenues. They’d face some challenges if they wanted to make more, but not the sort you face when you’re tacking upwind, trying to force a crappy product on ambivalent users by spending ten times as much on sales as on development. [1]
I’m not saying startups should aim to end up like Craigslist. They’re a product of unusual circumstances. But they’re a good model for the early phases.
Google looked a lot like a charity in the beginning. They didn’t have ads for over a year. At year 1, Google was indistinguishable from a nonprofit. If a nonprofit or government organization had started a project to index the web, Google at year 1 is the limit of what they’d have produced.
Back when I was working on spam filters I thought it would be a good idea to have a web-based email service with good spam filtering. I wasn’t thinking of it as a company. I just wanted to keep people from getting spammed. But as I thought more about this project, I realized it would probably have to be a company. It would cost something to run, and it would be a pain to fund with grants and donations.
That was a surprising realization. Companies often claim to be benevolent, but it was surprising to realize there were purely benevolent projects that had to be embodied as companies to work.
I didn’t want to start another company, so I didn’t do it. But if someone had, they’d probably be quite rich now. There was a window of about two years when spam was increasing rapidly but all the big email services had terrible filters. If someone had launched a new, spam-free mail service, users would have flocked to it.
Notice the pattern here? From either direction we get to the same spot. If you start from successful startups, you find they often behaved like nonprofits. And if you start from ideas for nonprofits, you find they’d often make good startups.
Power
How wide is this territory? Would all good nonprofits be good companies? Possibly not. What makes Google so valuable is that their users have money. If you make people with money love you, you can probably get some of it. But could you also base a successful startup on behaving like a nonprofit to people who don’t have money? Could you, for example, grow a successful startup out of curing an unfashionable but deadly disease like malaria?
I’m not sure, but I suspect that if you pushed this idea, you’d be surprised how far it would go. For example, people who apply to Y Combinator don’t generally have much money, and yet we can profit by helping them, because with our help they could make money. Maybe the situation is similar with malaria. Maybe an organization that helped lift its weight off a country could benefit from the resulting growth.
I’m not proposing this is a serious idea. I don’t know anything about malaria. But I’ve been kicking ideas around long enough to know when I come across a powerful one.
One way to guess how far an idea extends is to ask yourself at what point you’d bet against it. The thought of betting against benevolence is alarming in the same way as saying that something is technically impossible. You’re just asking to be made a fool of, because these are such powerful forces. [2]
For example, initially I thought maybe this principle only applied to Internet startups. Obviously it worked for Google, but what about Microsoft? Surely Microsoft isn’t benevolent? But when I think back to the beginning, they were. Compared to IBM they were like Robin Hood. When IBM introduced the PC, they thought they were going to make money selling hardware at high prices. But by gaining control of the PC standard, Microsoft opened up the market to any manufacturer. Hardware prices plummeted, and lots of people got to have computers who couldn’t otherwise have afforded them. It’s the sort of thing you’d expect Google to do.
Microsoft isn’t so benevolent now. Now when one thinks of what Microsoft does to users, all the verbs that come to mind begin with F. [3] And yet it doesn’t seem to pay. Their stock price has been flat for years. Back when they were Robin Hood, their stock price rose like Google’s. Could there be a connection?
You can see how there would be. When you’re small, you can’t bully customers, so you have to charm them. Whereas when you’re big you can maltreat them at will, and you tend to, because it’s easier than satisfying them. You grow big by being nice, but you can stay big by being mean.
You get away with it till the underlying conditions change, and then all your victims escape. So “Don’t be evil” may be the most valuable thing Paul Buchheit made for Google, because it may turn out to be an elixir of corporate youth. I’m sure they find it constraining, but think how valuable it will be if it saves them from lapsing into the fatal laziness that afflicted Microsoft and IBM.
The curious thing is, this elixir is freely available to any other company. Anyone can adopt “Don’t be evil.” The catch is that people will hold you to it. So I don’t think you’re going to see record labels or tobacco companies using this discovery.
Morale
There’s a lot of external evidence that benevolence works. But how does it work? One advantage of investing in a large number of startups is that you get a lot of data about how they work. From what we’ve seen, being good seems to help startups in three ways: it improves their morale, it makes other people want to help them, and above all, it helps them be decisive.
Morale is tremendously important to a startup—so important that morale alone is almost enough to determine success. Startups are often described as emotional roller-coasters. One minute you’re going to take over the world, and the next you’re doomed. The problem with feeling you’re doomed is not just that it makes you unhappy, but that it makes you stop working. So the downhills of the roller-coaster are more of a self fulfilling prophecy than the uphills. If feeling you’re going to succeed makes you work harder, that probably improves your chances of succeeding, but if feeling you’re going to fail makes you stop working, that practically guarantees you’ll fail.
Here’s where benevolence comes in. If you feel you’re really helping people, you’ll keep working even when it seems like your startup is doomed. Most of us have some amount of natural benevolence. The mere fact that someone needs you makes you want to help them. So if you start the kind of startup where users come back each day, you’ve basically built yourself a giant tamagotchi. You’ve made something you need to take care of.
Blogger is a famous example of a startup that went through really low lows and survived. At one point they ran out of money and everyone left. Evan Williams came in to work the next day, and there was no one but him. What kept him going? Partly that users needed him. He was hosting thousands of people’s blogs. He couldn’t just let the site die.
There are many advantages of launching quickly, but the most important may be that once you have users, the tamagotchi effect kicks in. Once you have users to take care of, you’re forced to figure out what will make them happy, and that’s actually very valuable information.
The added confidence that comes from trying to help people can also help you with investors. One of the founders of Chatterous told me recently that he and his cofounder had decided that this service was something the world needed, so they were going to keep working on it no matter what, even if they had to move back to Canada and live in their parents’ basements.
Once they realized this, they stopped caring so much what investors thought about them. They still met with them, but they weren’t going to die if they didn’t get their money. And you know what? The investors got a lot more interested. They could sense that the Chatterouses were going to do this startup with or without them.
If you’re really committed and your startup is cheap to run, you become very hard to kill. And practically all startups, even the most successful, come close to death at some point. So if doing good for people gives you a sense of mission that makes you harder to kill, that alone more than compensates for whatever you lose by not choosing a more selfish project.
Help
Another advantage of being good is that it makes other people want to help you. This too seems to be an inborn trait in humans.
One of the startups we’ve funded, Octopart, is currently locked in a classic battle of good versus evil. They’re a search site for industrial components. A lot of people need to search for components, and before Octopart there was no good way to do it. That, it turned out, was no coincidence.
Octopart built the right way to search for components. Users like it and they’ve been growing rapidly. And yet for most of Octopart’s life, the biggest distributor, Digi-Key, has been trying to force them take their prices off the site. Octopart is sending them customers for free, and yet Digi-Key is trying to make that traffic stop. Why? Because their current business model depends on overcharging people who have incomplete information about prices. They don’t want search to work.
The Octoparts are the nicest guys in the world. They dropped out of the PhD program in physics at Berkeley to do this. They just wanted to fix a problem they encountered in their research. Imagine how much time you could save the world’s engineers if they could do searches online. So when I hear that a big, evil company is trying to stop them in order to keep search broken, it makes me really want to help them. It makes me spend more time on the Octoparts than I do with most of the other startups we’ve funded. It just made me spend several minutes telling you how great they are. Why? Because they’re good guys and they’re trying to help the world.
If you’re benevolent, people will rally around you: investors, customers, other companies, and potential employees. In the long term the most important may be the potential employees. I think everyone knows now that good hackers are much better than mediocre ones. If you can attract the best hackers to work for you, as Google has, you have a big advantage. And the very best hackers tend to be idealistic. They’re not desperate for a job. They can work wherever they want. So most want to work on things that will make the world better.
Compass
But the most important advantage of being good is that it acts as a compass. One of the hardest parts of doing a startup is that you have so many choices. There are just two or three of you, and a thousand things you could do. How do you decide?
Here’s the answer: Do whatever’s best for your users. You can hold onto this like a rope in a hurricane, and it will save you if anything can. Follow it and it will take you through everything you need to do.
It’s even the answer to questions that seem unrelated, like how to convince investors to give you money. If you’re a good salesman, you could try to just talk them into it. But the more reliable route is to convince them through your users: if you make something users love enough to tell their friends, you grow exponentially, and that will convince any investor.
Being good is a particularly useful strategy for making decisions in complex situations because it’s stateless. It’s like telling the truth. The trouble with lying is that you have to remember everything you’ve said in the past to make sure you don’t contradict yourself. If you tell the truth you don’t have to remember anything, and that’s a really useful property in domains where things happen fast.
For example, Y Combinator has now invested in 80 startups, 57 of which are still alive. (The rest have died or merged or been acquired.) When you’re trying to advise 57 startups, it turns out you have to have a stateless algorithm. You can’t have ulterior motives when you have 57 things going on at once, because you can’t remember them. So our rule is just to do whatever’s best for the founders. Not because we’re particularly benevolent, but because it’s the only algorithm that works on that scale.
When you write something telling people to be good, you seem to be claiming to be good yourself. So I want to say explicitly that I am not a particularly good person. When I was a kid I was firmly in the camp of bad. The way adults used the word good, it seemed to be synonymous with quiet, so I grew up very suspicious of it.
You know how there are some people whose names come up in conversation and everyone says “He’s such a great guy?” People never say that about me. The best I get is “he means well.” I am not claiming to be good. At best I speak good as a second language.
So I’m not suggesting you be good in the usual sanctimonious way. I’m suggesting it because it works. It will work not just as a statement of “values,” but as a guide to strategy, and even a design spec for software. Don’t just not be evil. Be good.
Notes
[1] Fifty years ago it would have seemed shocking for a public company not to pay dividends. Now many tech companies don’t. The markets seem to have figured out how to value potential dividends. Maybe that isn’t the last step in this evolution. Maybe markets will eventually get comfortable with potential earnings. (VCs already are, and at least some of them consistently make money.)
I realize this sounds like the stuff one used to hear about the “new economy” during the Bubble. Believe me, I was not drinking that kool-aid at the time. But I’m convinced there were some good ideas buried in Bubble thinking. For example, it’s ok to focus on growth instead of profits—but only if the growth is genuine. You can’t be buying users; that’s a pyramid scheme. But a company with rapid, genuine growth is valuable, and eventually markets learn how to value valuable things.
[2] The idea of starting a company with benevolent aims is currently undervalued, because the kind of people who currently make that their explicit goal don’t usually do a very good job.
It’s one of the standard career paths of trustafarians to start some vaguely benevolent business. The problem with most of them is that they either have a bogus political agenda or are feebly executed. The trustafarians’ ancestors didn’t get rich by preserving their traditional culture; maybe people in Bolivia don’t want to either. And starting an organic farm, though it’s at least straightforwardly benevolent, doesn’t help people on the scale that Google does.
Most explicitly benevolent projects don’t hold themselves sufficiently accountable. They act as if having good intentions were enough to guarantee good effects.
[3] Users dislike their new operating system so much that they’re starting petitions to save the old one. And the old one was nothing special. The hackers within Microsoft must know in their hearts that if the company really cared about users they’d just advise them to switch to OSX.
Thanks to Trevor Blackwell, Paul Buchheit, Jessica Livingston, and Robert Morris for reading drafts of this.
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