是魅力,笨蛋
是魅力,笨蛋
2004年11月,2006年6月更正
奥卡姆剃刀说我们应该在两个解释中选择较简单的一个。我首先提醒读者这个原则,因为我将要提出一个理论,这将冒犯自由派和保守派。但奥卡姆剃刀实际上意味着,如果你想不同意它,你有一个 hell of a coincidence 需要解释。
理论:在美国总统选举中,更有魅力的候选人获胜。
写政治的人,无论是左派还是右派,都有一种一致的偏见:他们认真对待政治。当一个候选人击败另一个时,他们寻找政治解释。国家正在向左转,或向右转。而这种转变当然可能是总统选举的结果,这使得很容易相信它是原因。
但当我思考为什么我投票给克林顿而不是第一个乔治·布什时,不是因为我在向左转。克林顿似乎更有活力。他似乎更想要这份工作。布什看起来老而疲惫。我怀疑很多选民都是如此。
克林顿不代表任何国家向左的转变。[1] 他只是比乔治·布什或(上帝保佑我们)鲍勃·多尔更有魅力。2000年我们几乎得到了一个受控实验来证明这一点:戈尔有克林顿的政策,但没有他的魅力,他相应地遭受了损失。[2] 2004年的故事相同。克里比布什更聪明、更有口才,但相当僵硬。克里输了。
当我进一步回顾时,我一直发现相同的模式。权威人士说卡特击败福特是因为水门事件后国家不信任共和党。但碰巧卡特以其大咧咧的笑和朴实的方式而闻名,而福特则以无聊笨拙而闻名。四年后,权威人士说国家向右猛冲。但里根,前演员,也碰巧比卡特更有魅力(卡特的笑在四年有压力的总统任期后不那么愉快了)。1984年里根和蒙代尔之间的魅力差距就像克林顿和多尔多之间的差距,结果相似。第一个乔治·布什在1988年设法获胜,尽管他后来会被历史上最有魅力的总统之一击败,因为在1988年他的对手是臭名昭著缺乏魅力的迈克尔·杜卡基斯。
这些是我个人记得的选举,但显然1964年和1972年也出现了相同的模式。最近的反例似乎是1968年,当时尼克松击败了更有魅力的休伯特·汉弗莱。但当你检查那次选举时,它倾向于支持魅力理论而不是反驳它。正如乔·麦金尼斯在他著名的书《1968年总统的推销》中叙述的那样,尼克松知道他比汉弗莱魅力少,因此 simply 拒绝在电视上与他辩论。他知道他不能负担得起让两个人并排出现。
现在候选人可能无法拒绝辩论而逃脱。但在1968年,电视辩论的习惯仍在演变中。实际上,尼克松在1968年获胜是因为选民从未被允许看到真正的尼克松。他们看到的只是精心编排的竞选广告。
奇怪的是,最近真正的反例可能是1960年。虽然这次选举通常被作为电视力量的例子,但肯尼迪显然如果没有伊利诺伊州和得克萨斯州政党机器的欺诈就不会获胜。但电视在1960年还很年轻;只有87%的家庭拥有电视。[3] 毫无疑问,电视帮助了肯尼迪,所以历史学家正确地将这次选举视为分水岭。电视需要一种新型的候选人。不再有卡尔文·柯立芝了。
魅力理论也可能解释为什么民主党倾向于输掉总统选举。民主党意识形态的核心似乎是对政府的信念。也许这 tends to attract people who are earnest, but dull. 杜卡基斯、戈尔和克里在这方面如此相似,他们可能是兄弟。对民主党来说幸运的是,他们的筛选器偶尔会让克林顿通过,即使一些丑闻随之而来。[4]
人们愿意相信选举是在问题上赢得或失败的,即使是像威利·霍顿这样的假问题。然而,如果它们是,我们有一个值得注意的巧合需要解释。自电视普及以来的每一次总统选举,明显更有魅力的候选人都获胜。令人惊讶的是,不是吗,选民对问题的意见连续11次与魅力一致?
在事后分析中提出向左或向右转变的政治评论家就像那些日复一日地被迫写关于股市随机波动故事的金融记者。一天结束,市场收盘上涨或下跌,记者分别寻找好坏消息,然后写市场因英特尔收益而上涨,或因中东不稳定恐惧而下跌。假设我们能以某种方式向这些记者提供关于市场收盘的错误信息,但给他们所有其他新闻 intact。有人相信他们会注意到异常,而不是简单地写股票因当天任何好(或坏)消息而上涨(或下跌)吗?他们会说,嘿,等一下,在中东所有这种动荡的情况下股票怎么能上涨?
我不是说问题对选民不重要。当然它们重要。但主要政党太了解哪些问题对多少选民有多重要,并如此精确地调整他们的信息作为回应,以至于他们倾向于在问题上平分秋色,让选举由他们无法控制的一个因素决定:魅力。
如果民主党在2004年选举中有一个像克林顿一样有魅力的候选人,他就会获胜。我们会读到选举是对伊拉克战争的全民公决,而不是民主党与美国中部的福音派基督徒脱节。
在1992年选举期间,克林顿竞选班子在办公室有一个大标语说”是经济,傻瓜”。也许这比他们想象的还要简单。
后记
关于魅力理论的意见似乎有分歧。有些人说不可能,其他人说很明显。这似乎是个好迹象。也许它处于中间的甜蜜点。
至于它不可能,我回答:这里是数据;这里是理论;理论100%解释数据。至少对科学家来说,这意味着它值得注意,无论它看起来多么难以置信。
你不能相信选民如此肤浅,以至于他们只选择最有魅力的家伙?我的理论不要求这样。我不是说魅力是唯一的因素,只是说它是两个党派努力相互抵消后留下的唯一因素。
至于理论是显而易见的,据我所知,以前没有人提出过。选举预测者能够用更复杂的模型达到相同结果时感到自豪。
最后,对那些说理论可能是真的,但相当令人沮丧的人:它不像看起来那么糟糕。这种现象就像定价异常;一旦人们意识到它在那里,它就会消失。一旦两个党派都意识到提名没有魅力的候选人是浪费时间,他们将倾向于只提名最有魅力的。如果候选人魅力相当,魅力将相互抵消,选举将在问题上决定,正如政治评论家喜欢认为现在的情况。
注释
[1] 正如克林顿自己在总统任期的第一个行为中试图向左转军方时惊奇地发现的那样。经过一场激烈的斗争,他得以挽救面子地逃脱。
[2] 确实,戈尔赢得了普选票。但政治家知道选举人票决定选举,所以他们为此竞选。如果布什一直在为普选票竞选,他大概会得到更多。(感谢 judgmentalist 提出这一点。)
[3] 来源:尼尔森媒体研究。在剩下的13%中,11%没有电视是因为他们负担不起。我认为缺失的11%可能也是最容易受魅力影响的11%。
[4] 这一理论的一个含义是党派不应该太快拒绝有秘密的候选人。有魅力的候选人往往比无可挑剔的呆子有更多秘密,但实际上这似乎不会输掉选举。例如,现任布什可能在二十多岁时比任何前任总统都做过更多的毒品,但却能够以福音派基督徒为基础当选。你只需要说你已经改过自新,并在细节上设置障碍。
感谢Trevor Blackwell、Maria Daniels、Jessica Livingston、Jackie McDonough和Robert Morris阅读本文的草稿,以及Eric Raymond指出我在1968年上错了。
相关
什么是魅力 政治和表演艺术 日语翻译
It’s Charisma, Stupid
November 2004, corrected June 2006
Occam’s razor says we should prefer the simpler of two explanations. I begin by reminding readers of this principle because I’m about to propose a theory that will offend both liberals and conservatives. But Occam’s razor means, in effect, that if you want to disagree with it, you have a hell of a coincidence to explain.
Theory: In US presidential elections, the more charismatic candidate wins.
People who write about politics, whether on the left or the right, have a consistent bias: they take politics seriously. When one candidate beats another they look for political explanations. The country is shifting to the left, or the right. And that sort of shift can certainly be the result of a presidential election, which makes it easy to believe it was the cause.
But when I think about why I voted for Clinton over the first George Bush, it wasn’t because I was shifting to the left. Clinton just seemed more dynamic. He seemed to want the job more. Bush seemed old and tired. I suspect it was the same for a lot of voters.
Clinton didn’t represent any national shift leftward. [1] He was just more charismatic than George Bush or (God help us) Bob Dole. In 2000 we practically got a controlled experiment to prove it: Gore had Clinton’s policies, but not his charisma, and he suffered proportionally. [2] Same story in 2004. Kerry was smarter and more articulate than Bush, but rather a stiff. And Kerry lost.
As I looked further back, I kept finding the same pattern. Pundits said Carter beat Ford because the country distrusted the Republicans after Watergate. And yet it also happened that Carter was famous for his big grin and folksy ways, and Ford for being a boring klutz. Four years later, pundits said the country had lurched to the right. But Reagan, a former actor, also happened to be even more charismatic than Carter (whose grin was somewhat less cheery after four stressful years in office). In 1984 the charisma gap between Reagan and Mondale was like that between Clinton and Dole, with similar results. The first George Bush managed to win in 1988, though he would later be vanquished by one of the most charismatic presidents ever, because in 1988 he was up against the notoriously uncharismatic Michael Dukakis.
These are the elections I remember personally, but apparently the same pattern played out in 1964 and 1972. The most recent counterexample appears to be 1968, when Nixon beat the more charismatic Hubert Humphrey. But when you examine that election, it tends to support the charisma theory more than contradict it. As Joe McGinnis recounts in his famous book The Selling of the President 1968, Nixon knew he had less charisma than Humphrey, and thus simply refused to debate him on TV. He knew he couldn’t afford to let the two of them be seen side by side.
Now a candidate probably couldn’t get away with refusing to debate. But in 1968 the custom of televised debates was still evolving. In effect, Nixon won in 1968 because voters were never allowed to see the real Nixon. All they saw were carefully scripted campaign spots.
Oddly enough, the most recent true counterexample is probably 1960. Though this election is usually given as an example of the power of TV, Kennedy apparently would not have won without fraud by party machines in Illinois and Texas. But TV was still young in 1960; only 87% of households had it. [3] Undoubtedly TV helped Kennedy, so historians are correct in regarding this election as a watershed. TV required a new kind of candidate. There would be no more Calvin Coolidges.
The charisma theory may also explain why Democrats tend to lose presidential elections. The core of the Democrats’ ideology seems to be a belief in government. Perhaps this tends to attract people who are earnest, but dull. Dukakis, Gore, and Kerry were so similar in that respect that they might have been brothers. Good thing for the Democrats that their screen lets through an occasional Clinton, even if some scandal results. [4]
One would like to believe elections are won and lost on issues, if only fake ones like Willie Horton. And yet, if they are, we have a remarkable coincidence to explain. In every presidential election since TV became widespread, the apparently more charismatic candidate has won. Surprising, isn’t it, that voters’ opinions on the issues have lined up with charisma for 11 elections in a row?
The political commentators who come up with shifts to the left or right in their morning-after analyses are like the financial reporters stuck writing stories day after day about the random fluctuations of the stock market. Day ends, market closes up or down, reporter looks for good or bad news respectively, and writes that the market was up on news of Intel’s earnings, or down on fears of instability in the Middle East. Suppose we could somehow feed these reporters false information about market closes, but give them all the other news intact. Does anyone believe they would notice the anomaly, and not simply write that stocks were up (or down) on whatever good (or bad) news there was that day? That they would say, hey, wait a minute, how can stocks be up with all this unrest in the Middle East?
I’m not saying that issues don’t matter to voters. Of course they do. But the major parties know so well which issues matter how much to how many voters, and adjust their message so precisely in response, that they tend to split the difference on the issues, leaving the election to be decided by the one factor they can’t control: charisma.
If the Democrats had been running a candidate as charismatic as Clinton in the 2004 election, he’d have won. And we’d be reading that the election was a referendum on the war in Iraq, instead of that the Democrats are out of touch with evangelical Christians in middle America.
During the 1992 election, the Clinton campaign staff had a big sign in their office saying “It’s the economy, stupid.” Perhaps it was even simpler than they thought.
Postscript
Opinions seem to be divided about the charisma theory. Some say it’s impossible, others say it’s obvious. This seems a good sign. Perhaps it’s in the sweet spot midway between.
As for it being impossible, I reply: here’s the data; here’s the theory; theory explains data 100%. To a scientist, at least, that means it deserves attention, however implausible it seems.
You can’t believe voters are so superficial that they just choose the most charismatic guy? My theory doesn’t require that. I’m not proposing that charisma is the only factor, just that it’s the only one left after the efforts of the two parties cancel one another out.
As for the theory being obvious, as far as I know, no one has proposed it before. Election forecasters are proud when they can achieve the same results with much more complicated models.
Finally, to the people who say that the theory is probably true, but rather depressing: it’s not so bad as it seems. The phenomenon is like a pricing anomaly; once people realize it’s there, it will disappear. Once both parties realize it’s a waste of time to nominate uncharismatic candidates, they’ll tend to nominate only the most charismatic ones. And if the candidates are equally charismatic, charisma will cancel out, and elections will be decided on issues, as political commentators like to think they are now.
Notes
[1] As Clinton himself discovered to his surprise when, in one of his first acts as president, he tried to shift the military leftward. After a bruising fight he escaped with a face-saving compromise.
[2] True, Gore won the popular vote. But politicians know the electoral vote decides the election, so that’s what they campaign for. If Bush had been campaigning for the popular vote he would presumably have got more of it. (Thanks to judgmentalist for this point.)
[3] Source: Nielsen Media Research. Of the remaining 13%, 11 didn’t have TV because they couldn’t afford it. I’d argue that the missing 11% were probably also the 11% most susceptible to charisma.
[4] One implication of this theory is that parties shouldn’t be too quick to reject candidates with skeletons in their closets. Charismatic candidates will tend to have more skeletons than squeaky clean dullards, but in practice that doesn’t seem to lose elections. The current Bush, for example, probably did more drugs in his twenties than any preceding president, and yet managed to get elected with a base of evangelical Christians. All you have to do is say you’ve reformed, and stonewall about the details.
Thanks to Trevor Blackwell, Maria Daniels, Jessica Livingston, Jackie McDonough, and Robert Morris for reading drafts of this, and to Eric Raymond for pointing out that I was wrong about 1968.
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