泡沫的正确之处
泡沫的正确之处
2004年9月
(本文源自ICFP 2004的特邀演讲。)
我在互联网泡沫中有一排前排座位,因为我在1998年和1999年在雅虎工作。有一天,当股票交易在200美元左右时,我坐下来计算我认为价格应该是多少。我得到的答案是12美元。我走到下一个隔间告诉我的朋友Trevor。“十二!“他说。他试图听起来愤怒,但没有完全做到。他知道我们的估值是疯狂的。
雅虎是一个特例。不仅仅是我们的市盈率是假的。我们一半的收益也是假的。当然不是安然那种方式。财务人员在报告收益方面似乎一丝不苟。使我们的收益虚假的是,雅虎实际上是庞氏骗局的中心。投资者看着雅虎的收益,对自己说,这里证明互联网公司可以赚钱。所以他们投资于承诺成为下一个雅虎的新创业公司。一旦这些创业公司拿到钱,他们用钱做什么?在雅虎上购买数百万美元的广告来推广他们的品牌。结果:本季度对创业公司的资本投资在下季度显示为雅虎收益——刺激了新一轮的创业公司投资。
就像在庞氏骗局中一样,这个系统似乎的回报只是对它的最新一轮投资。使它不是庞氏骗局的是它是无意的。至少,我认为是。风险投资行业相当乱伦, presumably有一些人处于能够意识到发生了什么并从中获利的位置。
一年后游戏结束了。从2000年1月开始,雅虎的股价开始崩溃,最终失去了95%的价值。
但请注意,即使市值被削减了所有脂肪,雅虎仍然价值连城。即使在2001年3月和4月的宿醉估值中,雅虎的人还是在短短六年内创建了一家价值约80亿美元的公司。
事实是,尽管我们在泡沫期间听到的关于”新经济”的种种胡言乱语,但有一个核心的真理。要得到一个真正的大泡沫,你需要这个:在中心有坚实的东西,这样即使是聪明人也会被吸引进来。(艾萨克·牛顿和乔纳森·斯威夫特都在1720年的南海泡沫中赔了钱。)
现在钟摆已经摆向另一边。现在任何在泡沫期间变得时髦的东西都不合时宜。但这是一个错误——比相信1999年每个人说的话更大的错误。从长远来看,泡沫正确的地方将比它错误的地方更重要。
1. 零售风险投资
在泡沫的过度之后,现在在公司有收益之前将其上市被认为是可疑的。但这个想法本身并没有什么内在错误。在早期阶段将公司上市只是零售风险投资:不是去风险投资公司寻求最后一轮融资,而是去公开市场。
到泡沫结束时,没有收益就上市的公司被嘲笑为”概念股”,好像投资它们本质上是愚蠢的。但投资概念并不愚蠢;这是风险投资家所做的,其中最好的远非愚蠢。
还没有收益的公司股票是有价值的。市场可能需要一段时间来学习如何评估这类公司,就像它在20世纪初必须学习如何评估普通股票一样。但市场擅长解决这类问题。如果市场最终做得比现在的风险投资家更好,我不会感到惊讶。
早期上市不会是每个公司的正确计划。当然,它可能会造成破坏——分散管理层的注意力,或者让早期员工突然变富。但就像市场将学习如何评估创业公司一样,创业公司将学习如何最小化上市的损害。
2. 互联网
互联网确实是一件大事。这是即使聪明人也被泡沫愚弄的原因之一。显然它将产生巨大影响。足以在两年内使纳斯达克公司的价值翻三倍?事实证明,没有。但在当时很难确定。[1]
同样的事情发生在密西西比和南海泡沫期间。驱动它们的是有组织公共金融的发明(南海公司,尽管其名称,实际上是英格兰银行的竞争对手)。从长远来看,这确实是一件大事。
认识到一个重要趋势比弄清楚如何从中获利更容易。投资者似乎总是犯的错误是过于字面地理解趋势。由于互联网是新的重要事物,投资者认为公司越互联网化越好。因此出现了Pets.Com这样的笑话。
事实上,从大趋势中赚到的大部分钱都是间接赚的。在铁路繁荣期间赚钱最多的不是铁路本身,而是两边的公司,比如卡内基的钢铁厂,它制造铁轨,以及标准石油,它使用铁路将石油运到东海岸,在那里可以运往欧洲。
我认为互联网将产生巨大影响,而且到目前为止我们所见到的与即将到来的相比根本不算什么。但大多数赢家只会间接是互联网公司;每有一个谷歌,就会有十个捷蓝航空。
3. 选择
为什么互联网会产生巨大影响?一般论点是新的沟通方式总是会产生巨大影响。它们很少发生(直到工业时代只有语言、写作和印刷),但当它们发生时,它们总会引起大轰动。
具体论点之一,或者其中之一,是互联网给我们更多选择。在”旧”经济中,向人们展示信息的高成本意味着他们只有狭窄的选择范围。通往消费者的微小、昂贵的管道被恰当地称为”渠道”。控制渠道,你就可以按照你的条件喂给他们你想给的东西。而且不仅仅是依赖这一原则的大公司。同样,工会、传统新闻媒体以及艺术和文学机构也是如此。获胜不取决于做好工作,而取决于获得对某些瓶颈的控制。
有迹象表明这种情况正在改变。谷歌每月有超过8200万独立用户,年收入约30亿美元。[2] 然而,你见过谷歌广告吗?这里有些事情正在发生。
诚然,谷歌是一个极端案例。人们很容易转向新的搜索引擎。尝试一个新的搜索引擎需要很少的努力,不需要花钱,而且很容易看出结果是否更好。所以谷歌不必做广告。在他们这样的业务中,做到最好就足够了。
互联网令人兴奋的是它正在将一切朝那个方向转变。如果你想通过制造最好的东西来获胜,困难的部分是开始。最终每个人都会通过口碑了解到你是最好的,但你如何活到那个时候?而正是在这个关键阶段,互联网的影响最大。首先,互联网让任何人几乎零成本找到你。其次,它极大地加速了口碑传播声誉的速度。总之,这意味着在许多领域,规则将是:建造它,他们就会来。制造伟大的东西并把它放在网上。这与上个世纪的获胜秘诀有很大的不同。
4. 青年
互联网泡沫方面,新闻媒体似乎最着迷的是一些创业创始人的年轻。这也是一个将持续的趋势。26岁的人之间有巨大的标准差。有些人只适合入门级工作,但有些人已经准备好统治世界,如果他们能找到人处理文书工作。
26岁的人可能不太擅长管理人员或处理SEC事务。那些需要经验。但那些也是商品,可以交给某个副手。CEO最重要的素质是他对公司未来的愿景。他们下一步将建造什么?而在那方面,有26岁的人可以与任何人竞争。
1970年,公司总裁意味着至少五十多岁的人。如果他有技术人员为他工作,他们被对待就像赛马场:珍贵,但没有权力。但随着技术变得越来越重要,极客的力量也随之增长以反映这一点。现在,CEO有一个聪明人可以咨询技术事务是不够的。 increasingly,他自己必须是那个人。
像往常一样,商业 clinging to old forms. 风险投资家似乎仍然想安装一个看起来合法的发言者作为CEO。但 increasingly公司的创始人是真正的权力,而风险投资家安装的灰头发人更像音乐团体的经理而不是将军。
5. 非正式
在纽约,泡沫产生了戏剧性的后果:西装过时了。它们使人显得老。所以在1998年,强大的纽约类型突然穿着开领衬衫、卡其裤和椭圆形金属丝眼镜,就像圣克拉拉的家伙。
钟摆摆回了一点,部分是由于服装行业的恐慌反应。但我赌开领衬衫。这不像看起来那么 frivolous 一个问题。衣服很重要,所有极客都能感觉到,尽管他们可能没有意识地意识到。
如果你是一个极客,你可以通过问自己如何感觉关于一个让你穿西装打领带去工作的公司来理解衣服有多重要。这个主意听起来很可怕,不是吗?事实上,可怕的程度远远超过穿这种衣服的 mere 不适。一个让程序员穿西装的公司会有一些 deeply 错误的地方。
而错误的地方在于一个人的外表表现比一个人的想法质量更重要。这就是形式主义的问题。打扮本身并不那么坏。问题是它绑定的受体:打扮不可避免地成为好想法的替代品。技术上无能的商业类型被称为”西装”并非巧合。
极客不只是碰巧穿着非正式。他们做得太一致了。有意识或无意识地,他们穿着非正式作为防止愚蠢的预防措施。
6. 极客
服装只是反形式主义战争中最可见的战场。极客倾向于避免任何形式的 formality。他们对工作头衔,例如,或任何其他权威的附属物不感兴趣。
事实上,这几乎就是极客的定义。我最近发现自己在和一个来自好莱坞的人交谈,他正在策划一个关于极客的节目。我认为如果我解释什么是极客会有用。我想出的是:一个不在营销自己上花费任何精力的人。
换句话说,极客是专注于实质内容的人。那么极客和技术之间有什么联系?大致是你无法愚弄自然。在技术问题上,你必须得到正确的答案。如果你的软件错误计算了太空探测器的路径,你无法通过说你的代码是爱国的,或前卫的,或人们在非技术领域使用的任何其他遁词来摆脱困境。
随着技术在经济中变得越来越重要,极客文化也随之兴起。极客已经比我小时候酷多了。当我在1980年代中期上大学时,“极客”仍然是一种侮辱。主修计算机科学的人通常试图隐瞒这一点。现在女性问我她们在哪里可以遇到极客。(脑海中浮现的答案是”Usenix”,但这就像从消防栓喝水一样。)
我对为什么极客文化变得越来越被接受没有幻想。不是因为人们意识到实质比营销更重要。是因为极客变得富有。但这不会改变。
7. 期权
使极客富有的通常是股票期权。现在有一些动向使公司更难授予期权。如果有一些真正的会计滥用正在进行,当然要纠正它。但不要杀死金鹅。股权是驱动技术创新的燃料。
期权是一个好主意,因为(a)它们是公平的,(b)它们有效。去公司工作的人(希望)正在增加其价值,给他们一份份额是公平的。作为一个纯粹的实际措施,人们有期权时工作努力得多。我亲眼看到这一点。
泡沫期间一些骗子通过授予自己期权抢劫公司并不意味着期权是一个坏主意。在铁路繁荣期间,一些高管通过出售掺水股票致富——发行的股份比他们声称的流通股多。但这并不意味着普通股是一个坏主意。骗子只是使用任何可用的手段。
如果期权有问题,那就是它们奖励了稍微错误的东西。不足为奇,人们做你付钱让他们做的事。如果你按小时付钱给他们,他们会工作很多小时。如果你按完成的工作量付钱给他们,他们会完成很多工作(但只按你定义的工作)。如果你付钱给他们提高股价,这就是期权的本质,他们会提高股价。
但这不是你想要的。你想要的是增加公司的实际价值,而不是其市值。随着时间的推移,两者不可避免地相遇,但并不总是像期权授予那样快。这意味着期权诱惑员工,即使只是无意识地,“拉高出货”——做会使公司看起来有价值的事情。我发现当我在雅虎时,我不禁思考”这对投资者听起来如何?“而本应思考”这是一个好主意吗?”
所以也许标准的期权交易需要稍微调整。也许期权应该用更直接与收益挂钩的东西替代。现在还早。
8. 创业公司
使期权有价值的,大部分是因为它们是创业公司股票的期权。创业公司当然不是泡沫的创造,但它们在泡沫期间比以往任何时候都更可见。
泡沫期间大多数人第一次了解到的事情之一就是为出售而创建的创业公司。最初创业公司意味着希望成长为一家大公司的小公司。但 increasingly 创业公司正在演变为一种在投机基础上开发技术的工具。
正如我在《黑客与画家》中写的,员工在按他们创造的财富比例获得报酬时似乎生产力最高。创业公司的优势——实际上几乎是它的存在理由——是它提供了 otherwise 不可能获得的东西:一种衡量方法。
在许多业务中,公司通过购买创业公司而不是内部开发来获得技术更有意义。你支付更多,但风险更少,而风险是大公司不想要的。它使开发技术的人更有责任感,因为他们只有在构建赢家时才能得到报酬。你最终获得更好的技术,创建得更快,因为事情是在创业公司的创新氛围而不是大公司的官僚氛围中制造的。
我们的创业公司Viaweb是为了出售而建立的。我们从一开始就对投资者坦诚这一点。我们小心地创建可以轻松插入更大公司的东西。这是未来的模式。
9. 加利福尼亚
泡沫是加利福尼亚现象。当我在1998年出现在硅谷时,我感觉像1900年抵达美国的东欧移民。每个人都如此愉快、健康和富有。这似乎是一个新的改进的世界。
新闻媒体,总是渴望夸大小趋势,现在给人的印象是硅谷是一个鬼城。完全不是。当我从机场开车下101号公路时,我仍然感到一种能量嗡嗡声,好像附近有一个巨型变压器。房地产仍然比全国几乎所有其他地方都贵。人们仍然看起来健康,天气仍然 fabulous。未来在那里。(我说”那里”是因为雅虎后我搬回了东海岸。我仍然想知道这是否是一个聪明的主意。)
使湾区优越的是人们的态度。我注意到当我回家到波士顿时。我走出航空终端看到的第一件事是负责出租车队伍的肥胖、脾气暴躁的家伙。我准备好面对粗鲁:记住,你现在回到了东海岸。
气氛因城市而异,像创业公司这样脆弱的生物对这种变化极其敏感。如果”进步”这个词还没有被劫持为自由的新委婉语,描述湾区气氛的词应该是”进步的”。那里的人们正在努力建设未来。波士顿有麻省理工学院和哈佛,但它也有很多好斗的工会员工,比如最近将民主党全国代表大会当作人质的警察,以及很多试图成为瑟斯顿·豪厄尔的人。一枚过时硬币的两面。
硅谷可能不是下一个巴黎或伦敦,但它至少是下一个芝加哥。未来五十年,新财富将来自那里。
10. 生产力
在泡沫期间,乐观的分析师曾经说技术将极大地提高生产力,从而为高市盈率辩护。他们对具体公司是错误的,但对基本原则并不那么错误。我认为我们在未来世纪将看到的大趋势之一是生产力的巨大提高。
或者更准确地说,生产力变化的巨大增加。技术是一个杠杆。它不增加;它乘以。如果当前的生产力范围是0到100,引入10的倍数将范围增加到0到1000。
其中一个结果是未来的公司可能会出奇地小。我有时做白日梦,想想你能在不超过十个人的情况下将一家公司(在收入上)发展到多大。如果你将除产品开发之外的一切都外包会发生什么?如果你尝试这个实验,我想你会惊讶于你能走多远。正如Fred Brooks指出的,小群体本质上更有生产力,因为群体内部的摩擦随着其大小的平方增长。
直到最近,经营一家大公司意味着管理一支工人军队。我们对公司应该有多少员工的标准仍然受旧模式的影响。创业公司必然很小,因为他们负担不起雇佣很多人。但我认为公司在收入增加时放松腰带是一个大错误。问题不是你能否负担额外的薪水。你能否负担因公司变大而带来的生产力损失?
技术杠杆的前景当然会引发失业的幽灵。我很惊讶人们仍然担心这个。经过几个世纪的工作杀死的创新,工作数量在想要工作的人数的百分之十以内。这不可能是巧合。必须有某种平衡机制。
新的是什么
当人们审视这些趋势时,有任何总体主题吗?似乎确实有:在下个世纪,好想法将更加重要。有良好想法的26岁的人将越来越比有强大人脉的50岁的人有优势。做好工作将比打扮更重要——或者广告,对公司来说是一回事。人们将按照他们创造价值的比例得到更多回报。
如果是这样,这确实是个好消息。好想法最终总会获胜。问题是,这可能需要很长时间。相对论花了几十年才被接受,而大部分时间才证明中央计划不起作用。所以即使是好想法获胜速度的小幅增加也将是一个重大变化——可能大到足以证明”新经济”这样的名称是合理的。
注释
[1] 实际上现在很难说。正如Jeremy Siegel指出的,如果股票的价值是其未来收益,在你看到收益结果之前你无法判断它是否被高估。虽然某些著名的互联网股票在1999年几乎肯定被高估,但仍然很难确定例如纳斯达克指数是否被高估。
Siegel, Jeremy J. “什么是资产价格泡沫?一个操作性定义。” 欧洲金融管理,9:1, 2003。
[2] 用户数量来自谷歌网站上引用的6/03尼尔森研究。(你会认为他们会有更近期的。)收入估计基于2004年上半年13.5亿美元的收入,如他们IPO文件中报告的那样。
感谢Chris Anderson、Trevor Blackwell、Sarah Harlin、Jessica Livingston和Robert Morris阅读本文的草稿。
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What the Bubble Got Right
September 2004
(This essay is derived from an invited talk at ICFP 2004.)
I had a front row seat for the Internet Bubble, because I worked at Yahoo during 1998 and 1999. One day, when the stock was trading around 12. I went to the next cubicle and told my friend Trevor. “Twelve!” he said. He tried to sound indignant, but he didn’t quite manage it. He knew as well as I did that our valuation was crazy.
Yahoo was a special case. It was not just our price to earnings ratio that was bogus. Half our earnings were too. Not in the Enron way, of course. The finance guys seemed scrupulous about reporting earnings. What made our earnings bogus was that Yahoo was, in effect, the center of a Ponzi scheme. Investors looked at Yahoo’s earnings and said to themselves, here is proof that Internet companies can make money. So they invested in new startups that promised to be the next Yahoo. And as soon as these startups got the money, what did they do with it? Buy millions of dollars worth of advertising on Yahoo to promote their brand. Result: a capital investment in a startup this quarter shows up as Yahoo earnings next quarter—stimulating another round of investments in startups.
As in a Ponzi scheme, what seemed to be the returns of this system were simply the latest round of investments in it. What made it not a Ponzi scheme was that it was unintentional. At least, I think it was. The venture capital business is pretty incestuous, and there were presumably people in a position, if not to create this situation, to realize what was happening and to milk it.
A year later the game was up. Starting in January 2000, Yahoo’s stock price began to crash, ultimately losing 95% of its value.
Notice, though, that even with all the fat trimmed off its market cap, Yahoo was still worth a lot. Even at the morning-after valuations of March and April 2001, the people at Yahoo had managed to create a company worth about $8 billion in just six years.
The fact is, despite all the nonsense we heard during the Bubble about the “new economy,” there was a core of truth. You need that to get a really big bubble: you need to have something solid at the center, so that even smart people are sucked in. (Isaac Newton and Jonathan Swift both lost money in the South Sea Bubble of 1720.)
Now the pendulum has swung the other way. Now anything that became fashionable during the Bubble is ipso facto unfashionable. But that’s a mistake—an even bigger mistake than believing what everyone was saying in 1999. Over the long term, what the Bubble got right will be more important than what it got wrong.
1. Retail VC
After the excesses of the Bubble, it’s now considered dubious to take companies public before they have earnings. But there is nothing intrinsically wrong with that idea. Taking a company public at an early stage is simply retail VC: instead of going to venture capital firms for the last round of funding, you go to the public markets.
By the end of the Bubble, companies going public with no earnings were being derided as “concept stocks,” as if it were inherently stupid to invest in them. But investing in concepts isn’t stupid; it’s what VCs do, and the best of them are far from stupid.
The stock of a company that doesn’t yet have earnings is worth something. It may take a while for the market to learn how to value such companies, just as it had to learn to value common stocks in the early 20th century. But markets are good at solving that kind of problem. I wouldn’t be surprised if the market ultimately did a better job than VCs do now.
Going public early will not be the right plan for every company. And it can of course be disruptive—by distracting the management, or by making the early employees suddenly rich. But just as the market will learn how to value startups, startups will learn how to minimize the damage of going public.
2. The Internet
The Internet genuinely is a big deal. That was one reason even smart people were fooled by the Bubble. Obviously it was going to have a huge effect. Enough of an effect to triple the value of Nasdaq companies in two years? No, as it turned out. But it was hard to say for certain at the time. [1]
The same thing happened during the Mississippi and South Sea Bubbles. What drove them was the invention of organized public finance (the South Sea Company, despite its name, was really a competitor of the Bank of England). And that did turn out to be a big deal, in the long run.
Recognizing an important trend turns out to be easier than figuring out how to profit from it. The mistake investors always seem to make is to take the trend too literally. Since the Internet was the big new thing, investors supposed that the more Internettish the company, the better. Hence such parodies as Pets.Com.
In fact most of the money to be made from big trends is made indirectly. It was not the railroads themselves that made the most money during the railroad boom, but the companies on either side, like Carnegie’s steelworks, which made the rails, and Standard Oil, which used railroads to get oil to the East Coast, where it could be shipped to Europe.
I think the Internet will have great effects, and that what we’ve seen so far is nothing compared to what’s coming. But most of the winners will only indirectly be Internet companies; for every Google there will be ten JetBlues.
3. Choices
Why will the Internet have great effects? The general argument is that new forms of communication always do. They happen rarely (till industrial times there were just speech, writing, and printing), but when they do, they always cause a big splash.
The specific argument, or one of them, is the Internet gives us more choices. In the “old” economy, the high cost of presenting information to people meant they had only a narrow range of options to choose from. The tiny, expensive pipeline to consumers was tellingly named “the channel.” Control the channel and you could feed them what you wanted, on your terms. And it was not just big corporations that depended on this principle. So, in their way, did labor unions, the traditional news media, and the art and literary establishments. Winning depended not on doing good work, but on gaining control of some bottleneck.
There are signs that this is changing. Google has over 82 million unique users a month and annual revenues of about three billion dollars. [2] And yet have you ever seen a Google ad? Something is going on here.
Admittedly, Google is an extreme case. It’s very easy for people to switch to a new search engine. It costs little effort and no money to try a new one, and it’s easy to see if the results are better. And so Google doesn’t have to advertise. In a business like theirs, being the best is enough.
The exciting thing about the Internet is that it’s shifting everything in that direction. The hard part, if you want to win by making the best stuff, is the beginning. Eventually everyone will learn by word of mouth that you’re the best, but how do you survive to that point? And it is in this crucial stage that the Internet has the most effect. First, the Internet lets anyone find you at almost zero cost. Second, it dramatically speeds up the rate at which reputation spreads by word of mouth. Together these mean that in many fields the rule will be: Build it, and they will come. Make something great and put it online. That is a big change from the recipe for winning in the past century.
4. Youth
The aspect of the Internet Bubble that the press seemed most taken with was the youth of some of the startup founders. This too is a trend that will last. There is a huge standard deviation among 26 year olds. Some are fit only for entry level jobs, but others are ready to rule the world if they can find someone to handle the paperwork for them.
A 26 year old may not be very good at managing people or dealing with the SEC. Those require experience. But those are also commodities, which can be handed off to some lieutenant. The most important quality in a CEO is his vision for the company’s future. What will they build next? And in that department, there are 26 year olds who can compete with anyone.
In 1970 a company president meant someone in his fifties, at least. If he had technologists working for him, they were treated like a racing stable: prized, but not powerful. But as technology has grown more important, the power of nerds has grown to reflect it. Now it’s not enough for a CEO to have someone smart he can ask about technical matters. Increasingly, he has to be that person himself.
As always, business has clung to old forms. VCs still seem to want to install a legitimate-looking talking head as the CEO. But increasingly the founders of the company are the real powers, and the grey-headed man installed by the VCs more like a music group’s manager than a general.
5. Informality
In New York, the Bubble had dramatic consequences: suits went out of fashion. They made one seem old. So in 1998 powerful New York types were suddenly wearing open-necked shirts and khakis and oval wire-rimmed glasses, just like guys in Santa Clara.
The pendulum has swung back a bit, driven in part by a panicked reaction by the clothing industry. But I’m betting on the open-necked shirts. And this is not as frivolous a question as it might seem. Clothes are important, as all nerds can sense, though they may not realize it consciously.
If you’re a nerd, you can understand how important clothes are by asking yourself how you’d feel about a company that made you wear a suit and tie to work. The idea sounds horrible, doesn’t it? In fact, horrible far out of proportion to the mere discomfort of wearing such clothes. A company that made programmers wear suits would have something deeply wrong with it.
And what would be wrong would be that how one presented oneself counted more than the quality of one’s ideas. That’s the problem with formality. Dressing up is not so much bad in itself. The problem is the receptor it binds to: dressing up is inevitably a substitute for good ideas. It is no coincidence that technically inept business types are known as “suits.”
Nerds don’t just happen to dress informally. They do it too consistently. Consciously or not, they dress informally as a prophylactic measure against stupidity.
6. Nerds
Clothing is only the most visible battleground in the war against formality. Nerds tend to eschew formality of any sort. They’re not impressed by one’s job title, for example, or any of the other appurtenances of authority.
Indeed, that’s practically the definition of a nerd. I found myself talking recently to someone from Hollywood who was planning a show about nerds. I thought it would be useful if I explained what a nerd was. What I came up with was: someone who doesn’t expend any effort on marketing himself.
A nerd, in other words, is someone who concentrates on substance. So what’s the connection between nerds and technology? Roughly that you can’t fool mother nature. In technical matters, you have to get the right answers. If your software miscalculates the path of a space probe, you can’t finesse your way out of trouble by saying that your code is patriotic, or avant-garde, or any of the other dodges people use in nontechnical fields.
And as technology becomes increasingly important in the economy, nerd culture is rising with it. Nerds are already a lot cooler than they were when I was a kid. When I was in college in the mid-1980s, “nerd” was still an insult. People who majored in computer science generally tried to conceal it. Now women ask me where they can meet nerds. (The answer that springs to mind is “Usenix,” but that would be like drinking from a firehose.)
I have no illusions about why nerd culture is becoming more accepted. It’s not because people are realizing that substance is more important than marketing. It’s because the nerds are getting rich. But that is not going to change.
7. Options
What makes the nerds rich, usually, is stock options. Now there are moves afoot to make it harder for companies to grant options. To the extent there’s some genuine accounting abuse going on, by all means correct it. But don’t kill the golden goose. Equity is the fuel that drives technical innovation.
Options are a good idea because (a) they’re fair, and (b) they work. Someone who goes to work for a company is (one hopes) adding to its value, and it’s only fair to give them a share of it. And as a purely practical measure, people work a lot harder when they have options. I’ve seen that first hand.
The fact that a few crooks during the Bubble robbed their companies by granting themselves options doesn’t mean options are a bad idea. During the railroad boom, some executives enriched themselves by selling watered stock—by issuing more shares than they said were outstanding. But that doesn’t make common stock a bad idea. Crooks just use whatever means are available.
If there is a problem with options, it’s that they reward slightly the wrong thing. Not surprisingly, people do what you pay them to. If you pay them by the hour, they’ll work a lot of hours. If you pay them by the volume of work done, they’ll get a lot of work done (but only as you defined work). And if you pay them to raise the stock price, which is what options amount to, they’ll raise the stock price.
But that’s not quite what you want. What you want is to increase the actual value of the company, not its market cap. Over time the two inevitably meet, but not always as quickly as options vest. Which means options tempt employees, if only unconsciously, to “pump and dump”—to do things that will make the company seem valuable. I found that when I was at Yahoo, I couldn’t help thinking, “how will this sound to investors?” when I should have been thinking “is this a good idea?”
So maybe the standard option deal needs to be tweaked slightly. Maybe options should be replaced with something tied more directly to earnings. It’s still early days.
8. Startups
What made the options valuable, for the most part, is that they were options on the stock of startups. Startups were not of course a creation of the Bubble, but they were more visible during the Bubble than ever before.
One thing most people did learn about for the first time during the Bubble was the startup created with the intention of selling it. Originally a startup meant a small company that hoped to grow into a big one. But increasingly startups are evolving into a vehicle for developing technology on spec.
As I wrote in Hackers & Painters, employees seem to be most productive when they’re paid in proportion to the wealth they generate. And the advantage of a startup—indeed, almost its raison d’etre—is that it offers something otherwise impossible to obtain: a way of measuring that.
In many businesses, it just makes more sense for companies to get technology by buying startups rather than developing it in house. You pay more, but there is less risk, and risk is what big companies don’t want. It makes the guys developing the technology more accountable, because they only get paid if they build the winner. And you end up with better technology, created faster, because things are made in the innovative atmosphere of startups instead of the bureaucratic atmosphere of big companies.
Our startup, Viaweb, was built to be sold. We were open with investors about that from the start. And we were careful to create something that could slot easily into a larger company. That is the pattern for the future.
9. California
The Bubble was a California phenomenon. When I showed up in Silicon Valley in 1998, I felt like an immigrant from Eastern Europe arriving in America in 1900. Everyone was so cheerful and healthy and rich. It seemed a new and improved world.
The press, ever eager to exaggerate small trends, now gives one the impression that Silicon Valley is a ghost town. Not at all. When I drive down 101 from the airport, I still feel a buzz of energy, as if there were a giant transformer nearby. Real estate is still more expensive than just about anywhere else in the country. The people still look healthy, and the weather is still fabulous. The future is there. (I say “there” because I moved back to the East Coast after Yahoo. I still wonder if this was a smart idea.)
What makes the Bay Area superior is the attitude of the people. I notice that when I come home to Boston. The first thing I see when I walk out of the airline terminal is the fat, grumpy guy in charge of the taxi line. I brace myself for rudeness: remember, you’re back on the East Coast now.
The atmosphere varies from city to city, and fragile organisms like startups are exceedingly sensitive to such variation. If it hadn’t already been hijacked as a new euphemism for liberal, the word to describe the atmosphere in the Bay Area would be “progressive.” People there are trying to build the future. Boston has MIT and Harvard, but it also has a lot of truculent, unionized employees like the police who recently held the Democratic National Convention for ransom, and a lot of people trying to be Thurston Howell. Two sides of an obsolete coin.
Silicon Valley may not be the next Paris or London, but it is at least the next Chicago. For the next fifty years, that’s where new wealth will come from.
10. Productivity
During the Bubble, optimistic analysts used to justify high price to earnings ratios by saying that technology was going to increase productivity dramatically. They were wrong about the specific companies, but not so wrong about the underlying principle. I think one of the big trends we’ll see in the coming century is a huge increase in productivity.
Or more precisely, a huge increase in variation in productivity. Technology is a lever. It doesn’t add; it multiplies. If the present range of productivity is 0 to 100, introducing a multiple of 10 increases the range from 0 to 1000.
One upshot of which is that the companies of the future may be surprisingly small. I sometimes daydream about how big you could grow a company (in revenues) without ever having more than ten people. What would happen if you outsourced everything except product development? If you tried this experiment, I think you’d be surprised at how far you could get. As Fred Brooks pointed out, small groups are intrinsically more productive, because the internal friction in a group grows as the square of its size.
Till quite recently, running a major company meant managing an army of workers. Our standards about how many employees a company should have are still influenced by old patterns. Startups are perforce small, because they can’t afford to hire a lot of people. But I think it’s a big mistake for companies to loosen their belts as revenues increase. The question is not whether you can afford the extra salaries. Can you afford the loss in productivity that comes from making the company bigger?
The prospect of technological leverage will of course raise the specter of unemployment. I’m surprised people still worry about this. After centuries of supposedly job-killing innovations, the number of jobs is within ten percent of the number of people who want them. This can’t be a coincidence. There must be some kind of balancing mechanism.
What’s New
When one looks over these trends, is there any overall theme? There does seem to be: that in the coming century, good ideas will count for more. That 26 year olds with good ideas will increasingly have an edge over 50 year olds with powerful connections. That doing good work will matter more than dressing up—or advertising, which is the same thing for companies. That people will be rewarded a bit more in proportion to the value of what they create.
If so, this is good news indeed. Good ideas always tend to win eventually. The problem is, it can take a very long time. It took decades for relativity to be accepted, and the greater part of a century to establish that central planning didn’t work. So even a small increase in the rate at which good ideas win would be a momentous change—big enough, probably, to justify a name like the “new economy.”
Notes
[1] Actually it’s hard to say now. As Jeremy Siegel points out, if the value of a stock is its future earnings, you can’t tell if it was overvalued till you see what the earnings turn out to be. While certain famous Internet stocks were almost certainly overvalued in 1999, it is still hard to say for sure whether, e.g., the Nasdaq index was.
Siegel, Jeremy J. “What Is an Asset Price Bubble? An Operational Definition.” European Financial Management, 9:1, 2003.
[2] The number of users comes from a 6/03 Nielsen study quoted on Google’s site. (You’d think they’d have something more recent.) The revenue estimate is based on revenues of $1.35 billion for the first half of 2004, as reported in their IPO filing.
Thanks to Chris Anderson, Trevor Blackwell, Sarah Harlin, Jessica Livingston, and Robert Morris for reading drafts of this.
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