为什么电视输了

Paul Graham 2009-03-01

为什么电视输了

2009年3月

大约二十年前,人们注意到计算机和电视正在发生碰撞,并开始猜测它们融合时会产生什么。我们现在知道了答案:计算机。现在很清楚,即使使用”融合”这个词,我们也给了电视太多的信任。这与其说是融合,不如说是替代。人们可能仍然观看他们称之为”电视节目”的东西,但他们主要会在电脑上观看。

是什么决定了计算机的胜利?四种力量,其中三种是可以预见的,一种则较难预见。

一个可预见的胜利原因是互联网是一个开放平台。任何人都可以在上面构建任何他们想要的东西,市场选择胜者。因此,创新以黑客速度而非大公司速度发生。

第二个是摩尔定律,它对互联网带宽发挥了通常的魔力。[1]

计算机获胜的第三个原因是盗版。用户喜欢它不仅因为它是免费的,还因为它更方便。Bittorrent和YouTube已经训练了新一代观众,让他们知道观看节目的地方是在电脑屏幕上。[2]

更令人惊讶的力量是一种特定类型的创新:社交应用。普通青少年孩子与朋友交谈的能力几乎是无限的。但他们不能一直与朋友在一起。我在高中的时候解决方案是电话。现在是社交网络、多人游戏和各种消息应用。接触它们所有的方式是通过计算机。[3]这意味着每个青少年孩子(a)想要一台连接互联网的计算机,(b)有动力学习如何使用它,(c)在它前面花费无数小时。

这是最强大的力量。这就是让每个人都想要计算机的原因。技术迷们得到计算机是因为他们喜欢它们。然后游戏玩家们得到计算机来玩游戏。但让其他人都想要计算机的是与其他人联系:这就是让连奶奶和14岁女孩都想要计算机的原因。在几十年将静脉输液直接注入观众的过程中,娱乐行业的人们可以理解地将他们视为相当被动的。他们以为他们能够支配节目到达观众的方式。但他们低估了他们彼此联系的欲望的力量。

Facebook杀死了电视。当然,这是极度简化的,但可能是你能用三个词得到的最接近真相的答案。


电视网络似乎已经不情愿地看到事情的发展方向,并做出了回应,不情愿地将他们的内容放在网上。但他们仍在拖后腿。他们似乎仍然希望人们在电视上观看节目,就像把故事放在网上的报纸仍然似乎希望人们等到第二天早上阅读印刷在纸上的版本一样。他们都应该面对互联网是主要媒介的事实。

如果他们早点这样做,他们会处于更有利的位置。当一个新的媒介出现,强大到足以让在位者感到紧张时,那么它可能强大到足以获胜,他们能做的最好的事情就是立即跳入。

不管他们喜欢与否,重大的变化即将到来,因为互联网消解了广播媒体的两大基石:同步性和本地性。在互联网上,你不必向每个人发送相同的信号,也不必从本地源发送给他们。人们将在他们想要的时候观看他们想要的东西,并根据他们最强烈的共同兴趣进行分组。也许他们最强烈的共同兴趣将是他们的物理位置,但我猜不是。这意味着地方电视可能已经死了。它是旧技术施加的限制的产物。如果现在有人从头创建一个基于互联网的电视公司,他们可能有一些针对特定地区的节目的计划,但这不会是首要任务。

同步性和本地性是联系在一起的。电视网络附属机构关心10点播放什么,因为这样可以给11点的本地新闻带来观众。然而,这种联系增加了更多的脆弱性而不是力量:人们不是在10点观看节目,因为他们想之后观看新闻。

电视网络将对抗这些趋势,因为他们没有足够的灵活性来适应它们。他们受到地方附属机构的束缚,就像汽车公司受到经销商和工会的束缚一样。不可避免的是,运行网络的人将采取简单的路线,并试图让旧模式再运行几年,就像唱片公司所做的那样。

《华尔街日报》最近的一篇文章描述了电视网络如何试图增加更多直播节目,部分原因是迫使观众同步观看电视,而不是在适合他们的时候观看录制的节目。他们不是提供观众想要的东西,而是试图强迫他们改变习惯以适应网络过时的商业模式。除非你有垄断或卡特尔来强制执行,否则这永远不会奏效,即使那样也只是暂时有效。

网络喜欢直播节目的另一个原因是它们制作成本更低。在那里他们有正确的想法,但他们没有把它推到结论。直播内容可能比网络意识到的便宜得多,利用成本大幅下降的方法是增加数量。网络被看到这整个推理路线所阻止,因为他们仍然认为自己在广播业务中——向每个人发送一个信号。[4]


现在是创办任何与电视网络竞争的公司的好时机。这就是很多互联网初创公司在做的事情,尽管他们可能没有把这个作为明确的目标。人们每天只有这么多的休闲时间,而电视是以长时段为前提的(不像谷歌,以快速发送用户为荣),所以占用他们时间的任何东西都在与它竞争。但除了这样的间接竞争对手,我认为电视公司将面临越来越多的直接竞争对手。

即使在有线电视中,长尾也被启动新频道必须跨越的门槛过早地截断了。在互联网上它会更长,并且在其中会有更多的流动性。在这个新世界中,现有的参与者将只拥有任何大公司在其市场中的优势。

这将改变网络和节目制作人之间的权力平衡。网络曾经是守门人。他们分发你的作品,并在上面销售广告。现在制作节目的人可以自己分发。网络现在提供的主要价值是广告销售。这将使他们处于服务提供商而非出版商的位置。

节目将发生更大的变化。在互联网上,没有理由保持他们当前的格式,甚至没有理由保持他们拥有单一格式的事实。确实,即将到来的更有趣的融合是在节目和游戏之间。但对于20年互联网上分发什么样的娱乐,我不敢做出任何预测,除了事情会变化很大。我们将得到最有想象力的人能创造出的任何东西。这就是互联网获胜的原因。

注释

[1] 感谢Trevor Blackwell提出这个观点。他补充说:“我记得在90年代初,电话公司高管在谈论融合时眼睛闪闪发光。他们认为大多数节目将按需提供,他们将实施它并赚很多钱。结果没有奏效。他们假设他们的本地网络基础设施对于视频点播至关重要,因为你不可能通过互联网从几个数据中心流式传输。当时(1992年)整个跨州互联网带宽都不足以支持一个视频流。但广域带宽比他们预期的增长更多,他们被iTunes和Hulu击败了。”

[2] 版权所有者倾向于关注他们看到的盗版方面,即收入损失。因此他们认为推动用户这样做的是免费获得某些东西的愿望。但iTunes表明,如果你让事情变得容易,人们会为在线内容付费。盗版的一个重要因素只是它提供了更好的用户体验。

[3] 或者实际上是一台计算机的手机。我没有对将取代电视的设备大小做出任何预测,只是它将有一个浏览器并通过互联网获取数据。

[4] Emmett Shear写道:“我认为体育的长尾可能比其他类型内容的长尾更大。任何人都可以广播一场对约10,000人有趣的高中橄榄球比赛,即使制作质量不是很好。”

感谢Sam Altman、Trevor Blackwell、Nancy Cook、Michael Seibel、Emmett Shear和Fred Wilson阅读本文的草稿。

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日语翻译

Why TV Lost

March 2009

About twenty years ago people noticed computers and TV were on a collision course and started to speculate about what they’d produce when they converged. We now know the answer: computers. It’s clear now that even by using the word “convergence” we were giving TV too much credit. This won’t be convergence so much as replacement. People may still watch things they call “TV shows,” but they’ll watch them mostly on computers.

What decided the contest for computers? Four forces, three of which one could have predicted, and one that would have been harder to.

One predictable cause of victory is that the Internet is an open platform. Anyone can build whatever they want on it, and the market picks the winners. So innovation happens at hacker speeds instead of big company speeds.

The second is Moore’s Law, which has worked its usual magic on Internet bandwidth. [1]

The third reason computers won is piracy. Users prefer it not just because it’s free, but because it’s more convenient. Bittorrent and YouTube have already trained a new generation of viewers that the place to watch shows is on a computer screen. [2]

The somewhat more surprising force was one specific type of innovation: social applications. The average teenage kid has a pretty much infinite capacity for talking to their friends. But they can’t physically be with them all the time. When I was in high school the solution was the telephone. Now it’s social networks, multiplayer games, and various messaging applications. The way you reach them all is through a computer. [3] Which means every teenage kid (a) wants a computer with an Internet connection, (b) has an incentive to figure out how to use it, and (c) spends countless hours in front of it.

This was the most powerful force of all. This was what made everyone want computers. Nerds got computers because they liked them. Then gamers got them to play games on. But it was connecting to other people that got everyone else: that’s what made even grandmas and 14 year old girls want computers. After decades of running an IV drip right into their audience, people in the entertainment business had understandably come to think of them as rather passive. They thought they’d be able to dictate the way shows reached audiences. But they underestimated the force of their desire to connect with one another.

Facebook killed TV. That is wildly oversimplified, of course, but probably as close to the truth as you can get in three words.


The TV networks already seem, grudgingly, to see where things are going, and have responded by putting their stuff, grudgingly, online. But they’re still dragging their heels. They still seem to wish people would watch shows on TV instead, just as newspapers that put their stories online still seem to wish people would wait till the next morning and read them printed on paper. They should both just face the fact that the Internet is the primary medium.

They’d be in a better position if they’d done that earlier. When a new medium arises that’s powerful enough to make incumbents nervous, then it’s probably powerful enough to win, and the best thing they can do is jump in immediately.

Whether they like it or not, big changes are coming, because the Internet dissolves the two cornerstones of broadcast media: synchronicity and locality. On the Internet, you don’t have to send everyone the same signal, and you don’t have to send it to them from a local source. People will watch what they want when they want it, and group themselves according to whatever shared interest they feel most strongly. Maybe their strongest shared interest will be their physical location, but I’m guessing not. Which means local TV is probably dead. It was an artifact of limitations imposed by old technology. If someone were creating an Internet-based TV company from scratch now, they might have some plan for shows aimed at specific regions, but it wouldn’t be a top priority.

Synchronicity and locality are tied together. TV network affiliates care what’s on at 10 because that delivers viewers for local news at 11. This connection adds more brittleness than strength, however: people don’t watch what’s on at 10 because they want to watch the news afterward.

TV networks will fight these trends, because they don’t have sufficient flexibility to adapt to them. They’re hemmed in by local affiliates in much the same way car companies are hemmed in by dealers and unions. Inevitably, the people running the networks will take the easy route and try to keep the old model running for a couple more years, just as the record labels have done.

A recent article in the Wall Street Journal described how TV networks were trying to add more live shows, partly as a way to make viewers watch TV synchronously instead of watching recorded shows when it suited them. Instead of delivering what viewers want, they’re trying to force them to change their habits to suit the networks’ obsolete business model. That never works unless you have a monopoly or cartel to enforce it, and even then it only works temporarily.

The other reason networks like live shows is that they’re cheaper to produce. There they have the right idea, but they haven’t followed it to its conclusion. Live content can be way cheaper than networks realize, and the way to take advantage of dramatic decreases in cost is to increase volume. The networks are prevented from seeing this whole line of reasoning because they still think of themselves as being in the broadcast business—as sending one signal to everyone. [4]


Now would be a good time to start any company that competes with TV networks. That’s what a lot of Internet startups are, though they may not have had this as an explicit goal. People only have so many leisure hours a day, and TV is premised on such long sessions (unlike Google, which prides itself on sending users on their way quickly) that anything that takes up their time is competing with it. But in addition to such indirect competitors, I think TV companies will increasingly face direct ones.

Even in cable TV, the long tail was lopped off prematurely by the threshold you had to get over to start a new channel. It will be longer on the Internet, and there will be more mobility within it. In this new world, the existing players will only have the advantages any big company has in its market.

That will change the balance of power between the networks and the people who produce shows. The networks used to be gatekeepers. They distributed your work, and sold advertising on it. Now the people who produce a show can distribute it themselves. The main value networks supply now is ad sales. Which will tend to put them in the position of service providers rather than publishers.

Shows will change even more. On the Internet there’s no reason to keep their current format, or even the fact that they have a single format. Indeed, the more interesting sort of convergence that’s coming is between shows and games. But on the question of what sort of entertainment gets distributed on the Internet in 20 years, I wouldn’t dare to make any predictions, except that things will change a lot. We’ll get whatever the most imaginative people can cook up. That’s why the Internet won.

Notes

[1] Thanks to Trevor Blackwell for this point. He adds: “I remember the eyes of phone company executives gleaming in the early 90s when they talked about convergence. They thought most programming would be on demand, and they would implement it and make a lot of money. It didn’t work out. They assumed that their local network infrastructure would be critical to do video on-demand, because you couldn’t possibly stream it from a few data centers over the internet. At the time (1992) the entire cross-country Internet bandwidth wasn’t enough for one video stream. But wide-area bandwidth increased more than they expected and they were beaten by iTunes and Hulu.”

[2] Copyright owners tend to focus on the aspect they see of piracy, which is the lost revenue. They therefore think what drives users to do it is the desire to get something for free. But iTunes shows that people will pay for stuff online, if you make it easy. A significant component of piracy is simply that it offers a better user experience.

[3] Or a phone that is actually a computer. I’m not making any predictions about the size of the device that will replace TV, just that it will have a browser and get data via the Internet.

[4] Emmett Shear writes: “I’d argue the long tail for sports may be even larger than the long tail for other kinds of content. Anyone can broadcast a high school football game that will be interesting to 10,000 people or so, even if the quality of production is not so good.”

Thanks to Sam Altman, Trevor Blackwell, Nancy Cook, Michael Seibel, Emmett Shear, and Fred Wilson for reading drafts of this.

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