股权方程式
股权方程式
2007年7月
投资者想要给你钱来换取你创业公司的一定股份。你应该接受吗?你即将雇佣第一个员工。应该给他多少股票?
这些是创始人面临的最难的问题之一。然而两个问题都有相同的答案:
1/(1 - n)
每当你在用公司的股票交换任何东西时,无论是金钱、员工还是与另一家公司的交易,决定是否进行的测试都是相同的。如果你用股票换取的东西能够足够改善你的平均结果,使得你剩下的(100 - n)%的股份比整个公司在交易前的价值还要高,那么你就应该放弃公司n%的股份。
例如,如果一个投资者想购买你公司的一半股份,这项投资必须改善你的平均结果多少才能让你盈亏平衡?显然,它必须使公司价值翻倍:如果你用公司的一半股份换取某种能使公司平均结果翻倍以上的东西,你就净赚了。你拥有某个价值翻倍以上的东西的一半份额。
在一般情况下,如果你放弃的公司比例是n,如果这项交易使公司的价值超过1/(1 - n),那么这就是一个好交易。
例如,假设Y Combinator提议资助你,换取你公司7%的股份。在这种情况下,n是.07,1/(1 - n)是1.075。所以如果你相信我们能使你的平均结果提高超过7.5%,你就应该接受这笔交易。如果我们使你的结果提高10%,你就净赚了,因为你持有的剩余.93股份价值.93 x 1.1 = 1.023。[1]
股权方程式告诉我们的一件事是,至少在财务上,从顶级风险投资公司拿钱可以是一笔非常好的交易。Sequoia的Greg Mcadoo最近在YC晚宴上说,当Sequoia单独投资时,他们喜欢拿一家公司大约30%的股份。1/.7 = 1.43,这意味着如果他们能使你的结果提高超过43%,这笔交易就值得接受。对于一般的创业公司来说,这将是一个非凡的便宜交易。光是能够说他们得到了Sequoia的资助就能提高一般创业公司的前景超过43%,即使他们实际上从来没有拿到钱。
Sequoia之所以是这么好的交易,是因为他们拿取的公司比例人为地偏低。他们甚至不试图为他们的投资获得市场价格;他们限制他们的持股量,给创始人留下足够的股份,让他们觉得公司仍然是他们的。
问题是Sequoia每年收到大约6000份商业计划,资助其中大约20份,所以获得这个好交易的机会是300分之1。那些通过的公司不是一般的创业公司。
当然,在风险投资交易中还有其他因素需要考虑。它从来不仅仅是金钱和股票的直接交易。但如果是的话,从顶级公司拿钱通常会是便宜货。
在给员工股票时,你可以使用相同的公式,但它以相反的方式运作。如果i是公司增加某个新人后的平均结果,那么他们价值n,使得i = 1/(1 - n)。这意味着n = (i - 1)/i。
例如,假设你只有两个创始人,你想雇佣一个额外的黑客,他非常优秀,你觉得他会使整个公司的平均结果提高20%。n = (1.2 - 1)/1.2 = .167。所以如果你用公司16.7%的股份交换他,你就会盈亏平衡。
这并不意味着16.7%是给他的正确股票数量。股票不是雇佣某人的唯一成本:通常还有工资和开销。如果公司在这笔交易中仅仅盈亏平衡,就没有理由这样做。
我认为要把工资和开销转换为股票,你应该将年费率乘以大约1.5。大多数创业公司要么快速增长,要么死亡;如果你死亡,你不必付钱给这个人;如果你快速增长,你将用明年的估值支付明年的工资,那应该是今年的3倍。如果你的估值每年增长3倍,新员工的工资和开销的总股票成本是当前估值的1.5年成本。[2]
公司需要多少额外的利润作为交易的”激活能”?因为这实际上是公司雇佣的利润,市场将决定这一点:如果你是一个热门机会,你可以收取更多。
让我们通过一个例子。假设公司想在上述新雇佣上赚取50%的”利润”。所以从16.7%中减去三分之一,我们得到11.1%作为他的”零售”价格。进一步假设他每年的工资和开销成本是6万美元,x 1.5 = 9万美元总额。如果公司的估值是200万美元,9万美元是4.5%。11.1% - 4.5% = 6.6%的报价。
顺便说一下,注意早期员工拿低工资是多么重要。这直接来自于本可以给他们的股票。
显然,这些数字有很大的变化空间。我不是说股票赠与现在可以简化为公式。最终你总是要猜测。但至少知道你在猜测什么。如果你基于直觉选择一个数字,或者使用风险投资公司提供的典型赠与规模表格,理解这些是什么的估计。
更一般地说,当你做出任何涉及股权的决定时,用1/(1 - n)来检验它是否有意义。交易股权后你应该总是感觉更富有。如果交易没有足够增加你剩余股份的价值使你净赚,你就不会(或不应该)做这笔交易。
注释
[1] 这就是我们无法相信有人会认为Y Combinator是笔坏交易的原因。真的有人认为我们在三个月内无法将创业公司的前景提高7.5%吗?
[2] 当前估值的明显选择是你上一轮融资的投后估值。然而,这可能低估了公司,因为(a)除非你的上一轮刚发生,公司可能价值更高,(b)早期融资的估值通常反映了投资者的其他一些贡献。
感谢Sam Altman、Trevor Blackwell、Paul Buchheit、Hutch Fishman、David Hornik、Paul Kedrosky、Jessica Livingston、Gary Sabot和Joshua Schachter阅读本文草稿。
The Equity Equation
July 2007
An investor wants to give you money for a certain percentage of your startup. Should you take it? You’re about to hire your first employee. How much stock should you give him?
These are some of the hardest questions founders face. And yet both have the same answer:
1/(1 - n)
Whenever you’re trading stock in your company for anything, whether it’s money or an employee or a deal with another company, the test for whether to do it is the same. You should give up n% of your company if what you trade it for improves your average outcome enough that the (100 - n)% you have left is worth more than the whole company was before.
For example, if an investor wants to buy half your company, how much does that investment have to improve your average outcome for you to break even? Obviously it has to double: if you trade half your company for something that more than doubles the company’s average outcome, you’re net ahead. You have half as big a share of something worth more than twice as much.
In the general case, if n is the fraction of the company you’re giving up, the deal is a good one if it makes the company worth more than 1/(1 - n).
For example, suppose Y Combinator offers to fund you in return for 7% of your company. In this case, n is .07 and 1/(1 - n) is 1.075. So you should take the deal if you believe we can improve your average outcome by more than 7.5%. If we improve your outcome by 10%, you’re net ahead, because the remaining .93 you hold is worth .93 x 1.1 = 1.023. [1]
One of the things the equity equation shows us is that, financially at least, taking money from a top VC firm can be a really good deal. Greg Mcadoo from Sequoia recently said at a YC dinner that when Sequoia invests alone they like to take about 30% of a company. 1/.7 = 1.43, meaning that deal is worth taking if they can improve your outcome by more than 43%. For the average startup, that would be an extraordinary bargain. It would improve the average startup’s prospects by more than 43% just to be able to say they were funded by Sequoia, even if they never actually got the money.
The reason Sequoia is such a good deal is that the percentage of the company they take is artificially low. They don’t even try to get market price for their investment; they limit their holdings to leave the founders enough stock to feel the company is still theirs.
The catch is that Sequoia gets about 6000 business plans a year and funds about 20 of them, so the odds of getting this great deal are 1 in 300. The companies that make it through are not average startups.
Of course, there are other factors to consider in a VC deal. It’s never just a straight trade of money for stock. But if it were, taking money from a top firm would generally be a bargain.
You can use the same formula when giving stock to employees, but it works in the other direction. If i is the average outcome for the company with the addition of some new person, then they’re worth n such that i = 1/(1 - n). Which means n = (i - 1)/i.
For example, suppose you’re just two founders and you want to hire an additional hacker who’s so good you feel he’ll increase the average outcome of the whole company by 20%. n = (1.2 - 1)/1.2 = .167. So you’ll break even if you trade 16.7% of the company for him.
That doesn’t mean 16.7% is the right amount of stock to give him. Stock is not the only cost of hiring someone: there’s usually salary and overhead as well. And if the company merely breaks even on the deal, there’s no reason to do it.
I think to translate salary and overhead into stock you should multiply the annual rate by about 1.5. Most startups grow fast or die; if you die you don’t have to pay the guy, and if you grow fast you’ll be paying next year’s salary out of next year’s valuation, which should be 3x this year’s. If your valuation grows 3x a year, the total cost in stock of a new hire’s salary and overhead is 1.5 years’ cost at the present valuation. [2]
How much of an additional margin should the company need as the “activation energy” for the deal? Since this is in effect the company’s profit on a hire, the market will determine that: if you’re a hot opportunity, you can charge more.
Let’s run through an example. Suppose the company wants to make a “profit” of 50% on the new hire mentioned above. So subtract a third from 16.7% and we have 11.1% as his “retail” price. Suppose further that he’s going to cost 90k total. If the company’s valuation is 90k is 4.5%. 11.1% - 4.5% = an offer of 6.6%.
Incidentally, notice how important it is for early employees to take little salary. It comes right out of stock that could otherwise be given to them.
Obviously there is a great deal of play in these numbers. I’m not claiming that stock grants can now be reduced to a formula. Ultimately you always have to guess. But at least know what you’re guessing. If you choose a number based on your gut feel, or a table of typical grant sizes supplied by a VC firm, understand what those are estimates of.
And more generally, when you make any decision involving equity, run it through 1/(1 - n) to see if it makes sense. You should always feel richer after trading equity. If the trade didn’t increase the value of your remaining shares enough to put you net ahead, you wouldn’t have (or shouldn’t have) done it.
Notes
[1] This is why we can’t believe anyone would think Y Combinator was a bad deal. Does anyone really think we’re so useless that in three months we can’t improve a startup’s prospects by 7.5%?
[2] The obvious choice for your present valuation is the post-money valuation of your last funding round. This probably undervalues the company, though, because (a) unless your last round just happened, the company is presumably worth more, and (b) the valuation of an early funding round usually reflects some other contribution by the investors.
Thanks to Sam Altman, Trevor Blackwell, Paul Buchheit, Hutch Fishman, David Hornik, Paul Kedrosky, Jessica Livingston, Gary Sabot, and Joshua Schachter for reading drafts of this.